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NOTICES

It has been arranged that the Annual Dinner of the Society will be held this year on Wednesday, July 15, 1953, at Claridge's Hotel, London, W.1. Further particulars will be sent out in due course to all members in Great Britain, and those coming home on leave from abroad are asked to get in touch with the office if they are thinking of attending.

THE Council acknowledges with gratitude the following accessions to the Library.

Presented by Mr. H. A. N. Barlow :

The Ao Naga Tribe, by W. C. Smith.

The Lhota Nagas, by J. P. Mills.

The Naga Tribes, by T. C. Hodson.

The Rengma Nagas, by J. P. Mills.

Arabic Grammar, by E. Elder.

Eastern Turki Grammar and Vocabulary, by G. Raquette.

Presented by Sir Charles Belgrave :

Annual Report of the Government of Bahrein for A.H. 1370.

Presented by Dr. Bayard Dodge.

The National Geographic Magazine for 1952-3.

Challenge and Response in the Middle East, by H. V. Cooke.

Also the following pamphlets :

The Ross Institute, *Malaria and its Control for Planters and Miners.*

Aryana: Ancient Afghanistan, Rahman Pazhwak.

Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Amsterdam: A description of Musical Instruments and some hitherto unknown objects of New Guinea, by Dr. P. Wirz.

South-east Asia—An annotated bibliography of the Library of Congress.

Members and contributors alone are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

The Honorary Secretaries would be grateful for news of the addresses of the following members of the Society: Mr. J. Fraser, Professor J. Heyworth-Dunne, Mr. P. W. Ireland and Captain R. A. Livesey-Haworth, and would remind members abroad that it is a great help if they will notify the office of all changes of address.

IN MEMORIAM:

ADMIRAL SIR HOWARD KELLY, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.

BY the death of Admiral Sir Howard Kelly the Royal Central Asian Society has suffered a grievous loss, and he has left a vacancy which it will not be easy to fill. His work for the Society, his genuine interest in its objects, and the thoroughness with which he tackled what had to be done, are well known to all its members, more particularly to those who shared his labours in the secretariat, and on the Council of which he had been Chairman for nearly three years.

Howard Kelly came of a distinguished Service family, and of four brothers one became an Admiral of the Fleet, one a general, and the youngest and fourth, a Sapper, died gallantly while repairing a bridge under fire in 1915. His two sisters survive him, and they have been for many years the mainstay of all Service benevolent work in Portsmouth.

Howard himself had a long and distinguished naval career.

In the early days of the 1914-18 war he commanded the light cruiser *Gloucester*, in which ship he shadowed the German battle-cruiser *Goeben* and light cruiser *Breslau* after their escape from Messina. For over twenty-four hours he held on to this powerful force; it was no fault of his that they were not brought to action.

In the official account of this episode occurs these words: "he showed a combination of audacity with restraint"—which aptly describes his general character, for those who knew him were well aware that he did not come to a decision lightly, or act rashly, but when he had decided on his course of action he saw it through to the end.

On this occasion his audacity was his salvation, the enemy deducing from his bold behaviour that he had support close at hand.

As a matter of fact, the only support he could have got was from the *Gloucester's* sister ship, the *Dublin*, which with two destroyers in company was on passage from Malta to join the fleet. Having intercepted the *Gloucester's* reports, she altered course in an endeavour to head off the *Goeben* and to attack her with torpedoes under cover of darkness. The *Dublin* was commanded by Howard's elder brother, John D. Kelly, and for some time the two brothers were in communication. However, the attack did not come off—a pity, for had the two brothers managed to delay the *Goeben* and brought about her destruction, what a family triumph it would have been, and surely a unique event!

Apart from his naval career Howard Kelly had other interests of a cosmopolitan character. He liked foreigners, and they liked and trusted him. As a young officer he qualified as a French interpreter and then in 1908 he joined the French section of the Naval Intelligence Division. This led in after years to his being appointed as naval liaison officer in Paris in the stirring year of 1917.

Such an appointment during a war did not suit his character, and his next move again brought him into contact with foreign navies, for he was

put in command of what was known as the Otranto barrage, where he had French and Italian ships under his orders.

After the war he headed a naval mission to Greece, and for two years held the rank of vice-admiral in the Royal Hellenic Navy.

At the expiration of that time he was for two years British naval representative on the League of Nations. Then followed sea-going appointments, the command of a cruiser squadron, and subsequently that of second in command of the Mediterranean Fleet, where his linguistic ability and diplomatic experience stood him in good stead.

In 1930 Howard Kelly came into his own. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief in China, where he served for two years under exceptionally difficult conditions. It was in 1931 that the Japanese marched into Manchuria, thus beginning that long-drawn-out struggle which terminated only with the Allied victory in 1945. During the early stages of that war the Japanese and Chinese forces engaged in fighting in and about the then International treaty port of Shanghai, thus exposing to grave risks the large British, American and European population, and causing great harm to the vast mercantile interests which had been built up there.

A considerable international squadron assembled off the port, and of this Howard was the senior officer.

By his resolute bearing, his precise threats as to what he would do if the belligerents in any way endangered what he was there to protect, he compelled the warring orientals to promise to respect the neutrality of the port, and then, having won the respect and liking of the rival leaders, he set about bringing them together to draw up an agreement ensuring a cessation of fighting in the area.

As one who had every opportunity of knowing wrote in an obituary notice: "Night after night he visited in secret the leaders of first one side and then the other, and in the end brought about a combined meeting aboard his flagship at which terms for a local armistice were agreed upon." This agreement between two bitterly opposed enemies was not only an invaluable service to a great international trading community, but a proof of his diplomatic ability and of the regard and confidence in which he was held.

On his return to England after two momentous years, and with no prospect of further naval service, Howard Kelly looked round for some further outlet for his unflagging energy, and found it in part in the Royal Central Asian Society, which he joined in 1936, becoming a member of the Council in the following year.

But great events were impending, and a man of his calibre could not long remain unemployed. He was recalled to the Navy in 1940 and sent to Ankara as personal representative of the Admiral, Sir Andrew Cunningham, British naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean. He stayed there for four years, and in those times, when relations with Turkey in her difficult position were very delicate, his tact and diplomatic acumen were of great value.

He became a well-known figure in Ankara, and a personal friend of the political recluse Field-Marshal Fedzi Chakmak, who rarely saw any foreigners but was the power behind the throne.

On his return to England in 1944 he was again placed upon the retired list, being then six years past the normal retiring age for an Admiral.

He was at once re-elected to the Council of the Society and in 1950 became its Chairman. He died during his third year of office, having proved himself, in the words of one of the oldest members of the Society, "a very able chairman."

His death ends a long and useful life during which both within his Service and in wider circles he had made a host of friends.

He will be greatly missed.

CORK AND ORRERY.

THE THIRD DANISH EXPEDITION TO CENTRAL ASIA 1948-53

THE WORK OF THE SECOND TEAM ON THE TIBET BORDER

BY H.R.H. PRINCE PETER OF GREECE AND DENMARK,
LL.D., G.C.R., R.E., C.B.(Mil.)

Notes from a lecture illustrated by a film at a meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on October 14, 1952, Sir Horace Seymour, G.C.M.G., C.V.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: I feel it quite unnecessary in this audience to introduce our lecturer, H.R.H. Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark. At least some of you will have heard him address the Society before today, and you will have read an article by him which has just appeared in our Journal. His talk today will be on Tibet, a country of which we have heard a good deal of late and are likely to hear more. We all look forward very much to what his Royal Highness has to say.

I must mention the pleasure it gives me personally to meet his Royal Highness under these conditions, as on several previous occasions it was under a less peaceful state of affairs. We first met in Persia, and then at Chungking during the war, and again when we were both in London, during an air raid. I hope, however, that today's meeting will be of a more peaceful character.

YOUR EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—I have particular pleasure in addressing a meeting presided over by Sir Horace Seymour, because, as Sir Horace has said, we have met before under very different conditions. I would like to express my thanks to Sir Horace and Lady Seymour for the generous hospitality they showed me whenever I was their guest—in Persia before the war, where I especially remember a most amusing ski-ing party in the Elburz mountains; and in Chungking at the time of the war in China.

I am also very pleased to speak to the Royal Central Asian Society, and this is the only meeting at which I shall be showing in London the film that was taken on the expedition. As I am mostly out in Asia, though not as much in Central Asia as I should like, it is good to come here to meet members, even though there is a gap of some five years between each visit.

And now I am going to talk of the expedition, and I feel I should begin by saying that the notice which was sent out appeared a little misleading, because the "Expedition to the Tibet Border" mentioned there was only part of a triple expedition. Also, while in the end it proved to be an expedition to the Tibetan border, that was not our original intention: we meant it to be an expedition to Tibet. And it was only this team to Tibet that I led. It was Henning Haslund-Christensen who was the leader of the whole expedition. The expedition was arranged by the Danes after the war, since when the Danes have, perhaps, led the field in exploration, for they have sent no less than twelve or thirteen expeditions out all over the world. That is an enormous cultural effort and a great credit to the Danish cultural bodies.

In 1945 the late Henning Haslund-Christensen was organizing what

he called "The Third Danish Expedition to Central Asia." Prior to the war he had already organized a First and a Second Danish Expedition to Central Asia, to Western Manchuria and to Eastern Mongolia respectively. His intention in 1945 was to organize the Third Expedition to cover the areas between those to which he had taken his First and Second Expeditions and the better-known regions in the west, of Turkestan and Persia. He organized an expedition in which three teams were to go out into the field, and each to work for two years in their different areas.

The first team was to go into Afghanistan and Kashmir and Ladakh, in the east of Kashmir. That expedition was made up of a team of scientists, anthropologists, geologists, geographers, botanists and others. Their object was to explore especially the Hindu Kush range, while Henning Haslund himself was to study the tribes of Mongol stock which live up in those mountains. Unfortunately, in the first year that he personally led that first team he died from heart failure, having been at too high an altitude in the Hindu Kush. He was already ill before he started on the journey, and he could not stand the altitude. But the members of his first team carried on with their work, and managed to produce all the results they were asked to obtain.

The second team was to go to Sikkim, and to work itself across Tibet, on up to (Lake) Koko Nor, and beyond the Great Wall of China on to the edge of the desert to a town called Wang-Yeh Fu. Henning Haslund himself was to come from Peking and get himself to Wang-Yeh Fu. He did not want to go over Tibet because he felt that he could not stand the altitude, so he asked me to lead the second team across Tibet. Actually, therefore, I was to lead the second team of the expedition, not the whole; and it was only the second team that was to work in Tibet.

The third team was to go out from Denmark to Srinagar, to work itself across the Kuen Lun mountains in northern Tibet, and to meet the second team as the latter returned over the Mongolian lakes, Etsin Göl, where we planned to work on some archæological remains. None of this happened. First, because Henning Haslund died, and the board of the Expedition in Copenhagen had therefore to appoint a new leader. Dr. Karl Grebs, who had been earlier in Mongolia, where he had spent many years, was appointed. He came out to India, but by that time the political situation made it out of the question to reach the Kuen Lun Shan or Tsinghai and the Mongolian lakes.

After I had done some preliminary work in South India during 1949, I went up to Kalimpong, a small town on the borders of Sikkim, to meet the remnants of the first team who were to help us at work in Tibet. When we arrived, we asked to proceed to Gyangtse in Tibet. The Chinese were already threatening Tibet with military occupation, so it seemed it would be difficult for the team to cross the whole of Tibet, and that it would be wiser only to go over the border to the end of the trade route. We were confident that we should obtain permission to do this because the trade route is covered by the 1908 Trade Regulations agreed to by Britain and Tibet, which allows the Political Officer in Sikkim to issue passes to those wanting to go as far as Gyangtse. In order to go from Gyangtse to Lhasa, it is necessary to obtain permission from the Tibetan

Government, but to go to Gyantse it is only necessary to obtain permission from the Political Officer in Sikkim.

On arrival at Kalimpong, I applied to the officer for permission to go as far as Gyantse, but he seemed dubious; he said that since 1947 the Indian authorities felt they could not be sure of the Trade Regulations of 1908; a new situation had been created, and they were not prepared to allow people to go to Gyantse on their sole permission. I should apply to the Tibetans, he said. I had previously consulted the Tibetans. In New York in 1948 I had met Tsipön Shakabpa, the official (a financial Secretary in Tibet), who was leader of the Trade Delegation to the United States, and I met him again in Kalimpong. He told me that Tibet stood by the Agreement of 1908,* and that if we wanted to go to Gyantse, we had to ask the Political Officer in Sikkim. As you will realize, they were each throwing the responsibility on to the other. Nobody seemed able to give an answer. However, when pressed the Political Officer said he would try to approach the Tibetans and obtain permission from them. But in spite of repeated reminders it was impossible to get an answer from him and we had to remain at Kalimpong. We afterwards learned that the representative of India in Lhasa had opposed our visit, on what grounds I do not exactly know, as I was never told.

Because of this we had to change our plans, and Dr. Krebs went off to the Western Himalayas. I remained at Kalimpong, to do as much there as I could. Altogether we were not unsuccessful. Very many Tibetans came down to Kalimpong as usual on their winter visit. The Darjeeling area can be looked upon as kind of Riviera for Tibet to which many Tibetans come in winter to get away from the cold of the plateau. Many wealthy Tibetans have large houses there, and statistics have shown that about 15,000 Tibetans move into the area each year. They are not, of course, all wealthy Tibetans: petty traders come, as well as many beggars, and also pilgrims on their way to the holy Buddhist shrines and temples in India. For this reason I found Kalimpong a very good centre to work in: in fact, I did quite an amount of work for the Danish National Museum while I was there. I was assisted by Inspector H. Siiger of the National Museum in Copenhagen, but he left during the winter after spending four months at Kalimpong. I was able to measure anthropologically over 2,000 Tibetans, thanks to the help of the Indian police, who allowed me to measure the people in the Frontier Police Headquarters when they came there to register. I was also able to collect a number of Tibetan dresses. The costumes were sold to me because the people realized they would not want them any longer; as one wealthy Tibetan said to me: "Probably in future we shall all be wearing khaki, so we might as well make money on our dresses while we can."

The Dalai Lama left Lhasa in the summer of 1950 and came down to the Chumbi valley on the frontier of India. He had his headquarters at Yatung. I again tried to get permission to go to Tibet, at least as far as

* According to Sir Charles Bell's *Tibet Past and Present*, the Trade Regulations of 1908 were only a pendant—and an inadequate one at that—to the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet in 1904 which was confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China in 1906.

Yatung. I even got King Paul of the Hellenes, my cousin, to send me a letter of greeting to the Dalai Lama, in the hope that I might be allowed to present it to him myself. But that seemed to scare the Tibetans even more than if I had asked to visit the Dalai Lama without producing the letter. One of the Joint Foreign Secretaries who was visiting Kalimpong told me, "We know that President Truman has a programme of aid to Turkey and Greece, and therefore it would get us into trouble with the Chinese if we allowed you to see His Holiness." Which remark shows again how, in spite of the isolation of Tibet, the leading men there are very much aware of world problems.

In the film you will shortly see you will be shown pictures taken in and around Kalimpong, also some taken during a visit I was lucky enough to make to Nepal. In November, 1951, I was invited by a Buddhist association to go to Nepal with the cortège taking the relics of the Buddha's two disciples, Sariputra and Mahamogalana, which, as you probably know, were given back to the Indian Government by the British Government as a gesture of friendship and peace in 1947. The relics had been for a time in the British Museum, after having been discovered by Sir George Cunningham in the third of the stupas at Sanchi in Bhopal State. They are now in the keeping of the Mahabodhi Society, whose headquarters are at Calcutta, and that organization has been taking the relics round all the Buddhist countries in and neighbouring on India: Nepal, Ladak, Sikkim, Tibet and Burma and the Chittagong Hill tracts of Pakistan. Visiting Nepal in this way provided a good opportunity to see the country at its best.

I shall also show some views taken on the Bhutanese border. Today Bhutan is more firmly closed to foreigners than ever. When I was at Kalimpong, a young American student asked recently if he might go to Bhutan, and he was simply told "No." He was very surprised at this abrupt reply, and enquired why they said "No" in that way to an ordinary student. The Bhutanese replied, "You may be only an ordinary American student, but to the Chinese you will be an American spy, so we cannot let you enter." I give these examples so that you may realize how difficult at times it is to work in those regions, because of the political tension. The Chinese are all along the Indian border, from Assam to Kashmir. So far their occupation of Tibet is a purely military one. Except for reinstating the Panchen Lama at Shigatse, there is no meddling with internal affairs. But, of course, it makes everyone on the border feel jittery, and, as usual, scientists are suspected of having deeper motives for being in those regions than is in fact the case.

There followed a beautifully coloured film, accompanied by sound recordings of certain religious rites, taken in part at Kalimpong followed by a section taken for purposes of comparison of religious ceremonies among the polyandrous Todas in the Nilgiri hills, and of the processions of the relics at Kathmandu and elsewhere in Nepal.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

ISRAEL IN 1952: TRIAL AND FAITH

By PROFESSOR NORMAN BENTWICH, O.B.E., M.C., LL.D.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on October 8, 1952, Sir Hugh Dow, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my pleasant task to introduce to you Professor Bentwich. It is not the first time that he has lectured in this hall and he is already known to many of you, at any rate by repute. He has had long service under the British Government. He was educated at Cambridge University and called to the Bar. He served in the Ministry of Justice, Cairo, in 1912-15; he was Attorney-General in the British Mandatory Government of Palestine for eleven years, 1920-31. He lectured at The Hague on International Law in 1929 and in 1934, and served as Director of the High Commission for Refugees from Germany from 1933 to 1935.

He is a Vice-President of the Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad; since 1948 he has been chairman of the United Restitution Office, and he was until recently Professor of International Relations of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

I do not know whether I should describe Professor Bentwich as a resident of this country who spends much of his time in Israel, or a resident of Israel who spends much time in England. At any rate, his knowledge of his subject not only goes back a very considerable time, but it is also recent, because he still spends a great part of his time in Israel and was, in fact, there earlier this year.

I do not know whether Professor Bentwich will be touching in the course of his lecture on controversial subjects, but, as many of us have contacts with the Arab countries, I should like to say of Professor Bentwich: that he is one who, to my knowledge, has given practical demonstration in Jerusalem of his sympathy with the troubles which have come upon the Arabs during these recent years. One of the saddest things I found in my recent three years in Jerusalem was the way in which war seemed to deaden the feelings of many people except for their own side. War is a terrible thing and it brings a great deal of undeserved suffering on many people. We cannot but be full of sympathy for the tremendous sufferings which the Jewish race has undergone in recent years. One had perhaps hoped that as a result of their own sufferings there would be a determination that other people should not suffer in the same way. I imagined that that feeling would be more general than I found it, but, at any rate, Professor Bentwich is one who, I know, feels very deeply for the troubles which have come to the Arab nation of recent years and, as I say, he has given, to my knowledge, very practical demonstration of his sympathy with that nation.

LET me first say a word or two in regard to the chairman's remarks: I describe myself as amphibious. I live part of every year in Palestine and part in England. Sadly, I am so old that I have just had to retire from the Chair of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, so that I have no longer any office there. However, I was there early this year, and hope to be there again in the winter.

One cannot talk about Palestine or Israel without being a little controversial. But I am not going to say much about the Arab refugees. I am going to describe life in Israel and the problems of Israel at the present day. Before doing so may I echo in all sincerity what the chairman said with regard to Arab refugees. I do feel there is a responsibility on the Jewish people, not only in Israel but in the world, to help the refugees; and I think that the prospects of resettlement of the mass of the Arab refugees—they have been living for four or five years in miserable

conditions—in the Arab countries are much more favourable and hopeful than they were a year or two ago.

Now I must come to my subject: "Israel in 1952." This is the fifth year of the State of Israel, and I added to the title "Trial and Faith" because this year has been a particularly difficult time. The first year of the State, 1948-9, was marked by the military struggle between Israel and the Arab States. The second year was marked by the political struggle, when Israel was able to come to armistice agreements with the Arab States and was admitted as a member of the United Nations, and therefore could take her place as a people at last in the comity of nations. The third year, 1950-51, was marked by the economic struggle; so was the fourth and so, I think, certainly will be the fifth year. The economic problems of Israel are very great, will continue to be great, and there is no quick or miraculous solution for them. The economic struggle is, I suppose, foremost in the thoughts of people in Israel and of the Jewish people about Israel. At the same time, what stands out in the life of Israel this year, as in all the years of the State, is an abounding faith, what the people in Israel sometimes call "Vitamin F." The leaders and the people think that this is their finest hour, and that they are going to create in their little country something that is good.

The most remarkable achievement in the history of these four years has been the Ingathering, as we call it, of the Jewish people into this little country. That has been a great act of faith. The first law which the Parliament of Israel passed was a law opening the country to every Jew who wanted to enter. Whatever might be his position, whether he had means or not, whether he was sick or crippled, the country was to be open to him. In this period of little more than four years three-quarters of a million Jews from all parts of the world have been brought into Israel. In the part of Palestine which became the State of Israel the total Jewish population when the State was created was under 700,000; that was in May, 1948, so that the Jewish population has been more than doubled in the four years by immigrants from all countries.

There have been two main waves of immigration. The first wave in the first two years of Israel was primarily European, the Jewish survivors from the concentration camps of the Nazis in Germany, Austria, Central Europe and Italy. In the last two years the wave has been of Jews coming from oriental countries. The first mass migration was from the Yemen in South-western Arabia, where a Jewish community had been settled more than 2,500 years. Then at the beginning of 1950 came the mass immigration of Jews from Iraq, particularly from Baghdad, which brought over 100,000 to Israel. There have been smaller numbers, but yet large migrations, from other Arab States, from Turkey, and so on. That will bring about a great change in the character of the Jewish population of Israel.

It certainly is a great act of faith on the part of the State to bring these masses into the country, because Jews from oriental countries are, compared with Jews from Europe, backward, not developed intellectually, and a large number are unproductive. Few of those coming from Iraq were cultivators of the soil; they are mostly petty shopkeepers, pedlars and

hucksters. It is a strain on the economic life to settle these people, to house them and find work for them. That strain is still immense, and the standard of life has inevitably been reduced. Life in Israel today has an austerity and hardship as great as in any country in the world, and the people, with open eyes, are prepared for that in order to carry out the ideal of bringing in all Jews who want to enter Israel.

It became impossible to keep up the immigration at an average of 170,000 a year; and this year the immigration looks like being not much more than one-tenth of that figure—that is, 20,000, a return to the figures of immigration as they were in the time of the British Mandate. That is partly because even Israel could not keep up the strain, and partly because recently no Jewish community, either in Europe or in the East, has been in immediate danger or peril and, therefore, needing a mass movement.

But the economic strain goes on because it takes some time before the immigrants can become productive. A great number have to be trained or re-trained. On arrival they go into what are called transit villages of tents and rough tin and aluminium houses, which are springing up all over the country. There they are engaged in public works—road-making, drainage, pipe-laying, and particularly tree-planting. An extraordinary amount of reclamation work of this nature has been done during the past four years, but it will be many more years before the immigrants become adequately productive.

So far the greatest increase in production has been in industry rather than in agriculture. The Jews have been primarily an urban people in the world. In Palestine under the Mandate the bulk of the Jewish population lived in towns, while the greatest part of the Arab population lived in the villages. The extension of the towns and of industry has been the most striking development during the past four years. A number of large industries has been started and industrial production is rapidly rising. Amongst others, a motor-vehicle factory, started by a big American enterprise, the Kaiser-Fraser plant at Haifa Bay, is producing cars and trucks for export on a large scale. Also there are textile factories and factories producing chemicals. What lags behind, and where the State is making its great effort to catch up, is agricultural production. The progress is not enough to match the vast immigration, and the Arabs who possessed most of the land and were the main cultivators with all the tradition of agriculture have gone. But the number of Jewish agricultural settlements has been trebled, and the irrigated area has been very much increased. In the last two years a spectacular change has been made in the development of the Negeb, which extends over more than half the little State of Israel, covering the whole of the southern area, and goes down to the Gulf of Akaba by the Red Sea. The Negeb has been an arid area throughout history, but every effort of scientific agriculture is being made to render it productive. The northern part was this year turned into a large grain-growing country. It had a bumper harvest last winter following very good rains, and half the grain produced in Israel has come from the Negeb. When, as it is hoped to do in the next years, the big irrigation schemes have been carried out, bringing the waters of the

Jordan and its tributaries to the northern part of the Negeb, the agricultural production should leap up.

The most spectacular development in the Negeb itself has been in the little port that Israel is building at the north end of the Gulf of Akaba. The port called Elath is on the west side of that Gulf, immediately opposite the Jordan port of Akaba, which is on the east side of the Gulf. Close by it the archæologists have found the ruins of King Solomon's port, which was known as Ezion Geber, "the spine of the giant." At what was previously a spot in the sand there is a little harbour, an airfield, a municipality, a botanical garden and an open-air theatre for music. Some experimental farms, worked by the Army and the Youth, have been started, to see what can be produced from the soil by the Gulf of Akaba.

Israel has been contending with grave currency difficulties during these last years, difficulties which arise from the serious adverse balance of trade, and which have produced a crisis in the foreign exchange. Palestine under the Mandate always had a heavy adverse balance of trade because, even with the modest immigration that was permitted, much more was imported than exported; it was necessary to bring in capital goods—food and raw materials—for the immigrants. In these four years of the State the adverse trade balance has been extraordinarily aggravated. Roughly, imports are, on the yearly average, £100 million, while exports average not more than £15 million. The huge gap between imports and exports has to be covered by contributions from the Jews outside Israel, by loans from governments and banks, and by private investment. These loans and contributions flow in from the Jewish communities of the world, most of all from America. They are supplemented by loans from the Import and Export Bank, and grants-in-aid to Israel from the United States Government for two purposes: the settlement of the immigrants and defence. Israel had important help in the first years from the use of the sterling balances which the Jews of Palestine had in England. Those amounted to between £20 million and £30 million pounds, and the British Government released the balances to enable Israel to get goods in this country.

An immediate crisis arose a few months ago in Israel because those sterling balances were exhausted, and Israel had depended on them for purchasing petrol, which is vital for the purpose of irrigation and other aspects of the economic life. She had no more credit in England with which to buy oil; and she had always bought it from the Shell Company. She could not get a loan from the British Government because conditions were too difficult. In the last few months she has been rescued by what might be regarded as an economic miracle—that is, the agreement with the Federal German Government in regard to reparations. Herr Adenauer about a year ago declared in the Bundesrat that he felt the Germans should make reparation to the State of Israel as a people; and, since February, 1952, negotiations were carried on at The Hague. The agreement was finally signed a month or two ago, under which Israel will receive in the course of the next ten or twelve years as reparation between \$700 million and \$800 million—somewhere near \$100 million a year. That sum is

not to be paid in money but in kind, in capital goods and raw materials for Israel's industry. One important factor which operates at once is that Germany is making available to Israel her credits in Europe, so that Israel can pay for the petrol which she will be able to buy again from England. The agreement with Germany will be an important factor in Israel's economy during the next years and will help her to carry out resettlement and turn to productive capacity her immigrant population.

The Government this year has reformed also its own finance. Previously it had three Budgets; (1) the ordinary, met entirely by taxation in the country and covering all the normal expenditure; (2) a defence Budget for the military forces, the Air Force, etc., which was secret and met partly by the contribution of Israel and partly by loans; (3) a development Budget for the settlement of immigrants, met almost entirely by contributions from the Jewish communities, by loans and a bond issue floated in the United States. Now the second Budget for defence has been cut out. Defence is included in the ordinary Budget, and Israel meets the whole cost, roughly one-quarter of the Budget, from taxation. The development Budget goes on as before.

I turn to the political position. In January, 1949, in the first year of the State, Israel started to set up a democratic government with a single chamber elected by adult suffrage. They have had this Parliament (Knesseth, it is called) as the sovereign body ever since. They have had also all the time a Coalition Government. There are many parties in Israel, far more than in Great Britain. With Israel's population still about $1\frac{1}{2}$ million, there are nearly twenty, and probably twelve of those would count, so that no single party can get a majority over the rest.

From the beginning, the main part of the Coalition has been the Central Labour Party, known as Mapai. To that party belong the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Gurion; the Foreign Minister, Mr. Sharett; the late Finance Minister who died this year, Mr. Kaplan, and his successor, Mr. Eshkol; the Minister of Labour, a woman, Mrs. Golda Myerson. The other principal factor in the Coalition is the religious bloc, which is composed of four different religious sections. Difficulties from time to time have arisen between the Labour Party, which is the strongest in the House, and the religious bloc. They led to fresh elections in the summer of 1951; and in those elections the result was much the same, except that the Middle-Class party, the General Zionists, gained at the expense of the extreme Left-wing Labour party, which is in opposition, known as Mapam, and the extreme Right-wing party, Herut. The Coalition was reformed, mainly of Labour, with the religious group. Still more recently there has been another rift between them on the question of conscription of women for National Service. At the moment the crisis has not been resolved. It is expected that Ben Gurion will try to bring into the Coalition the General Zionists, the Middle-Class party, but that has not yet been done. It is interesting that the balance in the House is held by the Arab members, of whom there are eight of the 120 members of the Knesseth. Five of the eight Arab members usually vote with the Government; they belong, as it were, to Arab Labour parties. Two are Communists; in the Communist party there are altogether five members, three

Jews and two Arabs. One Arab is a member of the Left-wing opposition Labour party.

I can go only briefly into the position of the Arabs in Israel. Their number is roughly 180,000, in the total population of 1,600,000. They are mostly cultivators and live mostly in the north. In Galilee one can drive through what seems to be still an entirely Arab area, cultivated by Arabs. They enjoy in principle equal political and civil rights, but in practice one has to recognize some discrimination. This year great opposition was voiced in the Assembly by the Opposition parties, and by some of the Mapai, to the terms of the Israel nationality law, which imposed a certain discrimination against Arabs as regards acquiring automatically Israel nationality. In many cases they can be naturalized only with the consent of the Minister of the Interior. The ground given for it was public security, the fear that some Arabs might be agents of the Arab States with which Israel has still not come to terms of peace. The Ihud (Unity) group, not represented by a member of the House, formed in the Mandate time by the late Dr. Magnes, who believed in a bi-national Palestine, maintains a constant struggle for securing equal rights for the Arabs, and runs a Hebrew paper devoted to that cause.

Turning from political to social conditions, an outstanding feature in Israel is the great power and influence of the Federation of Labour, the *Histadrut*. It was in the time of the Mandate a powerful economic and political force; today it is by far the strongest economic force, and it embraces more than half the adult population of Palestine. Nearly all the workers by hand or head are members, and it federates together all the trade unions, the co-operative societies, and the collective agricultural groups. It is striking that, although politically there is today a feud between the Central Labour Party, Mapai, and the Left-wing Labour Party, Mapam, yet within the Labour Federation they work together for economic and social purposes. It is only politically that they are estranged. The chief contracting organization in the country carrying out the big public works is a part of this Federation. The chief marketing bodies are in the Federation; also the chief bodies for the distribution and sale of agricultural produce. The *Histadrut* occupies a powerful position because the individuals composing it are organized in terms of their economic interest. Israel has not yet been able to work out its own traditions or to develop new social institutions of its own; hence the economic organization is powerful. Economic interest binds the people together more completely than the religious observance, which used to be the main bond of the Jewish people. Today, while the religious groups and parties are still powerful, a great number of the people are not held together by the religious life.

Lastly, I turn to cultural development in Israel, which, perhaps because I have been more concerned with it, seems to me the greatest and most important achievement of all. In four years the State of Israel has been able to create a feeling of a national culture, and to create for the whole people a national language, or a revival of Hebrew as the language. When you remember that less than a quarter of the Jewish population of Israel was born in that country, and that more than half of that popula-

tion have come within the last four years, bringing a babel of tongues—every conceivable language—you will realize that to have made Hebrew, as it is, the language of the country and the language which the mass of the population know and talk, and to have built up a sense of national culture, is a striking achievement.

The main instrument in this regard has, naturally, been the children's school. The second important legislative act was the law passed by the Government for free compulsory elementary education. Today about 350,000 children are attending the schools of the State; and that law embraces, of course, the Arab children as well as the Jewish children. Of these, the greater part, 50,000 children, have been brought into the system, a much large proportion than ever before. The Arab children are taught Arabic as their main language, but they learn a little Hebrew. In the Jewish schools the language is Hebrew; and it is through the schools that this welding together of the people takes place.

Next to the school another great educational instrument, deliberately educational, is the army. There is National Service for young men and women. This year the term of service was raised from two to two-and-a-half years. One full year for all is spent in work on the land and the women often spend the whole of their service on the land. The army has been designed by the Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, to be an educational instrument for adults to give them not only knowledge of the language but understanding of the country, its history, literature and culture. Educational work in the army is a most important part of the training.

Another interesting and original development which Israel has carried through during these years is the residential college for the intelligentsia of the immigrants, who have been lawyers, teachers, doctors or in the civil service abroad, and who want to fit themselves for that kind of life in Israel. These go at once into a residential college either in a town or in the country; they spend six or nine months in the college learning intensively the language and geography and history of the land, and by the end of the time they get over their shyness about the use of the language, and can carry on their profession in Hebrew. Some tens of thousands have passed through these colleges.

The crown of the educational effort and cultural system is the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, with which I have been associated for all of its twenty-seven years. It has been since 1948 a University in exile, deprived of its home on Mount Scopus, which is in Jewish possession and looked after by Jewish police; but the only approach is through the Arab area, so that it is not available for University purposes. There was provision in the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan that Scopus with the university and the hospital should be restored to its cultural uses, but so far there has not been agreement as to that. The university, meanwhile, is carried on in a dozen places, in improvised buildings in various parts of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, in spite of physical, financial and other difficulties, the university has grown rapidly since it was reopened—and it could not reopen until 1949. The number of students has been trebled. From eight to nine hundred, it has risen to 2,500 in the last academic year, and in the academic year starting this month the number will prob-

ably be over 3,000. The original faculties were the humanities and science; now three new faculties are added: medicine, law and agriculture. The students at the university have no common room in which they can meet socially; they hold their meetings literally on the staircases of the buildings in which they are studying. But in spite of all this the students have faith that they are taking part in a great enterprise, and they are keen to learn and to fit themselves for work in the State.

I have exhausted my time, and I can say only a few words on the subject of the arts. You feel in Israel a great keenness and eagerness and love of the arts, principally music, which plays a part in the life of the whole people. The Symphony Orchestra attracts the big musicians of the world. There is also development of the other arts—painting and sculpture and architecture; and archæology is a popular activity and interest.

I end where I began. I think the supreme quality of Israel in these five years has been the quality of its faith in the building of a good society. Of course there are some who murmur. Who would not in the terribly difficult circumstances in which they live? However, the main feeling among the leaders and people is that they are engaged in an effort out of which is going to be created a better life. The supreme need is for peace between Israel and the Arab States. Hopes are entertained today which I trust are well founded, that out of the new conditions in neighbouring Arab States, and out of the military revolt in Egypt, Syria, and the Lebanon, will come an atmosphere more favourable to understanding and co-operation with Israel than the old feudal order. The people live according to the maxim of the Bible verse: "Dwell in the land and cherish [—and feed on—] Faithfulness" (Psa. 37. 3).

MR. BIGGS DAVISON: To what extent is this faith in the Jewish State based on religion. In the elementary schools where there is compulsory education, is religion taught to the children?

PROFESSOR BENTWICH: There are four so-called trends in the schools: two are religious, and in their schools religion plays a very important part in the education; two are non-religious. Although the Bible is a fundamental part of education in all schools, the children do not have lessons in religion and Jewish laws in schools of the two non-religious trends. Judaism is taking on a new aspect in Israel. The strict observance of the Jewish law, which used to be called "orthodox" Judaism, is followed today by only a minority of the people, perhaps by one-quarter, but the mass of the people believe in the fulfilment of the Messianic prophecy, and the Bible is a strong element in the education and general outlook of the people.

MR. NATHAN: I believe that some of the satellite Soviet States have now permitted emigration of Jews from those States into Israel. Does Professor Bentwich think that will have any important political repercussions in Israel?

PROFESSOR BENTWICH: I do not think so. One satellite State, Roumania, has permitted emigration throughout; and early on nearly the whole Jewish population emigrated from Bulgaria. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary there are still, I believe, considerable restrictions on emigration; but those who are Communists in the various countries do not, of

course, want to migrate. Those who migrate are principally not Communists. Soviet Russia at the beginning put no difficulties in the way of Jews going from Poland to Israel; she perhaps thought that they would strengthen the Communist forces in Israel. However, it has not worked out that way and recently there has not been much inclination on the part of the Soviets to allow emigration. Russia does not allow any of her own subjects to emigrate to Israel.

Colonel GREENSLADE: What is the present tendency for the development of agriculture in Palestine? As I knew it up to five years ago it was largely based on the agricultural settlements and Kibbutzim. My impression was that the settlements for agriculture were grouped into families and so on; but that the Kibbutzim seemed to be taking up clean-collar professions rather than getting on with the job of developing the land.

Professor BENTWICH: In the first two years the tendency was to increase these collective settlements, mainly by the Jews coming from Europe. In the last two years the movement has been away from the Kibbutzim and towards the establishment of co-operative settlements based on the individual family farm, although all the village work co-operatively. That is today the prevailing trend in agriculture. I do not think there is a movement of the young away from the agricultural settlements to the towns. Possibly some of the second and third generations may drift to Tel Aviv and other towns, but, broadly, the desire to get on the land is still strong in the nation's youth.

Miss KENNEDY: Would Professor Bentwich trace on the map the area of Israel?

Professor BENTWICH: The whole of the northern part of Galilee is Israel. There is the Sharon-Jerusalem corridor which runs from the plain below Jerusalem, and half Jerusalem is Jew and half Arab. The Negeb is in the south; it is the triangular piece of land which runs down to the Gulf of Akaba, some 8,000 square miles in area. Israel comprises rather more than three-quarters of what was Palestine west of the Jordan.

A MEMBER: Could Professor Bentwich say what is the position in regard to the teaching of English and other languages in the schools?

Professor BENTWICH: English is taught in the elementary schools, but in only the last two classes. The children commence to learn English at the age of 11. In the secondary schools it is left to each school to determine, and some have a good deal of English. University students in most faculties are required to know English, and if they do not know it before entering the university they learn it there. One of the urgent needs of the country is to obtain English books. Unfortunately, owing to currency restriction the Israel bookseller and newsvendor cannot pay for the books in sterling; and so the supply of books from England, as distinct from English books from the United States, is greatly restricted.

Sir JOHN PRATT: When the lecturer says "English books" I assume he means books written in America in the English language?

Professor BENTWICH: That is so.

Sir GILES SQUIRE: Is the introduction of Hebrew not rather a retrograde step, in that it brings in an extra language?

Professor BENTWICH: I do not think so. Hebrew has been one of the classical languages for centuries past. In the Renaissance in England it played an equal part with Latin and Greek. It has a great literature, and has always been the language of religion for all Jews. Moreover it is the only linguistic bond between Jews coming from all the different countries. Yiddish was the language of the Jews of Europe; Arabic their language in the oriental countries; a Spanish dialect in the Mediterranean countries. Hebrew is the one essential bond between the Jews coming from the various countries. Not only had it a great literature in the past, but it is so rapidly producing a literature today that it will, I think, enrich the world as well as the Jewish people.

Mr. A. WHITE: What is the proportion as between Moslem and Christian Arabs?

Professor BENTWICH: Two-thirds Moslem and one-third Christian. The proportion of Christian to Moslem Arabs in Israel is considerably greater than was the proportion of Christians under the Mandate in Palestine.

Mr. WHITE: What is the position of Christian missionaries in Israel?

Professor BENTWICH: I do not think many missionaries are going out, but certainly a number of them are working in Israel.

The CHAIRMAN: There are one or two points on which I would like to touch in regard to which I entirely agree with Professor Bentwich. One is the very remarkable achievement of getting a practically dead language, Hebrew, revived. One has during the last forty years or so seen several attempts to do the same. There has been a sort of revival in Ireland of Erse, and as a result of the first World War it was a remarkable experience when travelling through the countries of Europe, as I had occasion to do about 1920, to go to Hungary, for example, and find there, in a country where almost everyone knew French or German or English, and all the street names were up in French and German; that later they were all obliterated and one had to speak Magyar. I am not a Magyar scholar and I remember getting into trouble with a policeman for reasons which I could not understand. I found it was actually because I was walking on the wrong side of the road. I spoke to him in German, which he understood very well, but he answered me in Magyar. This happened on more than one occasion during the week I spent in Hungary. There was apparently a determination to make Magyar the only language of the country. We are familiar with that sort of thing in connection with the early struggles of any nation. In Israel there has been remarkable success in that regard. I think Professor Bentwich gave the correct reason, that although Hebrew was the spoken language of hardly any of the Jews who came into Israel it was the one possible link which bound them all together. If there had been an attempt to make everybody learn English and to make that the language of the country there would have been a good deal of resentment on the part of many from other nations, so that Hebrew was the only possible language, and won remarkable success. I have watched people who could obviously hardly read and write, who had had nothing but an elementary education at the most in their own language—people of mature age, studying Hebrew grammars everywhere, talking to each other

in groups and getting over their language difficulties. That could be seen on board ship and wherever people met together.

Secondly, I would like to say that I am sure Professor Bentwich is quite right in regarding the Jew's faith in his own future in Israel as one of his strongest assets. They have really deliberately got into a great many of their economic difficulties because of their determination to maintain free entry. It was easy to show that the bringing in of large numbers of people who were not going to be very much use, so far as production in the new country was concerned, was really absurd economically, but in spite of it all they have kept the country open, and I found that every Jew with whom I spoke had a strong faith that, whatever difficulties he got into through the maintenance of this policy—and the difficulties were obvious enough to everybody in view of the many troubles of life, rationing and so on, being so very severe throughout this period—the Jew was confident that if it came to the worst World Jewry was not going to let this great experiment fail. As far as I can see the faith of the Jews in this experiment has been justified.

And now all I need do is to thank Professor Bentwich, on your behalf and my own, for his most interesting and informative lecture.

POPULATION PROBLEMS IN ISRAEL

By H.E. ELIAHU ELATH
(*The Israel Ambassador in London*)

Report of a lecture delivered to the Society on Wednesday, December 10, 1952, Sir Hugh Dow, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my pleasant task today to introduce our lecturer, His Excellency Mr. Eliahu Elath, the Ambassador for Israel in London. He is well known to many of you, because His Excellency has been a member of this Society for no less than eighteen years and has frequently contributed papers to our Journal. The first, I think, was as long ago as 1936, when he wrote a paper on the Hauran in Syria, and he has since contributed papers on the Bedouin of what was formerly Transjordan and also on Kuwait. His membership of this Society dates, I believe, from the days when he was studying Arabic and the history of Arabian tribes.

His Excellency has, of course, a very wide knowledge of and has been closely acquainted with Palestine and all the surrounding Arab countries, and he has always taken a great interest in population problems.

I do not know on what aspect of these very wide problems he is going to dwell, and I am not one of those people who think that it is the duty of a chairman to try to anticipate what the lecturer is going to say and to say it first himself. I can only say that for my part I am looking forward to this lecture with very great interest, and not without some confidence, and hope that I shall gain something from it which will be useful to me when I have to deal with, perhaps, rather similar problems in another place.

I REGARD it as a great honour to have been asked to speak to my fellow members of the Royal Central Asian Society on the very complex problems of population in Israel. I must begin, however, by disclaiming any specialist knowledge or training on the economic, demographic or statistical side of the subject, and must ask your indulgence if, with the sociological background very present in my mind, I sometimes tend to stress the humane and psychological aspects rather more than the economic and statistical ones. If pressed by questions—as I look forward to being later on—I may perhaps take refuge in the plea that a diplomat in these days can hardly be expected to be a specialist in anything. On the contrary, the very diversity of his duties forces him to try to know “less and less about more and more.”

From which you will gather that I cannot hope to provide anything approaching a comprehensive demographic survey of the whole field. I propose, with your permission, to limit myself this afternoon to those aspects of our population problems with which I am most familiar—namely, those deriving from the absorption and integration into Israel's life, first, of a wide variety of newcomers to the country, and second, of our substantial Arab minority.

The urgency of the short-term problems—largely economic and financial—which Israel faces today has, I fear, monopolized public attention abroad to the exclusion of some no less dramatic, and in the long run certainly no less significant, social and cultural aspects of current developments. It is no light undertaking to double a country's population in four years—to transplant physically, and transform socially and economically,

hundreds of thousands of people from the ends of the earth, bringing with them an almost incredible variety of languages, cultures, habits and traditions, and to forge them into a united, though far from uniform, national entity. True, you may say that we have had some experience: Moses had much the same sort of job. But the number and variety of our present-day tribes is very much greater than his; and for us there has been no forty years' wandering together in the wilderness to weld the disparate elements into one.

This is, of course, primarily our own internal problem, and we must solve it for ourselves. But it is, I think, also one which can hardly fail to appeal to anyone interested in the study of human relationships.

Incidentally, I might mention that this problem which we in Israel are tackling today is, in its essence, the search for a harmonious adjustment between East and West; for a means of integrating the ideas and traditions of past ages into the social and political structure of a modern society. (By "East" and "West" I mean here, of course, rather what Kipling meant than what the political leader-writer of today means!) And that problem is not ours alone. As thoughtful people everywhere are already realizing, it is a problem which also faces—though perhaps less urgently—the whole Western world, as conditions in many parts of the East continue to deteriorate. And when it has to be faced, it will be on a vastly larger scale. For us in Israel it is already a matter of urgency. We shall no doubt make a lot of mistakes in handling it in the haste that the circumstances impose on us. But it may be that, in so doing, we may serve as a pilot-plant from which those interested (including some of our neighbours) may learn something of value when the larger problem comes to be dealt with.

I think no objective observer of present conditions in Israel can fail to be struck by the great difficulty of the conditions under which we have to work. Processes whose success or failure may determine our future for generations to come, and which in other countries have been spread over centuries, have had to be speeded up in what someone has called "the pressure-cooker of Israel." Pressure-cookers have their advantages and their disadvantages, and we in Israel are finding out, by trial and error, their qualities and defects as instruments of social change. Yet we have found, too, in this social laboratory of ours, that success sometimes comes when least expected, and in defiance of every accepted canon of social and economic science. Failure can come the same way—all you can hope to do is not to make the same mistake twice.

We have no illusions—no expectation of early or easy success. Only generations to come will know how far we have succeeded in welding our diverse elements into the kind of society of which we dreamed for so many years before Israel came into being.

Here I would digress for a moment to say that we have never looked upon statchood, and do not now look upon it, as an end in itself, but rather as a scaffolding which had to be erected in order to build up the kind of community-life—not mere material livelihood—which can best provide the frame for a free and untrammelled expression of Jewish thought and tradition deriving, ultimately, from the Book of Books and

the teachings of the Prophets. Interrupted, diluted, dimmed, by two thousand years of Dispersion, that tradition has never failed completely, and to its survival the remnant of my people owe that moral and spiritual foundation which has enabled them to stand firm against the many storms which have come so near to overwhelming them.

The creation of such a society depends on our ultimate success in absorbing our new citizens, and in fusing them, together with the pioneers of Zionist settlement and the Arabs already in the country, to form a single nation, united to face the challenge of the future.

So much by way of introduction. With these few general ideas in mind, it may perhaps be easier to recognize the underlying principles and processes of the rather confused picture which Israel, in her present formative and transitional stage, must present to the outside observer.

For convenience, population problems in Israel may be considered under two main heads, at once distinct from, and complementary to, each other, and together composing the single bunch of nettles which we have to grasp.

First, as already mentioned, is the problem of absorbing and integrating our newcomers into the existing community.

Second, and no less vital, is the problem posed by our Arab minority, which we have also to find means of fusing, socially, culturally and economically, into our modern and democratic society.

And here, I am afraid, a few figures become necessary, by way of background :

The area of Israel is approximately 8,000 square miles.

The total population at the end of August, 1952, was 1,610,000, of whom 1,433,000 were Jews and 177,000 Arabs.

Half of the Jewish population—some 700,000—have come in since May, 1948, when the State of Israel was established. They came from countries as diverse as Libya and Poland, Roumania and Yemen, Canada and Iraq. About half the newcomers—mostly those who came in the first two years of Israel's existence—are from European countries. These are the survivors of the Hitler persecutions, hard-core cases from the Displaced Persons' Camps, the flotsam and jetsam of war. Some of these, especially the younger generation, had the advantage of a training period, more or less lengthy, in England or France or Scandinavia, during World War II. But very many of them had not. And though the majority of the adults had once been men and women of character and quality, with a firm background of Western culture, many of them eventually reached Israel as physical or nervous wrecks, needing long periods of treatment and rehabilitation before they could face the world as citizens of their new home.

The other half of the recent immigrants have come, mostly in the last two years, from Asian or African countries, from some of which, like Yemen and Iraq, practically the whole community has been transplanted *en masse*. You may have heard of what was called "Operation Magic Carpet," which brought some 50,000 Yemenite Jews trekking overland to Aden, whence, with the generous and timely help of the British authorities on the spot, we arranged an air-lift for them to Israel. They brought

with them ancient traditions, venerable customs, sincere religious convictions, and usually habits of frugal industry—but little technical knowledge, and no experience at all of modern social and economic patterns.

I have been told by those who were in charge of the flights from Aden that there was no difficulty whatever in persuading the Yemenites to enter the aeroplanes. They knew from Biblical prophecy that eventually the blessed were to return to the Promised Land “on the wings of eagles.” But when, on arrival in Lydda airport, they were shepherded towards the waiting fleet of motor-buses, they showed great fear, and much tactful persuasion was required before they could be induced to enter them. Prophecy, unfortunately, is silent on the matter of motor-buses. . . .

The education and re-orientation of these people is clearly a very complex and delicate business. They have not only travelled 1,500 miles “on the wings of eagles”; they have come nearly as many years through time—from the Dark Ages (or, at best, the early middle ages) to the twentieth century. In common with immigrants from other oriental countries, they have brought with them the social patterns and habits of the country of their birth, of which the most conspicuous features are a high birth-rate and a total ignorance of hygiene, with a consequent incidence of preventable disease which to Western eyes was frankly appalling.

Nearly 30 per cent. of these oriental groups were children under 14 years of age; about the same proportion were elderly people. Only some 35 per cent. fell within the age-group between 19 and 39, which contains, of course, the people easiest to absorb in productive employment and to readjust to new conditions. The disease rate, particularly in trachoma and bilharzia, was very high, and Israel's medical services were strained to their limit to cope with it. But fortunately we have so far been spared any serious epidemics of infectious diseases.

The community upon which these two widely differing streams of returning exiles, from Europe and Asia, have been converging for some years, at the rate of 15,000 to 20,000 a month, is a modern democratic community. For a quarter of a century it had lived under a British Administration. (And although we may often have differed from our Mandatory Administrators, we knew that at the same time we were learning from them much of priceless value to us—as we are still learning from this country, in a different, and happier, relationship.) The Jews of Israel, then, in 1948 were a highly educated, highly organized and dynamic community, with all the traditions of a free, progressive, Western democracy (plus a few of their own, deriving from the democratic habits of Jewish communal life, with its respect for the liberty of the individual), and with modern standards of public health, education and social welfare.

And the two converging streams of newcomers, though they differed widely in practically every other respect, shared the common ideal of the Return to Zion. Not that this was precisely a new idea. Individual Jews from all the quarters of the globe had for centuries been returning to their ancient homeland. The persecutions in Russia and Roumania in the eighties of the last century brought about the beginnings of organized Jewish colonization in Palestine. The Balfour Declaration gave the Movement a new impetus and a new international meaning. The establishment

of Israel as an independent Jewish State, whose gates stood open to any Jew in need of a refuge, brought many thousands of new immigrants seeking a permanent home for themselves and their children where they might live in peace and security, preserving and developing their own traditional culture as a free and sovereign nation.

There, very briefly, you have the problem. As you see, it is a complex one, and I propose, with your permission, to deal here with its two main elements separately. In real life, of course, they act and inter-act on each other, and cannot be kept in water-tight compartments.

First, then, let us look at the new arrivals. What are we doing about them? Well, we began in 1948, with the guns of our War of Independence hardly yet silent, and uneasy armistice hardly yet in sight, with the obvious expedient of receiving our mass immigration—at that time largely European—in reception camps. These were usually either former “Immigration Camps” inherited from the Mandatory régime, or camps and barracks formerly used by the British Army. There we housed, fed, doctored and sorted out the newcomers, taught them some Hebrew, and provided professional training courses in preparation for their final settlement.

But it soon became clear that integration would take longer than we had hoped; that most of the immigrants would need to stay longer in the camps than we had expected before they could take their places in a normal community—or before there would be houses and work for them. You cannot materialize houses and farms and factories overnight. As the months passed, and Israel kept her gates wide open, the camps became unbearably crowded—at one time as many as 100,000 people were returned as living in reception camps. We realized that there would have to be some kind of intermediate stage between the reception camp and permanent settlement.

From this realization was born the system of *maabaroth*. These are transitional settlements, or workers’ villages, usually sited near to towns or to agricultural centres where work is available. And to them, after the briefest possible stay in a reception camp, we now direct those immigrant families whose heads are of working age, in order that they may complete their acclimatization.

Housing in the *maabaroth* is mostly in prefabricated bungalows (there are still some tents, but we are replacing them as quickly as we can); medical attention, education for children and adults, vocational training, and municipal services are provided, and employment is found for the head of the family in near-by towns or villages, or sometimes created by means of public works—roads, drainage schemes and so forth. Some *maabaroth* have been set up in the remoter rural areas, both because we desire to maintain and increase the proportion of our rural to our urban population, and must therefore try to accustom the newcomers to pioneering rural life as early as we can, and also because we know that the only way to make a frontier permanent and safe is to settle it.

The total *maabaroth* population in the middle of 1952 was about 228,000, about 27 per cent. having been sent to Galilee and about 18 per cent. to the Negev. At the same date—the latest for which I have returns—there were still about 17,500 people in reception camps, but these were

almost all "special cases"—chronically sick people, or social misfits of one kind or another still needing treatment. 450,000 of our 700,000 new citizens are already in permanent houses, and are gradually beginning to play their part in the country's economy.

So far we have managed to keep unemployment within manageable limits, and the daily average has not exceeded 2 per cent. of those gainfully employed. But this has entailed almost superhuman efforts in the way of public works, as well as much discomfort for the whole community through the reduction of living standards, overcrowding, shortages and general austerity conditions. We hope that the worst of all this is now over, and are looking forward to some improvement in the near future. But it is obvious that to increase a country's population by nearly 100 per cent. in four years is bound to have deeper effects on the structure and habits of the original community. Thirty-seven per cent. of our people are today of Asian or African origin.

Exactly what the effects will be it is probably still too early to say with any precision. But certain tendencies may already be noted:

(1) There has been a rise in the percentage of people employed in agriculture—from 12·6 per cent. in 1948 to 13·9 per cent. in 1951—and an even more marked rise in the rural as compared with the urban population. In 1948 only 16 per cent. of Israel's population lived in rural areas, and 84 per cent. in the towns. Today the rural population is 22·5 per cent. of the total, and the urban population only 77·5 per cent. Between 1948 and the middle of 1952, 277 new agricultural settlements were established, and as their crops begin to be harvested, these contribute to make Israel more nearly self-supporting in foodstuffs than ever before.

(2) The development of industry has not kept pace with agricultural development, largely owing to shortage of raw materials and investment capital.

(3) The proportion of persons in the liberal professions has markedly declined in the last two years.

(4) There have been slight increases in the general mortality rate and the infantile mortality rate, but both remain among the lowest in the world, and far below those of any other Middle Eastern or oriental country. The birth-rate having risen appreciably with the influx of people from oriental countries, Israel is now among the countries with the highest natural increase in the world, and the percentage of children under 14 years of age has risen rapidly, and is still rising.

(5) For the time being, we have also a higher percentage of elderly and disabled people—and the combination of these two factors means that, for some years to come, our population of working age will have to work very hard, and pay very high taxes, in order to support our large proportion of "unproductive" citizens. But this is a problem which will solve itself as the children grow up.

(6) A more obvious—and less agreeable—effect of our mass immigration is the growing social differentiation between the various classes of the Jewish community, especially in the towns. This is a development which we view with serious concern: it aggravates the difficulty of integrating the newcomers, and makes social contacts even harder to achieve than

they inevitably are by reason of differences of language and cultural background. Some idea of the linguistic difficulties may be gained from an experience of my wife's, while teaching in Israel: in one of her classes of thirty-five pupils, no fewer than seventeen different languages were in use! And that was before the latest great wave of immigration had reached its peak.

This is one reason why my Government places such great emphasis on the revival of the Hebrew language, for language is, in itself, one of the greatest unifying influences between differing groups of a people. Some Hebrew is usually known to every Jew. Though it has not been used as a spoken language outside Palestine (and in Palestine itself has been so used only for the last fifty years or so), the language of the Bible has always been the tongue used in prayer and in the religious liturgy; through all the centuries of the Dispersion, it has remained dear to the Jewish heart. Moreover, from the purely practical point of view, some *lingua franca* was essential if Israel was not to become a Tower of Babel. To this need Hebrew was the natural and inevitable answer, and its revived use symbolizes Israel's spiritual and cultural links with her people's past, as well as the fulfilment of the Zionist renaissance which laid the foundations of our new national life.

While on the subject of language, I must mention one of the most popular and effective instruments of linguistic and cultural integration for adult immigrants—namely, the *Ulpan* (literally "Academy"). This is a kind of evening school run by the Ministry of Education and Culture, where, for a nominal fee, grown-up immigrants may take intensive courses in the Hebrew language and literature, and in other subjects calculated to make them useful citizens of the State. *Ulpans* exist in all the larger centres throughout the country, and have now about 20,000 students and some 1,000 teachers.

Here I must also pay tribute to two extremely valuable instruments—of very different character—which have also been playing leading parts in the work of integration. The first is the Israel Defence Army, which has not only been doing yeoman service in the actual organization of reception camps and *maabaroth*, but is also supplying immigrant boys and girls of military age with the nearest thing to a "universal University" and "School of Citizenship" that we can hope to give them. A very elementary University it may be—one where toothbrush drill is sometimes more urgently needed than the multiplication table. But it is none the less invaluable as a unifying influence. Here the immigrant boy or girl from Yemen or Morocco serves side by side with young people born in Galilee or Jerusalem, and the ex-wards of Youth Aliyah trained in England or France. Here they learn, while still young enough to lay aside their prejudices, to respect each other's qualities and to understand each other's points of view. There is no other equally effective solvent of social barriers.

Here, too, we have found the most potent antidote for that hostility and distrust of all authority which is so deeply rooted in the psychological make-up of large numbers of the newcomers. Bitter personal experience—whether in the ghettos of Warsaw or Baghdad, or on the roads of a war-scarred Europe—had convinced many of our new arrivals that

authority was always and everywhere against them: that the police, the army, the official, was always their enemy. It was entirely outside their experience to contemplate the possibility of a policeman being *their* policeman, of authority being well-intentioned; of a soldier being *their* friend—all of them integral parts of the same society as themselves, sharing as free citizens in the same duties and privileges. Common service in the Defence Army is among the most effective means of driving home this essential lesson.

The second institution is one that is probably known to you by name—the Children and Youth Aliyah Movement, which, for twenty years and more, has been bringing children and young people (including many orphans) to Palestine and Israel, clothing and feeding them, and giving them their first training and experience in the life of the country. Youth Aliyah's former wards—there are by now some 50,000 of them all told, from sixty countries—constitute the backbone of our younger generation of immigrants.

I turn now to the other half of our problem—our Arabic-speaking minority. According to the latest available figures (for May, 1952) this comprised 120,000 Moslems, 35,000 Christians, and about 15,000 Druzes. 32,000 of them live in the towns; 120,000 in the villages; and we have still some 15,000 nomads—mainly Beduin, in the Negev.

A rough social classification shows about 65 per cent. as being fellahin, labourers or artisans; about 20 per cent. as small farmers or specially skilled workers; and the remaining 15 per cent. as including some white-collar employees, small merchants, substantial landlords, etc.

And here, I think, one has to bear in mind that Israel was born in the midst of a war—welcomed with shot and shell from her Arab neighbours on all sides. As she fought her assailants to a standstill, and emerged into the half-light of uneasy armistice with them, her Government found itself in a situation of bewildering complexity *vis-à-vis* its own Arab citizens. The Arabs who had remained in Israel after the conclusion of the military operations had suffered a profound psychological upheaval, as well as the dislocation of their economic and social life. Almost overnight they had found themselves transformed from a majority to a minority, and deprived of their dominant position. Most of the wealthy and educated—the big land-owners, the well-to-do peasant farmers, the influential families, the professional people—had fled, and the community was left leaderless. The whole fabric of Arab social life had disintegrated: the urban population had lost its employers and its jobs; the villagers found their accustomed markets gone and their trade connections severed.

And here—though it is not strictly within the scope of this paper—I feel I must say just a word about the Arab refugees. This is a problem which Israel has never regarded as of her making. She places responsibility for it on the Arab States who attacked her in defiance of the United Nations decision. Nevertheless, Israel fully realizes the importance, for political and humanitarian reasons alike, of securing an early and constructive solution. My Government has repeatedly affirmed its readiness to contribute its share towards such a solution. We have taken over the resettlement of the 19,000 Arab refugees whom the war left within our borders;

we have made and are making every effort to reunite a number of Arab families, separated by the war, by admitting the excluded members; and we have already committed ourselves to releasing a substantial part of the blocked Arab accounts in Israel.

Returning now to the Arabs in Israel, under the Proclamation of Independence, and the "Little Constitution" under which Israel is governed, Arabs are full and equal citizens, with complete freedom of worship, conscience, education, language and culture, as well as social and political equality. The large majority of the Arab inhabitants (some 140,000 out of the 177,000) automatically became citizens of Israel under the new Citizenship Law. The main exceptions are (a) those Arab residents who were not actually in Israel on March 1, 1952 (when the register was compiled), and thereafter until the coming into force of the Citizenship Law on July 14, 1952; and (b) any Arabs who have, since March, 1952, entered the country without permission.

The Arabs are well represented in the *Knesset* (Parliament), where they have eight members out of the 120; and at the last election (in July, 1951) 70,000 Arabs voted—about 80 per cent. of the total number on the Register of Voters. The voters included a number of women—I believe the only Arab women anywhere in the Middle East who have ever gone to the polls. Arab workers are admitted as full members of the appropriate trade unions.

As to language, though Hebrew is the State language, Arabic is also officially recognized, and is used, together with Hebrew, in the Law Courts, on coins, postage-stamps, banknotes, and in Arab schools and on public buildings. The Official Gazette appears in both languages, and quite a number of Government officials are Arabs.

But equality before the law and under the Constitution does not always mean quite the same thing as equal status in everyday life. That depends less on law than on social and educational standards and ways of life—and also, until there is a firm peace between us and our Arab neighbours, on certain security considerations which neither our Administration nor our military authorities would be justified in ignoring. (These explain certain temporary regulations limiting the free movement of Arabs in a few specified areas, where special permits are required for travel.)

But in general it is the declared ambition of my Government to raise the standards of our Arab citizens up to the level obtaining among the Jews, as the first and most decisive step towards full practical equality between all Israel's citizens, irrespective of race, creed or language. We have ourselves suffered too much and too long from the evils of minority status and discrimination ever to wish to inflict them on anybody else—quite apart from the fact that history goes to show that a policy of discrimination does, if possible, even worse harm to the discriminators than to the discriminated-against, and ultimately saps the moral foundations of any State unwise enough to adopt it.

Our main instrument in our levelling-up policy is education. Education is the essential prerequisite for bridging the gap between Jew and Arab, and for ensuring the real and practical integration of the Arabs into the democratic political structure of our State. We fully realize that

democracy is no mere matter of mechanics, and that democracy in the Western sense can be maintained with difficulty—if at all—while large numbers of a population remain illiterate and a prey to disease and degradation. This explains my Government's insistence from the outset on the introduction of free and universal education and free public health services, even though these must obviously consume what looks, in present conditions, an unduly high proportion of our limited resources. But we regard them as essential, in order to foster in all our citizens, Jew and Arab alike, the sense that they have a vital personal stake in the country's well-being.

The compulsory Education Act in force in Israel applies to Arab as well as Jewish children, girls and boys alike, and I am glad to be able to say that it is no dead letter. Indeed, one of the most remarkable developments of the past four years has been the enormous growth of the Arab school system. In 1949 there were in Israel 10,000 Arab pupils and 250 teachers. There are today some 27,150 pupils and 750 teachers (about a quarter of them women), for a population which has shown no very marked increase in the interval. The change is most noticeable in the village schools (there were always, of course, a number of quite large Arab schools in the towns). But one village in Lower Galilee had in 1948 a school consisting of a single room and a single teacher, attended by forty-five children. Now it has a school of seven rooms, 400 pupils, and eleven teachers—working in two shifts. The compulsory Education Act plays its part, of course, in this remarkable increase. But it would not be difficult to evade it, since the village schools are largely the responsibility, under the Ministry of Education, of the local councils. But the truth is that nobody wants to evade it, and that there is a new spirit abroad among Arab parents and children alike. The new schools are filled to capacity because everyone wants to learn.

This seems to me to be one of the most hopeful features about our relations with our Arab citizens. Another is the increasing study of Hebrew as a second language in the Arab village schools. With the parallel teaching of Arabic in Jewish schools, this should facilitate better understanding between all sections of the population as the younger generation grows up. There is at present a great shortage of teachers—both Jewish and Arab—which we are doing our utmost to make good.

In a few years' time we should be seeing the results of this upsurge of the desire for schooling among our Arab citizens, and shall, I hope, be some stages farther along our road. And here I would emphasize that the goal is not anything like an imposed assimilation, but rather the further integration of an Arab community preserving its own distinctive character.

All the same, I would not wish to leave you with the impression that we have already reached the decisive stage in the integration of our Arab minority. Still less would I wish to encourage the inference that we have already achieved full harmony in solving the initial difficulties which faced the remnants of the Arab population in Israel. We are taking what practical steps we can, but time alone can bring complete healing of some of the wounds suffered by both communities during the years of bitter strife from which they have so recently emerged. Time—and a firm peace with

our Arab neighbours, which will undoubtedly make an important and lasting contribution to the solving of this problem.

I have said nothing so far about one particular group of Arabs—one in which I am myself specially interested—namely, the Beduin. We have still about 14,000 Beduin within our borders in the Negev. Nearly all of them are of the *Tayaha*, but there are also a few of the *Tarabin* and *Azazma* tribes. Partly because their movements are now restricted by the more rigid character of the frontier, and by regulations designed to control nomadic incursions into cultivated areas, a number of them are now turning to settled agriculture, and this the authorities welcome and encourage, both for economic and for security reasons. The general development and irrigation in progress in many parts of the Negev also make life easier for the tribes in seasons of drought, and they are gradually discovering the advantages of co-operation with the Jewish settlers, who are glad to draw on the local knowledge and experience of the Beduin, in exchange for technical know-how and the loan of implements. Beduin-bred sheep and goats find a ready market in a country as short of meat as Israel now is, and this rural industry is a thriving one. And work on the roads, water supplies, etc., is becoming a popular and profitable source of income for many former tribesmen, though some of their sheikhs still tend to frown upon it as interfering with the traditional tribal ways of life, and also with their interests as land-owners in keeping their tribesmen working on their own lands.

Following its general policy, my Government has been supplying medical and educational facilities, and other advantages—such as the use of the improved water supplies—to all Beduin in the area, whether they prefer to keep to their nomadic way of life or to settle down. But we are taking as much care as we can not to interfere with tribal customs, and in particular are maintaining the old system of Beduin courts, where the sheikhs themselves sit as judges, with a representative of the district court as chairman. These courts can impose fines up to 200 Israel pounds, and terms of imprisonment of up to three months. As in the past, they usually try to arrange for major disputes to be settled by agreement, and this system continues to work well, even in serious tribal or inter-tribal disputes.

I must add a word—in case I be accused of talking all the time as though Israel were an island in the middle of the Pacific, with no relation to its surroundings—to make it clear that we regard ourselves, and wish to be regarded, as an integral part of the Middle East, as deeply rooted in its history and civilization, and as firmly established there, as any other of its peoples.

This fact has its relevance not only to the security, economic and political aspects of our existence, but also to the problems with which I have just been dealing, and it may, therefore, not be inappropriate if I conclude with a brief reference to our long-term attitude to our neighbours.

We have a longing for peace in our own part of the world—such a peace as will transform the present animosities and rivalries into co-operation and good neighbourly relations. For we know well that, without friendly

understanding between the various countries of the Middle East, there can be little prospect of progress or prosperity for the area as a whole or for any of its peoples.

A common effort by the countries of the Middle East is the only way to restore the ancient fertility of the region, and to ensure the development of its great natural resources for the good of all its inhabitants.

When I speak of the resources of the region, I am thinking not only, or even mainly, of oil; but first and foremost of the enormous agricultural potentialities of the Middle East—once the granary of the ancient world and the hub of great civilizations. Only the restoration of the area's agriculture—through rational use of its water resources, and the introduction of the vitally necessary reforms—can lead to that social and economic progress which is the foundation of political stability.

We live in times when, without social and economic security, there can be no security at all. It is thus in our own interest, as well as in that of our neighbours, that we desire to see, and are anxious to promote so far as we can, the general progress and development of these countries.

We earnestly hope that, once our Arab neighbours have become reconciled to the existence of an independent Israel, and have shown themselves ready for a just and honourable settlement, we shall be able, with them, to pursue our common aims and interests to our common advantage. Properly organized and directed, the great potentialities of the Middle East have much to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world at large.

The CHAIRMAN: We were told that something like 78 per cent. of the Israelis now live in towns, and 22 per cent. in rural areas. I do not know what is the exact distinction between a town and a rural area. When does a village cease to be a rural area and become a town? Is there any sort of fixed size which is taken into consideration when these statistics are gathered together?

Secondly, our lecturer seems very confident that although at present Israel has a very large proportion of young children and old people, this would right itself as the children grew up. I am not quite so sure of that, unless he looks forward to the present lot of children being very much less productive than their parents. As the old people die out, the present middle-aged people will become old, and this vast number of children will presumably have grown up and be producing children at the same rate.

Mr. ELATH: I am afraid it is rather difficult to be precise about the exact distinction, in Israel, between rural and urban areas. The figures I have given are for the administrative areas classed respectively as "rural" and "urban," and I doubt if they can be regarded as reflecting precisely the social, cultural or even economic lines of demarcation. Israel is living through a period of rapid transformation; rural and urban development are taking place all over the country, side by side, and often overlapping. It would be premature to try and foretell how a "social distribution map" (if there is such a thing) will look in ten or even five years' time. For example, the Negev is now being rapidly developed as an agricultural

area. But in view of recent discoveries of important mineral deposits there, it is quite possible that in a few years it may become one of our main centres of industrial development. Beersheba, which used to be a little market town for a pastoral hinterland, is today already an important centre for a settled agricultural region, and shows signs of impending industrial development in the neighbourhood.

If, therefore, the chairman's first question was directed primarily at the social and cultural distinction between rural and urban life, it is not today possible to give an exact reply. It will still take a few years before the facts are clear. What can be said now is that Israel is one of the few countries in the world (and certainly the only one in the Middle East) where the contrasts between town and country life are least sharp, and where one passes from one to the other with the least sense of expatriation. We are doing our utmost to preserve this relationship, and to avoid the dangerous cleavage between town and country whose distressing effects we have so often seen in other lands.

On the administrative side, the grant of a municipal charter is subject to authorization from the Ministry of the Interior, which takes into consideration both the size of the village in question and the capacity of its inhabitants for assuming the responsibilities of local government.

As regards Sir Hugh's second question, I again hesitate to try my hand at prophecy—especially in a field like that of demography, where events have proved so many specialists mistaken. Several factors will influence the size of Israeli families in the next generation or two: First, the countries whence our new immigrants may come. Naturally, if there continues to be a preponderance of oriental immigrants (as in the last few years), the proportion of large families will remain higher than if the bulk of the immigrants are in future drawn from Western countries. Everything turns on the interaction between these two main elements of Israel's population. We believe that, as the synthesis develops, the living standards of the oriental element—social and cultural as well as economic—will rise; and that this will have the usual result of reducing the average number of children per family. Eventually, Israel's people may develop some sort of *via media* between the oriental family of nine or ten children and the Western family with one or two. I myself know couples who themselves had ten children but whose sons and daughters are providing them with only two or three grandchildren apiece.

SIR CLARMONT SKRINE: May I ask His Excellency the present situation about the Lake Huleh reclamation scheme and the possibility of settling Arabs on the land? I think there were to be about 2,000 farms on the reclaimed area, and as it is quite near to Galilee and Nazareth, where there are so many of the Arabs, and also close to the border of Syria and Lebanon, this scheme might help to solve the problem of settling a considerable number of Arabs who at present have no land. I do not know how the project is progressing. There was great trouble, I know, with Jordan and Syria about it.

I was very glad to hear so complete an exposition of the political status of Arabs, because in an article in *The Times* yesterday it was stated in effect that the Arabs did not have the same political rights as the Jews.

That seems to have been altogether too sweeping a statement. Of course, there is the fact that large areas, including most of the Arab areas, are actually under military government, which, of course, puts the Arab inhabitants in a different situation to the Jews of the other areas.

Mr. ELATH: The Huleh Reclamation Scheme to which Sir Clarmont Skrine refers is a project for draining the swamps of the so-called "Lake" Huleh area in Upper Galilee. Till recently, the "lake" spread widely over a low-lying area, turning acres of good land into mud, and wasting a great deal of potentially fertile soil and even more precious water, which a small country like Israel cannot afford. Not only so, but the swamps were the breeding ground of the mosquitoes which spread malaria, and a danger to the health of the surrounding populations, not only in Israel but also in neighbouring Syria. The reclamation scheme, when completed, will be of the greatest advantage to Jews and Arabs alike, in Israel and over the border in Syria as well. The scheme is an expensive one, but in spite of this, and in spite of Israel's present financial difficulties, we are doing our utmost to get it completed. We have also had to contend with interruptions from the Syrian side, which have made our progress slower than it should have been, and the work much more difficult, as everything had to be done from the eastern banks of Huleh and the Jordan river. Once the scheme is completed, we believe that the Huleh area will become one of the most prosperous in Israel, with everybody sharing in that prosperity.

Colonel CROCKER: There is one point that I should like to mention with regard to the extraordinary way in which the old prophecies have been, and are being, fulfilled, especially the prophecy regarding the Jews coming back into Israel and Palestine.

May I ask His Excellency: What is the opinion of the Israeli Government of the old prophecies regarding the invasion of Palestine by the forces of Gog and Magog from the north? Do they regard that threat seriously, or do they dismiss it as something to be disregarded?

Mr. ELATH: Without faith in the Return to Zion I hardly think we should have had a State of Israel at all. At different times in the history of Jewish exile that idea has assumed different forms and expressions—each age used its own terms—its current "isms"—of which "Zionism" is one of the more modern.

As regards the threat of invasion, In Israel today we regard Jeremiah as having been fortunate in having to fear invasion from the north only. We have not only the threat from the north to consider, but also the threats from the east and the south. There may be wider dangers that threaten the entire area. But for us the immediate peril springs from our Arab neighbours, with whom we have still no firm peace—only an uneasy armistice. And by their refusal to negotiate with us for a permanent settlement, by the campaigns of belligerency conducted by their responsible leaders and their press, they are constantly threatening Israel's existence. We are fully aware of the dangers involved in all this. But those dangers can be dissolved only by Arab readiness to reach a peaceful and honourable settlement with us.

Monsieur BERCHAUD: May I ask His Excellency what hopes his

Government entertain of gathering those Jews who are at present living behind the Iron Curtain?

Mr. ELATH: A good part of the newcomers to Israel since 1948 have in fact come from Eastern Europe—from Poland, Roumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. They have proved themselves good and useful citizens of Israel and are contributing much to its progress and development. We have done, and shall continue to do, all we can to facilitate the immigration of Jews from these countries, and if there is a possibility of further substantial immigration, with the consent of the respective Governments, I can only say that it will be as welcome to us in Israel as were the earlier arrivals from Eastern Europe. But about the prospects of consent from the Governments concerned I am in no position to prophesy.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sorry that the clock informs me that the limits which we usually set to our discussions have been more than reached.

I was asked by Sir John Shea, our President, to express his regrets to your Excellency that he was not able to be present. I am quite sure that when he learns what an extremely interesting and informative lecture we have had, he will be more than ever sorry that he has missed it. I am sure that he would wish me, on behalf of everyone present, to thank His Excellency for coming to speak to us this afternoon.

The vote of thanks was carried with acclamation, and the meeting concluded.

SYRIA AND THE WEST TODAY

By J. M. COOK

The report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on September 24, 1952, Sir Hugh Dow, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. John Cook will speak about Syria, a country which in many respects holds a key position in the Middle East, although most of us find it difficult to understand the suddenly changing political currents in that area.

Mr. Cook, even before the beginning of his active career, had a good deal of intimate acquaintance with the Middle East, for his father, after a brilliant career in the Indian Civil Service, presided as a Governor over the destinies of the National Bank of Egypt.

Mr. Cook himself, after being caught up in the second World War, during which he was in the Gloucestershire Regiment, later in a Commando, and was wounded and invalided out, went to the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies. He spent the year 1945 there, and thereafter he spent most of his time in Syria. Not only did his business relations bring him into touch with the leading political personalities of the day, but also Mr. Cook's fluent knowledge of Arabic enabled him to talk and mix with all classes of people, and so to learn something of the views and feelings of that rather elusive person, the average man.

MY subject is "Syria and the West Today," but I hope you will pardon my not plunging at once into the middle of the matter because I feel that I should, first, briefly describe the extent of the Syrian Republic and then relate something of its post-war history.

The frontier of the Republic runs from Quneitra, which lies between Mount Hermon and Lake Tiberias, south towards the river Jordan and marches with the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. It then turns east, and as it crosses the road between Damascus and Amman it also crosses the 30-inch oil pipeline which the Americans have put up from the main oil-fields of Saudi Arabia to transport crude oil to Sidon. After crossing the pipeline, the frontier passes south of the Jebel Druze mountains and up across the desert to Abu Kemal on the Euphrates. In that desert stretch the frontier is crossed by three oil pipelines of the Iraq Petroleum Company, two of the pipelines ending at Tripoli in Lebanon and the third, the new 30-inch pipeline, ending at Baniyas in Syria. The frontier, still in desert country, goes northwards to the Tigris; it then turns westwards and runs along the railway of the Turkish border until, north-west of Aleppo, it dips down to the sea. The coast of Syria includes the port of Lattakia, which has not hitherto been very important, but is now being built up into a rival to Beirut with funds partly supplied by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and partly provided locally. The coast of Syria also includes the pipeline terminal of Baniyas and the old pirate isle of Ar Ruad. The Lebanese frontier is met again north of Tripoli, and Syria then comes inland to include the Krak des Chevaliers, after which the boundary goes south again to Hermon along the ridge of the Anti-Lebanon range.

Syria, in size, is larger than England and about three-quarters the size of Great Britain. In that area there is a population of $3\frac{1}{4}$ million of whom

under half a million are Christians. More than half the population live in the towns and main cities, which are Damascus, the capital, with about 325,000 inhabitants; Aleppo, the commercial capital, which has about 350,000 inhabitants; Homs, with 110,000; and also Hama, Qamishliye, Hassetché, Deir ez Zor, and Lattakia. Although one does not meet the true Arab in the towns, one sees most of the Syrians who count in Damascus and Aleppo.

Once Syria included Tripoli and Sidon and the lovely fertile valley of the Beqaa, but these areas under the French Mandate were taken and added to the small district of Mount Lebanon to form the Republic of Lebanon, in such a way as to include as large an area as possible without having a Moslem majority in the electorate. Alexandretta in the north was also part of Syria under the French Mandate; the area of the Hatay included Antioch and some very fertile land, but in 1939 that area was ceded to Turkey, and Syria thus lost the natural port for the wealth of Aleppo and the Jezira.

One might expect the Syrians to be bitter about this territorial loss, but it is surprising that although Alexandretta and Tripoli are remembered with regret they do not usually figure prominently in Syrian political statements. But we must bear in mind the effect of these losses, because a Moslem historian of Syria might be pardoned if he recorded that the Christian Arabs of the Lebanon, for all their outstanding leadership in politics and in other social services, had played the part of an outpost of European influence and a pretext for western intervention in Syria's affairs.

To revert to the territory of Syria, over half of the area is classified as uncultivable (including therein forest and pasture land). There is still probably nearly one-third of the cultivable area—that is to say, one-sixth of the total area of Syria—still to be brought under cultivation.

The wealth of Syria undoubtedly lies in her agriculture, and, although visitors may see factories, railways and much commercial activity, it is on the crops that Syrian wealth is based. Agriculture is practised in the south, in the Hauran plain and around Damascus, near Homs and Hama, but more particularly from Hama northwards and eastwards along the line of the Fertile Crescent into the Jezira. Wheat, barley and cotton are the three most important crops of Syria and the most important area, agriculturally, is the Jezira, where cotton and wheat are plentiful, and can yet be more fully developed. In the three seasons 1949, 1950 and 1951 the yield of cotton went up four times, but, in order to achieve that, some land was turned over from cereals to cotton and the 1951 cereal crop of wheat and barley was not much more than half of the crop of 1949. Indeed, in the bad harvest year of 1951 it was necessary for Syria to import cereals.

SYRIAN CROPS

(In Metric Tons)

	1948-9	1949-50	1950-51	1951-2 <i>Estimate.</i>
Cotton Fibre ...	13,300	35,495	62,924	60-62,000
Wheat	889,322	830,026	509,642	805,000
Barley	357,467	322,012	154,701	240,000

The area under cotton has been reduced in 1952, but improved methods may bring a crop little if anything smaller than that of 1951. The resultant gain in the area under wheat should assure Syria a good balance for export over and above the 550,000 to 600,000 tons consumed in the country.

Future prospects are good. There was a bad cotton harvest in 1951, largely due to bad methods of agriculture, for Syria had not adopted the methods employed by Egypt and the Sudan in selecting seed and making sure of pure breeds of cotton and of pest control. But Syria's potential is great; not only can the area of cultivation be extended by schemes of drainage and irrigation such as those being financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, but the degree of cultivation can be intensified by greater use of tractors and irrigation pumps. These have been coming into Syria since the war in great numbers, but there is still room for more mechanization and much more scientific progress in agriculture. America and Britain have done something to further afforestation and agriculture, to convince the conservative farmer, who in most areas uses archaic tools, to change from fatalism to fertilizer and to work with combine harvesters and all the modern paraphernalia of agriculture.

One obstacle to Syria's cereal export trade is the price, because in Syria the commercial man finds that his returns from other transactions are not only large but very quick. He is not, therefore, attracted by the long-term slow progress and 4 per cent. yield of agriculture and not enough money is going into the development of agriculture. There are few financial houses willing to back agricultural mortgages. I remember one man I would have treated as a very good risk who was paying 25 per cent. per annum interest, and at such rates it is not possible to develop large-scale agriculture.

Since the war, light industries have been developed without foreign participation. These industries are not as important as they look at first sight, because they do not export. Indeed, the most successful industry, cement, has not yet, even with a new factory at Aleppo, made Syria self-sufficient in this commodity. The textile industry produces piece goods for Syria's internal consumption, but for the last two years has had a bad time because of increasing cheap competition from southern Europe and Japan, but the industry is well organized and efficiently run by a strange phenomenon in the Middle East—rich men who are prepared to work hard.

Other industries have been started, some without a proper study of raw material requirements and market potentialities, without the type of survey one would expect to be made before anybody put money into a scheme or a factory was built. Today these particular industries exist only by virtue of Government subvention and by tariff protection, and one hopes that the unfortunate shareholders who have lost money in these industries have learned their lesson. There is always a tendency for a new country to set up its own industries, even without regard to the hard facts of economics and to whether the plant can be used with a fair chance of making a profit. But there is a hope that responsible Syrian civil servants will discourage wild capital development, and I think the people

generally and those who govern realize that they must put more money into agriculture.

For international trade up to March, 1950, Syria and the Lebanon formed a Customs and Economic Union, and their statistics were combined and it was not possible up to that date to differentiate, as I am trying to do now, between Syria and the Lebanon. But, since 1950, it would appear from Customs returns that Syria's foreign trade is just in credit balance when one takes into account not only the exchange of goods but various moneys paid by foreign firms to Syria.

In my opinion, Syria's economic affairs are far more important, not only to the Syrians themselves but to us in Great Britain, than are her political affairs. If in this talk I give prominence to political affairs it is because I think that our political relations with Syria need deliberate improvement, whereas our economic relations should progress satisfactorily on sound lines in complete spontaneity so long as political difficulties do not intervene. So I would now like to turn to discussion of the history of Syria since the last war and lead up to the political difficulties I have mentioned.

At the outbreak of the last World War, France held a Mandate over Syria, and when metropolitan France fell the government of Syria was carried on by Vichy. This continued until June, 1941, when the activities of German and Italian missions in Syria made it necessary for the Allied Forces to attack, and, after some very bitter fighting, British and Free French Forces managed to beat the Vichy troops. In September, 1941, the independence of Syria was proclaimed by the allies, but Britain agreed at that time that France should maintain a specially predominant position in Syria, and, in fact, France continued to govern. There were elections in 1943 and these brought forth the Nationalist Party under the leadership of Shukri Kuwatly, Saadallah Jabri and Jamil Mardam. The Nationalist Party came into power with the declared object of attaining complete Syrian independence, and so its words and deeds more and more brought Syrian politicians into conflict with the French governing authorities. Tension grew and mounted so high that on May 29th, 1945, the French Governor ordered the bombardment of Damascus. That was the end of French rule, for Britain took over control and confined the French troops to barracks. The powers of government were transferred to the Nationalist Party and by April 17th, 1946, all foreign troops had left Syria.

This anniversary is still celebrated each year, and it may seem strange to those of you who had a hand in the successive liberations of Syria to hear that at this anniversary the withdrawal of the British troops is celebrated no less than the withdrawal of the French troops. The press and politicians who delight to use the foreigner as a subject for purple passages brand both nations equally as "imperialist invaders."

Inside Syria, political events showed that a political platform is a most unstable support. The Nationalist Party had come into power with the object of turning the French out; that was the major plank in their platform, but when the French had left there was nothing to put in its place. So, in 1947, the Nationalists for a time gave way to the Populist Party. I

do not think I shall try to analyse the difference between these two parties, for although political experts may see fundamental differences between the numerous parties in Syria, I as an ordinary resident could only distinguish two parties, those in power and those in waiting.

In March, 1949, there came the first military *coup d'état*: Colonel Husny Zaim bloodlessly overthrew the government and the Nationalist leaders left the country. Zaim's first actions were bold and much needed, and it appeared as though his rule would accelerate the progress Syria had already made. But power corrupted him, and he became so unpopular with the people and with his own supporters that in August, 1949, Colonel Hennawi brought about another *coup*. This time Zaim was killed as also was the Prime Minister, Muhsen Barazi. In December, 1949, a third military leader arose, Colonel Adib Shishakly; he has had to strike again more than once since then, but he remains, though not the titular Chief of State, the only source of all power. At the moment General Fauzi Selou, as Chief of State and Prime Minister, and the army rule without a Parliament.

Most people in Syria are content to leave the power and the responsibility where they are, and the country is probably better off now than it has been under any other Government. There is not the seething discontent that one would expect under a drastic dictatorship; in fact, I personally cannot see at the moment a workable alternative. This may sound rather harsh to those who believe in the principles of democracy, but democracy in the East is a frail and some might say an unnatural growth. I feel we should judge the present Syrian Government rather by the level of economic progress and contentment in the country than by the absence of certain of our own democratic procedures.

Since the war, Syria's relations with the West have gone through three phases. In the first phase, all were too preoccupied with the cares of internal government to bother about foreign politics. For the first time, Syrians themselves had power and responsibility, and for the first time for many years a patriot's duty was to support and not to try to overthrow the Government, and this change of feeling takes some time to get over. Capable civil servants were developed most of whom owed their training to the French, whose systems of civil government were adopted and mostly proved beneficial; an exception is the government accounting and financial control system, inherited from the Turks and the French, which is not only utterly cumbersome but also completely ineffective.

In 1946 and 1947 everyone in Syria was kept far too busy by new responsibilities to spare time for world politics, and during this time foreigners, particularly the British, were really welcome and their advice was sought.

The second phase of Syria's relations with the West started in 1948 and in it there were two most important factors, the Palestine situation and the return of French influence. The history of events in Palestine since 1946 I shall not discuss, because to my mind the affair was shameful to every party connected with it. The result has left most Syrians with a very poor idea of western political honesty and justice and little or no

faith in the strength of the Arab League. It seems that over Palestine Britain has done a bad deed for the Syrians and that in the liberation of Syria three times we have done a good deed for the Syrians. If our diplomacy can achieve a write-off not only of the odium we have incurred by our bad deed but also of the gratitude we should have earned from our good deed, then it will have achieved a great triumph. When I went to Syria in 1946 I was told not to speak French in the streets or I should be spat at, and yet, only three and a half years after the bombardment by the French, they were the least unpopular of the western Powers. How this was achieved is too long a story for now, but the fact is that the French today have regained much of their old influence.

During 1950 the tension between the western Powers and Russia was growing and the former were trying to pull Syria off the fence of neutrality, but with little success because the French, the Americans and the British were pulling in three different ways—not a very satisfactory method for a tug-of-war team. All through that time one could sense that there was suspicion between the French and the British and between the Americans and the British and generally between the three western Powers when all should have been acting in concert.

The third phase of Syrian relations with the West is, I believe, now starting and will be one of increasing co-operation. I think we may be justified in claiming that developments in Turkey, and to a certain extent in Egypt, justify the hope that an effective scheme for co-ordinating the Near East in a defensive bloc against the common enemy will arise from the ashes of so many spoiled projects and fruitless negotiations. But there are fundamental problems which will have to be solved before this relationship can be achieved and we can conclude the alliance which is in the interest of all.

The first problem applies to France and the United States of America to a certain extent, but most of all to Britain. It is shown by the fact that, at election times, the Syrian Press pretend that Britain is spending thousands of pounds in order to swing the election results from one political party to another. These suspicions, when analysed, are only laughable, but they do, in fact, cloud relations between our two countries and they can be swept away not by diplomatic denials but only by rather blunt talk. I think we could more easily persuade Syria of our honourable intentions if we pointed out, firstly, that if Britain were to take over Syria it would mean that the British taxpayer would assume a burden that he is neither able nor willing to undertake. Secondly, that having liberated Syria we have three times been in a position to take over the country but each time we forwent the privilege.

The next problem is that of Syrian nationalism, which many of us may feel to be inspired chiefly by hostility toward ourselves. That would be a false assumption, for all nations—even all villages—have some sort of hatred of foreigners. We British have among us many who cry "Damnation and confusion to foreigners." The Americans have their incredulous horror of anybody who is un-American, and the French their contempt for "*indigènes*." I do not feel that Syrian xenophobia or nationalism is

any more extreme or unbalanced than these characteristics amongst ourselves. Indeed, most Syrian political demonstrations that I have seen have consisted of high-school youths who would be rather inhuman if they did not take the opportunity of a holiday; in fact, you find most of them are doing their homework as they march along, waving banners and shouting "Down with America and Britain!" I can recall one demonstration making its way in a very orderly manner to the British Legation to make its protest, which I think the Duty Officer was waiting to receive. Suddenly an acquaintance of mine dashed out of the column, seized me by the hand and greeted me: "Wallahi istinakum, wa zai essaha, insha'allah bi kheir"—and in other words inquired after my health and hoped I was well and that we would meet again very shortly. Then he returned to the column and marched on with it shouting "Down with Britain!" Such demonstrations are treated by our diplomats with good humour and it is a pity that they should be reported in our press as "riots." Under the Shishakly régime the students are kept out of all political activity to the great benefit of their education.

However, there have been demonstrations of a more serious nature. There have been incidents, and I am thinking particularly of some aimed at the Americans—insults to their flag or bomb outrages endangering American lives—which are a very different matter. Such incidents have not, in my humble opinion, been treated strongly; they should have evoked a sharp reaction, for dignity requires a certain firmness for it to command respect.

Now let me turn to our commercial relations with Syria. Russia has little or no commercial relations with Syria, so that anything that goes wrong in commerce is between Syria and the West. There are two trends in Syrian commercial policy that lead to tension with foreigners. The first is a parlour trick learned from us: nationalization of certain public utilities; but I am glad to say that, so far, the Syrians have played the game under British rather than under Persian rules. Secondly, and more serious, there have been restrictive laws which make it very difficult for a foreign business to exercise proper control and management of its affairs in Syria, because it will soon not be possible for a foreign business to have in Syria a foreign manager. I feel we cannot object to this because it is within the right of a Sovereign State, but we need to remember that there are many Syrian business men in our own country and in our dependencies, and that a Sovereign State with full right to take any action has no right to object to reciprocal action.

But the most important problem between the West and Syria is that of wooing Syria from neutrality to alliance. This is sometimes wrongly attempted by the argument of duty. On the one hand, the Syrians and the Arabs in general ask for our help and say it is our duty to help them, but I feel that Arab services to the allied cause in wartime have been amply repaid. We, on the other hand, sometimes turn to the Syrians and say they ought, as a matter of duty, to help us against Russia. I do not feel that these moral and theoretical arguments are likely to carry much weight.

Our task should be to convince the Syrians, firstly, that we consider it

our duty to combat any Communist aggression, wherever it may occur, and that, apart from duty, the West has legitimate interests in the Near East which the West will protect.

Secondly, that the strategic situation is such that, if a war should come, the battleground is more likely to be picked by Russia than by ourselves, and that Russia will not ask Syria's permission before using the Near East as a battlefield.

Thirdly, and most important, we should convince the Syrians that if a war should come we are likely to win it, for they naturally do not want to back the wrong side. We are not likely to convince the Syrians that we can win such a war by meekly acquiescing in the present sport of the Middle East of twisting the lion's tail.

We must not, however, think the Syrians need no convincing to support us against Communism, because they do not know much about Communism and cannot appreciate its deadliness. There is no Communist Party in Syria or, if there is, it is underground and the political leader is away.

Communist influence can be seen in socialist-labelled parties, but their importance is not very great. The most important and, to my mind, the most dangerous aspect of Communist influence in the Middle East is its effect on ultra-nationalists and on religious extremists. No attempt is made, or is possible, to reconcile the Koran with *Das Kapital*, but Russian policy is finding its most ready tools in unlikely places: in the religious schools and amongst the more misguided of the Ulema.

I feel that to combat this is very difficult, because Moslem religious leaders are not subject to influence from the West. It is, however, vital that either by a *Fetwa* or by some other means the Syrians and other Moslem countries should be brought by their religious leaders to the side of other religions who are also fighting Communism. Syria is neither European nor pseudo-European, its cities are far enough from the Mediterranean to have retained their roots in Asiatic culture; the cultures of Asia and of Europe must be united against the Red unbeliever.

Syria is a very pleasant country to live in and, before I close, I should like to pay a tribute to the hospitality and good manners one finds there. I never met in Syria any hostility from individuals directed at a foreigner because of his foreign nationality; indeed, they tolerate the ignorance and abruptness of the occidental in a manner quite gratifying until one realizes what a low standard is expected of one.

Unfortunately, some of this good impression is marred by the spy-fever prevalent in Syria, which subjects the innocent foreign resident to attentions that are not only annoying but sometimes alarming. Security precautions are carried to ridiculous extremes which are not justified by the alleged risks and which may antagonize Syria's best friends.

Politically, economically and socially the West has many ties with Syria, founded on mutual and not on one-sided interest; but there are still a few residual cobwebs of suspicion which must be blown away before we can fully enjoy all the mutual benefits of alliance and of friendship.

Group Captain H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: Has Mr. Cook any explanation for the receptivity by the Moslem of the student class of Russian ideas?

The two seem so utterly opposed that I feel there must be some explanation for that.

Mr. COOK: I think I might explain that by saying that the young student class must have some direction in which to explode; they do not play rugby football, so they take part in politics. If you are going to be enthusiastic it is common to be enthusiastic against something, and the rulers of the various countries naturally do not want their young students to be anti-rulers and so they are encouraged to be anti-foreigner. The Russians are not known in the Middle East, and the foreigner against whom the students' wrath can be raised must be someone they know—that is to say, John Bull or Uncle Sam or Marianne. Students who are anti-foreigner do not thereby subscribe to Communist party doctrine. It is in their actions against the foreigner—unfortunately, in the Near East the foreigner is usually British—that they assist Communist policy even though they are not influenced by Communist ideology, with which they have not much sympathy.

Admiral of the Fleet Lord CORK AND ORRERY: What sort of position does Syria occupy among other Arab States? Is it in a leading position? If I remember aright the Syrians did not show up very well when the Arabs were fighting the Israelites. Do the other Arab States pay much attention to Syria? Are they guided or influenced by her?

Mr. COOK: The Arab League, which was in its inception almost entirely Egyptian-inspired, has made a lot of noise and made many statements which were not necessarily all subscribed to by other Arab countries. There has been a cleavage between the pro-Hashemites and the anti-Hashemites, and according to whether Syria at the moment was pro-Hashemite or anti-Hashemite sometimes depended the extent of her influence. But, since the arrival of Colonel Adib Shishakly, people have, I think, been paying more attention to Syria than previously. The average Arab in other countries has possibly heard too much about his Egyptian big brother and has seen Syria running on its own without any foreign influence, and today Syria, in my opinion, speaks with far more authority than she did after the end of the last World War.

As for the part Syria played in Palestine, I do not think any Arab nation played a very strong part in the war there, and Syria did not certainly get any credit thereby. But since the dictatorship has been made to work and since Syria has been able to advance economically, leading politicians have taken to coming to Damascus and talking things over. Syria is not the leader in the Middle East, but occupies the second place on the Mediterranean Littoral.

Colonel ROUTH: Lattakia must be a very expensive port? At present it is little more than an open roadstead. Why do not the Syrian Government use the Arab refugees for the solving of their labour problems?

Mr. COOK: The port of Lattakia has rather an exposed beach, but before development it was fully studied by a firm of British engineers. It copes now with about a quarter of a million tons of goods per annum, and its extension will be an expensive proposition. It is worth while to the Syrian Government because they will gain from goods coming in through Lattakia, by port duties, warehouse fees and so on, which now go to

Beirut. It is not economically viable from a general Middle Eastern point of view, but from a purely internal Syrian point of view I think Lattakia may succeed, with the support of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in becoming an important asset.

As to the use of Arab refugees, that is largely a political and not an economic problem. As you know, the Arab States have set their faces against action by themselves which may be construed as an acceptance on their part of the *status quo* in Palestine. Using refugees or resettling them they feel could compromise their position, and that is why the Arab refugees are not being settled on the big development schemes. Syria has not anything like the number of refugees that Jordan has.

A GUEST: There are reports of German military officers organizing the Syrian army. Could Mr. Cook tell us more in that regard?

Mr. Cook: German goods, pumps and machines and diesel lorries have since the war been in increasing circulation in the Middle East, because they are cheap. The same applies, I think, to military advisers. It is cheaper to maintain a German wing commander, who would otherwise be out of a job, than an American or a Briton. Also, the Nationalist is scarcely likely to feel that Germany has territorial claims on Syria, whereas British, American or French officers in the same position would be suspect. Spy fever is at a great height in Syria, but the Germans are not so suspect and are used to a large extent as military advisers in the army; some of them have, I believe, been prisoners of war in Russia.

Brig.-General SPENCER WESTON: Can Mr. Cook indicate what the financial situation in Syria is? Will the Budget be balanced? I have noticed that, if one follows the finances of the various countries, Communism invariably creeps in the moment the currency begins to deteriorate.

Mr. Cook: A Budget, even to the most simple civil servant in the lowest grade, can always be made to balance; it is only a matter of putting a figure here or there! I could never go into the matter far enough to decide whether any country's Budget is honestly balanced, but Syria's Budget does appear to balance. Taxation is largely indirect, which is not very satisfactory, but that process is not uncommon in other countries, including our own. There is not a heavy income tax; there are taxes on sugar, petrol and other commodities. Though the income and gold reserves of the country are not very great, I do not think there is inflation. I speak here of details that I used to have to follow every week but have not followed since the beginning of this year; up to then the increase of the note issue was not great, not as much as was demanded by popular outcry, particularly amongst small bankers, and I would say the issue was fully backed by the national resources. I can only quote—this may not be a true remark, so please do not take it as such—that Van Zeeland, who went out to the Lebanon to look into the country's finances and make comments and give advice, on leaving is reputed to have said: "Gentlemen, I do not know how you do it; all my economic training tells me that you cannot carry on. But, while you can carry on, pray do. I can think of no alternative."

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

QANATS AROUND KIRMAN

By PHILIP BECKETT*

FOR settlement to be possible in regions of low rainfall it is necessary that there should be cultivable land on which the rainfall can be supplemented by irrigation. In Persia the Caspian provinces, some of the intermontane basins of the Zagros, and Azerbaijan are the only sizable areas with sufficient rainfall for irrigation to be unnecessary. The simplest way of obtaining water is from a spring or stream, but the majority of these are in the mountains and foothills where there is only a limited area of good land. Where the ground water does not come to the surface all the year round water can be raised from a well by some means, mechanical or by animal power, but the depth at which it becomes impracticable to raise water in quantities sufficient for irrigating fields is quite small, and the shallow ground water is found most commonly in valleys with small areas of cultivable land. In some places it is possible to store water from the spring floods in reservoirs (*birkeh*), but villagers would find it difficult to make reservoirs in other than small gullies, and the amount of water that could be stored, and hence the area of land to be watered, would be small. The area that can be irrigated by these means could not produce food for a fraction of the present population of Persia, and to support the great number of people living on the Central Plateau it has been necessary through the ages to find some means of tapping the deep water-table under the plains and deserts,†

The result is the qanat system of water supply (in principle a horizontal adit leading water under gravity from the water-bearing strata to the surface, with a number of vertical shafts for ventilation and access: see diagram 2), which is able to draw water from the deep water-table with no mechanical pump or lift, and which can tap a very poor-yielding aquifer.

The opening stage in the construction of a qanat is to choose the site of the trial well (*gamuneh*). The expert who is called in to advise is not a water diviner in the English sense of a man with some physical perception of water not possessed by most of us, but rather in the nature of a craftsman, a man with special knowledge and experience. He is shown by the landowner the general area from which the qanat is to flow, and then examines closely the lie of the land, looking for a site on permeable strata where a barely perceptible difference in vegetation shows that the spring flush of water lasts a little longer than elsewhere (suggesting that during the rest of the year the flow of ground water there will be a little stronger). Such a site will probably be found opposite the mouth of a dry valley or

* The author is a soil chemist, and led the Oxford University Expedition to Persia in 1950.

† I have tried to give a fuller account of the unique utility of qanats in the *Journal of the Iran Society*, January, 1952.

gully in the mountains, and indeed where the water-table is very deep he will have little other guide than the shape of the distant mountains.

At the site chosen the qanat-makers (*moghanis*) and their labourers dig a shaft until they enter the water-bearing strata (*ab deh*), and then down until they have confirmed that the rate of seepage is sufficient to justify the expense. The local criteria are that it should be possible to draw off some standard volume of water in a given time without noticeable draw-down, or that the shaft after emptying should fill to a depth of 2 metres overnight. However, before he orders the expensive digging to start the landowner must be satisfied that the *gamuneh* has tapped the *ab-i-khari*—that is, the ground water fed by percolation from the catchment area (either the deep ground water itself or a constant local flow on an impermeable bed) and not the *ab-i-araq-i-zamin*, the volume of wet rock that overlies an isolated impermeable bed, whose limited quantity of water is renewed only by local rain, and is rapidly exhausted.

So more shafts are dug (*pishkar*) above the *gamuneh* and to the same depth to determine the extent of the aquifer, or below and deeper than the *gamuneh* in case the aquifer is thought to be deep but local. If the latter is found to be the case the gradient of the adit is made such that it taps the aquifer at a greater depth than the foot of the *gamuneh*.

The shaft (*chah*) farthest from the fields to be watered becomes the "mother well" (*madar chah*).

Next the surveyors must run a line of levels to check that water from the depth of the foot of the *madar chah* will flow under gravity to where it is wanted.* Provided that the point where a horizontal line from the foot of the *madar chah* intersects the land surface is among or higher than the fields to be irrigated, a qanat can be constructed from the *madar chah* to water them. If this point (*mazhar*) is among the fields the water can be led straight from the qanat; if it is higher, then the qanat may be given a slope or the water may be led down by a stream. The latter is essential where the drop is large, since a steeply sloping qanat would soon be destroyed by the rapid flow of water, and is of course much cheaper, but losses due to evaporation and seepage will be much greater (perhaps 10 per cent.). In one case I saw a channel like this lined with powdered chalk, which becomes very hard in the sun and cuts down the seepage loss. Generally a long qanat is made nearly horizontal because of the difficulty of measuring a slight gradient over a long distance, but a short one may be sloped to about 1/1,000 or 1/1,500, provided that this does

* Traditionally a long rope is let down the *madar chah* and one mark made on the rope where it touches the floor (A), and another at surface level (B). A stave is set up at the head of the *madar chah* and another on the line of the qanat some 20 yards away; a cord is stretched between them. Recently the cord has been levelled with a spirit level, previously it was wetted and one end raised or lowered until the drops of water collected at the centre. The difference in height above the ground of the cord at the two staves will be the drop of the land surface between them, and a new mark is made (C) such that BC is the difference in height. CA is less than BA if the surface drops from the head of the *madar chah*, and will be the depth of a shaft from that point whose foot is at the same height as the foot of the *madar chah*. This is repeated along the line of the qanat, adding when the surface rises and subtracting when it falls, until the last mark coincides with A, showing that at that point the surface is at the same height as the foot of the *madar chah*.

not cause excessive wear on the walls by increasing the rate of flow above two to three miles per hour. Often the slope of the adit (*pushteh*) is decreased on entering the *ab deh*, in order to reach a greater depth more rapidly.

Having decided the gradient and the depth of the adit the surveyors supervise the digging of a number of shafts of the correct depth about every 300 yards or so along the line of the qanat, as a guide to the *moghanis*, and then leave them to get on with the digging.


The *moghanis* begin digging out the *pushteh* in the dry section (*kushki-kar*), digging new shafts where necessary. The team consists of four men; one below extending the *pushteh*, one below loading the spoil into leather bags (*dul*), and two above winding up the spoil on a wooden windlass (*charkh*). The tools used are a broad-bladed one-handed pick (*kələnd*), a shovel and a small oil lamp (diagram 1. i). Careful workers will start at the point where the *pushteh* leaves the aquifer, digging towards the point where it is to meet the surface (*haranj*), and using the water to show the level, but in this way only one team may work at once. More commonly several teams are at work digging out the *pushteh* between the shafts left by the surveyors. Sometimes they align the digging on two lamps spaced in the *pushteh* already dug, but the number of kinks one finds in most qanats, particularly in the *ab deh* where the *pushteh* can only be dug from the lower end, shows that usually the *moghanis* trust to their sense of direction or the noise of another team working towards them.

The section in the *ab deh* cannot be begun until the *kushki-kar* is complete, and must be dug from the *haranj* end so that the water which seeps in can flow away. If it is impossible to bale out the water seeping into the shafts being constructed in the *ab deh* fast enough for them to be dug down to the level of the *pushteh*, then these shafts are dug down as far as possible, and completed by a *moghani* digging up from beneath on a wooden scaffolding, while a team above bale away as fast as they can so that he may not be drowned in the rush of water as the shaft is completed.

As they work the *moghanis* watch their lamps. These burn castor-oil, produced locally, and will generally go out before the air becomes so poor that a man is in danger of suffocating. In order to provide ventilation extra shafts are made between those left by the surveyors. Where the *pushteh* is not deep the shafts are reasonably cheap, and perhaps 25 yards apart. Deeper they become more expensive and are spaced farther apart, such that the distance between is a compromise between increasing cost and increasing need for ventilation; probably an average spacing is 50 yards and it is never more than 150 yards. In the very deep qanats around Yezd shafts are built in pairs on opposite sides of the *pushteh*, so that a lamp at the foot of one will cause a down draught in the other. Temporary ventilation is provided while digging a deep shaft by an air current from a short well alongside.*

The diameter of the shafts is about one yard, which is wide enough for

* I suspect that the diagram of this in a paper by Colonel E. Noel (ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL, p. 198, 1944) has been printed upside down.



PS

DIAGRAM I.

the *moghani* to swing his pick and to hoist up the spoil, and not so wide that he cannot climb up with feet on one side and back on the other.

Having constructed the *pushteh* from the *haranj* to the *madar chah*, the *moghani*s will probably extend it into the aquifer beyond the *madar chah* as far as the ventilation will allow in order to increase the water-yielding surface.

The *pushteh* must be high enough for the *moghani* to work and to walk to and fro when cleaning out the silt that collects—that is, some 3 to 4 feet. A poor qanat will need less frequent cleaning probably and it is possible to economize on the height of the adit. The width will depend upon the nature of the soil or rock traversed and upon the amount of water. Ideally the depth of the water should be 10 to 20 inches in a 4-foot *pushteh*, and the slope should be chosen so that the water flows at this depth in a *pushteh* 24 to 30 inches wide. In fact it is not possible to vary the slope much, and the width of the new *pushteh* may be up to 40 inches if the flow of water is large. It is probably better to keep to the usual width, and to increase the depth of the water and the height of the *pushteh*, so that the height is always about three times the depth of the water. The average rate of flow seems to be some half to one mile per hour, but there are many cases where it is less, and a few up to six miles per hour. In the latter case wear and tear was considerable.

Often the *pushteh* goes through a bed of soft sand or clay (*shurat*), and it becomes necessary to provide support for the roof and sides. The *moghani*s set up a firing oven, little more than a large hole in the ground containing a fire of desert scrub, covered by a roof. (This is one of the many industries whose denudation of the Kirman plain for fuel is allowing sand dunes to blow on to the fields.) Clay is puddled thoroughly with straw and dung, and made into oval rings (*nars*) 1 to 1½ inches thick, and fired. If the rings are moderately fired the shape remains good, but the clay becomes softened by the water in time; if they are very strongly fired the clay is often warped, but it takes on a glassy consistency and the *nars* last indefinitely. The size of the *nar* depends upon the flow of the water, and a *nar* should not be more than three-quarters filled. Usual dimensions are some 36 to 40 inches high and 12 to 25 inches wide, and five *nars* edge to edge fill 1 metre of the *pushteh*. The *nars* are placed upright in the channel, with a slight space between each, and the corners packed with broken *nars* and earth so that there can be no flow outside the *nar* (diagram 1. ii).

Should the qanat cross a desert, then the tops of the shafts must be covered to keep out blowing sand (*kureh*); if it crosses the line of a possible springtime flood the shaft is roofed over and, in case the roof gives way, the shaft and *pushteh* are lined with *nars* to prevent erosion by the torrent that will rush in; the top of an old shaft is often lined with stones to hold off the day when it will cave in (*sanguneh*); and the mouth of the qanat is commonly cut back a few metres, giving a deep channel (*haranj*) whose roof is nowhere less than 3 or 4 feet thick, which may be reinforced with *nars* (diagram 1. iii).

In time a layer of silt (*zeret*) collects on the floor of the *pushteh*, which must be removed by the *moghani*s. Probably most of this falls from the

SECTION ACROSS EDGE OF KIRMAN PLAIN




DIAGRAM 2.

walls of the shafts, on which condensation takes place in winter and down which if not closed the rain trickles in spring. Old shafts generally acquire a bell-shaped profile in time by this means. However, there is no doubt that some silt comes from the sides of the *pushteh*, whose cross-section does increase with time, and in very soft aquifers there may be some silt brought in with the ground water, though this must be uncommon since the usual aquifer is a soft conglomerate of gravel and sand, weakly cemented by gypsum and deposits of iron oxides.

Sooner or later the process of wearing away the *pushteh* and shaft leads to a collapse of the roof (*gusain*), most commonly underneath an old shaft whose top drops in. Then the *moghani* has the choice of cleaning out the debris and lining the *pushteh* at that point with *nars*, or of walling it off with stonework and cutting out a detour (*kungoort*); in either case he is in danger of being washed away and drowned in the rush of water that flows as soon as he taps the water banked up behind (I. iii).

The extent to which the flow of a qanat is influenced by year-to-year changes in rainfall will depend upon the size of the catchment area—the greater the distance travelled by the percolating ground water the more chance there is that the fluctuations in ground flow due to variations in rainfall in successive years will be smoothed out. However, over and above changes due to changing rainfall there is almost invariably a falling off with time in the flow from a qanat. There is a quite rapid drop on the completion of a qanat as the pockets of *ab-i-araq-i-zamin* tapped are exhausted, and then over a period of fifty to a hundred years the flow gradually decreases, presumably as a new local equilibrium is attained. At Jupar, some twenty miles south of Kirman, this trend had temporarily been reversed by a recent earthquake, quite a slight one I imagine, as a result of which the water that had previously seeped slowly into a qanat now flowed vigorously at one point as from a spring; the *moghani*s were certain that this could not continue for long.

Fields will have been made and villages built to take advantage of the full flow of the qanat, and as it tends to dry up the landowner must find means of maintaining the flow. Sometimes new *gamuneh* are dug beyond the *madar chah* and the *pushteh* extended to tap more of the *ab deh*, or branches are dug whose upper ends will tap other areas in the *ab deh*. If the aquifer is a narrow one, then the floor of the *pushteh* in the *ab deh* is deepened, and the rest deepened sufficiently to allow the water to run away.

If the decrease in flow is rapid, so that the flow is dried up altogether, then probably the new *pushteh* will be several feet below the old and separate from it, though ventilated by extensions of the same shafts. If the decrease is slow, so that the floor need only be lowered a little at a time, then the existing *pushteh* will be deepened to give a tall thin cross-section. I have attempted to demonstrate this in diagram I. iii, which is based chiefly on the qanat Gauhar-riz at Jupar,* in which one can look up the shafts to see the empty mouths of an earlier and now dry *pushteh*,

* This particular qanat has been described by Mr. Anthony Smith in the *Journal of the Iran Society*, July, 1951, and in his book *Blind White Fish in Persia* (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.).

and the later *pushteh* has been deepened by 3 to 5 feet as the flow dried up. One walks up a tall passageway sometimes thin and often widened by falls from the roof until it is nearly circular, broken frequently by low detours round the rubble that has fallen.

In diagram 2 I have tried to show by a typical example the way in which the majority of large villages round Kirman, and indeed all over the Persian plateau, are sited on the good land between mountain and desert, tapping the ground water percolating from the broader gullies in the mountains. Jupar is watered by several short qanats and Gauhar-riz, which has six branches. Their *madar chahs* vary in depth from 30 to 60 feet, and they flow underground for one to three miles. The Eishabad qanat, which crosses an outcrop of soft conglomerate, is sited to tap the water that banks up behind the ridge, and is a mile long. Out on the edge of the desert is the *madar chah* of one of the ten or fifteen deep qanats that supply Kirman (the original water supply from the mountains by which it stands is insufficient for the present population). The ground water here is about 300 feet deep, and the qanat has been levelled from here to Kirman twenty miles away, using a piece of rope and two sticks, and the *pushteh* dug out by hand with a shaft every 70 yards or so, to come to the surface in one of the suburbs of the town.

In regard to the cost of a qanat the figures I have are not very consistent, partly because there is a genuine variation in cost from one area to another, and partly I think because the *moghani* who answers the questions of the inquiring traveller is more used to thinking of costs in terms of so much per day's work than in terms of so much per cubic yard or horizontal yard.

My data are the following :

1. Colonel Noel* (pre-war, rate of exchange £1 = T 12.7). Wages of *moghani* 5 rials and labourer 3 rials per day. Cost per yard of *pushteh* (presumably including shafts) :

30 feet deep	T 2.2	per horizontal yard
60 " "	T 2.8	" " "
120 " "	T 5.6	" " "
240 " "	T 8.4	" " "

A Qanat of length 10,000 yards, *madar chah* 250 feet, might cost T 25,000.

2. Mrs. Merritt-Hawkes† (pre-war, rate of exchange £1 = T 8) : Qanat of length 21 miles, *madar chah* 90 feet, cost T 55,000.
3. *Moghani*s at Jupar (1950) : Cost of qanat; T 50 per horizontal yard of adit plus T 10 per vertical yard of shaft.
4. *Moghani*s at Negar (1950) : Cost of qanat; T 14 per horizontal yard of *pushteh*, including shafts, up to T 80 in hard strata.

From which, after converting Mrs. Merritt-Hawkes' figures to the same base as Colonel Noel's, recalculating both in terms of the 1950 toman by

* ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL, 1944, pp. 191-202.

† *Persia; Romance and Reality*, p. 162.

comparing the labourer's wage of 3 rials per day pre-war with the 1950 wage of 22 rials, and rearranging costs of *pushteh* and shafts in terms of so much per horizontal yard of *pushteh* with shafts at an average interval of 50 yards, I obtained :

Depth of <i>pushteh</i> in feet.	Cost of qanat in 1950 per horizontal yard of <i>pushteh</i>			
	Noel.	Merritt- Hawkes.	Jupar.	Negar.
30 ft.	T 16.2		T 52	
45 ft.		T 17.5		
60 ft.	T 20.6		T 54	
120 ft.	T 41.1; 18.3		T 58	T 14.80
240 ft.	T 61.6		T 66	

Next it is necessary to have a rough idea of the cost of maintaining and repairing qanats. Colonel Noel gives a figure of 1.2 per cent. of capital cost. At Jupar three men were permanently engaged in cleaning and repairing Gauhar-riz at an annual cost of about T 2,400, and I estimate the capital cost of Gauhar-riz today would be T 500,000, making the cost of maintenance much less than 1 per cent. However, I will assume an average of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of capital cost spent each year on upkeep.

Under the system of share-cropping practised round Kirman the landlord provides land, water, seed, and pays the taxes; the peasant provides his own labour and his tools; either party may provide the draught animals and it makes little difference to the division of the crop. The landlord's share is 75-80 per cent. of the crop for all produce except opium. Now, the taxes average about 10 per cent. of the total crop and the seed is about 10 per cent. The land has no value without water, and there is plenty of spare land for anyone who is prepared to make a qanat to irrigate it, therefore the 55 per cent. of the crop remaining to the landowner may be taken as the annual return on the capital he has invested in a qanat.

Taking wheat as a crop whose value is intermediate between fruit and vegetables on the one hand and the lesser cereals on the other, the average yield per acre is 900 lb.,* which is worth T 164.† One cusec year will irrigate 100 acres,‡ and a flow of one *jarib* (enough to irrigate 32 square yards in 24 hours) applied to a field every tenth day, usual for most crops, will irrigate 320 square yards. So the qanat owner's net income from land irrigated by the flow from his qanat is :

per cusec year	T 9,000
per <i>jarib</i>	T 5

From the above it is possible to calculate the profit on money invested in a qanat.

I must emphasize that these figures are only very approximate, but I think they give a fair idea of the costs of qanats and the returns that are likely to accrue to the landowner who is prepared to invest in the land.

* Average yield over the whole of Persia.

† At Kirman prices in 1950.

‡ There is good agreement between the lesser of Colonel Noel's two figures and a weighted average for different crops from Persian sources.

<i>Qanat.</i>	<i>Capital* cost.</i>	<i>Volume of water.</i>	<i>Annual income from crops.</i>	<i>Cost of Main- tenance at $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.</i>	<i>Net income.</i>	<i>Per- centage return.</i>
Colonel Noel (p. 192)	T 183,000	2 cusecs	T 18,000	T 900	T 17,100	9%
Colonel Noel (p. 199)	T 73,400	1 cusec	T 9,000	T 400	T 8,600	11%
Deep qanat to Kir- man 18.3 miles long, <i>madar chah</i> 270 feet	T 1,600,000	—	T 126,000†	T 8,000	T 118,000	7%
Deep qanat to Kir- man (same dimen- sions)	T 1,400,000	800 <i>jaribs</i>	T 4,000	No profit at all		
Negar qanat 9.5 miles long, <i>madar chah</i> 200 feet	T 500,000	2,000 <i>jaribs</i>	T 10,000	T 2,500	T 7,500	15%
Gauhar-riz, at Jupar	T 500,000	3,000 <i>jaribs</i>	T 15,000	T 2,400	T 12,600	25%

I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Colonel Noel, whose interesting article roused an interest in qanats that was gratified on the Oxford expedition based on Kirman in 1950, and from whose article I have drawn a number of the figures quoted above. Also to Mr. Anthony Smith, the zoologist on that expedition, whose notes I have consulted repeatedly; to Mr. George Oddy of the C.M.S., who gave us both much information about qanats; and to the qanat-owners round Kirman, in particular to Mohammed Khan Ahmeri, up and down whose qanats the members of the expedition paddled in search of fish and lesser creatures.

Colonel Noel in his article uses a number of the special terms current among the *moghanis*, and lists some more at the end. I have combined these, marked N, with a number collected in the same area by Anthony Smith.

Ab deh = Section of qanat in water-bearing strata. N.

Ab-i-araq-i-zamin = Subsoil water of a temporary nature. N.

Ab-i-khari = Ground water depending on deep water-bearing strata, and so not much affected by rain. N.

Asman nigah = "Looking to the sky"—said of a qanat whose water supply depends on rain. N.

Bad dum = "Bad earth" and so to the collapse of the roof of an adit.

Baghal bur = Diversion made to avoid rock or bad soil. N.

Bahar ab = Subsoil water of a temporary nature. N.

Chah = Shaft.

Charkh = Wooden windlass for raising spoil.

Charm-i-gao = Cowhide bucket for raising spoil.

Darkand = Place where qanat comes to the surface.

Daweel = Shaft dug upwards from adit. N.

Dul = Sheepskin bucket.

Dum = Hard strata.

* Costs calculated approximately from known dimensions and average cost of construction; figures in 1950 tomans.

† Cost of water for one hour every eleven days = T 480.

- Gamuneh } = Trial wells. N.
 } = First well to find water. S.
- Gharq ab = Ingress of water in quantities sufficient to interfere with work. N.
- Gil andaz = Width of 12 metres reserved for line of shafts. N.
- Gusain = Collapse of roof.
- Haranj = Open channel for last few yards of adit before reaching surface. N.
- Harim = Gil andaz. N.
- Hafr kardan = To dig a qanat. N.
- Jarib = Flow sufficient to irrigate about 32 square yards in twenty-four hours.
- Jush = Conglomerate or any ground cemented by deposition of chalk from water. N.
- } = "Tunnel." N.
- Kureh } = Shaft covered over with a roof, most commonly where shaft is in the path
 } of flood water. The roof is often of broken nars covered with soil. S.
- Kakhim = Moghani.
- Karvar chah = Ring of spoil round top of shaft.
- Kasab = Jarib.
- Kavull = Nar. N.
- Keleelai bandi = Protection to mouth of shafts like chimney pot. N.
- Kelend = One-hand pick used by *moghanis*.
- Kushki-kar = "Dry work," that is working in the length of tunnel higher than the aquifer. N.
- Kungoort = Detour round place where roof of adit has collapsed.
- Lat rubi = Removal of silt. N.
- Madar chah = Mother well, shaft farthest from haranj.
- Mann = 9-14 Jaribs. N.B.—Not the unit of weight.
- Maqsam = (This may be a very local word.) The basin from which the flow of water from a qanat is divided to flow into different parts of the village; in one case divided into five equal streams and so also called Panjab.
- Mazhar = Mouth of qanat. N.
- Mileh = Shaft. N.
- Moghani = Skilled qanat worker, assisted by labourers.
- Mossadeq } = Expert at measuring the flow of water.
- Mojadda }
- Naighar = Maker of nars.
- Nakh = A branch to a qanat.
- Nar = Oval ring of burnt brick for lining the adit.
- Narestan = Place where nars are needed.
- Pasgod = Bed of qanat not level. N.
- Pishkar } = Upper end of tunnel (adit). N.
- } = Shafts dug beyond the *gamuneh* to determine the extent of the aquifer. S.
- Pushteh (kar) = Length of adit between two shafts.
- Qanat = The complete system of adit and shafts constructed to draw water from a deep or feeble aquifer and lead it to the surface under gravity.
- Qanat tafya = Dry qanat.
- Rikhwai = Soil requiring a lining of nars. N.
- Roost-i-safid = Clay with veins of lime. N.
- Roost-i-zard = Stiff clay. N.
- Sang-i-ab = Flow of about half a cusec. N.
- Sanguneh = Ring of stones round head of shaft to prevent debris falling in.
- Sar su = Top of water-bearing strata. N.
- Sheh = Lowering the floor of the adit to maintain the flow.
- Shefteh = Sediment on floor of adit.
- Surakh ab = Underground spring.
- Sang chin = Stone lining of a qanat. N.
- Shurat masteh = Sandy soil requiring a lining of nars. N.
- Shurat roost = Clayey soil requiring a lining of nars. N.
- Tankihai = Cleaning of qanat. N.
- Taraz = Levelling; also refers to the collection of tools used for levelling.
- Zeret = Sediment on floor of adit.
- Zir su = Bottom of water-bearing strata. N.

APPENDIX

NOTES FOR THE BIOLOGIST PLANNING TO WORK IN QANATS

Means of access.—In qanats with large *pushteh* it is possible to walk up from the lower end, but, as it is quicker to walk over the surface of the land, time can be saved by lowering a rope down the shaft nearest to the place of work. For short shafts an ordinary thick rope is sufficient, but for deep ones a ladder made of thin nylon rope is more suitable. Three hundred feet of rope ladder would be heavy and costly, but would make it unnecessary to have four men to haul the Biologist up. Only one man would be needed at the top of a rope ladder, to see that its attachment was secure. The winches used by the *moghani*s could be utilized by the Biologist, but the excavations will have usually made that part of the qanat temporarily unsuitable. The winches cannot be easily transported and it takes two men to work them.

Ventilation.—With deep qanats it is best to open some shafts a day or two before going down in order to allow a circulation of good air.

For working in Qanats.—Clothing should be a minimum. Gym shoes should be worn to protect the feet on the stony stretches, although they are liable to be pulled off in the stretches of mud. Helmets are not necessary, as it is the back which suffers most from contact with the roof. A strong battery lamp is a great asset, especially if the battery part does not have to be carried in the hand (*i.e.*, a miner's cap lamp with the battery hanging on the belt is ideal), but a battery is liable to expire rapidly, and so a *moghani's* oil lamp should be taken and used when no strong light is necessary. A rucksack should have no rigid frame and should have straps so that it can be hung on the back or chest, or just carried in the hand.

Biological Equipment.—It must be possible to fold up the supporting structures of Nets for plankton and small creatures, and there should be protecting runners on all sides to ease the net through the channel. It should be possible to push the nets ahead when walking up the *pushteh*, as nets which are trawled behind catch all the mud which is stirred up by the feet of the man pulling them. Stakes should be taken for attachment where the speed of flow is sufficient to justify the net being left in one place. For this purpose nets of the Lowndes type are quite suitable as they keep the net portion above the mud level, but they are quite useless for trawling or pushing. Some form of net should be taken to catch the fish, in order that they and their stomach contents may be examined.

Thermos flasks are absolutely necessary to keep the qanat water and specimens cool (approx. 63° F.; for an outside temperature of *c.* 90° F.) on the way from the qanat to the field laboratory. Many small ones should be taken in which to keep the various catches separate, and they must be robust. For later examination in the laboratory room the double-tray system should be used in order to keep the temperature down, although this is difficult to arrange when there is no running water available.

If traps are used the sides should be of nylon and there should be grids over the entrances to prevent fish and snakes from taking the bait.

In general, the greatest obstacle to working in qanats is the difficulty of arriving at the point chosen for study, and so all equipment must be of a type that does not impede progress or become damaged *en route*.

ANTHONY SMITH.

THE WORK OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST OF THE UNITED NATIONS

By T. F. BRENCHLEY

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, April 30, 1952, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brenchley is in the Foreign Service and has been on Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's staff in Malaya. He is, I understand, Liaison Officer between Great Britain and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East—E.C.A.F.E. He has just arrived back in England from that part of the world and will explain to us what this Economic Commission is and the work that it has done recently: his is one of the most interesting subjects of the present day.

RECENTLY I read that it would be more appropriate to call our present age not an Atomic Age, as some do, but the Initials Age. It is certainly remarkable how adept we have become at deciphering such clusters of initials as S.H.A.P.E., O.E.E.C., N.A.T.O., etc. The affairs of Asia and the Far East being less well known than those of Europe (at least to most of our compatriots), it is understandable that the initials E.C.A.F.E. should be less familiar. I will therefore begin by saying a little about the position of E.C.A.F.E. in the United Nations structure and go on from that to the main subject of my lecture, which is the work of the Commission.

The United Nations Organization, when it considers economic problems, does so primarily in its Economic and Social Council. That Council has, to assist it, three Regional Commissions, which have very sensibly been set up to decentralize the extremely complex and difficult work of watching over the economic problems of the world. Those three Regional Commissions are the Economic Commission for Europe, E.C.E.; the Economic Commission for Latin American, E.C.L.A.; and my own particular subject, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, E.C.A.F.E. There was also to have been in Economic Commission for the Middle East, but for various reasons beyond the scope of this talk that Commission has never come into existence.

MEMBERSHIP OF E.C.A.F.E.

The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East was set up in 1947. Its area, geographically, stretches west to east from Pakistan to Korea and the Philippines, excluding Japan at present, and north to south from China to Indonesia and Ceylon. Its membership is fairly large. There are fourteen Full Members and at present eight Associate Members. The fourteen Full Members consist of seven within the region which I have just described, and seven outside it. The seven in the region, going clockwise round the map, are Pakistan, India, Burma, Thailand, China, the Philippines and Indonesia. The seven outside the region are the other four permanent members of the Security Council—namely, the United King-

dom, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and France (China being already mentioned as within the region), and three other countries with close links with this area of the world—namely, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand. In addition, there are the eight Associate Members, and I would like to say before detailing them that the position of Associate Member is, I think, a unique one, or almost unique, in the United Nations structure. Going clockwise again, they are Nepal, the three Indo-Chinese States (Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam), Korea, Hong Kong, Malaya and British Borneo, and Ceylon. It is possible, and in fact likely, that within the next few months Japan will be admitted as a further Associate Member. That was the recommendation of E.C.A.F.E. at its session held last February in Rangoon, and it only awaits the blessing of the Economic and Social Council, which is likely to be forthcoming in the near future.

These Associate Members are, as I have said, an unusual organizational feature. They have been instituted for two reasons: the first is to associate E.C.A.F.E. and its work with the territories which are not yet self-governing, and you will see that in that way Hong Kong has become an Associate Member, and Malaya and British Borneo have become a Joint Associate Member. Moreover, it has been found convenient to admit as Associate Members countries which are debarred from being Full Members of E.C.A.F.E. because they are not members of the United Nations. In other words, this has been a way of overcoming to some extent the obstacles created, in most cases, by the Russian veto. That applies to Ceylon, to Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos, and to Korea, by which of course South Korea, the Republic of Korea, is intended.

There is one further point I would like to make in this connection. I mentioned that one of the Associate Members was Malaya and British Borneo. This is a further unusual feature, that five territories—namely, the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei—five territories geographically close together and all under British rule or bound to Britain by treaty, have joined together to become a single Associate Member. They send a joint delegation to meetings of E.C.A.F.E. and have an arrangement between them for sharing the expenses arising from such representation.

Japan, although not yet an Associate Member, has already been associated with the work of E.C.A.F.E., because E.C.A.F.E.'s terms of reference directed it to consult with the Allied Occupation Authorities in Japan about the economic affairs of that country, which obviously very closely concern the life of South-east Asia. So Japan has been represented in the past by S.C.A.P. (another of these sets of initials with which you are, no doubt, familiar) and there has been a gradual change already towards Japan becoming an Associate Member. In the days when I first came into contact with E.C.A.F.E., the S.C.A.P. observer delegation was always led by an American, though he might have Japanese advisers with him. During the last twelve months, however, there has been a move towards completely Japanese delegations which came in the name of S.C.A.P. and were only observers, but, nevertheless, were clearly the first step towards direct Japanese representation.

Before I pass from the membership to the work of E.C.A.F.E. I would like to tell you something that happened at the Seventh Session of E.C.A.F.E. held in Lahore in January and February, 1951. There was at that stage a feeling among some of the Asian countries of E.C.A.F.E. that this very large non-Asian membership of seven outside Powers as against seven Full Members from the region itself was rather disproportionate, and that, voting rights being one per member, it might lead to the wishes of the countries of the E.C.A.F.E. region being overlooked. Various possible means were discussed of avoiding this potential danger—it was by no means an actual danger—and it was decided, in the end, that nothing very formal need be done. An admirable compromise was reached, and I will read you one paragraph from the Report of that Seventh Session which I think you will find interesting. “In effect, therefore, countries within the region, Full Members and Associate Members, have been taking their own decisions, in the formulation of which the presence, co-operation and advice of countries outside the geographical scope of the Commission have been most welcome. Member Governments feel, however, that the time has come when a clearer recognition should be given to the principle that member countries belonging to the region should take their own decisions in the Commission on their own economic problems, and that in doing so they should take full account of the views of the Associate Members in the region, to be ascertained, when not known, by referring any specific resolution to a Committee. In pursuance of this principle the member countries of the Commission not in the region would be willing as a general rule to refrain from using their votes in opposition to economic proposals predominantly concerning the region which have the support of the majority of the countries of the region. The Commission does not consider a more formal expression of this conclusion to be necessary and notes with satisfaction that all members are agreed on the principle which governs their co-operation.”

Now, that decision has had certain important practical consequences. As you will see, it laid down a method of finding out the views of the Associate Members—namely, by referring subjects to a Committee. The reason why that would have been necessary is that Associate Members do not have a vote in the Commission; only Full Members have a vote. But Associate Members do have a vote in all subordinate bodies of the Commission, such as committees, sub-committees and working parties; and it would have been one way of finding out their views. You see that the effect of this is really almost to abolish the distinction between Members and Associate Members, because the views of Associate Members as well as of Members are to be considered by the countries outside the region. That has meant a considerable increase in the status of the Associate Members, and I think it has already led some of them to play a more active part in the Commission's work.

REHABILITATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

With those preliminary remarks I turn to my real subject, the work of the Commission. When the Commission was set up, the emphasis in its terms of reference was on rehabilitation. The countries of South-east Asia

had many of them been occupied by Japan and had suffered considerably during the war, and a large task of short-term rehabilitation was opened up by the liberation. It was the intention of the Economic and Social Council that E.C.A.F.E. should play a major part in that task. For two reasons, as I see it, that never really came about.

The first reason was that there was already another organization which was getting on with this task pretty efficiently and had been doing so since the reoccupation of South-east Asia after the Japanese defeat. That was a British organization, headed by Lord Killern in Singapore, in his capacity as Special Commissioner for the United Kingdom in South-east Asia. On his staff were advisers on various technical subjects; rice was the most important of these, but there were also agricultural advisers, statistical advisers, and a whole host of others. Those advisers had been giving their advice freely to the countries of South-east Asia that wished to take it, and they had been getting on very rapidly with the work of reconstruction in its first phase. For instance, the allocation of scarce materials vital to South-east Asia had been arranged through committees centred in Singapore on which the countries of South-east Asia were represented. So E.C.A.F.E. found in being an organization already getting on, and getting on pretty efficiently, with the work of immediate post-war rehabilitation which its terms of reference really imposed upon E.C.A.F.E.

The second reason was that it is not possible to set up overnight such a body as an Economic Commission. It takes some time to organize a Secretariat and to find people willing to serve on it, and more time still for that Secretariat to assemble the basic body of knowledge which will enable it to carry out rehabilitation work effectively. By the time that E.C.A.F.E. reached that stage, the first phase of rehabilitation was really over.

ECONOMIC SURVEY AND DEVELOPMENT

But in the course of reaching it E.C.A.F.E. had done a task which was of great importance, and that was a fact-finding task. Indeed, up to about twelve months ago, that was the main thing that E.C.A.F.E. could point to as its achievement. It had gathered together a great deal of information about the economies of the countries within its geographical scope and had begun to make this information available to the world in its publications, particularly in its Annual Economic Survey, of which three numbers have appeared, and in a quarterly Economic Bulletin which fills in the intervals between the Surveys. That task, I think everyone is agreed, E.C.A.F.E. has done very well, and it reflects a great deal of credit on its Secretariat.

The third type of work, which E.C.A.F.E. is now beginning to undertake, is the task of economic development in South and South-east Asia. At a meeting last year of the Economic and Social Council, E.C.A.F.E.'s terms of reference were revised, at the Commission's request, to remove from them the emphasis on short-term rehabilitation, which was now obsolete, and to substitute the task of economic development of the countries within its geographical scope, which is obviously a problem which is going to be before the Commission for very many years to come. E.C.A.F.E. has turned to this work and has begun it from the ground up.

one might say. It is, of course, hampered in trying to take on the task of economic development by a very simple financial fact, and that is that it has no funds available except to finance its secretariat and meetings; it has no money that it can give to all those countries to form the capital for economic development. That is a basic difficulty and one that E.C.A.F.E. feels very strongly. E.C.A.F.E. would certainly like to have millions of pounds and dollars available to distribute among its needy members. But E.C.A.F.E. has done, in a quiet way, some useful work at a technical level. There have been a number of very interesting specialist meetings, chiefly going under the name of Working Parties, to discuss rather technical subjects, such as statistical organization in the countries of the region, and one very obviously important one, the mobilization of domestic capital, which in plain language means how to raise some money in South-east Asia itself to spend on economic development. In these specialist meetings lies, in my opinion, the main future work of the Commission for many years to come.

ORGANIZATION OF E.C.A.F.E.

I would now like to give you some idea of the way in which E.C.A.F.E. meetings are organized. As I have said, the Commission meets now once a year, generally in February, and just before that, its two main committees meet: one the Industry and Trade Committee; the other the Inland Transport Committee. Those three meetings form a solid block in January and February of each year, lasting for some four or five weeks. During the remainder of the year, and chiefly between May and October, there are a large number of smaller meetings of a more technical character, such as I have been describing. The two main committees have sub-committees under them which meet during that period. Thus, the Industry and Trade Committee has a sub-committee on Iron and Steel, and a sub-committee on Electric Power. There is also a Regional Conference on Trade Promotion meeting at present every second year. Then there are Working Parties on more detailed subjects, such as Cottage Industries and some of the technical subjects I have mentioned. The Inland Transport Committee also has sub-committees on the three main branches of inland transport: railways, waterways and highways. In addition, there are certain subjects which fall outside the scope of the two main committees, such as statistics, on which meetings are held from time to time. Finally, there is a particular part of the Commission, known as the Flood Control Bureau, which is administratively part of E.C.A.F.E., though in practice it works largely on independent problems and has its own separate budget. That, too, tends to hold its meetings between May and October so as to be able to submit a report on its activities to the Commission when it meets in February. Thus there are during the year quite a number of E.C.A.F.E. meetings one way and another—anything between a dozen and twenty would be a normal twelve months' quota—and they range over very varying subjects.

The United Kingdom has played, and still plays, a very active rôle in E.C.A.F.E. This is natural in view of our historic connections with the region in modern times, but there are also more immediate causes. It

arises partly from the fact that, as I have described, the United Kingdom, through its Special Commissioner in South-east Asia, carried out much urgent rehabilitation work in the region at the end of the war, and that E.C.A.F.E. in certain respects took over the study of the longer-term aspects of those problems. It also is due, in part, to the very strong representation which the United Kingdom has had at meetings of the Commission. At the first seven meetings of the Commission the United Kingdom was represented by Mr. Stent, who was the Permanent Delegate to E.C.A.F.E. for the United Kingdom. This put him in a very strong position. He was often the only national representative who had been to all the meetings of the Commission from the beginning and who knew the whole history of the way in which things had grown up in the Commission. In addition, there was in Bangkok, which is the present seat of the Commission, a United Kingdom Liaison Officer, Miss Hinder, who kept in close touch with the Commission between its meetings as well as attending the meetings themselves. Since the Seventh Session of the Commission both Mr. Stent and Miss Hinder have retired. This has inevitably deprived us of the benefit of continuity, but we have still been very strongly represented, and you will remember that at the Eighth Session, which has just been held, we were fortunate in having Lord Reading to represent the United Kingdom. This was the first occasion on which our delegation had been led by a Minister of the Crown and is a token of the importance attached by Her Majesty's Government to the work of E.C.A.F.E.

Another reason for the strong position of the United Kingdom in E.C.A.F.E. is that it is in our national language that the meetings are really conducted. Officially the languages of the Commission are English and French, but in practice most of the representatives attending the meetings from Asian countries are English-speaking rather than French-speaking, with the obvious exception of the three Indo-Chinese States. Inevitably, therefore, most of the work of the Commission is done in English. Drafts of documents are normally prepared in English in the first instance, and translated into French. It is natural, therefore, that the United Kingdom should be one of the countries regularly invited to be represented on drafting committees, and this in turn ensures that the United Kingdom's views on controversial matters are not overlooked.

One of the points you will have noticed about the membership of E.C.A.F.E. is that the Soviet Union is a member. This is something which is often forgotten in this country. People talk about the value of E.C.E., the Economic Commission for Europe, as being an organization in which the countries of the West and the Soviet Union meet and, therefore, a forum in which at some future date there might be meetings of minds as well as of bodies and so, possibly, a step towards lasting peace. It is equally true that both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union are members of E.C.A.F.E. and, looking back over the whole history of the Commission, I would have thought that that, on the whole, has been an advantage.

It has, of course, been a period largely of Cold War, whether acknowledged or unacknowledged, and the Soviet Union has undoubtedly used

E.C.A.F.E. as a ground for trying to put over propaganda of various kinds, most of it with an anti-Western flavour. For instance, at the Session at Rangoon in February, 1952, the Soviet delegation made a powerful attack upon what it conceived as being the United Kingdom's economic "exploitation" of the British territories in South-east Asia and, indeed, of other territories now independent, such as Burma, in which Britain retains some important economic interests. Those propaganda attacks by the Soviet Union have, on the whole, done the Soviet Union no good whatsoever. They are usually rather forced into the agenda, and the representatives of the Asian countries to whom they are presumably directed have been pretty impatient with them. The Soviet delegates speak in Russian, which means that there have to be interpretations into English and French, and it becomes tedious to listen to a half-hour's speech in Russian, which you do not understand, and then hear it interpreted into English, when it may still not be very interesting, and, in addition, have to sit through it all again when interpreted into French. For that physical reason, as well as because they are digressions from the real subject on the agenda, with which the Asian representatives are keen to proceed, there has been antipathy to these Soviet propaganda speeches from the outset.

Secondly, we have been able to give effective answers to them, when necessary, and I am glad to say usually in very much shorter format than the Soviet propaganda speeches themselves. For instance, after the attack upon Britain's so-called exploitation of the mineral resources of Asia we were able to give an answer by one of our leading economists which completely demolished the Soviet case. I believe it was of great value that that answer was heard by the Asian representatives present, because charges of exploitation are common Communist propaganda, and they would have been heard in one way or another whether or not the Soviet delegate had made his speech, but the answer to them is by no means so often heard, and on this occasion it was particularly effectively presented. I have discussed this subject with Asian representatives in the Commission and have asked them whether they think that over the last three or four years we or the Russians have come out better in this slanging match which the Russians like to start. They have all been convinced that this propaganda effort by the Russians has been greatly to the latter's disadvantage.

The United Kingdom naturally takes a special interest in the part played in E.C.A.F.E. by the two Associate Members which are British colonies or British protected territories—namely, Hong Kong and the Malaya/British Borneo group. It has been a striking feature of the policy of the Governments of these territories that the delegates they have sent to E.C.A.F.E. sessions have by no means consisted of British officials in the Government employ. It has, in fact, been the exception rather than the rule for the representation to be British, or at any rate for the leader of the delegation to be British. In the case of Malaya and British Borneo, the leader has normally been a Malay from the Federation of Malaya and in the delegation there have been Chinese and Indians from Singapore. In the case of Hong Kong the delegations have been predominantly Chinese.

These international meetings are a very valuable training ground for the leading Asian inhabitants of these countries and we hope that the experience will stand them in good stead when they reach the stage at which they can become more directly responsible for the conduct of their own foreign relations.

The United Kingdom has obviously one great difficulty with regard to E.C.A.F.E., and particularly so at the present moment when the Treasury are, rightly, thinking very much of economy in Government spending; that is, that we in this country are a long way from the E.C.A.F.E. region, and it is expensive to send a delegation out there. That has been overcome to some extent by using as delegates people already in the area, either in the Commissioner-General's office in Singapore or in the various British Embassies and Legations or High Commissioners' staffs in the different countries of the region. These officials have the added advantage of being directly concerned with the region in their everyday work and are, therefore, already familiar with the subjects to be discussed and may well know personally some of the Asian representatives attending the meetings.

LINK WITH U.N.O.

Looking at the present situation of E.C.A.F.E., we can say, without any doubt, that it is now a firmly established part of the United Nations Organization. This was not yet so a year ago. The three Regional Economic Commissions were reviewed last year by the Economic and Social Council, to see whether they had justified themselves, and were worth keeping in being. I am glad to say that all three came through that scrutiny with flying colours, and E.C.A.F.E. particularly so. There is now no set time at which E.C.A.F.E.'s future will again be reviewed by the Economic and Social Council. It can, therefore, regard itself as a permanent institution, so far as anything is permanent in politics these days.

Its organization is also now fairly complete. I have described to you, very briefly, its structure of committees, sub-committees and working parties. They cover all the chief subjects with which the region is immediately concerned, and there is not likely to be any very great change in them over the next twelve months or longer, though they are now very different from what they were twelve months ago.

Another feature of E.C.A.F.E.'s development during the last twelve or eighteen months has been the considerable growth in what we call its Advisory Services. The members of the Secretariat of the Economic Commission, of course, acquire considerable knowledge of the economy of the area and of its problems; it is only sensible that when countries in the region so wish, they should be able to call upon E.C.A.F.E. to send its expert in some subject—for example, iron and steel—to give them advice on problems falling within his particular field. Increasing use is being made of these opportunities.

LINK WITH THE COLOMBO PLAN

A further new feature is the establishment of a formal link between E.C.A.F.E. and the Colombo Plan. There had grown up a possibility of

overlapping between these two bodies, now that E.C.A.F.E. is turning increasingly from fact-finding towards economic development work. At the official level stage of the meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee held at Karachi last March it was decided to invite E.C.A.F.E. to send a representative to meetings of the Consultative Committee whenever subjects were under discussion which were of interest to both bodies, which means in fact on most occasions. That decision took effect immediately, and Dr. Lokanathan, the Executive Secretary of E.C.A.F.E., attended the subsequent ministerial stage of that meeting of the Consultative Committee.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Looking into the future a little, I should like to try to suggest what changes I think will come about in the work and organization of E.C.A.F.E. within the next year or two. The first and most obvious is that Japan will very shortly become an Associate Member of E.C.A.F.E. As I have explained, the difference between associate membership and membership is now very small. So that Japan will undoubtedly play a much larger part in E.C.A.F.E. work than it could do when attending only as an observer under the ægis of S.C.A.P. That has already been made evident by the fact that E.C.A.F.E. has been invited to hold certain of its meetings during the next twelve months in Japan.

Secondly, it is possible that some decision may be taken within the next twelve months on the permanent location of E.C.A.F.E.'s headquarters. When the Commission was set up it was originally given Shanghai as its headquarters and it started to form there. But shortly afterwards, as a result of the civil war in China, E.C.A.F.E. moved as a temporary measure to Bangkok, where it still is. At first it seemed possible that it might some day go back to Shanghai, but that idea was dropped officially at the Seventh Session, and there was then no permanent site in view. The subject has now been raised by the Philippines Government, which has offered Manila as a site for the headquarters of E.C.A.F.E. The Ceylon Government has also indicated that it may make an offer of a headquarters site, though that is not yet certain. It seems possible also that the Thai Government may offer Bangkok as a permanent site, in which case, though I hesitate to prophesy, that might prove the best solution, as both the Philippines and Ceylon are geographically bad centres for the E.C.A.F.E. region.

Another thing on which the next twelve months may throw light is a tendency in the E.C.A.F.E. Secretariat towards more and more complete Asianization. It is natural that the E.C.A.F.E. Secretariat would have an Asian Executive Secretary, and Dr. Lokanathan has proved a very able choice. It is right, too, that a large proportion of the Secretariat staff should be drawn from countries within the E.C.A.F.E. region. That has more and more become the case during the last twelve months, despite the obvious difficulty that these countries have in sparing administrators and experts on technical subjects. In consequence the Western representation in the Secretariat of E.C.A.F.E. has decreased and rightly so; but there is beginning, I think, to be a danger that it may decrease beyond the point

which is desirable in a branch of the United Nations Secretariat. There are of course recruitment problems, especially while the permanent location of E.C.A.F.E.'s headquarters remains undecided. None the less, I hope it may be possible to maintain a balance, and in particular I should like to see more qualified experts from the United Kingdom applying for posts in the E.C.A.F.E. Secretariat when they fall vacant.

A further change which may come about at some time in the future is an extension of E.C.A.F.E.'s work to cover social as well as economic activities. You will notice that E.C.A.F.E. is a subordinate body of the Economic and Social Council, but it is itself officially concerned only with economic matters. That is, perhaps, a slight over-statement, since there is in Bangkok, working alongside the E.C.A.F.E. Secretariat, a representative of the United Nations Department of Social Activities. Nevertheless, the emphasis is on the economic aspect of problems which are necessarily both economic and social, and that dual nature of the problems may at some future date be more adequately recognized by the conversion of the Regional Commissions into Economic and Social Commissions of the United Nations.

I will mention just one more possible change of great importance. It was proposed last February by the representative of F.A.O., the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, who attended the Eighth Session of E.C.A.F.E., that there should be a Joint Division formed, staffed half by E.C.A.F.E. and half by F.A.O., to study the economic implications of agricultural problems in the E.C.A.F.E. region. This seems to me a particularly desirable development, since most of the countries of the region are basically agricultural, and some of them have perhaps been over-emphasizing recently the value to them of industrial as opposed to agricultural development. The work of the proposed Joint Division might help to correct this tendency. Nevertheless, desirable as it may be, the proposal has some rather difficult budgetary implications and it may not be possible for the Joint Division to be brought into being until the need for staff economies becomes less stringent.

With those rather disjointed remarks I come to the end of my prophesying, but I would be happy to answer questions which anyone may wish to put to me, so far as I am able, on that or on other parts of my talk.

THE CHAIRMAN: I personally am delighted that I have arrived back in this country just in time to listen to the highly instructive and interesting lecture we have had from Mr. Brenchley.

I was so glad to hear what he said about agriculture, because I saw in my own time what I may call the first molehill of agricultural uplift in India, to help the peasants raise their standard of life. I suppose large practical help on those lines will be the next development in South-east Asia. What is troubling me so much now is that as you have no money, you are living on pious hopes, are you not? I presume in time you will get some money. Secondly, I cannot understand how we are to give actual and practical help to the countries in South-east Asia until we can base that help on security, and in all too many of them the security situation leaves much to be desired.

I conclude my few remarks by saying how very deeply grateful I personally am for your very lucid and clear exposition of what E.C.A.F.E. is and what E.C.A.F.E. hopes to be.

Col. G. ROUTH: I am told there are several bodies responsible for finding money for Asian development, E.C.A.F.E. among them, and I wonder what the others are?

Mr. BRENCHLEY: E.C.A.F.E. as such is not responsible for finding money for economic development; that would be an over-statement at present. But there is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is a United Nations body responsible for providing money in the form of loans for development projects which it thinks economically sound. The Bank has extended loans to a number of the E.C.A.F.E. member countries. The Colombo Plan is another of the sources of finance. The United States of America has expended quite considerable sums in the form of E.C.A. grants; and also sent the 2,000,000 tons of wheat supplied recently to India. That wheat was sold to the Indian public and the money thus raised is being set aside for development projects.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN MALAYA

By DR. VICTOR PURCELL, C.M.G., Litt.D., Ph.D.

Lecture delivered at a meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on November 5, 1952, Sir Horace Seymour, G.C.M.G., C.V.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: An introduction of Dr. Purcell is hardly necessary to this audience, but it is one of those customs which, like all good customs, we must observe. I need only remind you, therefore, that he has had long experience of Malaya as a Civil Servant before and since the war; that as a lecturer at Cambridge he is fortunate enough to have occasion to visit the country every year and that he has recently returned, and will tell us of his thoughts and experience during this last stay in Malaya.

THE last occasion when I had the honour of addressing the Royal Central Asian Society was when I returned from a visit to Malaya and South-east Asia two years ago. I went to Malaya two years after the Emergency, in 1950, when the Briggs Plan was just starting, and then I visited a number of the villages. On the occasion of my recent visit I went to Malaya at the invitation of the Malayan Chinese Association, an Association founded some years ago, as a community, with the blessing of the late Sir Henry Gurney, it also had the blessing of the Commissioner-General. The Association wanted me on this recent visit to take stock of the situation. I took with me a colleague, Mr. Carnell, who is Lecturer in Colonial Administration at Oxford. This was his third visit to Malaya, and I was glad to have him with me because he had knowledge not only of Malaya but of the other colonies and territories in the Empire and he was able to see the comparisons and analogies which I would have missed. We went out by air and arrived in Singapore on August 20, 1952. We spent one month exactly in Malaya, going up and down the country, and of course we received a very fine welcome from the Chinese community, our hosts.

There was difficulty on my arrival—I say “my” because *I* was “the nigger in the wood-pile.” A certain group of Malays objected to my coming because they said I came in the interests of one single community. I wrote to the President of the United Malays National Organization explaining that I came in the interest of the community as a whole, that I had enjoyed the friendship of the Malays for about thirty years, and that I hoped I should be able to meet the President himself. Eventually he was to meet me, but at the last moment the meeting did not take place. A good deal was made of this incident, but out of proportion to its importance, because the United Malaya National Organization does not have the standing it had when it was first founded. It was founded in 1946 to protest against the Malayan Union. You will remember that after the war the British Government introduced a union with the State boundaries and introduced at the same time the principle of equality of citizenship. On this

protest the Union was succeeded on February 1, 1948, by a Federation. Since its leader, Dato Onn, left the party the organization has declined in influence and now represents a very small proportion of the Malays; in fact, the division and uncertainty among the Malays is one of the main troubles in Malaya at the present time. The Malayan Chinese Association, on the other hand, is a strong organization. It is well organized and has sufficient funds. The Malays, on the contrary, are badly organized: they are split up into various groups, sections and factions, and they are accordingly very frustrated. One of the immediate impressions I had was that the Malays did not know exactly where they were heading. They felt a sense of general resentment as to how things were going. I would say that the principal feeling against the British régime comes from the Malays and not from anyone else. I am excepting, of course, always the Communists in the jungle. Nevertheless no considerable section of Malays or others really wishes the British to leave Malaya, in spite of some of the theories to the contrary, and that in itself should give us some degree of comfort; but in my view that is only one small part of the story.

We visited, during our month in Malaya, several of the big towns and a considerable number of the new villages in some of the States and Settlements—Kedah, Selangor, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, and so forth. These new villages were created in accordance with the Briggs Plan. Lieutenant-General Briggs, who died, I am sorry to say, not very long ago, went out to advise on Malaya, and he said the only way in which to settle the Emergency was that the Chinese squatters, of whom there were about 500,000, should be brought together, under administrative control, into villages. That scheme has been put into operation; in fact, it came to maturity about the end of 1951.

The murder of Sir Henry Gurney gave rise to a depression, especially among the Europeans, amounting almost to despair. But this depression was very soon succeeded by a new spirit amongst the people of the country, a spirit of deep resolve arising from resentment. People in general reacted very strongly to the murder, and in fact I think it is one of the greatest blunders that the Communists have committed. My view is that they did it unintentionally, but that can only be confirmed or denied in the light of history in the years to come. However, the new spirit gained in strength, and at that period, about November and December, 1951, the Briggs Plan came to maturity and began to embarrass the Communists quite a lot. That meant a higher rise in the spirit of the Europeans generally and of a good many of the Chinese and members of other communities. Since the arrival of General Templer in February, 1952, the improvement of morale has become associated with him and his leadership.

I went to Malaya in a very hopeful mood. I believe when I spoke to the Society in regard to my last visit I struck a note of qualified optimism. This time I went with much greater expectations than I had done on the previous occasion, and indeed there was a great deal superficially that justified that feeling. The towns of Malaya, notably Singapore, remain comparatively remote from the Emergency; in fact, in some ways Singapore is inclined to brush the Emergency aside. There are still signs of the great prosperity which came to Malaya with the boom in 1951. There is building

going on, factories are going up. When you fly over the country you see many scores of new buildings all roofed with Marseilles tiles. (One of the features which distinguishes Malaya from other Colonies, especially the African ones, is that there is very little corrugated iron or asbestos.) Although I have not a very good picture to paint of the situation, I do not want to give the impression of unrelieved gloom. Malaya is a living organism; there is development, and in many ways the country is going ahead. The morale of the Europeans and of many Asians is high.

When I came to visit the new Chinese villages, however, I began to have certain misgivings. The villages differ very greatly and according to a number of factors. The first factor is: how long have they been established? If the village is new it is usually at sixes and sevens, with a row of red earth and new half-made drains, pieces of plank, and so on; but if the village has been established say for a couple of years the chances are that it is beginning to assume the appearance of a human habitation. These villages differ also according to the characteristics of the resettlement officers in charge. If the resettlement officer is a good man, then the village reflects his personality; if he is a mediocre individual, the same applies, and so on. A number of the resettlement officers are very good indeed; they are putting their hearts into the new villages. But there are also a number of mediocre resettlement officers and a number of indifferent ones—people who are merely doing the job for a living. I place high amongst the good resettlement officers a number of missionaries who were previously in China and who have a knowledge of the Chinese language. The villages differ also in proportion to whether they have been peaceful and not interfered with, or otherwise. I went to one village in which there had been two murders, in each case of the Chinese headman, at an interval of about a week, not long before I arrived. There are two fences round the villages. These fences the bandits cut, and going to the headman's house, shot him dead and then left again. No one said a word about this. I wondered why the village had not been punished like Permatang Tinggi, since the inhabitants were likewise guilty of not giving information. Another thing that gave me misgivings was that this particular village was twenty miles away from any real "jungle." I wondered how it was possible for the guerillas to assemble in this way, cut the wire, come into the village and murder the headman without interference. I was told that the Police Post at the village, manned by Malay police, had not fired a shot.

My first feeling of suspicion that, perhaps, the optimism that we find reflected in our newspapers is a little overdone came when someone said to me: "You must always travel by taxi, because they are never interfered with; they have an understanding with the bandits; they pay them so much a month and they are not therefore interfered with." I wondered how it was possible for the guerillas to have such a good idea what was going on on the roads that they could distinguish between a taxi and other vehicles. But this general feeling I had (and it was shared by my colleague) crystallized when I met a Chinese-speaking officer of the Malayan Civil Service. He remarked that things "were not getting any better." I asked why he said that, because my impression was that everybody thought they were very much better. He

replied: "Yes, but that feeling is confined almost exclusively to the Europeans. The fact is we are not making any progress with the fundamental problem of winning over the 500,000, or whatever their number, squatters to our side." I asked what he suggested we should do. He shrugged his shoulders and said: "All I can think is that we should switch the whole of the machinery of propaganda away from the people on to the Administration. The Administration is very largely out of touch with the villages; its officers live outside them; a great proportion of them are centred on the towns, notably Kuala Lumpur, which has a large percentage of the total." He then spoke to me about the extreme difficulty of getting people to talk to the Chinese. That is not the first occasion that this complaint has come to my attention. I have been talking and writing about that problem of language for years. I fear the situation in that respect has been very little remedied. The number of Civil Service officers learning Chinese has been somewhat increased, but taking the Administration and the Security Force together (remember that the Security Force number somewhere in the neighbourhood of half a million—there are I believe somewhere about 40,000 troops, 50,000 Police at least and about 350,000 Home Guards), I should say not more than one in 10,000 can carry on a conversation with the Chinese in their own language. The bulk of the Chinese squatters know very little Malay, but a knowledge even of Malay is not widespread among the European troops at least. That estimate is subject to correction, but I do not see any reason to doubt its general fairness. That is, of course, a serious handicap, and it means that even those who are in daily contact with the villagers are unable to communicate with them effectively and are therefore unable to understand their difficulties. I should mention that there is a police school at Cameron Highlands at which there is an intensive course in the Chinese dialects, but it is a twelfth-hour measure, and considering the dimensions of the problem it is rather like putting out the Fire of London with a squirt.

The villagers labour under a very severe handicap. They are brought in from the jungle where, generally speaking, they took as much land as they wanted. You will remember that they were not important in number until the Japanese occupation. The Japanese encouraged squatting and after our return we allowed the squatters to remain where they were; in fact, we had neither the administrative officers nor the time to deal with them successfully; nor did we wish to interfere with anything which would increase the food supply of the country. These people have been brought from thousands of individual settlements into the new villages. The land has to be obtained from the State, which means in effect from the Malays. Some of the land encroaches on Malay reservations—that is, land set aside for cultivation by the Malays. That, of course, does not please the Malays and adds to the friction. Also, it is not always possible to get land which is adjacent to the houses. In some cases the villagers may have to go two or three miles to their vegetable gardens, and their crops are likely to be grubbed up by pigs, by Malays, or by anybody about. The vegetable gardens are an essential part of the economy of the people. A great number of Chinese squatters work in plantations and supplement their food by growing vegetables. There is also a large section of the squatter com-

munity which grows vegetables for the urban market. There was, two or three years ago, a committee that went into the squatter problem and found that the squatters were an economic necessity for Malaya. This is true at any time, but very much truer in a period of recession. Before last year there was a boom in rubber, and it was possible for the squatters to buy as much rice as they wanted from Siam. The Siamese rice question is becoming more acute because the Siamese are getting as much as they can for their rice, and the price of it has gone up in the Federation. In fact, the price went up to 36 cents a catty when I was in the Federation, whereas before the war it was 6 cents a catty. The cost of food was far greater than before the war, and proportionately so. So if wages are reduced and purchasing power is lost the villagers are thrown more and more upon what they can themselves grow. As I say, these villages labour under handicaps. The people are there behind wire. They are subject to a curfew and they are also subject to duress on the part of the Communists. It appears that the Communists can still be selective in their murdering. I have no time now to discuss the new Communist orders issued about last December. I do not think there is any reason to think that long-term Communist policy has switched very greatly, but they seem to concentrate more on selected individuals and to avoid the indiscriminate killing of civilians.

I come to the question of the reprisals. Reprisals took place in the early part of the Emergency largely not by design or by policy but because outraged police and soldiers who did not know where their enemy was struck rather blindly at the apparent source of their enemy. There was the Batang Kali incident, for example. However, these incidents did not recur. The feeling of the Administration was very much against them. But they seem to have been reintroduced as policy since General Templer went there. I went to Pematang Tinggi, a few miles south of Penang on the mainland—or rather visited its site. There is nothing there now. That incident took place early in August, and the story is that about 300 Malays came out of the jungle (incidentally, there is no “jungle” for many miles), went into the camp, and murdered the Chinese resettlement officer. Then General Templer arrived with his armoured cars; assembled the villagers and told them that unless they revealed who the murderers were he would punish them. They revealed nothing. Sixty-seven men, women and children were therefore put into detention. Needless to say, some were quite innocent.

One thing I can say with confidence (and I made very careful enquiries amongst the Chinese in Penang province) is that the universal belief there is that it was an inside job. They say that the Chinese resettlement officer was the member of a well-known Penang family, a ne'er-do-well, a little man who used to bully the villagers and extract things from them under threats of a shot-gun. It was said that he was accordingly disposed of by the villagers. I have no means of proving that one way or the other. But let us assume for a moment that it is true. If so, no amount of detention or punishment is likely to persuade the villagers to convict themselves of murder.

Now let us take the policy generally. In the last few days there has been another punishment of a village. This time Pekan Jabi, a very tiny

hamlet three miles north of Singapore Island. Its nearness to Singapore shows how the guerillas or Communists are able to penetrate near to big strongholds of Administration. Let us consider what appeal can be made to the inhabitants of these villages (one has to be careful to call them "villages." Having been a prisoner-of-war once myself, I referred inadvertently to "this camp," and the official taking me round jumped at me like a ton of bricks, saying: "This is not a *camp*; it is a *New Village*." I was misled by the existence of the barbed wire). What appeal can one make to these squatters? One can say to them: "If the Communists take over control you will be much worse off than you are now." That may conceivably be true, but a family living in a shack with an earth floor, with whom I conversed, subject to a curfew, with barbed-wire round them, and also subject to an unstable rubber market which may mean a livelihood or not, will not readily believe that kind of propaganda. One can also say to them that if the Communists came they would lose their democratic rights. But they have neither citizenship nor votes! Moreover, there are no parliamentary elections. So that kind of propaganda is not likely to be much good. It is possible to say, as the United States say in effect (I will admit to slightly caricaturing the way they put it)—"If you behave yourself properly, in due course you will get frigidaire and skyscrapers." That has very little appeal to those people. Remember that although they are transferred from the jungle to the villages they are still subject to the possibility of arrest. Purges are going on all the time. One resettlement officer said: "It is difficult because we do not know what our man-power will be the next day. The police may come and may arrest six males or females if they want to and take them away to police stations for interrogation. The police are allowed to keep them up to twenty-eight days for interrogation. Those people may come back; they may not. Of course that creates new economic problems. Who is going to look after a family deprived of its wage-earner? The Government, of course, has to do something about that. Mind you, a good deal has been done for these settlers. The Government has subscribed a large proportion of the money for the schools and the Malayan Chinese Association has supplemented the grants. The Government also pays the salaries of teachers for one year. That, of course, is a concession, but it annoys the Malays because they consider all this money should not be spent on what they regard as intruders. Also, other things are being done for the settlers. For example, welfare work. That has not actually got under way, but should do so before long by means of the girls who have been brought out from the British Red Cross Society. (I may mention in passing that in one State they will not be operating, at least for some time, because the Red Cross has been held to be a Nazarene symbol! I do not know how that is to be got over or whether it will be got over, but it is a symptom of the religious nationalism one can detect amongst certain of the Malays in Malaya.)

Finally, I still pose the question of what the right line of approach is to these villagers, but I do not say it is a question I can solve. In fact, it stumps me, and I have had a lot of experience of political warfare both in Malaya and the South-west Pacific. But, to take the purely negative side, I cannot feel that the policy of going to a village and punishing it because

some murder has taken place is going to produce the results that were hoped for. The official justification for this policy is that information which was hitherto not available is now being made available. If that is so, it ought to be reflected very shortly in the end of the shooting war; it ought to be possible to round up the leaders and fairly speedily to make an end of the shooting war. There has been a considerable increase in the number of leaders killed. However, one thing is certain, and that is that the smallest successes under the present régime are highlighted in the English newspapers. There are successes which under Sir Henry Gurney—for example, the capture of a bandit—would not even have been reported in the press but which are now given headlines whenever they occur. If one examines the figures one finds that although there is an increase in the number of killings, it is not very considerable. I think from January to August—I do not know what has happened since statistically—the figures went up about seven a month. Assuming they went up by fifty a month, that is not enough to suggest that the bandits are getting to the end of their man-power resources. The number of guerillas in the jungle has been calculated to be from 4,000 to 8,000. That is regarded as the optimum figure for fighting in that kind of country. There is a civilian force of sympathizers of Communism, the Min Yüan, from whom the guerillas have hitherto drawn their reinforcements. It is said to number up to 80,000.

A villager is faced with this: he is told that if he does something that the Communists do not like the consequence to him will be very serious. If he refuses to supply the guerillas with what they want, then he almost certainly will be shot. He may be suspected of communication with the authorities, in which case he will also probably be shot. As against that the High Commissioner can only say to the inhabitants of the villages: "If you help the enemy in any way, then I will put you into detention, or I may cut down your rice ration, or subject you to curfew, which means that you stay in the house so many hours out of the eighteen." They are the two big sticks wielded by the two sides. (If I were exposed to these two threats I know which one I would respect.) Also, unless a policy such as this is carried through consistently, it is bound to recoil on the heads of those who have initiated it. Unless the High Commissioner applies this policy in every instance there is bound to be loss of prestige. The Chinese have a proverb: "He who rides the tiger dare not dismount."

Now I want to pass from the Emergency itself—after all, the shooting war is one thing, but there are other things of equal importance in Malaya—to general considerations of policy at the present time. When I was in Malaya two years ago I was only in Kuala Lumpur for a few days, but I dined with Sir Henry Gurney twice. I had two long conversations with him and I know then that the policy was to introduce sympathetic institutions as soon as possible, and he was aiming at elections; that is to say, that he hoped to remedy the citizenship question sufficiently to enable elections to have some meaning. I know that I am not misrepresenting the present policy when I say that is not contemplated during the present emergency. In Singapore, as you know, much progress has been made towards the introduction of representative government on the Legis-

lative Council level. In the Federation there have so far been no elections on the Legislative Council level. There were Municipal Elections in Penang and in Malacca and also in Kuala Lumpur. That last is a very interesting case, because the Malayan Chinese Association and the United Malays National Organization got together to exclude Dato Onn and his Independence of Malaya Party. They succeeded in doing that. It is a precarious sort of alliance, but it shows what devices the situation encourages.

Now only two things can happen in Malaya: one is that Malaya will in a reasonable space of time become independent under a democratic system and will be able to stand on its own feet and resist the Communists, or it will become Communist. Our declared policy, of course, is to produce the first state of affairs, that is to say an independent and strong Malaya. I cannot see any signs of that being achieved. The concessions made to the Chinese, for example, in the way of citizenship, there were some concessions made in the wrong way by re-defining the subjects of the Sultan, whereby the number of Federal citizens was increased; but there is no move of the kind that has taken place in other parts of the British Commonwealth. As you know, in India, at the time of Lord Ripon, in the 70s or 80s of last century, Local Government was introduced. There is no Local Government in Malaya; they are introducing a Village Council Bill which is intended to give a certain measure of autonomy to the villages, but even this measure is very moderate and reserves a great deal of power to district officers. Nevertheless, the measure, moderate as it is, is not welcomed by quite an important section of the Administration, on the ground that it will lead to inefficiency and is also dangerous. I think one can agree it will lead both to inefficiency and that it is "dangerous." But unless a start is made there will never be a state of affairs in which these Malayan people can begin to find their own economic levels outside their communities. Within the rigid framework of the Emergency the Malays and Chinese are poised against one another in a state of tension; communal differences are accentuated. Take Ceylon. There the people have had elections for many years. When they were first held there was the usual confusion and trouble, but ultimately there was progress and development as I think is taking place in Singapore. When the elections were first held in Ceylon the people voted communally. The Sinhalese would vote for a Sinhalese and a Tamil for a Tamil. They no longer do this. They vote (so I am informed on the best authority) according to their economic interests. That is to say that Ceylon, which is often held up as an example of what can be done or should be done, is able to a great extent to stand on its own feet and play its part in the Commonwealth. But if the shooting war were to end tomorrow the same could not be said of Malaya. In fact, the end of the shooting war would precipitate difficulties of an even more serious kind, because the Malays would no longer have their energies fully occupied in fighting the Emergency and all their grievances and sense of frustration would come to the fore. This inter-communal feeling is very uncomfortable and even dangerous. I do not know whether it is generally realized that under the Federal Constitution the British advisers have no direct part in the Ad-

ministration. Before the war the British Resident, who was the predecessor of the British Adviser, had a large house and a retinue of servants and was also in complete charge of the administration of the State, both purely administrative and financial. By the Federation all those powers are transferred to the Malays. The advisers still have their large houses—I stayed in two of them—and they still have their retinue of servants, but their *staff* consists usually of one lady secretary; and if the Malays do not choose to ask the advice of the British Adviser they can easily avoid doing so. I was told that when the Federal Constitution first came into operation one British Adviser at least had nothing to do; he simply sat and hoped the Malays would come to him for advice. That situation has finished and the Malays find they need advice on a good many matters, but there is usually no reason why they should ask for advice, because the actual administration is in their hands. It means, however, that we have not handed the administration over to the Malay *people* but to the Malay *aristocracy*. The impression I got from talking to the Malay newspapermen was that every man-jack of them is very much of a Leftist—far to the Left; in fact, I wondered why one or two were still outside a detention camp. Their resentment is much more against the British for their patronizing tactics before the war than is generally understood. Amongst this sort of person—and I am afraid that this kind of thinking is not confined to Leftists—there is a school of thought which says: If we get rid of the British, then we have our army and police; they are almost exclusively Malay and will be able to run the country in our own interests; we will nationalize tin and rubber and we shall in that way be enabled to draw off from the Chinese a share of the wealth which we have been unable to get by economic control. That sounds fantastic and unrealistic, and it is. It depends on the proposition that Malaya would remain a political vacuum, free from external intervention, which it never would. If the British left somebody else would step in. It looks as if South-east Asia is fated to be a sort of semi-colonial area. In South America there are republics run by the army and the police. However, this kind of thinking is not shared by the Malays generally. The ruling Malays certainly have no desire at all for the British to leave.

Now let me turn to the Chinese. The Chinese have one great weakness. They have the economic power of the country in their hands, but they do not participate to any great extent in the Armed Forces, though this participation is increasing. If the situation continues it will mean that the Chinese political power will be correspondingly reduced. Moreover, it will enable the Malays to say that the Chinese are not bearing their part in the Emergency.

Then there is the question of political development. One official, an old colleague of mine, said: "If we can only establish a Labour Party here"—he is a Conservative in English politics but by "Labour Party" he meant something to break down this communal wall in Malaya. There is an embryonic Labour Party, but in the Federation there is only a nominal move in that direction. "If you had a Labour Party," my colleague said, "then very soon the parties of the Centre and Right would come into existence and they would cut across these communal traditions

to a great extent." Then he added that he was afraid it would not work because the police are not politically educated enough. They would not be able to distinguish between pink and red, and Labour leaders would find themselves in great difficulty. I am afraid I agree with him.

Now, Sir Horace, I wish to portion my time carefully so that I do not squeeze the questions into the last few minutes. I wish I could end with a resounding peroration that we are on the right or wrong track, but I fear my subject-matter and my feeling do not lend themselves to that kind of thing. I can only give you my experience—and there are a number of interrogation marks—and express to you misgivings I have about present events and also my own feeling that the policy of reprisals, amongst others, is not well conceived. One of the unfortunate features about the administration is that there are so few people who are really in contact with the people. The High Commissioner is new to the country; the Deputy High Commissioner also new to the country; the late Chief Secretary became superfluous because of the new arrangements and has retired. And, believe me, the people who have any lengthy knowledge of Malaya are woefully thin on the ground. And then there is the all-pervading consideration of language. I do not think it is possible to exaggerate the futility of the state of affairs when it is impossible for the Administration really to make contact with the people through the medium of their own language. There are as yet no Chinese in the Malayan Civil Service of the Federation. That is the note on which I will end. It is not a very cheerful note, but perhaps when I answer questions I may be provoked into cheerfulness.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like the lecturer to amplify a point which he mentioned in passing, about falling rubber prices.

Dr. PURCELL: Any considerable further fall in rubber prices would be catastrophic, especially if there were anything like the state of affairs that there was during the slump of 1931-2, because the unemployed would increase in number. They would undoubtedly swell the ranks of the general malcontents. There may be some facts in this connection which are not within my knowledge, but I believe the seriousness of the fall in rubber prices is being brought home to the Americans, and they may consider it is not purely an economic matter, but also a political question. In a country like the United States which is founded on free enterprise there is naturally the attempt to buy in the cheapest market and to sell in the dearest. That is right provided it does not mean that the economy of their allies is sabotaged in one very important quarter. Things have not yet reached that stage, but even whilst I was in Malaya there were tendencies, and it would seem they were tendencies caused by the fall in rubber prices which were reflected in a demand for more land for growing vegetables. This is only the beginning. Unless it is checked and there is some sort of reasonable price assured for the future of rubber, and also that there can be a working agreement between employers and employees—there has been some controversy about that—there will be trouble. But I can see at least one person in the audience who knows more about this aspect than I do.

Group-Captain St. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: When I was in Malaya rather a long time ago, the Chinese community were looked upon as very industrious and good citizens. I think our people there appreciated what they were doing for the country. If Dr. Purcell will forgive me, I will quote another Chinese proverb which says: "If a bear coughs at the North Pole, the sands of the Sahara are disturbed." At the same time, I feel the Communistic movement in China must have a large effect on the Chinese community in Malaya. I would be grateful if Dr. Purcell could give an idea as to whether the majority of the Chinese in Malaya itself are Communist-thinking or anti-Communist?

Dr. PURCELL: You have given me an opportunity for at least skirting round one matter I left severely alone, because of its complexity. The Chinese in Malaya are under pressure from all sorts of forces: under pressure from the Communists and from political die-hard groups; under pressure from Malays, Europeans and Indians. Moreover, the community is composed of different sections. They differ according to the period during which they have been in Malaya. Some go back to the time of the Portuguese and they are identified with the country. They have a sentiment towards China, but they regard Malaya as their country. There are more recent waves who have lost their Chinese orientation; in fact, they are usually educated in English. More difficult and important than any other question today is that of education. Travelling through the country I saw 90 or 100 schools. I met what seemed like 10,000 school-teachers; they seemed to be everywhere; they were Chinese schoolteachers who were worried about their own future. The Chinese set up their schools without help and they feel the Government policy is to do away with them. There is a division amongst the Chinese as to whether they are to be educated in English or Chinese. The Government policy since the war has been to increase English education, and two years ago Mr. Barnes from Oxford went out to Malaya on a mission as a result of which he made a report advocating the formation of a national school. That is going forward, and means that there will be two languages: Malay and Chinese. The Chinese who are in the Chinese schools (and a considerable part of my service in Malaya was in connection with these Chinese schools) see the red light and they are using whatever pressure they can bring to bear to stop this advance of English education at their expense, and see that they get the same proportionate share of the revenues that the English schools get. One criticism of this kind of education is that it can lead only to China and this, in the end, must mean Communist China. However, the spokesmen for the Chinese schools deny this and give the analogy of Switzerland, where all people speak French, German, and Italian at one time. That is not likely to be the case in Malaya. The reason is that Chinese, English, and Malay differ from one another far more than French, German, and Italian do, and so far English is not taught effectively in Chinese schools. Until it can be, Chinese who go to these schools will tend to be monolingual.

You asked me how far the people are communistically inclined and how far not. I would say the answer is the same as it was two years ago: that generally the people are indifferent. They want to remain as they

are, but according to the pressure put on them, then they have to make a decision. There is an increasingly large number who have got to make up their minds one way or the other. It is a question of life and death. Unfortunately the Communists have the big-stick of violence; the Administration's only strong suit is the Welfare State, and a Welfare State is a tricky thing to create in modern, faction-torn Malaya.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

THE HERITAGE OF CHAGHATAI LANGUAGE IN RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA

By SIR OLAF CAROE, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

RECENT events have given some prominence to attempts which are being made by groups of emigrants from Turkistan to establish a common language as a means of communication and exchange of ideas among the various peoples, mainly of Turkish race, forming the indigenous population in the Central Asian Soviet republics beyond the Caspian. This country, once comprised in Russian Turkistan and Transcaspia, and including the old States of Bukhara and Khiva (Khorezm), is now divided, on principles ostensibly described as ethnic and linguistic, into the five Soviet republics of Kazakistan, Isbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenia and Tajikistan, and the Autonomous S.S.R. of Karakalpakistan within Uzbekistan. Leaving aside the Russian immigrants (in very large numbers in Kazakistan and considerable elsewhere), all of these except Tajikistan hold populations mainly of Turkish stock speaking various forms of Turkic; the fifth, Tajikistan, has a dialect of Persian as its ruling language, but the Tajiks are intermingled with Uzbeks, and themselves often speak Uzbek as well as their own tongue.

Since 1924 the name Turkistan has disappeared from Russian official documents and maps, and all the emphasis has been laid on diversity as between the various Turkish peoples living within the Soviet Union. In accordance with well-established Soviet policy this discrimination has been particularly applied in the linguistic field, the differences rather than the similarities between Uzbek, Kazak, Karakalpak, Kirghiz and Turkmen being accentuated in every possible way, with one object no doubt of breaking down any tendencies towards political unity which might have survived from the 1918-22 interregnum period and the Basmachi movement. In 1924-5 Turkistan was split up by boundaries professing to be drawn on ethnic lines, the division being carried into effect in the linguistic field largely by means of new alphabets. Between 1925 and 1928 various forms of Roman script, differing *inter se*, were introduced in each of the five republics of Central Asia, the preference for a Roman script at that time being perhaps attributable to a calculation that immediate introduction of the Cyrillic would be open to too obvious criticism. When Turkey herself went over from Arabic to a Roman script in 1928, further thought became necessary, with the result that just before World War II various forms of Cyrillic alphabet were made compulsory in all these republics. The adoption of the Cyrillic had a number of advantages from the Soviet point of view. It again isolated Turkistan from Turkey, it tended to sever the younger from the older generation, and it facilitated the teaching of Russian in the higher classes. But if it tended to shape the native tongue towards Russian, it acted in a precisely contrary way against any aspiration for an indigenous linguistic unity. The older

generations, brought up on the Arabic script, were left behind; change upon change shook the bases of the indigenous culture. All publicity in the native tongues was directed to each tongue separately; journals and news-sheets were confined within the limits of each republic; and the literary culture of each was treated as a separate and unrelated item, lacking the common tradition of a universal Central Asian Turkish background.

However much one may deplore the political motives underlying Soviet activities in the field of Turkic linguistics, it would be the greatest mistake to underestimate their extent and importance. The Soviet output of publications on this subject is far greater than that of all the countries of the West put together; it includes grammars and dictionaries of almost every Turkic language, and these are compiled with the double object of systematizing, and to a large extent isolating, the languages to suit Soviet policy and of making them readily accessible to Russians. The recent excursion of Stalin himself into the realm of linguistics has been marked by the issue of the first volume of the *Tyurkologicheski Sbornik* (Turcological Symposium) of which the subject matter ranges from "The Personal Pronoun in the Karakalpak language" to "Ancient custom as reflected in the primitive life of nomads."

The effect of this painstaking and scholarly attention to what the West has been accustomed to regard as obscure Central Asian dialects can only be countered by some corresponding effort directed at promoting rather than undermining the cultural cohesion of these peoples. Although the scope of such an effort might at first be confined to the many thousands of refugees living outside the Soviet Union, it would inevitably be extended in the long run to Central Asia itself.

Since the time of the Russian revolution there has been a large emigration from among the Turks of Central Asia. The older emigration is made up of those who fled the country after putting up an unsuccessful resistance to the clamping down of Bolshevik power on Central Asia during the period roughly extending from 1918 to 1922. These refugees were, some of them, adherents of the old Uzbek régimes in Bukhara and Khiva, overturned by the Soviets, while others were members of "Young" parties who, at first in attempted negotiation with the Soviets and later in opposition to them, had unsuccessfully tried to found national Turkish States in a loose federation with Russia. The younger emigration consists in the main of the remnants of a great mass of deserters and prisoners of Turkish stock from the Soviet Union who fell into German hands after the German attack on Russia in 1941. As many as 180,000 from the five Central Asian republics alone were enlisted as volunteers and fought against the Soviets until Germany was overthrown in 1945. Both the older and the younger emigration have steadily pursued the political aim of a united Turkistan free from Russian domination, and have laid particular emphasis on the need to evolve a lingua franca which according to them should be adopted as a common though presumably subsidiary language to be understood by all Turks from Central Asia, whatever their tribal origin. They have in fact been in pursuit of a linguistic policy exactly the opposite of that which the Soviets have sought to apply in

Turkistan itself. How far is their end a practical one in the circumstances in which the Central Asian Turks are placed?

A LINGUA FRANCA DEFINED

Before proceeding to discuss this question it may be helpful to attempt some definition of the concept of a lingua franca, and in so doing to examine various examples that have occurred in history. A broad definition might be that a lingua franca is an original and often simplified language which is understood and can be used by speakers of various—related or unrelated—languages in an area which greatly exceeds the limits of the territory in which the lingua franca (or the base from which it is formed) constitutes the indigenous speech of a group of speakers. It may be an already living established language or it may be a new amalgam. Such a lingua franca may spread naturally or artificially, or there may be a process which is a combination of the conscious and the unconscious.

We have examples of the extreme natural process when a language becomes widespread because the culture it expresses is of a special importance, often for religious reasons. Illustrations are Latin in the Middle Ages, Arabic in the period of Muslim expansion, French in the late Renaissance. A language may also spread naturally on a commercial background as being that spoken by merchants travelling over a wide area. Examples are Kiswahili in East Africa and Mandinka in West Africa. Or a language may spread in response to an inarticulate demand for a simplified linguistic currency for the exchange of ideas. Examples of this process are pidgin-English in China, coastal Malay in Indonesia, Beach-la-Mar in Oceania, and Chinook Jargon in N.W. Canada.

A process in the middle range, which combines the conscious and unconscious elements, is observable in cases where an external culture has been superimposed, whether by a conquest of force or by a conquest of idea or by both, on an indigenous culture. Examples are the Latinization of English after the Norman conquest, the Arabo-Persianization of Hindi after the Muslim conquest of northern India, resulting in Urdu (the language of the camp), and a similar Arabo-Persianization (in this case, in the later stage at least, a conquest of the mind only) of the greater part of the Turkish world as a result of the conversion of these Turks to Islam. In such cases the resulting linguistic amalgam often tends to be made up of abstractions taken from the conqueror's language imposed on a native phonetic and grammatical structure. An extension of administration, or of idea, will cause such a language to spread automatically, often in a simplified form.

The other extreme, that of the conscious process, is found in cases where a new and universal linguistic currency is superimposed on a number of older currencies, which are themselves limited either in the area covered or in the values they are able to express. In such cases the new currency will usually be alien to the country or countries in which it is introduced, and it will be artificially spread by use in the courts, in administration, in education, and in publications. Such a language can be either that of the nation ruling for the time being—*e.g.*, Russian in the non-Slav parts of the Russian Empire, or English in India—or an

artificial language made up of a group of inter-related indigenous languages, so standardized as to be partly intelligible to native speakers over the widest possible area. Examples of this last type are standard Nyanja and standard Swahili in Africa. In the first case the lingua franca is unrelated to the indigenous languages; in the second it must represent some sort of common denominator between a group of related native tongues. But in both cases the introduction of a lingua franca of this type would be the result of conscious policy as deliberately planned as was the use of English as a medium of higher education in India under the influence of Macaulay.

CHAGHATAI

We may now examine the application of these ideas to the problem of evolving a lingua franca for the Central Asian Turks. In so doing it must be acknowledged at the outset that, although all Turkic languages are closely related and of a common stock, the divergencies in the spoken tongues today, even in the groups spoken east of the Caspian, are considerable, and make mutual comprehension a matter of difficulty in many cases. In their present-day forms they are definitely languages and not dialects, taking these terms in the general sense understood by non-linguists. Zeki Velidi Togan, one of the older emigration and a leader of the Turk nationalists of the 1918-22 period who aimed at independence, seeks to treat these languages as dialects; but has to admit* that, as spoken today, Kazak and Uzbek—the one broadly the steppe language, the other the language of the cities and settled cultivation—are very different from each other, and in another passage that there is now no common language in Turkistan. And in fact, although the syntactical structure of all Turkic languages is more or less identical, there is a great difference in phonetics and vocabulary, not to mention the different morphologies, which have to be mastered before a transposition can be effected between, say, Uzbek and Kazak, even on paper. When it comes to the spoken languages, the iranized Uzbek of Tashkent, Bukhara and Samarkand has so shed the vowel harmonies common to all other Turkic languages that it becomes phonetically unintelligible to a Kazak or a Kirghiz. The Turkmen language belongs rather to the Western Turkish group, and in many features is closer to Azeri and the dialects of Eastern Anatolia than to any of the Transcaspian languages.

There is, however, one historical sheet-anchor which gives hope to seekers after a common linguistic currency for Turkistan. This is the fact of the existence of the literary Chaghatai language, which came to birth originally at the Court of the Shahs of Khorezm in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries A.D. before the Mongol invasions, and flowers in the Timurid period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in the hands of the great classical writers, the Emperor Babur and the poet Mir Ali Shir Nevayi. Babur was not only the first emperor of India but the prince of autobiographers; Ali Shir Nevayi at the Court of the Timurid Hussain Baykara at Herat late in the fifteenth century is described by Babur as an

* *Bugünkü Türkçü* (Istanbul, 1942), pp. 582-3. Bugün Türkistanda hakim olan Kazak ve Özbek lehçeleri biri digirinden epeyi farklıdır. See also p. 587, *ibid.*

incomparable person, and by the British scholar E. J. W. Gibb as the eastern sun by whose light Ottoman-Turkish poetry was kindled into light.*

Both wrote in a Turkic language which has come to be known as Chaghatai, using a *nastaliq* form of the Arabic script. These are the Chaghatai classics. By one of those curious historical confusions the name Chaghatai is not Turkish, but derived from the Mongol Chaghatai, Chingiz Khan's second son, who succeeded to the patrimony of that part of his father's dominion roughly coincident with Transoxiana and the settled portion of Turkistan. Nothing could better demonstrate the absorption of the Mongol hordes in the Turkish civilization of the Amu and Syr Daryas.

Togan quotes† Enver Pasha as having said in Bukhara in 1921 that Osmanli (the language which emerged in the course of the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries from amid the welter of Anatolian patois as the Ottoman Turkish literary medium, and the father of modern Turkish, as now understood) would never become the common language of Turkistan. Since he had come to Turkistan, said Enver, it had become clear to him that a native Chaghatai must be invented. Togan adds that until the middle of the nineteenth century Chaghatai had in fact been regarded as a universal literary language not only in Turkistan but over the whole country of the Chaghatai and Golden (Juchi) hordes, and even by the Ilkhans in Persia. This would give it a range from Khorasan to the Volga and the Don. He adds that it was the medium of diplomatic correspondence between the Tsars and the Turkish States of Transoxiana, the Kazak steppe and the Urals, and that it was known as Tatar. According to him it began to fail as a currency first as a result of the loosening of economic ties which followed the disuse of the caravan routes in the maritime age, partly because as a literary medium it was ousted by Osmanli (the Ottomans had overrun the Crimea), and finally when Russian civilization, spreading over the ruins of Turkistan, paved the way for the supremacy of "small tribal literary languages" which could not compete with Russian and could be used by Russia for her own advantage. He attributes the rise of literatures in the "dialects" of Uzbek, Kazak, etc., to the influence of local patriots, ignorant of the Chaghatai literary tradition, who knew only their own tongue and clung to it as against the Russians. This resulted in separate Kazak, Uzbek and Kirghiz literatures which, during the period of cultural resistance to Russian absorption, were enriched by the reduction to writing of the old heroic epics, transmitted by minstrels, the *Kublandi* and *Édige Batir* among the Kazaks, the *Alpamish* and *Köröghlu* among the Uzbeks, the *Manas* among the Kirghiz, and the *Dede Korkut* (*Korkut Ata*) among the Turkmens. Togan's conclusion is that, although at the present time there is with the Turks of Turkistan and the Urals a Kazak, an Uzbek and a so-called Tatar literature, all these must one day unite in what he calls "a Central Turkish literature, based on an essential unity of language," and relying

* E. J. W. Gibb, *History of Ottoman Poetry* (London, 1900), vol. 1, pp. 127-9.

† *Op cit.*, p. 460. Osmanlı lisanı Türkistanda umumi lisan olmiyacaktır ve burasi için ayrı edibi Çağatai dili yasatılması lazımdır.

on the old Chaghatai classics and the heroic epics. He himself, a Bashkir from the Urals, hopes that this central language will be created round the Kazak and Ural element lying between Kazan to the west and the sedentary population of Transoxiana to the east and south. "It should be based," he says, "on the old Chaghatai language for phonetics, and on Kazak and tribal Uzbek for vocabulary." It may be suggested that this aim would be easier of realization if the author made it clear that what he calls "dialects" would remain: the new unified language becoming a subsidiary currency for easier intercommunication between the various peoples of Turkistan.

A MIDDLE LANGUAGE

A group of the younger emigration in Germany led by Veli Kayum Khan, of urban Uzbek extraction, has done more in the practical field actually to establish a written language which they hope may act as a medium of communication throughout Turkistan. This language they call *Ortatili* (i.e., the Middle Tongue), and they use it in a monthly journal entitled *Millij Tūrķistan* (National Turkistan). Unlike Togan's ideal this experiment is based on Uzbek with a few morphological and vocabulary allowances made for other languages of Turkistan. It is written in a Roman script based on the Kemalist script for modern Turkish with certain additions. In this journal there appear to be two slightly different forms of language used, both of Uzbek stock, the first proceeding from a semi-iranized Uzbek dialect of the Farghana valley, and the second from an iranized urban Uzbek dialect, evidently that of Tashkent. Either form, more particularly the fully iranized, looks very strange to a Kazak or a Kirghiz.* Almost the only concession to non-urban Turkistan is to be found in the interposition of an *-n* in the locative and ablative cases between the possessive suffix and the case ending. Thus for "in his house" *üyindä* (or *Uyinda* iranized) is written in place of the Uzbek *öyidä*, so coming nearer to the Kazak *üyüdö*. Otherwise, phonetically at least, the language of *Ortatili* is very much an urban iranized form of Uzbek, and has already come under strong criticism from those of a more nomadic heritage who, like Togan, would prefer as a basis at least a system of phonetics more intelligible to a Kazak or Kirghiz ear. Nevertheless we have here a practical effort to realize an ambition, an effort which may indeed be criticized but should command respect. And it is at least arguable that a linguistic currency based on urban usage is more likely to establish itself than one manufactured in the mountains or upon the steppe.

We now come to a consideration of the utmost importance. Chaghatai

* One of the most important features of the iranized Uzbek dialects is their loss of the original vowel harmony, which is common to all other Turkic languages and even retained in certain form of Uzbek—e.g., the dialect of Yese. Furthermore the iranized dialects have a change of vowel qualities, inasmuch as original *ö* and *ü* merge with *o* and *u* (e.g., *koz* for *köz* = eye), and the original *ı* merges with *i*. The semi-iranized dialects, as is shown by the name, are halfway between the iranized and pure Uzbek dialects and show the above-mentioned features in a lesser degree. The pure Uzbek is best represented by the Yese dialect, the semi-iranized by that of Andijan, the iranized by the dialects of the urban centres of Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara. As Babur mentioned, the Andijan dialect is associated with the name of the great poet Mir Ali Shir Nevayi.

itself was a *literary* language, and, as written by Babur, Ali Shir, and more than a century later by the historian Abul Ghazi (Turc: *Ebülğazi*) of Khorezm, was full of Arabic and Persian words. In the first two cases at least the Turkic substratum was in general accord with the Uzbek dialect spoken at Andijan in the Farghana valley, the place where Babur tells us the purest Central Asia Turkish was spoken in his day and which today, 400 years later, is popularly recognized as the seat of the best Uzbek within the limits of the republic of Uzbekistan. The fact that Chaghatai was written in the Persian style of the Arabic script, almost wholly lacking vowel signs and quite unable to express Turkic vowel harmonies, concealed many of the morphological diversities of the various languages, and enabled readers to give their own pronunciation to the written word. It could therefore be read by speakers of any Central Asian Turkic language possessing a background knowledge of Persian, Arabic, and a few peculiarities of the morphology and vocabulary of the Andijan basic dialect adopted. But as a *spoken* currency it was of little use, and, lacking a continuing literary tradition of a unifying nature, it was doomed when the Arabic script was abolished in the U.S.S.R. The newly introduced Roman and (later) Cyrillic scripts showed up the differences in pronunciation, while, within Turkistan at least, there was a conscious attempt by the Soviets to devise orthographies which would make the languages look even more different than they were in reality. The case can be best explained by saying that a transcription of the Chaghatai *Baburnama* into Roman would today have to adopt a different orthography and a different alphabet to be intelligible to an Uzbek and a Kazak. It need not follow from this conclusion that classical Chaghatai can have no unifying influence as a basis for a modern lingua franca, but it is clear that, taken alone, it cannot supply all that is needed even in the purely literary sphere.

THE IDEA DEVELOPED

The *Ortali* experiment is subject to some of the limitations of Chaghatai, in that it also, for the most part at least, has been used as a medium for writing only. (We will refer later to the possibilities opened out by broadcasting.) If it is to be used as a speaking medium, much more attention will have to be given to the vowel qualities and harmonies and to the stress and pitch variations which form so important a part of the Turkic languages. But this is not to say that the proper way to introduce a movement for a lingua franca does not lie through the written word in the first instance. To avoid a charge of destructive criticism we should at least consider methods of approach under the two headings (A) written and (B) spoken.

(A) *Written*

The procedure would be not unlike that used in composing the standardized African languages mentioned above. It could not, as did Chaghatai, depend for intelligibility on a large inflow of Arabic and Persian abstract vocabulary, for it would have to aim at becoming more widely understood than any modern living language in Turkistan. This very simplicity might well lead to its rejection by the more educated speakers of

the living languages, who will tend to refuse anything written which is not their own. But this Turkic written lingua franca would be primarily designed for the more educated and not for the barely literate. In other words, the middle language must be simple if it is to spread, but this very simplicity is likely to lead to its rejection. The wheel turns full circle, and our task seems hopeless.

But, if we persist against this discouragement, we may suggest :

- (a) The basic dialect will have to be from an urban and settled area, for reasons already given.
- (b) Since the urban dialects tend to be iranized, and have lost their vowel harmony, and even the quality of some of their vowels has changed considerably, the basic dialect will have to compromise and take back the vowel qualities and harmonies characteristic of Turkic speech other than the iranized forms of Tashkent, Bukhara and Samarkand.
- (c) For the written language it might be possible to take a leaf from Chaghatai written in Arabic script, and in the Roman (or Cyrillic) script adopted omit all those vowels which can be omitted without making the agglutinations unrecognizable. The result would be to establish a written code of which most of the vowel sounds could be interpreted as they pleased by Uzbek, Kazak, Karakalpak, Kirghiz, etc., readers. For instance—

UZBEK

	<i>Yese.</i>	<i>Farghana Tashkent.</i>	<i>Kazak.</i>	<i>Kirghiz.</i>
<i>Our arms</i>	(a) qollarimiz	qollerimiz	qoldarimiz	qoldorubuz
	(b) qol-lr-mz	qol-lr-mz	qol-dr-mz	qol-dr-bz
<i>My houses</i>	(a) üylerim	üylerim	üyderim	üydörüm
	(b) üy-lr-m	üy-lr-m	üy-dr-m	üy-dr-m

The approximation could be increased if those agglutinative consonants which undergo strong changes in some languages—*i.e.*, *m* (-*b*, *p*), *n* (-*d*, *t*), *l* (-*d*, *t*), *d* (-*n*)—were printed in special forms to allow the reader of each language to read them in his peculiar way; *e.g.*, a changeable suffix -*n* could be printed N and the reader instructed that in Kazak, Kirghiz and Karakalpak this must be read as *d* or *t* in accordance with assimilation laws, which speakers of those languages would make unconsciously; the Uzbek and Turkmen would read it automatically as *n*—*e.g.*,

“ of the arm ”—Uzbek, qol-nin, qol-nun
 Kazak, qol-dun
 Kirghiz, qol-dun
 Lingua franca Uzbek and Kazak, qol-Nn
 Kirghiz, qol-Nn

An idea of this kind would need much elaboration, and in any case would resolve the problem of assimilation of the written word only. Moreover the morphology would have to be reduced to those forms which all the languages to be replaced have in common with identical meanings, so

making the substitute lingua franca childish and unattractive to an educated reader or speaker. So much for the morphological side. On the vocabulary side also there would be need of limitation to those words which the background languages have in common, or in similarity sufficient to give understanding. The problem is that of all "basic" languages, making circumscription inevitable and producing an adverse psychological reaction in the mind of the educated.

(B) *Spoken*

These compromises would not tend to put a unified spoken language into currency, for in speaking it is impossible to disguise differences by means of the trick expedients suggested. Even if it were possible to compile a spoken language with a common vocabulary and an approximation of morphology—not to speak of stress and pitch—from the various background languages of Turkistan, this language must either be a compromise or a strong enough currency to drive the others out of circulation. A compromise is hard to conceive, and could be artificially produced only by long-continued teaching in the schools. It is probable that at the present time an approach to the minds and souls of the various Turkish peoples within the U.S.S.R. is best made through the medium of their own individual present-day languages.

At the same time it must be freely acknowledged that there does exist an underlying sentiment of a common tradition among all the Central Asian Turkish peoples. This was proved at the time of the interregnum between the fall of the Tsars and the establishment of Soviet power (1918-22), and again by the Turki volunteers who in 1941-5 under German control were organized in one army without distinction of language and nationality and managed to understand one another. On the linguistic side experience then proved that the uneducated Turks of any nationality can make themselves mutually understood in every-day matters by using a somewhat reduced vocabulary and a simplified grammar. The educated can speak to one another in the Turkish of modern Turkey (which many of them know), if they fail to understand divergencies in their own languages. In the last resort, though unwillingly, they will turn to Russian.

CONCLUSION

In spite of the difficulties the effort to realize a linguistic unity as symbolic of a political aim for a United Turkistan deserves every sympathy. But these obstacles must be faced to be overcome. It is extremely hard for an emigration to make much progress in an endeavour which calls for the unstinted aid of the schools, the courts, trade and a living literature, and it is probable that artificial endeavours directed from outside the country will meet with only a very limited success. There are, however, two great possible aids, the one the inheritance of the past and the other the invention of the present. I refer first to the need for a continued and living literature in the Chaghatai tradition. If for instance a great poet of a Central Asian Turkish renaissance were to flourish among the emigration, such a man could do more than a hundred schools to unify the written word, and in that case the written word, as we know from the sacred

books of the great religions, would carry through into the spoken language also. The other is the adventitious aid of broadcasting. It is just possible that a cautious and gradual presentation of a new lingua franca or *ortatili* might be explained through this medium. Many in England complain today that the B.B.C., without a conscious endeavour, is driving out the old dialects. A similar process could be aided by broadcasting in other fields.

But my own forecast, put forward with some hesitation, is this. There are two mainstreams of Turkic language east of the Caspian (omitting Turkmen, which belongs to the western group). These are that of the steppe and that of the oasis, the first broadly coincident with the Kipchak or Kazak tradition, and the second with the tradition prevalent in Uzbekistan. The old Chaghatai belonged to the second. Cultural, historical and social data suggest that these two currencies may prove strong enough each to survive in its own milieu and drive out the rest. On that view a dominant Kazak, and a dominant Uzbek, may each in its sphere form a lingua franca over large parts of Turkistan without recourse to artificial stimulation. In short, the present main lines of demarcation, the result of history and encouraged by press and radio, are likely to prevail.

For the present at any rate, however noble the aspiration for a single common tongue, it is likely to remain one of mainly academic interest. For its fulfilment it calls for a Turkistan in a position to realize the political ambition of unity within itself and sufficient independence of Russia to substitute its own linguistic traditions for those of the stronger Russian. If what is written here seems critical, it will be understood that an easy optimism will not resolve a question of the utmost difficulty. But it is also worth remembering that a western mind may not be in a position to appreciate the immense importance attached by all modern Turks, and Russians also, to questions of linguistics, orthography and transcription. To them these matters seem to have an esoteric and transcendental meaning which is apt to escape the Anglo-Saxon mind. Remembering this, those who aspire to create a new Central Asian Turkish need not despair.

REVIEWS

The Suez Canal in World Affairs. By Hugh J. Schonfield. Constellation Books. Pp. 174, illustrated. 15s.

Mr. Schonfield is an expert about the Suez Canal, and has already written two lively books connected with that subject. In this new and up-to-date book, which is no less lively, he has set out to give a history of the Canal in its relation to world affairs. The book is, then, a short history of Mediterranean politics for the better part of a century. He starts with the grant of the concession for digging the Canal, given in 1855 by the Khedive Mohammed Pasha al-Said to "my attached friend, Ferdinand de Lesseps, of high birth and elevated rank." And he ends with a chapter on the position of the Canal during the war between Israel and the Arab States in 1948. Other chapters deal with the Egyptian question during the latter part of the nineteenth century, the German *Drang nach Osten*, the defence of the Canal in the first World War, the question of excluding Italian ships from the passage of the Canal in the war between Italy and Ethiopia 1935-6, and the defence of the Canal in the second World War. His writing is concise as well as lively, and he has an independent judgment about world affairs.

His book is full of interesting information. He tells, for example, how Port Said was built on land reclaimed by filling in marshes of Lake Menzaleh with the material excavated from the harbour at the Mediterranean end of the Canal. He tells how in the first World War the Turks were as confident and cocksure that they would conquer Egypt by advancing across the Sinai Desert as Mussolini was confident in the second World War that he would conquer Egypt by advancing from the Libyan Desert to the Nile Delta. It is striking to learn that the traffic in the Suez Canal has steadily risen, and was never so high as in the last two years. In 1950 and 1951 the total number of vessels passing through the Canal was nearly double the total of the years 1938-9. That was due to the great increase in tanker traffic, which may be affected by the closing of the refinery at Abadan and the completion of the oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Sidon.

The position of Egypt in the control and technical services of the Canal has been greatly increased by the agreement made between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government in 1949. The number of Egyptian directors was raised from two to seven, and the allowance to the Egyptian Government from gross profits was also increased; while four-fifths of the vacancies in the technical staff and nine-tenths of vacancies in the administrative staff were reserved henceforth for Egyptians. The Chairman of the Company said in 1951: "We use our utmost endeavours to be for Egypt, first, the most useful screen between that country and the great world interests which the Suez Canal has to satisfy, and secondly, an active instrument of the economic and social development of the province which the Canal has restored to life." In his chapter, headed "Aftermath," which deals with the problems of the Canal in the Israel war, he ventures a judgment—"The war should never have been fought, and with some goodwill and understanding on both sides an honourable settlement could have been arrived at." The remark does credit to his idealist outlook. But it was not as simple as all that.

The proof-reading appears to have been somewhat hurried. There are mistakes of spelling and punctuation, and occasionally the grammar is at fault.

The reference on p. 122 to the "Arabic Official Journal" appears to be the same as the previous reference to the Official Journal of the Egyptian Government. And on p. 91 the author mentions a speech of Mussolini in 1939, when he made a claim for Italy against France to control of the Canal, and adds that the speech "struck a note which is curiously up to date, from the viewpoint of 1952, in its references to Bolshevism and the need for a foreign loan"; but the remarks of Mussolini on those points are not quoted.

The book has useful appendices giving the text of the original concession and

the charter of concession, articles of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 concerned with the defence of the canal, statistics of the traffic of the Canal from 1869 to 1951, and the text of the International Convention of 1888. And lastly it contains some good illustrations and maps.

N. B.

Crusader Castles. By Robin Fedden. A brief study of the Military Architecture of the Crusades. London: Art and Technics. 1950. Pp. 96. 15s.

In this little book Mr. Fedden has given clearly and concisely an outline of the history of the Crusader castles. He has described how it was that the warriors of the First Crusade failed to take advantage of their initial success; had they gone on to capture both Aleppo and Damascus, they would have rendered unnecessary the construction of the majority of the Crusader castles. As it was, however, by leaving these two important cities in the hands of the Muslims, they exposed their long flank to attack from them, thus making it essential to protect themselves by building a series of strong points. As time went on, and reinforcements from Europe became fewer and fewer, the need for such bastions grew greater and greater. Furthermore, the garrisons of the castles, through being thrown on the defensive, developed in time a sort of "Maginot mentality" which sapped their offensive spirit. This development, coupled with ever-decreasing manpower, explains how it was that all the Crusader strongholds, despite the almost impregnable nature of some of them, fell eventually into Muslim hands. It is a story as fascinating as it is tragic, and Mr. Fedden has told it admirably.

He has included in this book a valuable description of three of the major fortresses of the Crusades—namely, the famous Krak des Chevaliers, Saône and Chastel Pelerin. Let us hope that he will soon find leisure to bring out a more extensive work on this subject which would include accounts of certain of the other Crusader castles such as Kerak, Beaufort and Montfort. Theirs is a story well worth telling, and who could do it better than Mr. Fedden?

The book contains a number of figures and plans, as well as 37 excellent photographs.

L. L.

Mamluk Costume. By L. A. Mayer. Geneva: Albert Kundig. Pp. 120 with 20 Plates. 1952.

When the Turkish historian Mushir Arif Pasha began to publish, in the Paris of the Second Empire, his monumental *Les Anciens Costumes de l'Empire Ottoman depuis l'origine de la monarchie jusqu'à la réforme du Sultan Mahmoud*, he could draw not only on the experience and memories of many people still alive, but had available for study a rich store of actual examples of Ottoman ceremonial dress, officially abolished within his own lifetime. Very different was the task that Dr. Mayer set himself in his survey of Mamluk costume, for the sources on which he could draw were scanty in the extreme. A few illuminated Arabic MSS. of the period, all suffering from lack of the detail so essential for such a purpose, seeing that "they merely hinted at things instead of depicting them"; bronze objects stripped of the silver incrustations which contained the detail; a very few glass objects other than mosque lamps (which show no human figures); the book of Dozy, an article by R. Levy, and some notes by Quatremère. That was all. His was something like the problem now before scientists: to work out steps in the development of life on this planet from a single cœlacanth.

At all events, Dr. Mayer has accomplished his task in a remarkably satisfying manner considering the disabilities under which he had to labour. The arrangement is clear and excellent. The author takes *seriatim* the several categories of persons: the Caliph; the Sultan; the military aristocracy; ecclesiastics; Christians; Jews and Samaritans; and women. There are separate chapters on arms and armour, and on robes of honour; and there is a neat little piece of research on that comprehensive term, the *qumash*, in Appendix I. Every statement is fully documented.

Throughout the book the author keeps strictly to the point, without digressions which would no doubt have been interesting (and probably tempting to him) but would have obscured his purpose. Yet we cannot help learning incidentally quite a lot about a fascinating period of oriental history that has remained obscure as regards the everyday life of its people.

The book is beautifully produced in Switzerland and is illustrated with twenty plates. Dr. Mayer, whose previous works have done much to justify the claim of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to an interest in Arab studies, has now made another notable contribution to those studies.

H. C. LUKE.

An English-Turkish Dictionary. By Fahir Iz and H. C. Hony. Clarendon Press. Pp. xii + 510. 1952. 42s.

Bay Fahir Iz and Mr. H. C. Hony, who collaborated to such good effect in their *Turkish-English Dictionary*, have now, five years later, produced its companion volume. It will not disappoint those who know the high quality of their earlier work.

This English-Turkish Dictionary has been compiled mainly with a view to the needs of Turkish students. It will, however, prove invaluable to English students of modern Turkish who have hitherto been obliged to make do with obsolete, inaccurate or, at the best, inadequate dictionaries. Here is a work which is as up-to-date as a dictionary can be where the language is still in a somewhat revolutionary state and where old and often beautiful words may still be purged in favour of new-fangled creations whose main virtue is that they show no trace of Persian or Arabic descent. Thus "darülfünun" long ago gave place to "üniversite" and no room is rightly found in this modern dictionary for the older but now obsolete word. It is strange, however, that against "school" there is no mention of "okul," which has long since displaced "mektep" from the schoolboy's textbooks if not from his vocabulary. Nor is it consistent to give the new Turkish alone for "Prime Minister" and only the old Turkish for "Foreign Minister." Turkish newspapers today use the newly manufactured words for both these ancient offices.

Usually, though, where the spoken Turkish has lagged behind the printed both versions are given—e.g., Monopoly = *Inhisar*: *tekel*. Another big attraction of this carefully compiled dictionary is the inclusion of a large number of everyday idioms and phrases, useful alike to Turkish and English students.

D. A. H. W.

Sultan's Pleasure, and Other Turkish Recipes. By Robin Howe and Pauline Espir. P. Garnett. Pp. 152. 1952. 10s. 6d.

This book of Turkish recipes is designed primarily to interest people in England in the Turkish way of cooking, and suggests that the dishes would form a pleasant variation on the diet here, especially under rationing. The exotic Turkish names are well translated, and followed by a simple explanation of their preparation. Although there may be some limitations to their use, owing to the difficulty of obtaining many of the ingredients anywhere but in the Soho markets, this should be overcome by an adventurous spirit, which the enthusiasm of the writers inspires, and, as they point out, most of the interesting varieties of nuts and spices which change the English boiled rice into the Turkish "pilaff" can be bought in quantity and stored. More difficult to overcome may be the need for butter in most of the meat dishes, or for the Turkish variety of cooking oil which is nearly tasteless. But apart from the original intention of the book, it should also prove extremely useful to any English person who is a prospective dweller in Turkey, and who has no knowledge of the language and customs, and of the food obtainable there. The necessity of living in a Moslem country without ham, bacon or anything derived from the pig makes a large hole in English methods of housekeeping, and here the many alternatives are appetizingly presented. The relation of food and cooking to Turkish life in general is also described, and very attractively illustrated with chapter headings by Osbert

Lancaster. This should be one of the essential lighter books necessary as an introduction to this charming country as it is at the present day.

I. C. W.

Omar Khayyam. A New Version based upon Recent Discoveries. By Professor Arthur J. Arberry. John Murray. Pp. 159. 15s.

The discovery some two years ago, in Teheran, of a hitherto unknown manuscript encouraged Professor Arberry to produce this new English version of Omar Khayyam, thus adding to the already substantial literature on the subject.

The manuscript, now in the possession of the Cambridge University Library, is the oldest that has yet come to light, having been written only seventy-five years after the poet's death and fifty years earlier than that acquired by Mr. Chester Beatty a short time previously.

These two manuscripts have thrown a great deal of fresh light on the work of Omar Khayyam and, as Professor Arberry says, it is necessary to make an entirely new estimate of Omar's position as a poet.

In a very interesting and able introduction Professor Arberry discusses a number of problems to which the Cambridge Codex gives rise. There has been much doubt in the minds of scholars about what poems can genuinely be ascribed to Omar Khayyam and opinions on the matter have been very varied, one authority, indeed, being reported to have declared that Omar wrote virtually nothing. Professor Arberry has made a detailed comparison of the recent discoveries with the other principal manuscripts and editions, which he has embodied in an appendix to the present volume, and he comes to the conclusion that the Cambridge and Chester Beatty manuscripts may be regarded as the most authoritative. He does not, however, rule out the possibility of further discoveries. At any rate, it is now certain that Omar Khayyam wrote many more quatrains than scholars were formerly prepared to credit him with.

Professor Arberry's opinion that there was a decline in Omar's reputation is certainly correct, and he advances a number of theories to account for it. There is no doubt that Fitzgerald's translation was to some extent responsible for a renewed interest in the poet's work in Persia.

Much of the preface is of course more for scholars and students of Persian rather than for the general reader, but this does not make it any the less interesting.

An analysis of the method of translation used by Fitzgerald in his celebrated and exquisite paraphrase is followed by a discussion of the intellectual background in the time of Omar Khayyam. Professor Arberry rejects the theory, sometimes advanced, that Omar was a mystical poet and rightly maintains that he was a rationalist. Omar's poems are in fact a series of epigrams spontaneously composed and founded possibly on incidents in his own life.

Professor Arberry's translation is a complete English version of the 252 stanzas contained in the Cambridge manuscript, and he makes it clear that it is not in any way intended to supersede Fitzgerald's beautiful work. What he has attempted to do is, as he says, to convey Omar's meaning with greater accuracy and fidelity. In place of Fitzgerald's quatrain with ten syllables to the line he has allotted to each quatrain of the original two four-line stanzas with eight syllables to the line, thus giving considerably greater scope for translation as well as for preserving the rhythmical qualities of the Persian original. The experiment is ingenious and can on the whole be considered successful.

The book is a valuable addition to the literature on Omar Khayyam and is to be recommended to all admirers of his work.

R. W. H.

Avicenna : Scientist and Philosopher. Ed. by G. M. Wickens. Luzac and Co. Pp. 128. 1952. 15s.

Avicenna was a great philosopher, a successful physician, a busy minister of state, and, it seems, a jolly good fellow; a tough job for any reviewer, more especially as

his chief work on philosophy has never been published in full and the partial edition is unsatisfactory. What sort of man was he? Did he keep his activities separate or did his medicine or his statecraft influence his philosophy and did his philosophy influence his life? The present volume does not answer these questions. The account of his life is businesslike but largely external, that of his position in science is a model exposition, but that of his influence is largely an exposition of the ideas of Aquinas. The chapter on his effect on Jewish thought boils down to the statement that Arabic thought influenced the Jewish thinkers, but it cannot be proved that the influence came through Avicenna; it also gives the impression of going round and round instead of forward. The lecture on his philosophy tries to read into him the ideas of Kant and Bergson and treats his thought as static, whereas there is evidence that it developed as he grew older. The reviewer is suspicious of attempts to read modern ideas into ancient authors; they are too like the finding of aeroplanes in the Koran. In a few places the book could have been improved by omitting sentences which had their place in the spoken word; the English might have been improved—*e.g.*, Avicenna is called “the protagonist of these lectures”—and there are a few misprints.

A. S. T.

Afghanistan. Crocevia dell' Asia. Antonio Vallardi Editore. Second Edition.

No one could possibly be found better qualified to write on Afghanistan than the two authors of this delightful book; nor is it surprising that the first edition should have been sold out within three months of publication. Resident for fifteen years in Kabul as members of the Italian Legation, Fathers Caspani and Cagnacci had the fullest opportunities of travelling widely in the country, and have put these opportunities to excellent use. A sympathetic and scholarly preface by Signor Quaroni, the present Italian Ambassador in Paris, who was for six years Minister in Afghanistan, forms a charming introduction to a fascinating book, whose 280-odd pages are packed with accurate and up-to-date information, admirably arranged.

The book deals briefly with the geography, history, administration and manners and customs of the country, while the final section is a gazetteer of Afghanistan's principal routes and towns. To the ordinary reader the chapter devoted to history is the most interesting, as it is the most important, in the book, especially the section dealing with the conquest of Alexander the Great and the Græco-Bactrian kingdoms that succeeded him. And it could hardly be otherwise when one considers the truly great heritage which the country enjoys. It has indeed been the cross-roads of Asia. A thousand years before the Christian era Balkh, in Northern Afghanistan, was one of the great cities of the world. Here Zoroastrianism flourished, and here, if tradition be accurate, Zoroaster himself was born and died. Centuries later Alexander the Great passed through Afghanistan, where he founded great cities, and left behind him Greek dynasties, the history of which is even now being traced from the coins which are still frequently discovered on the sites occupied by them. Father Caspani's account of this epoch contains much new material. At this period the country was the meeting-place of Eastern and Western civilization, as is testified by the wonderful Bagram discoveries now in the Kabul Museum. Here too was the great Buddhist city of Bamian, the real cross-roads of Asia, on the great caravan route from India to China, which lasted as a centre of Buddhist civilization until its eventual overthrow by the rising tide of Islam in the eighth century A.D. Here the great Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni had his Court at which the poet Firdausi composed the *Shahnameh*. Here too Babar, the founder of the Moghul Empire of India lies buried, at his own request, in a garden overlooking his beloved Kabul.

All this is duly recorded, as is also the later story of the country up to the present day. The tragic history of Anglo-Afghan relations and of the three Afghan wars is recounted factually and without bias. The rise of modern Afghanistan is treated with sympathetic understanding, and the story includes a brief account of the effect of the British withdrawal from India, and of the resulting difficulties besetting Afghan-Pakistan relations.

No review would be complete which did not accord high praise to Father Cagnacci's fascinating collection of photographs, more than 250 of them. These by themselves give a very complete picture of the country today, especially of the various racial types which make up its inhabitants, and of the ceremonies and customs described in the text. Indeed, the photos at page 152 of the "Buzkashi" (goat contest), the national sport which, though still enjoyed in the northern provinces, is no longer practised in Kabul itself, must be unique.

Whether Afghanistan will ever again be the cross-roads of Asia, especially for aviation, as the authors anticipate, remains to be seen. Attractive though the prospect may be, the mountainous nature of the country and the vagaries of the winter climate must inevitably be a hindrance to its realization.

G. F. S.

Secret Tibet. By Fosco Maraini, translated by Eric Mosbacher and with an introductory letter by Bernard Berensen. 60 illustrations from photographs by the author. Hutchinson. Pp. 251. 1952. 30s.

Tibet has a fascination for all of us, perhaps because it has been accessible only to the lucky few, and now, alas, it has been added to the number of countries to which representatives of Western countries, other than "fellow travellers," are forbidden entry. More than ever, Lhasa has become the forbidden city and Tibet a land of mystery. Fosco Maraini is one of the few Europeans who have crossed the frontier and raised the curtain between India and Tibet, but even he was not permitted to visit Lhasa. Thanks to a receptive mind and a great power of penetration, he was able in a short time to acquire a knowledge of Tibet and the Tibetans such as others have taken years to achieve. To many, Tibet is a land of mysterious ascetics, strange religions and esoteric learning. Fosco Maraini discovered another secret Tibet, and I feel sure that his is at least as real a one as the other. He was fortunate enough to find in Gangtok an instructress who combined Western education with a true love of her country and who gives the key to the problem in her remark, "Often when I read books written about us by foreigners, I think they don't understand us at all. A country of saints and ascetics, who care nothing for the world, indeed! You must read the life of Milarepa, if you want to understand us. Greed, magic, spells, passion, revenge, crimes, love, envy, torture. Besides, what need would there be to preach the law to us so much if we were always so good and full of virtue?" To this Maraini replied: "The fascinating thing about Tibet is its delightful, disastrous, irrepressible humanity. Perhaps one day I shall write a book and call it *Secret Tibet*."

Here is the key to this book. It is written about live, red-blooded people with a wide comprehension of their humanity, their strong points and their failings. Their religion falls naturally into place as the complement of their character and not as the sole feature of it. *Secret Tibet* is the story of the Tibetans as they are and as, I think, they would like to be known to the outside world. They are human beings like ourselves and have all the normal characteristics. They have been moulded by their country's climate and geography and in general are not strange beings who live a life of contemplation in lonely caves: on the contrary, they are a virile people who have to face all problems of a world as hard as the rock of their own mountains.

Secret Tibet is not a book of travel in the usual sense, though the author hangs his experiences and thoughts upon the journey he made with Professor Tucci in 1948, introducing, where suitable, events from a previous visit before the war. In it he gives us brilliant descriptions of the country, interspersed with discourses on Buddhism and accounts of conversations with priests and officials. He was lucky in having won the friendship of Princess Pema Choki, whose portrait adorns the dust-cover, and in finding someone who could express Tibetan ideas in Western idiom. Besides this, Signor Maraini has the benefit of a good knowledge of the Tibetan tongue and the ability to win the confidence of all he meets. With all this he was able to acquire intimate knowledge of the people, their way of life and their mental background, which he describes with understanding and sympathy. The Tibetans take their place as one of the "greatest little people in the world."

This book has a particular interest today, when China has re-established her hegemony over Tibet; and the author touches on this in his description of the relative positions of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, where he says: "It is foreseeable that, when a foreign power wishes to enter Tibet, it will start by using as a lever the rivalries existing between the two supreme pontiffs." He says later: "China seems infinitely remote from here," and explains the Tibetans' refusal to consider road-building and the introduction of power-driven vehicles by saying, "The truth of the matter is that the Tibetans prefer isolation and independence to communications and inevitable subjection." Recent events in Tibet and the concentration of the Chinese on the development of their lines of communication have proved how right and sensible this sentiment was. The author reflects how in only a few years' time the colourful mule caravans and the pageantry of the official progresses will give place to motor-cars and the drabness of the modern world. He reminds us of the world's state of flux in which the foundations of old cultures are being swept away. The Tibet he saw was still stable and individual, but today the process of destruction and change has begun, and who can say what the outcome will be?

Amongst many fine descriptions that of the arrival at Gyantse is perhaps outstanding. Signor Maraini draws a magnificent picture of the effects of distance and the pleasure of travelling on foot. The city suddenly appears on a distant horizon and for a long time never appears to get closer, but gradually it encloses and absorbs one. That is an impression that many who have travelled in open spaces must still treasure, and his description of the city when he reaches it clearly benefits by the long contemplation of it from a distance.

In addition to his account of Tibet, Signor Maraini has some interesting words to say on India, which, as the birthplace of Buddha, is one of the two countries which have had so great a part in moulding Tibetan character and culture. Not least interesting of these remarks are those contrasting India and Greece. Both produced great art and deep thinking, the one controlled and harmonious and the other "immoderate, gigantic, teeming, sublime and terrible." The author explains with unusual clarity why the Western world finds it hard to understand Indian civilization. Greek logic is part of our upbringing and the basis of all our thought, while the phantasmagoria of Indian culture are entirely alien to our way of life. Both are Aryan in origin, but how far apart they have travelled! The one is clear cut as Parian marble, the other impenetrable as the jungles of Assam.

Secret Tibet is as fine an introduction to the people and the country as anyone could wish and, for those who have travelled there, a book full of memories of friends and of lovely places.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

Hong Kong. By Harold Ingrams. Stationery Office. Pp. xii + 307 and Map. 1952. 27s. 6d.

This is one of the Corona Library publications, sponsored by the Colonial Office and designed to "fill the place between official Blue Books and the writings of occasional visitors." The book succeeds well in its purpose, and the sponsors were fortunate to find an author of the calibre of Harold Ingrams to write it. The plates and maps are beyond praise—it is the sort of book which it is a pleasure to own. The author's objectivity and sympathy are nicely balanced and the reader on completing the reading of this book may put it down knowing that the picture it has formed in his mind is an accurate and authoritative one.

To those who know and love this little corner of the British Commonwealth it will bring a nostalgia for the scenes and smells of that pocket empire.

The problems of our population are considered, but it is frankly acknowledged that no immediate solution is available. The difficulties of the vast Communist Chinese population on the borders of this colossal entrepot are well described, but few will deny that the huge increase in Hong Kong's population from China has resulted in increased trade and prosperity. The Chinese are not slow to appreciate the benefits of safe business and good law. But though they acknowledge these good things, that does not turn Chinese citizens into British subjects.

Overcrowding is, of course, very bad—the inevitable accompaniment of the enormous increase in population. It can, however, be said that no Chinese is forced to come to Hong Kong; that when he comes he knows he will have little accommodation, but he puts up with that for the sake of the advantages which go with a settled life in a country where the Government wishes to help and not hinder.

The impact of Christianity on the Chinese population is well, and I think accurately, described. The emergence of a public spirit is extremely interesting. Whereas in the old days the Chinese thought of themselves and their families and little of their country, and help for the under-privileged did not exist on their horizon, in Hong Kong there seems to be much welfare work being done by Chinese by whom a generation ago such work would not even have been envisaged. May one not hope that this spirit is a result of British example? Included in Welfare is, of course, the care of the newly born infant. In spite of the terrific overcrowding, infant mortality has dropped from 617 a thousand children under 1 year of age in 1935 to 327 in 1940 and to 91·1 per thousand in 1948.

Interesting are the chapters on the squatter problem, boat dwellers, food, farming, the arts and religion; and your critic finds it hard to praise too highly this comprehensive description of a part of the world about which all British citizens should inform themselves. This volume is the first of the Corona Series: may there be many more.

H. ST.C. S.

Windows for the Crown Prince. By Elizabeth Gray Vining.

In the spring of 1946 the Japanese Emperor requested an American Education Mission to engage an American tutor for his son, the Crown Prince. Mrs. Vining, an American member of the Society of Friends, was chosen and arrived in Japan that autumn.

It was not intended that she should be in charge of the Crown Prince's studies, but merely that she should coach him in English, and originally it was required that she should give him one hour's tuition weekly. In addition she was to teach not more than eight hours at the former Peers' and Peeresses' Schools in classes where he and other members of the Imperial family were studying. But the Emperor and the Court Chamberlains were so pleased at the results that little by little her duties were added to until, in the last of the four years to which her contract was prolonged, she was giving lessons not only to the Crown Prince but also to his brother and sisters and even to the Empress.

The influence for good that Mrs. Vining exercised can scarcely be over-estimated. She obviously approached her task in a spirit of humility, but with an unswerving purpose to help the Crown Prince to prepare himself for the great task to which he will later be called. Her sincerity combined with the sweet reasonableness with which she put forward her views seem to have made a great impression on all the Japanese with whom she came in contact. So much so that in the only criticism they made they gently chided her for showing too much *enryo*. They meant that she did not insist quite enough on her point of view.

In a way they could pay her no greater compliment. The Japanese themselves are taught to show a becoming reserve. They must think twice before thrusting their opinions on someone who thinks differently. They must remember their manners. It is a good trait—when not carried too far.

But it may be questioned whether Mrs. Vining would have achieved half as much as she did if she had insisted on her views being accepted at once. Instead she never lost an opportunity of pleading for changes to be made. In the end she had the satisfaction of seeing many of her views adopted, not because she had insisted but because she had convinced her principals that changes were desirable.

Mrs. Vining was distressed by the Japanese custom of taking the Imperial children away from their parents and setting them up in separate establishments. They had no real family life and they grew up surrounded by elders and almost isolated from social intercourse with their own brothers and sisters, let alone the outside world.

In season and out Mrs. Vining sought to break down this rigid tradition. How

she succeeded can best be learnt by reading her book. As regards the character of the Crown Prince, she concludes with these words: "He gives his faith slowly, but once he has given it he is steadfast. . . . He has a better than average mind, clear, analytical, independent, with a turn for original thought. He has a strong sense of responsibility and a deep love for Japan and her people. He is aware of his destiny; he accepts it soberly."

The book is delightfully written and eminently readable. The reviewer has pleasure in recording his own opinion that Mrs. Vining has done a great work of which she may well be proud.

OSWALD WHITE.

Konmara Pia Zat. By U Pok Ni. Vol. I: Introduction and Translation. By Hla Pe. Luzac. 6" × 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. viii + 162. 37s. 6d.

The attractions of the Burmese theatre are largely lost on the foreigner because he seldom knows the language well enough to follow the dialogue; and nowadays the stage is garish with Western sophistications. Nevertheless, even the casual observer could see the charm of the amateur performances which were at any rate till recently a feature of country life in some districts; they were a delight to the eye.

This native drama must have existed for centuries; its ballet or posture dance fills an instinctive need and its presentation of Buddhist scriptural stories would naturally appeal to the people. The absence of evidence about it before 1783 may be mere absence of evidence, not of the thing itself.

Articles on the subject occur in learned periodicals, notably J. A. Stewart's "Burmese Stage" (*Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, 1939, p. 761). But hitherto the only book has been (see our own issue for April, 1938, p. 322) Htin Aung's *Burmese Drama* (Oxford, 1937), which, though pleasantly written, is often in inaccurate and its extracts from plays are paraphrase rather than translation.

The present work by Dr. Hla Pe is a contribution to scholarship; it is a critical edition of a whole play, one of the first plays to attain the permanence of print. Printing, introduced by Christian missionaries about 1817, caught on among the Burmese; by 1871 they had three newspapers of their own, in 1875 they printed a Buddhist scriptural play, the well-loved Mahajanaka, and a month later U pok Ni, a rising dramatist, published the present play.

Dr. Hla Pe deals with the play in two volumes of which this, the first to appear, contains a valuable introduction to the subject and an admirable translation of the play. Some of his material may appeal only to specialists, but students of the drama will welcome the play itself which, despite the intrusion of the supernatural, is a love story with very human characters, and their behaviour brings the life of the people before our eyes. We even catch a glimpse of changing times, of "progress," in the vocabulary of the actors: they already know some English words—champagne, beer, sherry, gin, Hennessy, captain, warrant, summons, parliament, torpedo and bomb . . . !

G. E. H.

Ceylon. By Sydney D. Bailey. Hutchinson's University Library. Pp. 168. 1952. 8s. 6d.

Within the space of 158 pages the author has written a full history of the main events of the history of Ceylon, from the earliest records of invasion by the Buddhist Sinhalese to the rule of the British and the independence of the island in 1948. The successive invasions of the island, the internal strife of the native rulers, the arrival and departure of Portuguese and Dutch, are described with clearness and vision and give a vivid insight into the troubled eras of Ceylon's political and social struggles before the peaceful status of today.

Until the Portuguese assumed control over most of the island, rulers succeeded each other, political intrigues hindered the welfare of the people, rebellion and internal strife destroyed any chance of developing the inexhaustible riches of Ceylon. The cruelties of the Portuguese resulted in their expulsion by the Dutch, who were called

in to aid the native rulers to free their country from the oppression that revolted the gentle forms of Buddhist and Hindu creeds. The Dutch, in their turn, were expelled by the British, who were invited by the King of Kandy to drive out the Dutch, in the same way as the Dutch had been invited to expel the Portuguese. The Dutch retired after being defeated by the British and occupied the islands of Java and Sumatra, the modern Indonesia.

We are given delightful pictures of the beauty of Ceylon with its mountainous ranges rising up to Adam's Peak and Kandy the seat of the last independent ruler in the island. We also have intimate pictures of the state of the population under the successive régimes, the cultivation of rice and cinchona and cinnamon, coffee and rubber, and finally tea, now the principal export of the island. The destruction of the coffee plantations and ruin of the planters is vividly portrayed.

The strategical position of Ceylon due to her position on the sea route to the East has attracted all nations, to whom the capabilities of the great harbour of Trincomalee and afterwards Colombo proved an irresistible attraction.

Your reviewer has visited Ceylon and was fascinated with the wonderful ruins of Polunnæua and other places. We would have wished for more accounts of these wonders, which are worthy to rank with the finest in the world. They link up with the great Hindu epic the Ramayana, and the story of the construction of the causeway by the Monkey King for Rama to rescue his wife Sita from the Demon King of Ceylon.

Ceylon became a Crown Colony in 1802, and the squabbles between Whitehall and the Madras Government, who at that time administered the affairs of the island, make interesting reading to students of modern colonial administration. The expansion of Ceylon's industries and the social uplift of the people were hampered and frustrated lamentably through lack of funds, and nowhere is the need for a Colonial Development and Social Service Fund more emphasized than in the early days of Ceylon. Such a fund would have worked wonders for a colony compelled by the prevailing régime to exist and develop on the revenue that she could earn.

Difficulties soon arose between the British and the independent king of Kandy which inevitably led to war and the firm establishment of British rule over the whole island. The social services were taken in hand, irrigation improved, and education given to the people, who were encouraged to take an active part in the conduct of their own affairs. Gradually those fit for Government posts were admitted to the Councils and a system of electoral and political rights was established. Elections for the new State Council were held in 1931 and Ceylon proceeded on her way to complete Dominion status within the British Empire.

Though short, a vast amount of information is included in this little book, which should appeal strongly to all who have visited the island and have been fascinated with its beauties. The future of Ceylon will be regarded with great interest by those who have the welfare of the Empire at heart. They will find this book of Mr. Bailey of the utmost assistance in giving a thorough insight into her past history.

E. R. C.

Outlines of Muhammadan Law. By Asaf A. A. Fyzee. Oxford University Press. Pp. xvi + 443. 1949. Rs. 16.

The word "Muhammadan" was chosen to show that the book deals with Muslim law only so far as administered in the sub-continent of India. Therefore the subject matter is personal law only with two extensions, pre-emption and the law of *waqf*, charitable trusts. A brief but accurate sketch of the growth of Muslim law introduces the subject. One may object that the description of Arabia, the physical environment, is rhetorical and there are a few mistakes. The Sunna as well as the Shī'a discussed the relation between faith and Islam, the Zaidi manual of law is not as old as Prof. Fyzee makes out, a judge was usually expected to confine his judgments to one school of law, and private trusts were often attempts to outwit the tax-gatherer. Muslim law has been altered by custom, by English ideas working through the judges, and, more recently, by legislation. Where mass conversion took place, the converts brought some of their Hindu customs into their new religion. Thus a Khoja

can will away the whole of his property and, in regard to agricultural land, the Khojas, Sunni Bohoras and Molesalam Girasias are still governed by custom. Legislation is working to bring all Muslims under the orthodox canon law with changes to suit the age. To give one example: where a widow is the only heir, she will now take the whole estate instead of a fraction only, the Government taking the remainder. Cases are quoted freely to show how changes were made, a decision of the Privy Council was reversed by legislation and the author states his opinion boldly when courts differ or when no decision has been reached. Prof. Fyzee can be congratulated on having written a clear and—for its subject—readable exposition of the law as it stands. It will serve its purpose as an introductory textbook, and it will also help a layman who wants to know “what it is all about.”

A. S. T.

NOTE.—In a Review of *Jerusalem* by T. Weiss-Rosmarin which appeared in the last issue of the Journal one word needs to be corrected. The Government of Jordan recognizes the buildings of the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus as Jewish property and has *not* “occupied” them, although they are surrounded by Arab territory. Instead, special U.N.O. passes are issued to a detail of caretakers and police from Israel to enable them to pass through the territory of Jordan in a U.N. convoy once a fortnight to serve for a term of duty in these otherwise empty buildings.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR,

ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL.

SIR,

I was most interested in Lord Birdwood's article on the Asian Frontiers of Kashmir in the Journal for October, 1952.

May I, however, be allowed to point out that a through road, capable of taking light motor vehicles, has been open between Abbottabad and Gilgit since 1949.

From Abbottabad the road runs to Balakot, then up the Kunhar valley to the Babusar pass and so to Chilas and Gilgit.

It may be of interest to record that on a return journey from Gilgit to Balakot in 1950 I gave a lift to two Muslims from Tibet who were making their way to Karachi for the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. Unfortunately, I have mislaid the name of the district from which they came. They insisted on paying for their hundred-mile lift with a very fine piece of silk.

Yours faithfully,
A. P. H. B. FOWLE,
Captain, R.A.

Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE WAR

by GEORGE KIRK

with an Introduction by

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Professor Lenczowski has here written a comprehensive book which begins with an account of the Ottoman and Persian Empires, and ends with the after-effects of the Second World War, the Arab League, and the present rivalries of the Great Powers.

A List of Recent Books on the Middle East published by the Oxford University Press is now in preparation, and will be sent free to all who apply for it.

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NOTICES

Just before going to press the news of the passing of our Secretary, Rachel Wingate, reached the Society. It is impossible to express in these few words the loss that the Society has sustained. A telegram of sympathy has been sent to the bereaved family and a memorial notice will appear in the next issue of the Journal.

THE Council acknowledges with gratitude the following accessions to the Library :

Folk-Songs of Chhattisgarh, by Verrier Elwin.

Folk-Songs of Mahakoshal, by Verrier Elwin.

Folk-Songs of the Maikhal Hills, by Verrier Elwin.

The Aboriginal Problem in the Central Provinces and Berar, by W. V. Grigson.

Language Handbook to Assamese, all presented by Mr. H. A. N. Barlow.

Lalla Rookh, by Thomas Moore.

Voyage autour du Monde, par le comte de Beauvoir, in 4 volumes, presented by Miss U. Blackwood.

The Middle East. 2nd Edition 1950. Europa Publications.

The Regional Language in the Secondary School, by T. P. Santhana-krishnan. S. India Saiva Siddhanta Society, Tinnevely. 1950.

British and Soviet Colonial Systems, by K. Stahl. Faber. 1951.

Government of Bahrain Annual Report for the year 1370 A.H. (Oct. 1950-51 A.D.). Presented by Sir Charles Belgrave.

Members are reminded that the Annual Dinner of the Society will be held on Wednesday, July 15, 1953, at Claridge's Hotel. Members can bring up to three guests each. Those coming home on leave from abroad are asked to get into touch with the office for particulars, if they wish to attend.

Members and contributors alone are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

Under the auspices of the Library of Congress and Princeton University, a Conference will be held from September 8 to 19, 1953, at Princeton and Washington, U.S.A., on Islamic Civilization and Culture. Among those participating will be thirty eminent scholars from the Muslim countries, and the proceedings will be under the direction of Dr. Bayard Dodge.

CYPRUS SINCE THE WAR

By MAJOR-GENERAL H. L. HAUGHTON, C.B., C.I.E., C.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered at a meeting of the Society on Wednesday, March 25, 1953, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: General Haughton has been a member of this Society for a very long time and has also lectured here before on his archæological work in the neighbourhood of Gandhara, on the North-West Frontier of Pakistan. After a long and distinguished career in the Indian Army, General Haughton, at the end of the last war, lived for four years in Cyprus, and on that subject he is now going to speak.

WHEN I considered the title of this lecture I began to wonder to myself to what extent in essential qualities Cyprus really had changed. Of course, there have been changes there as there have been in all countries since the war, and I shall try to give you what I think would be the points that would strike anyone revisiting the island after a long period of absence.

First of all, I think that one would realize that Cyprus is no longer quite the poor man's paradise it once was, when one could stay for 12s. 6d. a day in a first-class hotel, all in. But even so, I think that Cyprus, having the great advantage of being in the Sterling Area, is probably cheaper than most places. The rise in the cost of living applies not only to the visitor but to all classes in the island. Everything has become much more expensive. The reasons are as for other countries, chiefly the rising cost of commodities generally and the great demand for labour. I think that before the war the average labourer or peasant was under-paid. He got only 1s. or 1s. 6d. a day. Perhaps now the pendulum has swung too far the other way—to 8s. or 10s. a day.

There is a great demand for labour, partly on account of the aerodromes and the increased garrisons and the building that is going on. People are putting up houses and other buildings. I cannot tell you what the garrison is, because it is always fluctuating, but it is something very much larger than the one or two companies of infantry that were there before the war. What it will be eventually, I suppose, depends upon the discussions on the Middle East generally, but personally I can never see Cyprus becoming a base in the sense that the Suez Canal zone and Alexandria were bases during the last war.

Apart from military matters, I think there is a tendency towards so-called improvements—that is to say, the building of big hotels, the multiplication of cinemas, the laying out of plages and lidos, and the influx of large numbers of cars and lorries, which seem to appeal to the local people but which perhaps would not attract some of us who liked the quiet homeliness of the island before the war.

The water supply has always been one of Cyprus's greatest problems. That problem is, as far as I know, by no means solved. A good deal is being done in the way of boring wells. There is a campaign against soil

erosion, and there is also reafforestation and a war against the depredations of goats.

Then lately, in the political field, there is the Enosis movement. The demand for union with Greece has boiled up again. That is nothing new. It has certainly been going on since 1878, though it is sometimes quiescent and sometimes acute. Recently it has been very active and it has spread to the extent of there being students' riots in Athens. The chief difference now, I think, is that it is further complicated by the advent of Communism, and it gives the Communists, of course, the opportunity to fish in muddy waters whatever their personal feelings on the matter may be. As far as I can see, it is a movement that is entirely emotional, based upon sentiment rather than upon historical facts or any sound reason. But that does not mean we can ignore it, because such emotional movements are sometimes by far the hardest to settle and deal with.

Perhaps one of the greatest achievements of the Administration has been its anti-malarial campaign, which has been carried out most efficiently and thoroughly and with such success that I think the anopheles mosquito really has been exterminated. That is so to the extent that, when I left the island, the authorities were offering 5s. to anyone who could produce an anopheles mosquito. I have not heard if anyone has since produced one, or not.

Those are the main changes. There are many things that remain as they always have been: the variety and beauty of the scenery, the wealth of wild flowers, the many places of historical and archæological interest, and, lastly, the people, with their friendly kindness and never-failing hospitality. There are many guide books in which you can read all about the island and of its history, and so on, and therefore I shall confine myself, if I may, to giving you some personal impressions—mostly they are so personal and so petty that they would probably be beneath the dignity of any guide book.

Cyprus is a big island as islands go—about 60 miles from north to south and, say, 140 miles long if we include the narrow Carpass peninsula that runs out towards Syria to the east, which ends in Cape Andreas and its famous monastery. But it has extraordinarily varied scenery and is very beautiful in almost all parts. I think one often gets an exaggerated idea of its size from that very variety I have mentioned. Looking south-west from Prodromos in the Troodos, one sees ridge after ridge of mountains rising one behind the other in seemingly endless succession, and it is only when one enjoys the superb view from some such vantage point as the crest of Olympus, and notes the sea towards Paphos, and again the sea in another direction with the setting sun glinting on Morphou Bay, that one realizes that one is on an island of no vast size.

The part that has most appealed to me has been the views from the crest of the Kyrenia mountains. To the north one looks down a sheer two or three thousand feet on to the narrow but fertile coastal plain and then, if one is lucky, to the coast of Turkey and even the whole line of the snows of the Taurus. To the south one looks down at an equally steep angle in most places on to the big plain of Messaoria, with Famagusta

away to the east, Morphou Bay to the west, and beyond Nicosia to the whole mountain mass of the Troodos.

Those Kyrenian mountains, lovely as they are themselves, are often, I think, the cause of atmospheric conditions which still further enhance the beauty of the scene. The sea is ever at war with the rocky coast of the northern shore, sometimes beating against it with a noise like thunder. At other times it is calm and peaceful and a typical Mediterranean blue. But on some days, owing to clouds, perhaps, and atmospheric conditions, there is a sort of network of opalescent shadow and sunlight over the sea which turns it from that intense blue to every shade of madder, from pink madder to purple or almost brown—a colour which enables us to realize what Homer meant when he talked about the “wine dark sea.” Then on other occasions, especially in the late afternoon, the moisture-laden air swept in from the sea is blocked by the mountain range and forced to rise, and as it rises it turns to thick cloud, but here and there the sun, which shines brilliantly over the Mesaoria, finds a rent in the clouds and sends shafts of light through to illumine the gloom below.

In discussing the scenery I used the word “variety,” and I did so advisedly because I know of no other country of its size which has such an extraordinary variety of scenery. If you consider the two mountain ranges, what could show more contrast than the Kyrenian range—precipitous, rocky and narrow, like the spine of some great monster; and the Troodos, on the other hand—a broad mass of forested mountains with villages in every valley. Or again, compare either of these ranges with the flat lagoon country round Larnaca and Limassol, or the miles and miles of vineyards growing on chalky soil that dazzles the eyes like snow.

Or, to descend to details, take the Troodos pine, which roughly speaking grows only upon slopes of Mount Olympus, and compare it with the Aleppo pine which is the common pine of the country. The former is virile and sturdy of trunk, to stand the buffeting of snowstorm, whereas the Aleppo pine is a graceful and slender lady standing with her feet on a carpet of bracken and undergrowth.

The trees and flowers have always been an intense source of pleasure to me, and, although olive trees under a dull sky in the west may be rather drab, somehow or other in Cyprus under the bright sun they lose all that drabness and their silver-grey foliage is most effective against a blue sea. There are, of course, hundreds of very ancient olive trees in Cyprus. I have never got anybody to give me a reliable estimate of their ages, but some of them must be very ancient indeed, and perhaps the little village of Thermia can boast of as many old gnarled warriors as any village—ancient trees which if they saw not the passage of Richard Cœur de Lion, must surely have looked down upon fair Katerina Cornaro on her way to Bellapaise, and on the coming of Venetian and Turk.

Then in the Stavros forest one may still see, though in sadly reduced numbers, those beautiful cedars which are the remains of the great forests which for their value as timber for ship-building were such an attraction to the contending powers of the eastern Mediterranean throughout the ages. They attracted the empires of the past. Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Persians and Phœnicians—they all wanted Cyprus for its timber. A good

deal is being done to try to spread and encourage them to replace themselves. I was told by a forestry officer there are probably about 2,000 now. They are often called "Cedars of Lebanon," but I understand they are actually of a variety peculiar to Cyprus. The silver blue of the upper surface of their foliage is most pleasant.

An interesting thing is to wonder whether the depletion of the forests has had anything to do with the falling off of the nautical instincts of the people of the island. It is very strange that a people who could send over a hundred galleys to join the Persian fleet in its attack upon Greece, and sent pilots and boat-builders to Alexander the Great, cannot now man even a small fishing fleet.

The flowers are one of the chief glories of Cyprus's spring, and they would need a volume to do justice to them. Curiously enough, there seems to be no popular book on the flowers of Cyprus, and it is very much to be hoped that somebody with the leisure and knowledge to do so will produce one. I can give you only one or two impressions made upon me by the flowers.

The first is that in Cyprus one may say that really spring begins in the autumn because, after the long summer drought when everything is parched and brown, as soon as the first rain falls, little flowers such as the miniature narcissi seem to rush to greet one as messengers in a hurry to bear the tidings of spring. Every day when you go for a walk you may find something new or record the finding of the first cyclamen or the first anemone, even though the north wind blows cold off the snows of the Taurus.

Another thing is that the flower season is divided very roughly into two golden periods and a blue period. Of course, the divisions intermingle to some extent, but I think they are definitely noticeable.

The first golden period comes when the oranges and lemons are still hanging on the trees and the ground is carpeted with yellow oxalis, which, however much it may be disliked by the agriculturist as a noxious weed, is very lovely to the unconcerned beholder. The second golden period is when the handsome giant fennel raises its yellow head 6 or 7 feet above its feathery green foliage and when the great sweeps of corn marigolds, often bejewelled with ruby red poppies, cover the land with cloth of gold and thickets of yellow wattle cover the sand-buried ruins of Salamis.

The intervening blue period, which of course is not truly blue, although I call it that, is marked by the blues and mauves of anchusas, wild lavender and borages, several kinds of blue thistle, sea lavender, grape hyacinths and tiny irises. Another flower I should like to include among the blues is that strange creature the "screaming mandrake," one of the commonest flowers in Cyprus. What the origin of its "screaming" was I have never found out, but you will remember Shakespeare says: "Shrieks like a Mandrake torn out of the earth, that living mortals hearing them run mad." So it seems that it is something to do with their being torn from the earth that makes them scream. There are references to them in the Old Testament and they were very popular in mediæval times for spells and charms and love potions, but it seems they had to be

turn up in the darkness of the night. We have the evidence of the witch in the "Masque of the Queen," who says:

"I last night lay all alone
O' the ground to hear the Mandrake grone
And I pluk't him up though he grew full low
And as I had done the cocke did crowe."

So there is that quaint flower growing all over Cyprus, and it is not very beautiful, but interesting.

Beside yellow and blue flowers there are, in their season, anemones of all colours, ranunculus, pink and white cistus, tulips, gladioli, asphodel, orchis of many sorts; and the wonderful profusion of almond blossom which embowers every village and can be seen, more beautiful perhaps than anywhere else, around the village and old abbey of Bellapaise.

Of matters archaeological and historical there is equal variety. I know of no other country upon which more influences have been brought to bear. Apart from the culture of the original Cypriots, the influences of the Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Phœnicians, Lusignans and Turks, have all left their marks upon the island, and one can see that very well exemplified in the Cyprus Museum in Nicosia, which, thanks to the Director of Antiquities, Mr. Megaw, and the very able Curator, Mr. Dikaios, is quite one of the best arranged and maintained of the smaller museums of the world.

These are all dealt with in the various history and guide books. So I shall not say more, but I should like to speak at greater length about the Crusader castles of Cyprus. I call them that and I think I am justified in doing so because the same people who built castles in Syria and Palestine played their part in Cyprus too. Richard Cœur de Lion, Guy de Lusignan, John D'Belin, Philip de Novara, Viscontis and Aldebrandis, and many like them, equally well known in Palestine, all played their parts, either as attackers or defenders, in and around these castles of Cyprus.

Whoever built the castles there had a very good eye for a site, for not only are they very strong tactically, but they could serve as the framework for a defensive system against attack either from the north or the south. But in fact they never seem to have been used collectively—and none seems ever to have been taken by assault. Either they were starved out individually, or the attackers grew tired and marched away. There are three on the crest of the Kyrenia Range, Kantara to the east, Buffavento and St. Hilarion. Kantara has a lovely view to the sea over the Carpass, and once I could discern the snows of Lebanon in the far distance. When I first saw the other two, Buffavento and St. Hilarion, from the north, my first reaction was to ask how they got there, because the precipices on that side are really stupendous.

Architecturally, very little remains of Buffavento, because the storms and earthquakes have destroyed what little the Venetians left. It stands at over 3,000 ft. on one of the highest points of the range. As Buffavento dominates the plain about it to the north and south, so St. Hilarion dominates the coastal plain and Kyrenia itself. That is rather surprising because

it is nearly 1,000 ft. lower than Buflavento. But St. Hilarion is not really on the main axis of the range; it is thrust forward to the north.

There is more left of St. Hilarion and to my mind it is an ideal fairy castle, especially when partly seen through drifting mist or in the autumn when the slopes of the hill are ablaze with terebinth bushes which turn to a wonderful red and gold at that time. It then appears to be a Phoenix Castle rising from a ring of flame. It is one of those places in which it would never be surprising to see a ghost or fairy. There is one, known as the Grey Lady, who, all the peasants will tell you, haunts the place. She is rather a pathetic little figure, said to be dressed in a mediæval costume and young and fair. The most popular version of her story tells that she was a lady-in-waiting who was so alarmed when the Emperor Frederick's troops entered the castle that she hurled herself out of one of the palace windows and was killed.

One knows that much cruelty and bloodshed took place around the castle, and yet I always felt somehow that it was a happy place. It is so lovely, in spite of terrible events such as that when the Prince of Antioch had the whole of his Bulgarian guard hurled one by one from the upper battlements to the rocks below because he thought they had been intriguing against him.

The castle seems only to have been known by the name St. Hilarion for the last three or four hundred years. Before that, it was always spoken of in old chronicles by the beautiful name of the Castle of Dieu d'Amour. There is a theory that that was a corruption by the old French knights of a Greek name "Didymonorea"—The Twin Peaks. It is true that the top of Hilarion is cleft into two, although the two parts are not at all conspicuous from any distance. But there is a local name which is much more commonly used among Cypriot peasants, "Regæna Ekato Spittea"—the Hundred Houses of the Queen—and it is a curious fact that when a survey of the ruins was made, 96 chambers of sorts were traced.

That raises the question: Who was this queen? I have often asked Cypriots and I have never been able to get them to give me the name of any specific queen. Some seem to regard Regina as just a woman's name, but in view of the fact that this "Queen" crops up all over the island in different forms, I have little doubt myself about the Queen being Aphrodite, Venus, who was so popular a goddess in the old days and whose very important temple at Paphos, where she was born of the sea foam, drew thousands of pilgrims from all over the ancient world. I am rather strengthened in that belief by one of these instances, where the "Queen of Chrysocava" is said to live in what is nothing more than an old Roman rock tomb. Yet even to-day the women of the surrounding country go there and offer a prayer for the safety of their sweethearts or husbands or brothers who have gone overseas. Who is more likely to be a protectress of sailors going overseas than Aphrodite, born of the sea foam, and goddess of a star by which she guided sailors?

I cannot help thinking that all these queens one finds in various localities are merely echoes of the old belief and faith in the popular Aphrodite. If that is so and if there ever was—and it is not at all impossible—a shrine of Aphrodite on the top of St. Hilarion, then perhaps, although the old

French knights got a little confused between Venus and Cupid, they may not have been so entirely beside the mark in connecting the mountain and the castle with a deity of love.

All these three castles on the crest of the mountains were slighted by the Venetians about 1480 A.D., as they probably had not sufficient men to hold them and preferred to concentrate upon the truly magnificent fortifications of the two chief towns, Nicosia and Famagusta.

But Kyrenia was another matter, as they doubtless felt that they must keep open one fortified port on the north coast, remembering perhaps that Sir Philip Chenart had managed to hold Kyrenia on behalf of the Emperor for a year by bringing in supplies from Tyre.

So they proceeded to strengthen Kyrenia Castle, and it is interesting to see how they did it. They realized that the rather light, square, Lusignan towers at the four corners were not capable of standing up to "modern artillery," so they encased three of them in solid masonry, converting them into round bastions of immense strength, and at the same time raised the wall on the west side to a height of 70 ft. and a thickness of about 20 ft. The east tower, facing the sea, they left as it was, thinking no doubt that it was less vulnerable, as the Genoese, the only people who had ever attempted an attack from the sea, had failed in their attempts. So the old castle stands to-day, keeping its watch over the little harbour pretty much as the Venetians left it, since it seems that it surrendered to the Turks in 1571 without serious resistance.

There are many other things of great interest in the island, such as churches with Byzantine frescoes, monasteries, rock tombs and scattered relics of ancient times, which I cannot describe here, but I cannot leave Cyprus without saying a few words about the people. I never held any position of responsibility in Cyprus, either civil or military. I never had to say to a man, "You must do this," or "You mustn't do that." But as a private individual I was gratefully impressed by the cheerful kindness and unfailing hospitality of all classes, and in the whole four years I was there, in spite of politics, I met with rudeness only once, and then from a man who should have known better. I have tried to convey some picture of an island that has given me many happy memories, and of a people for whom I shall ever retain an affectionate regard.

DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: General Haughton has very kindly said he will answer any questions anybody would like to put.

A VISITOR: What is the main language in Cyprus?

Major-General HAUGHTON: Greek. Nearly four-fifths of the people are Greek-speaking. Most of them are members of the Orthodox Church. There are also about 80,000 Turks and a few Armenians.

Mrs. ST. JOHN COOKE: Kyrenia, I think, has not many hotels?

Major-General HAUGHTON: The Katsellis Hotel has been very much enlarged. It now has about 140 rooms, and in Nicosia a very big hotel has been built and opened since I left. I believe it is very good and it is a boon to passengers passing through by air.

Sir JOHN HUTCHISON: Is there a considerable number of retired British there?

Major-General HAUGHTON: Yes, and it is a growing number. There is quite a sprinkling of them. One cannot say that numerically they are an important community in the island, and in fact I do not know what the number would be, but I suppose that when I left there were 50 or so living round Kyrenia and a certain number in Nicosia and other places. A good many have gone there since I left, I believe.

Dr. PURCELL: The speaker mentioned politics and the agitation that occurs. Does that take any violent form?

Major-General HAUGHTON: I do not think it has taken, or is taking, any violent form, except for marching about and cheering and so on. In about 1930 there were riots and the Governor's house, Sir Ronald Storrs' house, was burnt down, but there has not been any actual violence lately as far as I know.

Mrs. ST. JOHN COOKE: Is Famagusta the only harbour?

Major-General HAUGHTON: One of the troubles of Cyprus is that there are no harbours, but one rather hesitates as a soldier to talk about harbours when there is a distinguished Admiral in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: There is a small harbour at Famagusta into which ships about 300 ft. long can get. Then there is a sheltered stretch of water outside, with a reef running parallel to the shore, where a certain number of ships can lie. There has been a scheme to build a fair-sized harbour, but it would be a terrifically big and expensive job, and personally I doubt if one could ever stop the sea coming in when there is a strong easterly gale. It is not a good anchorage.

Mr. HAMILTON: Have any irrigation schemes produced good results?

Major-General HAUGHTON: The island is dependent upon rainfall. There are no rivers. There is hardly a perennial stream in the country. Even the wells are to some extent dependent on the rainfall. When I was in Kyrenia many wells were drying up and they were going off to get water from wherever it was to be found. There are one or two villages where I think a little more might be done in the way of irrigation, but it is a question of water not being there. Wells are numerous but are largely dependent upon rainfall, and if the springs dry up there is not very much in the wells.

A SPEAKER: When it does rain, do they not try to keep the rainwater?

Major-General HAUGHTON: There have been some small barrages built in one or two places with limited success. Possibly a little more could be done to conserve water. I understand, however, that there are considerable difficulties about that: the ground is so porous that the water seeps away underneath unless the whole area concerned is cemented.

Colonel CROCKER: I believe the Colonial Development people said it would come to something like £200,000 for Cyprus to improve the water supply. I do not know if they did anything about bringing water from the Kyrenian hills to Nicosia?

Major-General HAUGHTON: I do not quite know where it would come from. Famagusta already brings its water about 30 miles, just as in the Roman times.

Colonel CROCKER : In the hills somewhere near St. Hilarion there was a spring.

Major-General HAUGHTON : There is a good spring there; in fact I believe it is the old spring where John D'ibelin's forces camped when they were besieging St. Hilarion. But that is on the wrong side of the mountains for Nicosia.

Colonel CROCKER : I do not know how they were going to do it, but they were talking about it.

Major-General HAUGHTON : I am afraid I am out of my depth on that subject. They had great irrigation experts from Africa and India and all over the place and a good many things have been tried, but without very much success.

A SPEAKER : Did you see anything about preventing the goats eating the young trees?

Major-General HAUGHTON : They are carrying out a great campaign against the goats. They made a very liberal offer to try to get the goat-herds to give up their goatherding and take up something else. I believe they offered to buy their goats at the current market price and either to find them employment of some sort or to give them about £200 to start some little business. Quite a lot of the goatherds accepted the offer, but you always get the old type who would much rather sit in the sun on the hillside and call to his goats than do what you might call an honest day's work.

The CHAIRMAN : Perhaps I may say one word about the water, because not everybody realizes that the supply of water is one of the biggest modern problems which faces not only Cyprus but most parts of the world, owing to the fact that so much more water is now being used. People have more baths, and people who never bathed before do so now; modern sanitary arrangements take more water, and so forth. During the war we used to have ships carrying water all over the place in order to keep the war going at all. Water constitutes one of the big problems of the modern world, though not many people are aware of it.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

SOME INDIVIDUAL ENDEAVOURS TO HELP ARAB REFUGEES

By G. E. KIRK

IT has been the aim of United Nations planning for the Palestine Arab refugees that the development of works schemes for their employment and resettlement should make possible the progressive scaling-down of the sums allotted merely to relieving the destitute. In fact, however, this shift of emphasis from Relief to "Works" has not yet been realized. One cause of this is that the areas most heavily burdened with the refugees—namely, the kingdom of the Jordan and the Gaza strip administered by Egypt—are the very areas which offer the fewest potentialities for ready development. Conversely, areas which offer the greatest attractions to the planner, such as the Jazira of N.E. Syria, are remote from the present locations of the refugees. It is one of the most intractable features of the problem that the refugees' spokesmen have been unwilling to abandon the aspiration of returning to their original homes and to admit the principle of resettlement; and the governments of the Arab States, whether of policy or political necessity, have seemed to encourage this attitude rather than seek to persuade the refugees of its unreality, which grows ever greater as time passes.

The Jordan kingdom, which contains some 450,000 refugees, or about half the total number (including those not displaced but deprived of their lands), conferred citizenship on them when it incorporated the remaining hill-country of Arab Palestine into its territory. From a purely juridical point of view, therefore, the refugees are better off in Jordan than in other Arab countries, in which they are stateless persons. But Jordan's extremely limited natural resources provided only a marginal living for her original inhabitants. Hopes are entertained that the conclusion of an agreement between Jordan and Syria for the development of their frontier river, the Yarmuq, for irrigation and the making of hydro-electricity may, if the necessary finances are available from foreign sources, make possible an expansion of Jordan's economy which would absorb perhaps one-third of the refugees; but this and other projects are still in the future. Meanwhile, the refugees in their camps of tents and huts continue to exist, and even to multiply, on the United Nations rations of 1,500 calories daily; but it is an existence without occupation or incentive, and qualified observers testify to the increasing apathy and deepening demoralization which must soon become irreversible.

In this human desert of distress voluntary agencies with their limited funds have created a number of small oases of activity and hope, in the belief that the examples thus set may attract interest and support, and provoke imitation and emulation. For example, the C.M.S. Refugee Relief Centre at Zerqa, directed by Miss Winifred Coate and now in its fifth year, quite early extended its activities beyond the supplementing of United Nations relief to the neediest cases, and began to create and assist occupa-

tional enterprise among the 12,000 refugees added to the population of Zerqa, originally a small satellite-town of the adjacent military camp. The traditional embroidery designing of the womenfolk of the Palestine hill-villages offered a means by which those already skilled could be rescued from inertia, while younger girls could be trained in this craft or in lace-making; the Centre provides materials and undertakes the sale of the attractive finished articles to tourists and others. In 1949 a blind man who was a skilled basket-maker was set to work; he is now well established and has repaid the capital expended on him. A skilled potter was set up in a factory on land purchased through a loan from the Near East Christian Council; the potter himself did much of the building work and the erection of new furnaces, and a new outlet for his activities has been provided by the expansion of the Jordan cement works at Fuhais, with its steady demand for high-quality fire-bricks. This demand is now being met by the "Jordan Ceramic and Brick Factory" at Zerqa, although the writer understood, in February, that the good potter was distressed to find that utilitarian bricks were more saleable than his own more artistic creations. Near by was an animal farm and market-garden, a new venture in 1952. It was hoped to find a ready sale in Zerqa and Amman for turkeys, rabbits, hens, and pigeons, and to begin sheep rearing in the spring of this year; gardens were being laid out for soft fruit and vegetables. This undertaking would become the farmer's property when the initial capital outlay and loans had been repaid. Other projects contemplated, as funds to cover the small capital outlay became available, were the making of reed mats, candles, gloves, and simple local glassware, the materials for which were readily obtainable. Another undertaking at Zerqa, originating in the inquiry of an American benefactress, is the building of small houses of sun-dried brick for persons in regular employment, who could afford to pay a small rental which would eventually defray the capital cost, free of interest, and leave them owners of the property. Four houses had been completed by the beginning of 1953 at a cost of £320 each, including the land, and a proposed fifth house, to be built this spring, had drawn applications from sixty-two persons.

More immediately spectacular, however, is the transformation which has been effected at one locality in what is now commonly called the "west bank" of the Jordan—*i.e.*, Arab Palestine. Twenty-one Arab families, belonging to one village from which they had been displaced by the Palestine war of 1948, had since been living in five caves on a hillside to the east of Bethany and the Mount of Olives amid filth and lice, their misery increased by the flooding of the caves after each rainstorm. There they were discovered by Mrs. Stewart, the wife of the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, in the summer of 1952; and the bishop conceived the plan of re-establishing them as householders. An adjacent plot of undeveloped hillside was acquired from the village of at-Tur on the Mount of Olives, and from the stone quarried on the site a one-roomed house was built for each of the families from the caves. The lay-out was planned to avoid the regimentation of a barracks, the houses being given slightly differing orientations, and a wide street was left through the middle. Local quarrymen, master builders and a carpenter were engaged, thus providing employment in the

neighbourhood, and the unskilled work was done by the refugees themselves. The building was completed in about eight weeks at a cost of about £30 per house, including the land; the Iraq Petroleum Company gave the sheet-iron for roofing. A cistern holding 100 cubic metres was dug for water, and a communal bake-oven built to save fuel. The work has been supervised for the bishop by Mr. Stewart Perowne, late of the Colonial Service, who took the writer over the village in February. Mr. Perowne made it clear that he was ready to work patiently through the newly established villagers and their headman, and that he would not set a pace too fast for them. Thus the allocation of houses to families had been left to the villagers themselves, not imposed by "higher authority"; and the headman's rough-and-ready way with two gateposts that were too tall for the gate in the wall surrounding the village evoked only a sigh of expostulation! The villagers had laid out and planted small terraced garden-plots among the houses and the outcropping rocks of the shelving hillside, and it was hoped to establish trees. The site was too small for more extensive cultivation, but Mr. Perowne hoped that the men would find employment in improving the adjacent fields, which were too remote from at-Tur village to have received close attention. Meanwhile, the new villagers were still subsisting on United Nations rations; but their renewed vitality and purposefulness were in striking contrast to the dejection of the inmates of most camps. The house interiors were bare but clean, and the children, who had been plagued with running sores during their cave existence, were clean and lively. One thing was still lacking to this all-Muslim village—a mosque; and during our visit an informal *majlis* discussed the details of a small mosque which they were planning to build on the crest of the hillside, immediately above the village. Within two months of the completion of this village of Rafat at-Tur two other groups of villagers, living in caves and totalling about seventy families, had asked the bishop to do something for them. The bishop had acquired a new building site, and Mr. Perowne had visited Kuwait (where a substantial number of Palestinians have found employment with the oil company) to appeal for donations towards a minimum sum of £750, which would build a second village of twenty houses complete with cistern and other essentials.

Achievements like those just described may seem very small when compared with the great mass of destitute Arab refugees; but the merit of these schemes is precisely that, being small and personal, they do not arouse the political opposition which larger and more official projects have hitherto encountered. Not only do they provide new hope and purpose for the immediate beneficiaries among the refugees, but they furnish experience and example from which other organizations dealing with the refugee problem may well profit. They are thus eminently deserving of the support of all who are conscious of past connections and sympathy with, or obligation towards, the Palestine Arabs in the plight for which others besides themselves must bear so much of the responsibility.

ARABIC FOLK VERSE

By MAJOR C. G. CAMPBELL

After this article had been passed for press, it was with deep regret that we heard the news of the death of Major Campbell on March 31, 1953. He had recently been stationed near Benghazi in Libya, where he had been interested in local Arabic folk-lore. His death is a great loss to the study of Arabic dialects.

AT a time when so much good work is being done on folk verse in other countries, a field folklorist operating in the Arab countries would be sadly neglecting his duty if he failed to record examples from the Arab lands, and to engage in the usual search for parallels and variants. That much is routine, but it is a regrettable fact that only a poet can translate poetry. In giving the following examples from different countries, then, I should like to say that only those conversant with Arabic will be able to appreciate their beauty. I cannot translate into anything more than English doggerel, and the problem of conveying meaning without clashing with poetic beauty is one which has puzzled even great translators.

Love is the strongest of all the themes in the racial memory and a love song should undoubtedly come first. One of my favourites is from Iraq, a catching, haunting song which does deserve a better translation.

Hidni lasih alek.
W'alzimni la tih.
Waragat shujara thuleit
Wa yehizni er rih.

Release me or I'll call for help.
And catch me or I fall.
I am become a tree leaf
Caught by a squall.

Hatt kahil b'is sharhat
Wa aftan aleyyi.
Rawan qust el maut
Gabil el maneya.

Kohl on the eyelash
And angry you glower.
Show me the measure of Death
Before Doom's hour.

Yesmar samarek zein
Sandal b'il haqug.
Kule leila nus mithkal
Min aqali tebug.

Complex your complexion well,
Truly wood of Sandal.
Every night a half mithkal
Of my mind you steal.

Yeshgar dalili insaab
wa 'l jism matruh.
Kul leila mithkalen
Min aqali yeruh

Sweet Moon, my heart is pierced
And my pride is broken.
Every night two mithkals
You take of my reason.

Another love song, this time from Muscat, has as its motif a lovers' tiff. It is, I think, extremely fine in the Arabic.

Qustu el habbu* b'il meqias hatta
 Lan khaizeran ul habbi lana
 Fagalt: Taala ya habib el galb andi
 Wa nas fauga et thabana
 Fagala Mahommed: Abu Nawasu kitha
 Ashqun nisai f'arrijali ahiana!
 Fagalt: Walli ya khadiya el galbi anni
 w'aish kima kunt, rabana!
 Fagalt leha: Amma taarifi Miriam wa Khadija
 That wafa. Jiti enti, umm aqali khurfani!

I measured love with a measure, until
 Softened the bamboo of love, softened.
 She said: Come, Heart-lover, to me,
 And sleep on my breast.
 Mahommed said: Abu Nawas (thought) thus is
 The love which women hold for men, at times!
 She said: Fly, Trapper of Hearts, from me,
 And live as you lived before, a pilot!
 I said to her: Know you not Miriam and Khadija,
 Those mistresses of excellence? You came to me yourself, scatterbrains!

The Arabs excel in these bitter-sweet songs of love. I will give for a change something more primitive and in a broader dialect. The following is ascribed to Abadi, court poet to Sheikh Nasr el Ashgar es Saadun, but this, as with all folk ascriptions, is doubtful, as Abadi, like other known poets, tends to amass verse.

Akhhh! Qataltni hiya
 Hatarag galbi ishtal thiya
 Ammat aini—bi'esh ashuf
 Gumt rabbid weif aruh
 Gul li bia nawiya?
 Hanawiya shlon kalfa
 Hel amr wallah la kasfa
 Bad shasat maku harfa
 Gumt ma add el wasiya
 Rah tamautan min shufitha
 Tabqa kaghadh ya jisadha
 Naska wa halwa wa rafiya
 Dafaq damai ala Umm Adela
 Sar Shatt wa ghaddat lehja
 Biha sifun wa haut wa kullahun

To attempt to translate this, is, I feel, something like trying to put "On Ilkla Moor Baht 'At" into French. I will just give the approximate meaning line by line.

Akhhh! She's killed me
 My heart is aflame, a fire is lit.
 My eyes are blind—with what can I see?
 I am lost—where can I go?
 Tell me where I am?
 Where I am—how hard it is!

* Note how the nominative *habbu*, though the accusative would be grammatically correct here, carries on the sound of *qustu*. There are many instances, of course, of this licence.

By God! I didn't look for this!
 After this there's nothing else!
 Silent am I!
 Dying of her!
 Leaves of paper are her body
 Fit and sweet and slim.
 My tears have rushed on the Mother of Tresses.
 There's a river and a roaring,
 In it ships and fish and things!

So much, owing to shortage of space, for love. Nursery rhymes fascinate folklorists, as they provide so much material for research and comparison. The following I offer not for their poetic value—they have none—but for various interesting features. The first I heard being sung in Benghazi by children of four and five years of age. I thought, when I heard it in the distance, that it was a variant of the familiar *Cukukhti wein ukhtu b'il Hilla sha taqal bajilla* of Iraq (“Dove, where's my sister? In Hilla. What does she eat? Beans.”). Approaches to small Arab children by field folklorists complete with notebook being more likely to produce floods of tears than folk information, I had to wait until an assistant, with the aid of a small relation and a bag of sweets, could do the required recording.

The song goes thus :

Dalia ya dalia safara
 Wa finajil dahab
 yeruh bik li'and Italia

Sallam khai* jabha
 Hamra fi dolabha

Lilla ya Lilla
 Ahkouiya f'il Ballilla
 Wa hua saghayir ala'l Ballilla

I feel that to attempt a literal translation here would be most misleading, as this is an example of the common tendency in nursery rhymes to substitute words of similar sound. “Ballilla” was the Fascist youth organization, a surprising thing to find in a nursery rhyme and one which may give untold trouble to future folklorists. I don't think that this is a variant on the Hilla rhyme, but I think it may well indicate the presence of an older rhyme on the *bajilla* theme.

Another rhyme worth quoting is from the Muntafiq tribes in South Iraq. It goes :

Hadaya Badaya Naser daya
 Shid el kur ala zambur
 Banat Shlaishal limm el aish el
 Bab el Hilla wa bab es Sham
 Yek saibti tina subbi
 Ala jiddar
 Hadiha, badiha, taras el qaush b'nnafash.

* *khai* = friend (from brother).

Translations of these rhymes are misleading if we should start thinking in English, as there may well be word changes, but I would give the apparent meaning as :

Hadaya badaya run Naser, run!
 Tie the thread to a bee.
 Girls of Shlaishal, gather bread at
 The Hilla and Damascus gates.
 My stick for the pot
 Hadiha badiha, fill the pot with bullrush cobs.

In connection with this rhyme, I gathered by separate inquiry that *aish* did mean bread not rice, as in the Gulf. This song is sung by boys sitting in a circle, and at the words "Yek saibti" (What will these Lebanese arabists make of that one?) they all point their forefingers towards the centre.

This song has clearly to do with eating; it may refer to a famine. It gives rise to many questions. What city had both a Hilla and a Damascus gate? Not Baghdad, certainly! Samarra? And how did Shlaishal's girls gather the bread? These rhymes are not meaningless. The fine research in England which has established the connection of "Ring a ring of roses" with the Great Plague has had no counterpart so far in Arabia. The field folklorists have not yet done enough to provide material for research students. It is with a view to stimulating some more activity along these lines that I quote the above few poor samples. The field is immensely rich, and sufficient work will provide us with thousands of examples of recordable verse, which, in their turn, will provide us with information about life in prosperous Arab Iraq before the Mongol cataclysm, and, in other areas, information which may go back to before the days of Islam.

Recently a *Times Literary Supplement* leader commented on the rare beauty of the few songs which have survived from Chaucer's England, and on the tragedy of the many which must have perished, or of which only fragments have survived. Arab songs will not live long in the present atmosphere of economic progress. I hope it will be sufficient excuse for this article if I plead that anyone living in the Arab lands with time to spare should record at least a few of the very beautiful love songs. Perhaps the society could arrange for the collation of this material. It does not matter if songs remain untranslated provided they are permanently recorded, but one of the tragedies of folklore, that research may start too late, might well be avoided.

IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL PERSIA

By R. L. FITT

Report of a lecture given on March 2, 1953, Alistair Gibb, Esq., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing the lecturer, said: It may seem strange, after reading the newspapers recently, that a lecture should be given on actual developments taking place at this moment in Persia. But that is the fact. Mr. Fitt will tell us about the irrigation development that is now proceeding. He has travelled extensively in Persia during the last seven years on behalf of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, who are consulting engineers to various Persian authorities. You may be interested to know that in Persia consulting engineers as such have been accepted, because I think I am right in saying that they did not operate there before the war. Consulting engineers act as the technical agents of their clients, assisting them in the design and supervision of works. The builders or contractors, who are in every case local firms, have carried out the actual construction.

Another point to note in connection with Persia is that in this modern age everybody talks a great deal about politics, but they do not always carry on with essential development at the same time. In Persia, despite differences of opinion among the people themselves and with other nationals, development since the end of the war has slowly and steadily proceeded, through the foresight of certain Persians who are interested in the development of their country. Mr. Fitt will no doubt bring out this fact during the course of his lecture.

Mr. FITT then delivered his lecture as follows:

AGRICULTURAL statistics in Iran must be regarded as estimates rather than actualities. As a rough approximation, the total area of the country is 400 million acres, and of every 100 acres about 10 acres could be regarded as crop land and 20 acres as pasture and forest land. Of the 10 acres upon which crops are grown only about $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres at the most are under crops in any one year, and of this over $1\frac{1}{2}$ acres depend on rainfall alone, and less than 1 acre is irrigated.

The fact that so much of the cultivated land depends upon rainfall means that the agricultural economy of the country is largely tied to winter crops, which come to maturity during the months when rain falls. As the yield from the rain-grown crops is very small in relation to those grown under irrigation, the need for the development of the country's water resources, both from the rivers and from underground, is of the first importance.

Before considering more closely the limited area which forms the subject of this lecture, I would first like to give you a brief description of the country concerned and of its inhabitants.

From the large-scale map you will see that the low-lying area of Khuzistan is separated from the Central Plateau of Iran by the Zagros mountains, a continuous chain which forms the backbone of the country and constitutes a barrier restricting communications between the Persian Gulf area and the interior of Iran. There are few roads across this stretch of country and a journey from Ahwaz to Isfahan means a long detour northwards along the line of the Trans-Iranian railway, and then along

the road running east south-east into the valley in which Isfahan is situated.

To the north-east of Ahwaz and the west of the City of Isfahan there is situated a mountain massif known as the Zardeh Kuh, which rises to a height of 14,900 feet.

Zardeh Kuh provides the source of two of the country's most important rivers, the Karun and the Zayandeh Rud. The head waters of these two rivers are separated by a low range of hills known as the Karkunan Ridge, about 1,000 feet in height above the valleys.

To the west, the upper reach of the Karun, which is known here as the Ab-i-Kuhrang, runs through a narrow valley and subsequently breaks through the main body of the Zagros range, following a tortuous course down to the Khuzistan plains before finally discharging into the Shatt-el-Arab at the port of Khorramshah. The bulk of the water flowing down the Karun discharges into the sea, and, although the low-lying country of Khuzistan has been the scene of considerable irrigation development in the past, the land is not as valuable agriculturally as that to be found in the valleys of the Central Plateau area. In a country in which water is such a vital factor, it is a tragedy that so much of it is lost in this way.

The Zayandeh Rud, on the other hand, flows more or less due east for some 100 miles to the city of Isfahan, and finally loses itself in the salt marshes about 80 miles to the east south-east of the city. As in the case of the Karun, the broken and upthrown nature of the country determines a winding course for this river, but the valley through which it flows widens out in many places and provides fertile plains for cultivation.

The height of the Kuhrang and Zayandeh Rud valleys at the head waters is approximately 7,500 feet above sea level. The climatic conditions are quite severe, the summer temperatures being in the region of 110° F. by day and as high as 90° F. by night. In the winter months the fluctuations are even greater, temperatures of 60° F. being not uncommon, but the night temperatures often show as much as 40° of frost. Lower down the Zayandeh Rud valley at Isfahan, the altitude of which is some 2,000 feet lower, the daily mean maximum summer temperatures are about 101° F., and the mean minimum in January about 27° F.

Except for small areas adjacent to the many villages in the Zayandeh Rud valley, the whole countryside is devoid of trees. As you will have seen from the slides, the whole upper catchment areas of both rivers are subject to heavy snowfalls which occur during the months of December and January, and the snow lies unmelted on the ground until about the end of March. The thaw which then sets in is very rapid, although snow is to be seen on the higher peaks right through the summer months. As a result of the thaw the rivers become raging torrents which continue until some time in June, and thereafter the flow of the rivers falls rapidly.

The upper reaches of the Zayandeh Rud and the Kuhrang are populated by the Bakhtiari, one of the Lur group of tribes who have inhabited this part of the country from time immemorial. Their territory extends well down the Zayandeh Rud valley, where it gradually merges into the land occupied by the Persian peasant cultivators. The tribesmen living in the upper reaches are nomadic in their habits. They have well-defined

summer pastures in the mountain areas, and in the winter they move down into the Khuzistan plains to graze their herds in a warmer climate, again in well-defined areas. Not all of the tribesmen are nomads, however, for lower down the Zayandeh Rud valley there are settled Bakhtiari villages where the inhabitants remain throughout the year and cultivate their crops. Although the nomads are largely herdsmen, they also cultivate small areas of grain crops. In the mountain country the grain is sown in the autumn before the tribes leave for the plains, and the crops are reaped in the early summer after their return. They also cultivate some winter-grown crops in the plains. The tribesmen are a hardy people possessing a keen sense of humour, and the engineers who have been working amongst them in recent years have found them to be very friendly neighbours.

In the lower valley of the Zayandeh Rud irrigation work has been carried on for centuries, and although the local cultivators have had no opportunity of studying irrigation techniques elsewhere, nor are they in possession of much in the way of modern agricultural equipment, they have learned by long experience to use crude methods, including a form of crop rotation, which have yielded excellent results and which have kept the land in good heart for a long period of time. The peasant cultivators are an industrious people and a number of the local landlords take a keen and practical interest in the work of their tenants.

Water is brought on to the land by three separate methods. Small irrigation channels, or jubes as they are known in Iran, flank the valleys along the contour lines leading from the river intake to the areas under cultivation. The main feeder jubes are a permanent feature of the landscape, while the smaller jubes are used only from season to season.

In addition the valley also contains numerous examples of the Kanat, a well-known feature of many parts of Central Asia, but most highly developed in Iran. There are also a number of wells or boreholes from which water is pumped.

The gardens around Isfahan produce quantities of vegetables and fruits which are exported to other cities of Iran, but the rest of the valley is worked mainly to produce enough foodstuffs for the immediate needs of the village dwellers and the tribesmen. The main crops grown in the valley are wheat, barley, rice, cotton, millets, peas, beans, vetches and lentils and some sugar beet. In addition a good deal of fruit is grown in the numerous orchards, and in common with most parts of Iran the poplar is propagated for timber.

Much could be done to improve the productivity of the land already under irrigation, by better levelling and by more careful control of the water and improved methods of culture, including better selection of seeds. Agricultural equipment is of a primitive type, and although the peasant farmers are extremely conservative in their habits the gradual introduction of simple modern machinery would lead to increased cropping.

Quite apart from these factors the degree to which the valley has been cultivated has been conditioned by the quantity of water available in the river. The discharge is entirely uncontrolled and, whereas there is a surplus of water which sometimes leads to extensive flooding during the spring, there is a considerable shortage later on. As the average rainfall

around Isfahan is only about $7\frac{1}{4}$ inches per year, mostly falling in the winter months, it is the dry-weather flow of the river which controls the area which can be cultivated during the summer months. Owing to the vagaries of the climate this dry-weather flow varies considerably, and in years of drought crops which have been sown cannot all be brought to fruition, owing to lack of water during the critical growing period.

Water is thus the dominant limiting factor in agricultural production.

It has been estimated that there are about 250,000 acres capable of cultivation in the Zayandeh Rud valley. This is an area slightly bigger than the county of Huntingdonshire. By no means all of this area is at present developed, and even those areas where irrigation is practised may lie fallow from anything from two to five years at a time, due to lack of water.

The need for an expansion of irrigation in the valley was appreciated as long ago as the early days of the sixteenth century. It was then that Shah Tahmasp I conceived the idea of diverting the head waters of the Karun river into those of Zayandeh Rud. At that time Isfahan was the capital of the country, and the intention was to turn the Zayandeh Rud into a broad, flowing stream worthy of the capital. The work was entrusted to the Grand Vizier of Isfahan, Mir Fazlullah Shahrestani. It was proposed to link the two valleys, separated by the Karkunan Ridge, in order to permit the waters of the Karun to flow into the Zayandeh Rud. Some authorities say that the scheme involved tunnelling through the mountain and that some shafts seen on the mountain side are connected with this early attempt. Although the work actually commenced it was subsequently abandoned but not forgotten.

Some fifty years later Shah Abbas I revived the project, but this time the proposal included a dam to be built across the Kuhrang. The dam was to be 280 feet high, in order "to raise the waters over the suitably flattened crest of the mountain." Moheb Ali Beg, one of the slaves from the Royal Palace at Isfahan, was put in charge of the job, and it appears that he promised to complete it in five years. Work, however, proceeded slowly, and Shah Abbas was dissatisfied with the progress made, so he appointed Eman Qoli Khan, governor of the province of Fars, Jehangir Khan, mir of the Bakhtiari tribe, and Hossein Khan, governor of the province of Lurestan, to be jointly responsible for the completion of the scheme. Troops and civilian labour were made available, the latter being conscripted and subject to heavy fines if they broke camp. Right up to 1629 the work continued, but on the death of Shah Abbas, in that year, work was abandoned for the second time. Dissatisfaction with conditions of pay and accommodation seems to have been the main reason for this.

Again there was a lapse of some years before a third attempt was made, this time by Shah Abbas II, who tried to continue the work of his predecessor, but again with little result. Some 300 years elapsed before a further attempt was made, but even to this present day the deep cut made in the Karkunan ridge is readily recognized.

Following the unsuccessful attempt of Shah Abbas to cut through the mountain a legend sprang up in this remote part of Iran and has been handed down from generation to generation of local tribesmen and vil-

lages. This legend was to the effect that the ghost of Shah Abbas walked the Karkunan ridge by night, particularly in the vicinity of his famous cutting. No tribesman or villager would venture over the ridge near the cutting after dark (although, on account of the physical nature of the ground, this is understandable), as the ghost was supposed to stalk the heights, lament over its failure and proclaim that no one else should succeed. Over the past three and a half years disbelief in the achievement of piercing the mountain was expressed locally on many occasions; but if a ghost can conjure up difficulties, some created by nature and some by man, then perhaps it feels that it has done its best, and from the night of April 19, 1952, after some 300 years on its beat on the cold mountain top, it has been able to relinquish its watch and depart to more comfortable quarters.


You will gather from the foregoing remarks that a further, and this time successful, attempt has been made to connect the two rivers.

In 1945 a number of prominent citizens of Isfahan were actively concerned in the formation of a company with the primary object of augmenting the supply of water to the Zayandeh Rud valley, and with the secondary object of developing hydro-electric power. Their scheme was to tunnel through the Karkunan Ridge, and later on to construct a number of dams in the upper reaches of the Zayandeh Rud to store water and to develop power for industrial and domestic use in Isfahan. It should be noted here that Isfahan has become a most important industrial city. It has a number of cotton mills and a woollen mill, and these industries could be greatly developed by the further extension of agricultural activities in the valley.

The Central Government of Iran were also interested in the scheme through the medium of the Independent Irrigation Corporation, and arrangements were made for a preliminary geological and engineering reconnaissance survey, the geological study being undertaken by Sir Edward Bailey, then Director of the Geological Survey of Great Britain, assisted by an Iranian geologist, Dr. Dehghan. This reconnaissance was carried out in July, 1945, and much useful information was obtained as to the structure of the area and of the engineering problems associated with the project. As a result it was possible to advise that the scheme was a practical though hazardous one, and thereafter steps were taken to survey and design the engineering works which were put in hand at the end of September, 1948, the ceremony of firing the first charge being carried out by H.I.M. the Shah.

This tunnel, which is over $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles long, concrete lined and with an internal section slightly less than that of the London Underground, was holed through on April 19, 1952, and is being completed during the present winter. In conjunction with it a dam is being built across the Kuhrang just below the tunnel entrance, and this work was within a fortnight of completion when it was brought to a halt for the winter by the very early onset of the snows in mid-November. Victory is, however, in sight, and some water should pass from the Kuhrang to the Zayandeh Rud during the spring of this year, 1953.

The virtual completion of this important work provides an interesting



RAILWAY TO TEHRAN

ROAD TO IRAQ

ROAD TO TEHRAN

DAMENEH

ISKANDIARI

KARKUNAN RIDGE

ZAYANDEH RUD

ROAD TO TEHRAN

ISFAHAN

ZAYANDEH RUD

ROAD TO SHIRAZ

GAVKHANEH

ZAGROS MOUNTAINS

KARUN

ZARDEH KUH

KUH-RANG

KARUN

KARUN

KARUN

IRAQ

KHURRAN

AHWAZ

IRAN

BASRA

KHURRAMSHAHR

BANDAR SHAHPUR

SHATT EL ARAB

PERSIAN GULF

0 50 100 150 MILES

example of international co-operation. The Iranian Government and the citizens of Isfahan have, throughout the years during which the work has been under construction, maintained their interest and support, without which the scheme would have suffered the same fate as befell the project started long ago. As has already been said, the geological investigation was a combined Anglo-Persian affair; the design of the works and their supervision have been carried out by a British firm of consulting engineers who have on their staff not only engineers from this country but capable men of various nationalities, including two Italian inspectors with experience of tunnelling work in the Alps. The firm of contractors who carried out the construction work was a combined Persian and Scandinavian company registered in Iran, and most of their engineers on the site came from the Scandinavian countries. There were, however, men from other European countries, including Austria, among the engineering personnel. The labour was almost entirely Persian, and these men have shown themselves capable of tunnelling work under the most adverse conditions. It is a great tribute to them that they were able to carry on through the very severe winters experienced at this altitude. In addition survey work of possible dam sites lower down the river has been made recently by a group of French engineers, and an air survey of part of the valley was carried out last year by a Dutch organization.

The development of the water resources of the valley was strongly recommended in the Seven Year Plan Report prepared in 1949 by Overseas Consultants Inc., an organization composed of eleven American firms and one British firm of consulting engineers.

It should not be thought that the completion of the tunnel and the diversion of the water from one river into the other completes the major part of the work which has to be done to achieve full development of the valley. Once the water has been diverted there is still no means of storing it and reservoirs must, therefore, be constructed in due course. The construction of dams and the formation of the storage reservoirs carry with them attendant problems to which urgent attention will have to be given.

Rivers which derive their main source of water from the melting snows are in some respects better fitted for this class of work than are those whose rivers lie in the rainbelt areas. Snow acts as a reservoir, storing water in solid form during the winter and releasing it during the spring thaw. Instead of the immediate run-off which is experienced when heavy rain falls on steep mountain slopes, the flow of the rivers, Kuhrang and Zayandeh Rud, is prolonged into the summer as the snow melts.

By this means flood peaks are reduced, and what is even more important the slowing down of the run-off serves to reduce the amount of silt carried down in the rivers. In spite of this the Zayandeh Rud carries heavy quantities of silt during the flood period, and this presents a serious problem when reservoirs are under consideration. There have been cases in many countries, including Iran, where reservoirs have silted up and become useless in a relatively short period, for the rivers drop their silt as soon as they are brought to a halt in the artificial lakes formed by the dams.

The best way in which this problem can be overcome is by undertaking

soil conservation measures in the upper catchment area of the river. The most important step is that of afforestation, and it is to be hoped that the Iranian Government will before long take steps to plant trees of suitable types in this area and to protect them from the depredations of the local animal population. Where forests cannot be planted steps must be taken to encourage the growth of pasture and to prevent over-grazing. The difficulties of carrying out these operations must not be underestimated, for the tribesmen, like their neighbours in the valley, are very conservative and they have always had a free run of these mountain areas, and may be very averse to any change in their way of life.

I hope that I have been able to give you a broad picture of the great possibilities of this part of Iran. The addition of the Kuhrang water, and the subsequent reservoirs designed to pass this water down the valley in accordance with irrigation demands, will lead to at least a doubling of the present cultivated area. With improved methods of agriculture the amount of produce could be multiplied to a further extent, and if the production of cotton is increased and animal husbandry is encouraged by the growth of suitable fodder crops, industry in Isfahan can look forward to a considerable expansion.

Finally I would like to emphasize that the type of development which I have endeavoured to describe is typical of what can be done in many parts of the continents of Asia and Africa. You will all have heard of the Tennessee Valley Scheme in the U.S.A., of the large-scale irrigation developments in India, and of the Gezira Scheme in the Sudan. Far more can be done for backward countries and for the world at large by the proper development of the water resources of these continents than by any other means, and as an engineer I would like to say how very satisfying it is to find an ever-increasing interest in this sort of work.

Before these schemes can take shape a great deal of preliminary investigation has to be undertaken. There are, for instance, very few rivers, the most notable exception being the Nile, where long-term statistics are available as to the flow of the rivers, and without this information irrigation projects, particularly dams, cannot be designed. The setting up of hydrological and meteorological stations should, therefore, be undertaken wherever the possibilities of water development exist. In addition the silt and mineral content of the rivers should be studied—the amount of mineral salts, good or bad, which are brought down by the rivers, and which may either ruin or be of great benefit to the land brought under irrigation.

These are matters which immediately appeal to the engineer, but there are also studies to be made of the land itself. This is where the growing co-operation between agriculturist and engineer is playing its part, for while the engineer is studying the characteristics of the rivers, the agriculturist is investigating the soils, and deciding what are the best crops to be grown and the appropriate rotation of these crops in order to maintain fertility of the soil.

I do hope that my audience will give thought to these things and where possible lend their support to any projects, such as that in the Zayandeh Rud valley, which lead not only to a betterment of the lives of the people living on the spot, but also help to produce foodstuffs for export

to other areas in which, with improving conditions of health and education, the population is rising rapidly and food shortage becoming acute.

Mr. MOTT: Could Mr. Fitt possibly give some idea as to how the scheme is being financed? Will there be rates levied upon the agricultural villages which get the water? Or will the scheme be self-financing?

Mr. FITT: The ultimate intention is that the scheme shall be self-financing, but that is not possible during the early stages of the development. The Iranian Government, who have been largely responsible for financing the scheme, cannot charge the inhabitants of the valley for the water which is already flowing down the Zayandeh Rud. As they are now going to release into the Zayandeh Rud water from the Karun, and have as yet no means of storing this, they cannot separate the sheep from the goats, as it were. It is only when they have storage in reservoirs and can control the additional water that it will be possible to pass some form of charge on to the cultivators of the valley for the water supplied to them. In the meantime, the Government have taken the most important step of providing the water.

Dr. LOCKHART: It was interesting to hear what the lecturer had to say about the earlier attempts to carry out a similar scheme. Perhaps I may add a little historical background. The first attempt was made by Tahmasp I by means of a tunnel, but the engineers of his day were unable to cope with the problem of ventilation. I believe that two old shafts have been found on the top of the Karkunan Ridge and that if a line is drawn through those two shafts it will come out just by a ruined dam on the Karun river.

Following that, Shah Abbas made his attempt by means of an open-cut. His main reason for pushing the scheme hard was that he had in 1598 made Isfahan the capital of his empire, and the population of Persian capitals tends to increase rapidly. However, the scheme proved too much for his engineers, but a further attempt was made by Shah Abbas II. In spite of the fact that there was a French engineer, M. de Forest, in charge that attempt also failed.

Nothing further was done until the early eighteenth century, during the reign of Shah Sultan Husain. He was anxious to get more water, partly because he had embarked upon the construction of a very large garden and palace called Farahabad which was close to the famous garden of Hazarjarib. That put a great strain on the then existing water-supply particularly because at that time the population of Isfahan was three times what it now is. However, they got no further on that occasion than the levying of a tax for the carrying out of the scheme. That was all that was ever done.

Judge AMEER ALI: I am sure we all agree that the firm that initiated the scheme which has just been described is greatly to be congratulated. I hope I shall not be accused of throwing cold water upon the enthusiasm of any other firm or upon any project for the improvement of backward countries when I venture to make a point in respect to one of the later remarks the lecturer made. I believe he referred to the sub-continent of India as backward as regards possible irrigation and such like. I say with some diffidence, not being an irrigation engineer or agriculturist, that

India has been well nurtured from the irrigation point of view for the last 100 years, commencing with the work of British military engineers over a century ago. Rulers before the British also attempted irrigation projects, but were impeded by the lack of modern technique and industrial resources. The problem in India today is not so much that of more irrigation but of preventing waterlogging. In fact, we were finding that over-irrigation was putting areas out of cultivation. That is an indication that with certain highly alluvial soils it is necessary to go very carefully into the effects of such schemes.

At this moment I understand that India is constructing a large series of irrigation headworks and so on, financed by the Colombo Plan. That looks as though it may lead to major trouble in a different way, because certainly it will be possible to cut off the waters which go to Pakistan and divert them to India. Therefore, there is every indication of considerable trouble from that source.

I say this in no derogatory sense in regard to what these great engineering firms are now effecting, but there are other factors which have to be borne in mind in initiating great schemes for irrigation. These may not apply so much to light, sandy soils, but to soils of a more fertile type.

Mr. FIRT: I find myself in agreement with what has been said. At the same time, I would like to point out that I quoted India as an example of what *can* be done, and I instanced what had been done in India as worthy of application to backward countries. Perhaps I did not make myself quite clear on that point.

In the interest of economy of time I had to omit a portion of my talk which referred to the important factor the last speaker has mentioned: collaboration between engineer and agriculturist, the examination of the soil and of the other drainage problems, before an irrigation scheme is brought into being. That collaboration is an extremely important factor which I regret to say has been ignored on some occasions in the past. It is not going to be ignored in the future. The engineer and the agriculturist are really getting together on these matters, and I hope that it will be possible to say, when any future irrigation scheme comes into being, that it is the result of the close collaboration between the two groups of technicians.

As to the question of the division of the Indus waters between India and Pakistan, that problem is not unique. There are also the Nile, the Zambesi and many other rivers which flow through more than one country. There exists if not a written certainly an unwritten international law on this subject. It is not possible, in my opinion, for one country, even if it does live at the head of a river, to steal from its neighbour more water than is its proper due. There is an extremely interesting book which probably many here have read, *The Economic Uses of International Rivers*, by H. A. Smith, which quotes a number of legal cases in which questions of water rights have been decided.

Sir GILES SQUIRE: Is there any connection between the scheme which has been described and the scheme for supplying municipal water to Isfahan? Or are the two schemes quite separate?

Mr. FIRT: They are quite separate. Municipal water to Isfahan has

never presented a problem. There is no piped water supply around Isfahan. The subsoil is largely of sandy gravel, and the people can always get water from their shallow wells. The towns which have received special treatment in respect of water supply have been Shiraz and Teheran. There is also a scheme for Meshed, but it has not yet been implemented.

Mr. WHITTERON: I think the lecturer said that there was to be development of hydro-electric power under the scheme. Would it supply Isfahan?

Mr. FITT: I admit I have rather ignored that aspect because I could not get everything into the time. There is at the down-stream end of the Kuhrang tunnel sufficient head for quite a major hydro-electric development. There is also the prospect of obtaining power from the dams which will be built in the Zayandeh Rud. Power will, however, have to take a secondary place to irrigation demands. If there are to be multi-purpose projects, irrigation must come first and power afterwards. Isfahan is, by the shortest route, 100 miles away from the source of hydro-electric power supply, and 100 miles of transmission line is a costly business. There must be a real demand for power before it becomes economically possible to develop a source so far away from the consuming centre.

The CHAIRMAN: I think all will agree with me that Mr. Fitt has given an exceedingly interesting example of one of the most vital questions of the day: a development which will increase food production. He has brought out the point that in this case the Persians themselves, the citizens of Isfahan and the Persian Government have shown great perseverance in the way in which they have, amid considerable difficulties, managed to keep this scheme going, especially on the technical construction side. Mr. Fitt has shown that there has been the most remarkable co-operation between Persians, British, Dutch, French, Italians and Scandinavians in carrying out this scheme. It does now really look as though it is going to be completed.

May I, on your behalf, thank Mr. Fitt very much indeed for a most interesting lecture. (*Applause.*)

THE CAUSES OF THE ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL DISPUTE

By LAURENCE LOCKHART, PH.D.

Report of a lecture delivered on Wednesday, January 21, 1953, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Dr. Lockhart has come to lecture to us on "The Causes of the Anglo-Persian Oil Dispute," a very controversial subject. Dr. Lockhart knows a great deal about Persia; he is a distinguished historian, but has carried out research work on Persian history and has written many books on it.

He joined the Foreign Office and after some years transferred to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. During the war Dr. Lockhart served with the R.A.F. in the Middle East and was for a time liaison officer with the Soviet Forces. Returning to A.H.Q. Levant, he served with the Bomber units in Tunisia and Cyrenaica, and in the last year of the war was Chief Intelligence Officer at Aden.

Since the war Dr. Lockhart worked for a short time in the Foreign Office and then returned to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. His duties have included visits to Persia. He wants it made clear that the views he is about to express are entirely his own.

The lecture will be prefaced with a coloured film of Persia, lent us kindly by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, so that we may see the type of country with which the company has had to deal.

IT is with much trepidation that I rise to address you today, because the subject on which I have been asked to speak—namely, the Anglo-Persian oil dispute—is a highly complex and controversial one. My task is rendered difficult by several things. First, we are as yet perhaps too near the events of 1951-2 to be able to see them in their proper perspective, and feelings still run high. What I am anxious to do today is to avoid saying anything which might make matters worse instead of better; we should all of us be on our guard in this respect. Further, my position is complicated by the fact that I have myself played a very minor part in the controversy; if I therefore sometimes fail to achieve objectivity, I must crave your indulgence. I must make one more preliminary remark; unless otherwise stated, the views I shall express are my own and do not necessarily represent those of any other person or organization.

From the film which we have just been shown, you will have formed some idea not only of the enormous scope of the Persian oil industry, but also of the great difficulties that had to be overcome in order to bring it into being and to build it up and maintain it. We have heard a good deal recently of what has been done in the other oil-producing countries of the Middle East; it is not my intention to belittle the efforts that have been made in those countries to develop their oil—far be it from me to do that. What I want to do, however, is to point out that those who, half a century ago, laid the foundations of the Persian oil industry were the *real* pioneers of Middle Eastern oil; production in the other Middle Eastern countries began less than half that time ago. Another point that should be stressed is that Persia was until very recently the only one of those countries which had a large refining capacity (Abadan refinery is, in fact, the largest in the

world). That means that the Persian oil industry, being concerned not only with production but also with the very complicated processes of refining, has had need of many more highly trained and experienced technicians than would otherwise have been the case. The importance of this fact will become apparent later.

Fifty years elapsed between the signature of the D'Arcy concession and the closing down of the great industry to which it gave rise. Though it may seem long to us, that is a comparatively short period in relation to the exceptionally long history of Persia. Nevertheless, in that space of time an enormous industry had come into being in Khuzistan (this province, which had formerly been most fertile and prosperous, became greatly impoverished when the great barrages and elaborate system of irrigation canals of the Sasanians fell into decay and gradually ceased to function). In those fifty years Persia's primitive and small-scale oil industry—if industry it may be termed—which had endured unaltered for so many centuries underwent a miraculous transformation, a transformation that made her the fourth largest oil-producing country in the world.

This remarkable change was brought about by means of a partnership in which, in the earlier stages, Persia supplied the oil and the unskilled labour, while Great Britain was responsible for the initiative and planning, the financing, the provision of the engineers and other highly skilled and experienced technicians, the plant and machinery, and the transport and marketing arrangements. In due course, Persia shouldered more of the burden, by providing increasing numbers of skilled workers and some of the technicians, while much of the capital needed was obtained from the profits of the enterprise. However that may be, neither partner could do without the other, and their mutual association in the enterprise was of great benefit to both.

The huge capital investments of the A.I.O.C. in the enterprise, the large sums which it paid annually in wages to its employees in Persia and its very substantial expenditure on its medical, health, educational and training services, all contributed in their various ways to the wellbeing of the Persian people; they would have benefited further if the large sums which their Government received annually from the company had been expended more with a view to the common good (I refer here particularly to the Persian Seven-Year Plan, which has been hamstrung by lack of funds). Many thousands of the inhabitants of Khuzistan, who had hitherto eked out a precarious existence by tending their flocks and moving with them from winter to summer pastures and *vice versa*, according to the season, abandoned their traditional nomadic mode of life for steadier and far more remunerative employment at Abadan and the oil-fields.

Furthermore, as the years went by, increasing numbers of young Persians, after undergoing training by the A.I.O.C. in Persia and in certain cases in the United Kingdom as well, were enabled to rise to high positions in the organization. Another and by no means inconsiderable advantage to Persia was the provision by the company of adequate supplies of high-grade oil products on a nation-wide basis. The cost of these products to the consumer would have been exceptionally low but for high taxation

and heavy transport charges. The importance of having such supplies of fuel can be better appreciated when it is realized that Persia is a country where both coal and wood are scarce and very costly.

Let us now turn to Great Britain. It would be idle to pretend that all the advantages were on the side of Persia, because Great Britain has also benefited substantially in a number of ways. Although D'Arcy and his successors had to invest many hundreds of thousands of pounds in the undertaking before success was achieved—and, it must be remembered, they had no guarantee that oil *would* in fact be found—they ultimately reaped a rich reward. The British Treasury, especially in more recent years, received large sums annually from the A.I.O.C. in the form of taxation and also to a lesser extent as dividends on the British Government's holding in the company. The contract between the A.I.O.C. and the British Admiralty provided the Royal Navy with large supplies of fuel oil, which was a factor of prime importance, especially in both World Wars. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the fact that for many years the United Kingdom's balance of payments benefited substantially from the sale of products from Abadan; it was by "invisible" transactions such as this that the United Kingdom derived much of the money needed to cover part of its imports bill. Although this income was reduced to some extent by the export of machinery and plant from this country to Persia, the shipment of these goods to the latter enabled the A.I.O.C.'s operations there to be stepped up and so later increased the revenue from that source, besides providing British manufacturers with many a valuable order. What the loss of Persian oil has meant to our balance of payments can be gauged by the statement in the *Economic Survey for 1952* that "purchases of dollar oil to replace Persian oil have been costing the sterling area . . . over £100,000,000 a year, the greater part of which is reflected in the United Kingdom's invisible account."*

Why was this great enterprise, which was of such manifest advantage to both Persia and Great Britain, brought so abruptly and, as some of us may think, so needlessly, to an end?

It would be an over-simplification of the matter and also, I feel, lacking in fairness if I were to answer that question by saying that the present situation has arisen solely because of excessive nationalism in Persia and the intransigence of Dr. Musaddiq. It would be equally unfair to say that it has been brought about by the misdeeds of the A.I.O.C. As we shall see, some of the causes of the dispute, besides being indirect, were by no means confined to incidents arising out of the company's activities in Persia. There were, in fact, many other factors, such as Russian hostility, Anglo-Russian relations, British Middle Eastern policy—or lack of a policy, if you like—Persian desire to be neutral in the event of a third World War, world economic trends and crises, and last, but not least, the growth of nationalism in Asia.

I think that it is true to say that the most important single influence has been that of nationalism. In a broadcast some little time ago Professor Toynbee referred to the remarkable upsurge of nationalism in Asia during

* Cmd. 8509, p. 15.

the post-war years as a reawakening of that continent. The word "reawakening" is a very apt one so far as Persia is concerned, because she has had in the course of her long history several eras of great splendour and glory. In the Achæmenian period she was the greatest power in the world and she was also the first universal State. Then, we must not forget her great contributions to religion, philosophy, literature and the arts, many of which were made at times when these islands were still the abode of barbarians. It is therefore very understandable that the Persian of today should take an intense pride in his country and its achievements; we should not blame him for that. Now, the existence of this pride is a thing which some of us British did not take sufficiently into account in the past; by our failure to do so we have, no doubt more often than not quite unwittingly, offended Persian susceptibilities. That is one side of the picture, but there is also another side. What is unfortunate is that many Persians, having observed the rapid spread of nationalism and its manifest successes in other parts of Asia, have become so imbued with its spirit that they have lost their ability to appreciate realities. Now, nationalism is a heady wine which should therefore be taken in moderation. Persians could not help contrasting the success of nationalism in the East with the simultaneous decline of British prestige there. There can be no doubt that the withdrawal of Great Britain from India and her consequent loss of control over the Indian army has had a great effect on Persian opinion.

What has aggravated the effects of nationalistic feeling has been the lack of contact between Khuzistan, where Abadan and most of the oil-fields lie, and the rest of Persia; this lack of contact has been caused by the great mountain barrier of the Zagros. Now, lack of contact leads to ignorance, and ignorance is a frequent cause of misunderstandings. I may mention here that Dr. Musaddiq has never set foot in Khuzistan. In fairness, I must also state that, particularly in early years, the Zagros barrier and the lack of communications prevented the majority of the British staff of the company from getting to know much about Persia and her people.

I can most conveniently show how the various influences, major as well minor, have come into play by giving in outline form the story of the Persian oil industry during the last fifty years.

From the very outset, before even the signature of the D'Arcy concession, we notice one important thing—namely, the hostility of Russia to British influence and enterprise in Persia. It was Russian opposition which all but caused the failure of the negotiations for the D'Arcy concession and which resulted in the exclusion from it of the five northern provinces. We shall see later how the Soviet Government has inherited the hostile policy of Tsarist Russia, thereby contributing to some extent to the present state of affairs.

Seven years of costly effort and much disappointment elapsed before oil was struck in commercial quantities at Masjid-i-Sulaiman. This discovery led to the formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. in 1909 and to the completion of the pipeline from the oilfield to Abadan two years later. The refinery (which is on a very small scale compared with present-day standards) was completed in 1913, and it was not until the following year that

the first profit was made; at the beginning of 1915 the Persian Government received its first royalty payment. Meanwhile, in May, 1914, the British Government had taken up a majority holding in the company, and the latter had concluded a long-term contract with the Admiralty for the supply of fuel oil to the Royal Navy. In the arrangements made between the British Government and the company it was clearly laid down that, although there were to be two Government directors armed with the power of veto on the board of the latter, they were not to interfere in its ordinary commercial activities. The main object of the British Government in taking this action was to safeguard the supply of fuel oil to the Royal Navy; by investing £2,000,000 in the enterprise at a time when it would have been impossible for the company to have raised so large an amount in any other way, it enabled it to expand its operations very considerably. I give this explanation because many Persians have failed to understand the true character of the relationship between the British Government and the company. Some have alleged that the company induced the Government to take up its holding so as to be able to make it bring pressure to bear on Persia; others, quite as unjustifiably, have maintained that the British Government took this step in order to make the company an instrument for the furtherance of its imperialistic aims in Persia. The close identification in Persian minds of the British Government with the company has also tended to make the latter suffer for the sins, real or imaginary, of the former. We can thus see that the association between the British Government and the company has had its disadvantages as well as its advantages, and that it can therefore be regarded as in some measure a contributory factor to the dispute. Persians cannot forget Great Britain's 1907 Convention with Russia (though they usually overlook or ignore its real motive—namely, fear of the ominously growing power of Germany). They also remember with distaste the abortive Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, as well as the unavoidable presence of British troops on Persian soil in the two World Wars. Although it has been—and still is—a cardinal point in British foreign policy that Persia should be free and independent, many Persians have looked upon her with almost as much fear and suspicion as they have upon their dangerous neighbour Russia. As far back as 1896 the well-known constitutionalist Mirza Aqa Khan of Kirman, shortly before his execution by the cruel and reactionary Muhammad Ali Mirza, wrote the following lines :*

Ne'er may that evil-omened day befall
 When Iran shall become the stranger's thrall;
 Ne'er may I see that virgin fair and pure
 Fall victim to some Russian Gallant's lure;
 And ne'er may Fate this angel bride award
 As serving-maid to some English Lord.

I have already mentioned that the company made its first royalty payment to the Persian Government in 1915. We find that on many subsequent occasions controversy arose between the Persian Government and

* English translation by the late Professor E. G. Browne, in his book *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*, p. xi.

the company over the calculation of the royalty. In the D'Arcy concession it was laid down in what were unfortunately somewhat vague terms that the Persian Government was to receive a royalty of 16 per cent. of the net profits of any company or companies to be formed for the working of the concession. Thus it was inevitable that differences of opinion should arise between the Persian Government and the company. These differences were smoothed over by the conclusion of an interpretative agreement in 1920; thereafter for some years the relations between the Persian Government and the company were of a cordial nature. It was during this period that Reza Shah came to the throne and by the exercise of his powerful authority broke the power of the tribal chiefs with whom, in Khuzistan, the company had hitherto had to deal in regard to the acquisition of land, the protection of the oilfields and refinery, etc. Henceforth all such matters came within the province of the Central Government; this development was on the whole very much a change for the better, as the Government and the company came to know each other better; something was at last being done to neutralize the effects of the Zagros barrier. A further improvement occurred when it became possible to travel by road between Khuzistan and Tehran and other places on the central plateau. Subsequently, communications were further improved by the construction of the railway across Persia and the introduction of air travel.

Unfortunately, in 1928 the royalty trouble flared up again and for four years both sides made numerous attempts to solve the problem, sometimes by seeking to revise the relevant clauses of the D'Arcy concession, at others by endeavouring to conclude an entirely new agreement. It was when matters were in this state that the world economic depression set in. Prices and sales of oil fell everywhere, thereby reducing the company's profits and with them the royalty to the Persian Government. Whereas for 1930 the Government received £1,288,312, in respect of the following year it got only £306,872. The true reason for this very serious fall was not understood in Tehran, and, at the instigation of the Government, the press began a campaign of vilification of the company. This was followed up by the Government's unilateral cancellation of the D'Arcy concession, despite the fact that the company was then awaiting counter-proposals for a settlement of the royalty problem. I need not describe in detail what ensued—namely, the unheeded protests by the company and the British Government, the latter's submission of the question to the Council of the League of Nations, and the successful move to induce the Persian Government and the company to enter into direct negotiations under the auspices of the League. The outcome was the conclusion of the 1933 concession.

This new concession represented a compromise from which both parties to it benefited. It was very much in the interests of the Persian Government and the company that the percentage basis of the royalty was replaced by one assessed mainly on the quantity of oil sold in or exported from Persia; in addition, the Persian Government was to receive annually a sum equivalent to 20 per cent. of the distribution to the ordinary stockholders of the company in excess of £671,250 whether by way of dividend or out of reserves. There was also to be a further payment per ton of oil

sold in Persia or exported in lieu of taxation. As there were guaranteed minimum annual payments of nearly £1,000,000 in regard to the tonnage royalty and taxation exemption payments, the Government was protected against any drop in production, as well as against loss arising from a reduction in the profits. Moreover, it stood to gain in good trading years from its right to a proportion of the dividend distribution to stockholders. What must also be regarded as an advantage to Persia was the reduction of the area of the concession from 480,000 square miles to 100,000.

For its part the company gained from an extension of its concessionary rights from 1961 to 1993 and from an undertaking by the Government not to cancel the concession or to alter its terms by either general or special legislation in the future or by administrative measures or any other acts of the executive authorities. Differences between the parties that could not be settled by direct agreement were to be submitted to arbitration.

It was also laid down in the new concession that the Government and the company should prepare a plan for the progressive reduction of the latter's non-Persian employees, with a view to their replacement by Persian nationals as quickly as was consistent with the efficient working of the concession. For some time past there had been much criticism in Persia of what was considered the unduly large number of posts of importance that were held by the British staff. What most of these critics failed, of course, to realize was that the oil industry, especially when refining is taken into account, is a highly technical one, calling for the employment of many highly trained and experienced men; they also did not allow for the fact that there were but few Persians available who had the requisite skill and experience.

I have dealt at some length with the 1933 concession because there has been much controversy in regard to it in recent times. For example, the Persian Government has sought to justify its disregard of its undertaking not to cancel or alter that concession by maintaining that it was negotiated under duress and therefore null and void *ab initio*. Let us look at the matter as dispassionately as we can. Both parties voluntarily agreed to negotiate direct, the concession was concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, and the Bill embodying it was subsequently passed by the Majlis and approved by the Shah. There was no question whatever of duress. It has also been stated that, since the concession was granted by a dictatorial régime, it could not be regarded as binding on the successors of that régime. The fact is that the company had to conclude the agreement with the government of the day in Persia; the precise nature of that government has surely no bearing whatever on the matter. In any case, one cannot help regarding as significant the fact that successive Persian Governments not only accepted the validity of the concession as beyond question, but also accepted, as consideration, the large annual royalties that accrued under the terms of that concession. A further allegation has been that the company, considering the terms of the D'Arcy concession to be unfavourable to it, forced or induced the Shah to cancel it and to replace it by the 1933 agreement, which, it was said, was far more advantageous to the company. We have already seen how advantageous the 1933 agreement was to the Government; this view is supported by the testimony of a

well-informed and impartial observer. George Lenczowski, in his book *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948*, said :

Compared with the previous concession, the new agreement gave so many more benefits to Iran that its conclusion could justly be regarded as a great victory for Reza Shah's bold foreign policy and as a final act in the process of development and assertion of Iranian independence. By this act perhaps more than by any other, the new régime demonstrated that, far from being a tool in the hands of Western Imperialism, it was ready and able to put up a stubborn resistance to it.

I must now return to my narrative.

There can be no doubt that the new concession, by removing serious causes of friction, greatly improved relations between the Persian Government and the company. By reason of its confidence in the durability of the concession and the extension of the concessionary period by over thirty years, the company embarked on a programme of great expansion in the years that ensued. It invested a large proportion of its earnings in extending the scope of its enterprise, and it succeeded in discovering and bringing to the production stage a number of new oilfields, besides making the necessary additions to the pipeline systems, the refinery at Abadan, its tanker fleet and its marketing organizations.

In conformity with the concession, the company and the Government duly prepared the plan, which provided for a progressive reduction of the proportion, but not necessarily of the actual *number* (so as not to prevent the efficient carrying out of the expansion programme), of the company's foreign employees to the total Persian staff. As there were still far too few Persians available with the requisite training and experience, the company went far beyond its concessionary obligations in extending the scope of its educational and training schemes for its Persian employees, many of whom were sent to the United Kingdom to undergo university and other courses in order to fit them for duties of a more responsible nature. My reference to the lack of suitably trained Persians is not intended as a reflection on the work of the Persian Ministry of Education; it has done its best, but its efforts have been terribly hampered by lack of money and also of teachers. It is greatly to be regretted that it never received adequate funds.

In order to bring the Persian and British members of the staff closer together by removing or at any rate reducing the language bar, the company instituted classes in English for the former and in Persian for the latter, and encouraged proficiency by the granting of bonuses.

With the opening up of new fields and the continued growth of Abadan, the company had to make a corresponding increase in the scope of its medical and health services. In the absence of any other medical facilities, these services had to deal with not only the company's own employees and their dependants, but also with many of the other inhabitants in the areas where its operations were carried on.

At Abadan and the oilfields a big housing programme for the benefit of

the company's employees was embarked upon, but the development of the industry was so great and so rapid that there was an inevitable lag, particularly in new areas.

It was very unfortunate that just when the various factors for bringing about a lasting betterment of relations were beginning to take effect the second World War broke out. One of the first of the company's activities to be adversely affected by the war was its housing programme. As so much of the material needed for the construction of houses for its employees had to be imported into Persia, the growing scarcity of such materials in the United Kingdom and the shortage of shipping caused first a curtailment and later a complete suspension of this programme. Work on it was, however, resumed at the earliest possible moment after the war. That strictly impartial organization, the International Labour Office, has paid a tribute to the company's achievements in this field in its report on conditions in the Persian oil industry, which it published in 1950.

A more serious effect of the war was the decline in the A.I.O.C.'s production of oil which occurred in the earlier years of the struggle, bringing with it a decrease in the royalty payments to the Persian Government. This decline was caused by the loss of many of the company's markets as well as by shipping difficulties. This development, although due to causes that were beyond the company's control, led to a serious disagreement between it and the Government. This dispute was ended by the company agreeing to compensate the Government by making large additional payments over and above what were strictly due under the terms of the concession.

In the later stages of the war the ever-growing requirements of the Allied Forces in the Middle East for aviation spirit, petrol and other products enabled the company not only to regain the lost ground but also to break all pre-war records. Although production had sagged to 6,600,000 tons in 1941, it rose to 9,399,000 tons in the following year. By 1945 the total amounted to nearly 17,000,000 tons. This large growth in production was naturally reflected in the royalty payments to the Persian Government.

During the war there were no serious disagreements between the Government and the company, apart from the one that I have just mentioned. On the other hand, developments which were entirely unconnected with the company, such as inflation, then occurred which were to prove detrimental to its interests and also to the maintenance of harmonious relations between it and the Government.

The abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 brought to an end the era of strong government in Persia. This change led, amongst other things, to the formation later that year of the Tudeh (or Masses) party. Consisting at first of genuine reformers, this party soon came under the influence of Soviet Russia, which speedily fashioned it into an instrument for the spread of Communism in Persia. As early as 1942, agitators from Soviet Azarbaijan and emissaries of the Tudeh party went to Khuzistan, where they began to indoctrinate the workers of the A.I.O.C.; they had, however, orders not to cause any major disturbance there so long as the war

lasted, so as not to jeopardize or impede the flow of war materials from the Western Allies to Russia across the Persian "bridge of victory."

The presence on Persian soil of British and Russian troops, and later of American forces as well, was not unnaturally resented in Persia, while the steep rise in the cost of living caused by the war situation generally also gave rise to much anti-foreign feeling. Although Persian national pride had suffered a grievous setback by reason of the entry of foreign troops into the country, the spirit of nationalism was by no means dead. When in September, 1944, Soviet Russia demanded the granting of an oil concession in northern Persia and brought such strong pressure to bear on the Persian Government that it was forced to resign, national feeling was deeply stirred. It was at this juncture that Dr. Musaddiq, the leader of a small right-wing group in the Majlis, tabled a Bill to prevent any member of the Cabinet from negotiating or granting an oil concession to any foreign interests so long as the war lasted; this Bill was passed by the Majlis on December 2, 1944. The Russians were enraged at this measure, but they could not secure its withdrawal. It was certainly a triumph for Persian national feelings, and Dr. Musaddiq and his followers had the sympathy and support of Great Britain and the United States.

I had occasion at that time to read a number of Dr. Musaddiq's speeches. I reached the conclusion then that he was a sincere and genuinely patriotic man, but that he showed at times some confusion of mind. I think that, so far as it goes, that conclusion still holds good, but I and many others in this country then and for some time after underestimated not only his astuteness and obstinacy but also his pertinacity and consistency; these last two qualities, which he has displayed for the best part of a decade, are rare in a Persian politician.

It was obviously in consequence of the British support of Dr. Musaddiq during the 1944 crisis that the Tudeh press proceeded to attack Great Britain as a supporter of "fascist" régimes and as subjecting Persia to exploitation through the A.I.O.C. As the country was then suffering from the inflationary conditions occasioned by the war, and as anti-foreign feeling was, for this and other reasons, rife, these Tudeh attacks were more effective than they would otherwise have been.

In the years that followed the conclusion of peace in 1945, the A.I.O.C. greatly stepped up its activities in Persia. Its production of oil rose to unprecedented heights, as did also its royalty payments to the Persian Government. Its efforts were, it is true, hampered in the spring and summer of 1946 by a series of dangerous strikes that were fomented by the Communist and Tudeh agitators to whom I have already referred; these strikes were a counterpart to the separatist movement which the Russians fostered in Azarbaijan. These troubles were, however, soon overcome, and the process of active development was resumed.

Meanwhile, Soviet Russia, still smarting from her rebuff in 1944, had returned to the charge over the question of the northern oil concession. Despite her treaty obligation to withdraw her troops from Persia by the beginning of March, 1946, she used their continued presence there after that date as a means of putting pressure to bear on Qavam as-Saltaneh, the Persian Prime Minister. She said that she would withdraw her troops

if he would undertake to arrange for the oil concession to be granted to a Perso-Soviet company. Qavam as-Saltaneh was virtually forced to conclude an agreement on these terms, but it proved to be most unpopular in Persia, and on October 22, 1947 (by which time the Russians had been prevailed upon to withdraw their forces), the Majlis, by an overwhelming majority, passed an Act which declared the agreement to be null and void and which provided that the Persian Government was not to grant an oil concession to any foreign power or to the nationals of any such power. A noteworthy feature of this Act was the final clause, which read as follows:

“In all cases where the rights of the Persian nation, in respect of the country’s natural resources, whether underground or otherwise, have been impaired, particularly in regard to the Southern oil [*i.e.*, the A.I.O.C.], the Government is required to enter into such negotiations and take such measures as are necessary to regain the national rights and to inform the Majlis of the result.”

It is a moot point whether this final clause was inserted in order to “gild the pill” for the Russians or whether it was designed merely to leave the door open for an attempt to extract more favourable terms from the A.I.O.C. at some future date. In the light of what has since occurred, there seems some justification for the latter view. The Persians, having successfully escaped from the Bear’s hug, may have thought that they might later be able to give the Lion’s tail a twist. It would, however, be going too far to claim, as Dr. Musaddiq and his supporters have recently, that this clause was added for the express purpose of preparing the way for the nationalization of the Persian oil industry. Even in his wildest moments Dr. Musaddiq had had no thought of nationalization up to that juncture, nor indeed did he entertain any such idea for some time to come. Persian nationalism was not as yet extreme; the influences that were to bring about this development had not yet made themselves felt. The Russian crisis had brought about a feeling of national solidarity rather than one of extreme nationalism.

In the meantime, as I have already stated, the company was successfully continuing its operations in the south. Although it had certain difficulties to contend with, such as Communist propaganda amongst its workers, its relations with the Government remained close and cordial. But these relations were to be made to suffer by reason of British policy in another sphere. Although the company’s royalty payments to the Government rose year by year, they would have been larger still had it not been for the limitation which the company had had to place on its dividends because of the British Government’s dividend limitation policy. Although in the long run the Persian Government, by reason of its interest in the company’s general reserve, would have lost nothing, it was undoubtedly made to suffer some temporary hardship on account of this policy.

Another Persian grievance, and in my view a very real one, was the fact that in the post-war years the Government’s royalties were a good deal less than the sums which the company had to pay annually to the British Treasury in the form of income tax and profits tax. For example, for 1948 the company had to pay no less than £28,310,353 in such taxes,

whereas its royalty to the Persian Government was only £9,172,269. Even if we take into account the fact that the company's tax payments to the British Treasury represented a levy on its profits from all its manifold activities both inside and outside Persia, the discrepancy is a very striking one. Although the company's British tax payments fell to £22,840,181 for 1949, they rose to no less than £50,706,880 for the following year. As against these huge amounts, which aggregated over £100,000,000 for these three years and were almost equivalent to the total royalties for the whole period of the company's operations, the Persian Government's receipts were no more than £38,693,251. Even if the Supplemental Agreement between the company and the Persian Government (of which I shall give some explanation later) had come into force, there would still have been an appreciable gap between the receipts of the Persian Government and those of the British Treasury. It was most unfortunate that this period of exceptional profits should have coincided with one of altogether exceptional British taxation which had been rendered necessary by the second World War.

Realizing the hardship which the Persian Government was suffering by reason of the British Government's dividend limitation policy, the company in 1948 offered to make an immediate additional payment as compensation. The Government replied that it would prefer not to accept this offer but to make it instead form part of a settlement of a more general nature. The fact that there had been a marked improvement in oil prices and markets since the conclusion of the 1933 concession certainly justified the view that some of the benefit therefrom should accrue to the Persian Government. The company shared this view, and thereupon entered into negotiations with the Government. During these negotiations the two parties considered for a time the conclusion of an agreement providing for an equal sharing of the profits of the enterprise, but, as the Persian Government insisted that its share, which it evidently wanted to be even more than 50 per cent., should apply to the company's profits on its activities both inside and outside Persia, this avenue proved unfruitful. The attitude of the Persian Government on this and certain other occasions reminds one of the well-known lines in Canning's despatch to Sir Charles Bagot at The Hague, dated January 31, 1826 :

In matters of commerce the fault of the Dutch
Is offering too little and asking too much.

It was then agreed to retain the general framework of the 1933 concession, but to introduce certain major modifications in Persia's favour which would result in greatly increased royalties and other advantages. These modifications were duly embodied in the Supplemental Agreement, which was signed by the company and the Persian Government on July 19, 1949.

It was unfortunate that this agreement was signed only a few days before the Majlis was due to dissolve. When M. Sa'id, the Prime Minister, introduced the Bill for its ratification, the small group under the leadership of Dr. Musaddiq easily filibustered it out. It is important to note that this group opposed the Bill not through animosity to the A.I.O.C. or their

dislike of the terms of the agreement, but because they wished to block anything put forward by the ruling clique.

I cannot help feeling that if the Persian Government had accepted the 50/50 profit-sharing principle when it was first mooted, or, alternatively, if the Supplemental Agreement could have been signed a year before or even a few months earlier, and if the Persian Government had then taken energetic steps to explain its manifest advantages to the Majlis deputies and the general public, the Bill for its ratification might have been passed without serious difficulty or appreciable delay. We might then have had no oil dispute and no rupture of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Persia. But this is, of course, mere conjecture, and it is quite likely that the Persian extremists might have forced on the crisis, though perhaps at a later date, no matter what steps the company had taken to benefit Persia financially. We must remember that the financial factor, though important, is by no means the only one.

There was much delay over the elections for the next Majlis, and the Bill for the ratification of the Supplemental Agreement did not come up for consideration again until the middle of June, 1950. The Government, instead of arranging for an early debate on the measure, when it could have made it clear how advantageous the agreement would be to Persia, merely referred it to a Committee of the Majlis. It is noteworthy that the chairman of this committee was Dr. Musaddiq and that several of his henchmen were members of it.

On June 26 General Razmara became Prime Minister. He was regarded in the West, particularly in the United States, as a "strong man" who could be relied upon to maintain Persia's alliance with the Western Powers. The open support which Dr. Grady, the United States Ambassador, gave to General Razmara provided the anti-foreign elements in the country with the opportunity to denounce him as a hireling of the West.

On numerous occasions the A.I.O.C. asked whether the Government intended to press on with the Bill for the ratification of the Supplemental Agreement, but General Razmara always adopted delaying tactics and tried to obtain even better terms. Dr. Musaddiq and his National Front, as they now styled themselves, took up a stand against the Bill; as before, they did so purely for political reasons. Dr. Musaddiq lost no opportunity of pointing out to the Majlis deputies that if General Razmara gained control of the vast sums that would be payable to the Government on ratification, he would be able to dissolve the Majlis and rule as a dictator. He also made capital out of the support which Dr. Grady was giving the General, asserting that if he did become a dictator he would nevertheless be under the control of the West. Thus the Bill continued to be a pawn in the Persian political game; so far there was no serious talk of nationalizing the Persian oil industry, although one of the National Front deputies had put the idea forward in October, 1950.

On December 12 the Majlis oil committee recommended the Government to withdraw the Bill on the ground that it did not adequately safeguard the interests of the nation, with the result that the Government acted on this recommendation a fortnight later.

Early in January, 1951, it became known in Persia that the Arabian

American Oil Company had concluded a 50/50 profit-sharing agreement with the Saudi-Arabian Government in respect of its operations in that country. The A.I.O.C. at once reminded the Persian Government that it was ready to conclude such an agreement, and, at the request of that Government, it made an immediate advance of £5,000,000 against future royalties in order to assist it in its financial difficulties, and it also offered to pay £2,000,000 per month for the rest of the year on the same basis. Although the company pressed the Prime Minister to make public its readiness to act in this way, and what it had already done, he refused for a time to do so; when at length the facts were made known, Dr. Musaddiq had already formally proposed to the Majlis Committee the nationalization of the oil industry.

The cause of nationalization was at once taken up with fervour by the National Front, partly because it appealed to their pride and partly because they saw in it an effective weapon to be used against General Razmara. "Nationalize the oil industry!" immediately became a parrot-cry that thousands took up enthusiastically throughout the country, without in the least realizing what such action would entail.

The decision of the National Front to espouse the cause of nationalization of the oil industry marked a most important development. It meant that it was no longer opposed only to General Razmara and his supporters, but that it was now to come into conflict with the A.I.O.C. Nationalization of the oil industry had an attractive ring to those who had become affected by the wave of nationalism which had reached Persia from further east, and it also appealed to all who, for one reason or another, were hostile to the A.I.O.C. or indeed to anything foreign. The consequence was that the strength and influence of the National Front increased by leaps and bounds; no longer could it be regarded as nothing more than a small but noisy minority. Another result of the launching of the nationalization crusade was that the company's offer to conclude a 50/50 agreement became as dead an issue as the Supplemental Agreement.

Amongst those who made common cause with Dr. Musaddiq was Ayatullah Kashani, a prominent reactionary and notorious anglophobe. His supporters, who called themselves the Mujahidin or "Wagers of the Holy War," consisted largely of *mullas* and religious fanatics who were, like their leader, opposed to any outside influence or interference; their desire was for agriculture and the other branches of industry in Persia to revert to the old primitive methods, without any of the innovations and improvements of the West. A similar but even more extreme right-wing body which supported Dr. Musaddiq, but only when it suited its interests to do so, was the Fidayan-i-Islam or "Devotees of Islam"; I shall say something of its sinister activities presently. The National Front's championship of nationalization also attracted to its ranks those Persians who felt it to be an affront to their national pride that their most precious mineral asset, oil, should be drained away so efficiently and so profitably by a foreign concern without Persia, in their opinion, getting any commensurate return. A Persian friend of mine once put the matter in this way: "How would you in Great Britain like it if you saw a huge foreign company exploiting your coalfields in a most profitable manner, putting

their own nationals in all the key positions, and contributing practically nothing to your national wealth?" I would answer that, if the facts were as stated, we should dislike it very much. But the facts are, of course, very different, and the analogy between British coal and Persian oil is not a close one. We in this country have always had the essentials for the development of our coal deposits. These essentials are: initiative, ample capital for exploration and development, the necessary machinery and plant, sufficient technical and administrative staff, the semi-skilled and unskilled labour force, and the means for transporting and marketing the coal. When we turn to Persian oil we find that Persia had only one of these essentials for a long time, namely the labour force, and it was not until fairly recent times that she has been able to supply an appreciable number of the technical and administrative staff. Another basic difference is that, while practically all British coal is consumed in the home market, leaving only a small quantity for export, 95 per cent. of Persian oil had to be exported, in most cases to distant countries, where it had to be disposed of in a highly competitive market. I have dealt at some length with this matter because it illustrates in an interesting manner the working of the Persian mind.

A not inconsiderable number of Persians supported the National Front's nationalization campaign, not because they were anti-British or anti-company (many in fact were not), but because they feared that the continued existence on their soil of a huge foreign enterprise might well involve them against their will in a third world war. They could not forget that, in the 1914-18 war, the belligerents had violated Persia's frontiers and fought on her territory and that, in the second World War, as I have already pointed out, foreign troops had occupied large areas and had caused much hardship and suffering. We must therefore not regard this attitude of mind as altogether unreasonable.

Others who became allies of the National Front in the nationalization campaign were certain of the factory owners who feared that the liberal wages policy of the A.I.O.C. and the better living conditions of its workers might cause discontent amongst their own employees. Many of the landed proprietors also supported the campaign because they regarded it as a means of diverting public attention from their failure to carry out reforms in their own properties. The Tudeh party, although it had no love for Dr. Musaddiq, encouraged him to take more and more drastic action against the British, made vicious attacks on the A.I.O.C. and continued its subversive activities amongst its workers.

I must now return to the course of the oil dispute, for such it had become.

After Dr. Musaddiq had proposed to the Majlis committee the nationalization of the oil industry, that body requested General Razmara to say whether it would be practicable. The Prime Minister thereupon consulted his experts, who submitted reports which rejected nationalization as a practicable solution of the problem and expressed serious doubts as to its legality. On March 3, 1951, General Razmara presented these reports to the oil committee and arranged for their contents to be broadcast. Four days later a member of the Fidayan-i-Islam, in a manner identical with

that of the *fidais* of the Assassins some 800 years previously, struck down the Prime Minister, saying that he did so to free his country from foreign domination. We have no reason to suppose that Dr. Musaddiq was in any way directly responsible for this terrible deed, but there can be no doubt that the removal of his chief political adversary, and the general terror which it spread in the timorous Persian mind, greatly facilitated his rise to supreme power.

The murder of General Razmara came in fact as a great shock to the Persian nation. Moreover, it had the effect of stilling the voices of those Persians of moderate views who disliked nationalization; many of them received letters threatening them and their families with death if they persisted in their opposition to it. There was therefore no longer any attempt made to put the brake on the movement for nationalization, which was fast gaining momentum.

As I am dealing with the causes of events rather than with events themselves, I need say but little as to what occurred after Dr. Musaddiq became Prime Minister on April 28, 1951, and the passage of the oil nationalization law three days later; in any case, these events are well known to you all. As time went on Dr. Musaddiq's attitude became more and more uncompromising, and his oft-repeated insistence on the immutability of the oil nationalization law brings to mind the Prophet Daniel's reference to "the Law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not." There can be no doubt that, in the later stages of the crisis, he derived encouragement for his intransigence from the British Government's vacillations and apparent lack of policy. He was, moreover, able to gain some support and sympathy in the United States through his adroitness in playing upon that country's fear of Communism. Although we in the West were inclined to underrate him in the past, we should not do so now. Besides his very considerable political skill, he has the undoubted power of swaying his countrymen; by playing upon their emotions rather than upon their reason, he induces in them the same kind of mass hysteria as is caused by the *taziye* or passion play. But by taking this action and by his alliance with such fanatical reactionaries and xenophobes as Kashani, he has unleashed forces which he may be unable to control and which may end by controlling him, if indeed they have not done so already. I have one further remark to make about Dr. Musaddiq. Throughout his career he has shown a propensity only to destroy or obstruct; in fact, destruction rather than construction seems to have been his watchword.

I may sum up this very complex and difficult affair by saying that Persia had, in several respects, a good case for the redress of certain grievances and hardships, but that she has spoilt it by her failure to respect the sanctity of contracts, by refusing to go to arbitration, by making extravagant demands and by rejecting offers which would, if accepted, have placed her in a position at least as favourable as that of any other oil-producing country in the Middle East.

I have been obliged today to dwell almost exclusively on disputes and misunderstandings between the A.I.O.C. and the Persian Government

and on conflict between the British and Persian points of view. I may therefore have given some of you the impression that bad feeling has existed the whole time. This, however, is far from having been the case, as there were long periods when relations were most friendly. If I may speak for myself, let me say that I have the happiest recollections of the years that I have spent in Persia, and I shall always remember with gratitude and pleasure the unfailing kindness and unstinted hospitality of my Persian friends. It is a great grief to me that this dark cloud has come between us, but I hope that means will yet be found to disperse it. This could be done if both sides showed moderation and understanding and would combine to make a realistic approach to the problem. We in this country can claim to have shown moderation and understanding and have given proof of our readiness to make such an approach; is it too much to hope that Persia will do likewise?

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

ASSYRIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By HIS BEATITUDE THE PATRIARCH MAR ESHAI SHIMUN

The CHAIRMAN (Viscount Templewood): I am delighted to have this opportunity of introducing Mar Eshai Shimun, the Patriarch, to this audience, and of paying a tribute both to him and to his community for their gallant history. Their heroic struggles to keep alive their national life and Church, and also the help that they gave us during the First War, were invaluable. The Patriarch will describe to you the present position in the community. Let me, however, add my own small experiences drawn from the years that followed the First War.

In the First War this community was the smallest but not the least gallant Ally. At the end of the war their flag appeared with the flags of the other Allies upon the Cenotaph. They had a gallant record on behalf of the Allies.

The war came to an end, and shortly afterwards, as Secretary of State for Air, I was faced with a very difficult problem in the Middle East. There, as the aftermath of the War, we had a very large army. We were faced with a very serious national rising, and it became an urgent issue as to whether we should withdraw altogether and cut our very serious losses.

At that time Lord Trenchard and I, at the Air Ministry, undertook to run the country by what we called "control from the air." That is to say, we allowed this very large army to leave Iraq, and law and order to depend upon a limited number of Air Force squadrons and a very small number of local units.

The most valuable units that we had at that time, without which we could not have successfully undertaken this duty of air control, were the Assyrian Levies—three or four regiments of Assyrians. I am delighted to see here today General Browne, who commanded them—fine fighting men, very well disciplined, excellent guards; a small garrison without which we could not have ensured peace in Iraq.

I remember very well visiting them near Mosul, and it was there that I made the acquaintance of one of the most remarkable ladies that I have ever met: the Lady Surma, aunt of the Patriarch, who was, quite obviously, the mother and the guide of the whole community. I do not think I was ever so greatly impressed by any lady, and I am delighted to hear that she is still alive and vigorous, and that we hope to welcome her here in England in the near future.

There was this small community, these excellent regiments, this remarkable lady. I remember having news at the time of the young Patriarch. I think he was then in England, and I was told that he was the only Patriarch who had been a good football player.

I do not want to go back too much into the details of past history, let alone discuss with you the sad events that followed after the end of the First War. The wave of extreme nationalism spread across the Middle East, with terribly bad and sad treatment of the Assyrian community. And our difficulty, weakened as we were after the First War, was being unable to give it the help to which it was entitled. That is past history, and we hope now that a new and happier chapter has begun.

The Patriarch will tell you of his plans for the future. We wish him every success for them. Here he is, the head of one of the most interesting Christian Churches in the world, a primitive Church, "the Church of the East," with its own Apostolic succession and a recorded history that goes back to the 1st Century A.D. Indeed, I heard it claimed the other day, and, I think, with justice, that it was the first missionary Church in India and that our King Alfred sent it a donation.

From thence onwards it has maintained its traditions and its very primitive and very interesting liturgy; and those of us who worship as members of the Church of England must remember that the Church of England has always taken a particular interest in the Assyrian Church, and it would be altogether contrary to our record if we ceased to take an interest in it in the future.

I have said enough, I hope, to show you that, at any rate, I am intensely inter-

ested in the fortunes of the Patriarch and his community, and on your behalf I wish him every success in the new chapter upon which he is embarking. I hope that his family, when they come to settle here in the near future, will receive a most friendly welcome, and will establish themselves here and make a success of their lives.

IT is a great pleasure to be here today and to address so many old friends and men who have known the Assyrians and who are well acquainted with the history of the Assyrians in the Middle East. I am therefore not going to speak about the past situation as it concerns the political side of history, because, as Lord Templewood has remarked, that is already very well known to all of you.

It is especially a great pleasure to have today Lord Templewood presiding, whom I have had the pleasure of knowing since 1925, when I came to this country for my studies at St. Augustine's College, Canterbury, and he was just about to go on his trip to Iraq. I went to see him in one of those small ministerial rooms in the House of Commons, when he was very much pressed for time between meetings. That was the first time that I had the pleasure of meeting him, and today is the third occasion. Although he has not changed much, I have changed a good deal since those days!

Of course, the history of the Assyrians is inseparable from the political history of the Middle East. What you will be interested especially to hear today is the existing situation of the Assyrians. I shall, therefore, take in sequence the various countries where the Assyrians are now settled and where the Church of the East exists, in which, of course, I am primarily and deeply interested and concerned.

You all remember the settlement of the Assyrians from Iraq and Syria on the Khabur, in the north-east of Syria. Originally, about 12,000 of them were brought there. Some have scattered into other parts of Syria and the Lebanon, but between 9,000 and 10,000 still remain in the Khabur area. These people experienced very hard times. In those days the Jezirah was a desert, and these Assyrians were settled, under the auspices of the League of Nations, on the the river Khabur, the historical river of the Bible, where once the Assyrians had settled the Jews.

The Assyrians underwent great hardships and experienced the greatest difficulties. There were constant raids and thefts from the Bedouin Arabs, and in addition there were regular droughts, so that practically all the time they were having trouble of some kind or another.

I am very glad to say that after the departure of the French the political situation became much better, and thefts by the Bedouin have now almost completely stopped. There are, of course, occasional thefts—the Bedouin steal quite a lot even from each other—but since the French went, and under the present Syrian Government, the real troubles and the dangerous situation which the Assyrians experienced have gone.

The present Syrian Government has been very understanding and sympathetic towards the Assyrians on the Khabur. In about 1948 they experienced in two successive years what must have been droughts of a record severity, with the result that they were almost on the verge of starvation and in danger of dispersing. At that time the Syrian Government helped them by lending grain for food and seed to be paid for later.

Since then the Syrian Government has started an irrigation system on a big scale on one side of the Khabur, on both sides of which there is Assyrian settlement. Some of them, therefore, are within the area of this irrigation scheme, so that at present they have water with which to irrigate not only their water plants—by custom in the Middle East, there are certain plants that are grown by irrigation, while wheat and other crops are left for the rains—but in future will have even more water to irrigate their crops also.

In the other area of settlement, outside the irrigation scheme, individual Assyrian villages have bought communal water pumps, or wealthy Syrian landowners have offered the use of water machines on a percentage basis. As a result, practically every village now has some sort of irrigation system of its own.

What is more promising is that they have started to grow cotton. The cotton of Jezirah, I understand, is one of the best in the world. The market has not been particularly good during the current year, but the previous two years were pretty successful and those who grew cotton were able to sell it for a good price.

So far as the education of the Assyrians in Syria is concerned there are of course schools, but unfortunately there is only one Government school. This is in Tel-Tamer, which is the largest village. There are some thirty or thirty-five villages altogether. There is a very keen desire to have schools, and especially Government schools, but I believe that the Syrian Government is not yet able financially to provide schools for every village. The problem, therefore, is not yet solved. We have a clergy training school, but during the past year or more we have had to slow down because we have made a similar start in Iran. I hope, however, that if we have sufficient money we will reopen that school.

As regards the church life in general, we have churches in every village. I have just been sent a beautiful picture of a church which is being built in Kamishleh, where the Assyrians have settled along with other elements. That is the general picture of the situation of the Assyrians in Syria.

Regarding Iraq, I really cannot say more than many of you already know. You are much better acquainted with it than I am, because since I have been away for the last twenty years my knowledge is derived from communications. As regards the economic situation, naturally the Assyrians in Iraq are largely dependent upon Habbaniyah, either as Levies or in other positions, and a considerable number are employed also in the Iraq Petroleum Company. I do not know the exact number, but in the Petroleum Company's paper, which I receive, I always see quite a number of Assyrian names. I believe that some of you who are here today have better information than I on the exact numbers employed.

During the last four or five years especially, they have increased their efforts in establishing schools, building churches, and in general establishing themselves on a more solid basis. Three important churches were recently built in Iraq, one in Gelainkan, one in Dohuk (in Northern Iraq) and one in Kirkuk, and the funds have been raised for another in Mosul. In Iraq we have the Metropolitan Mar Yosip and another bishop.

The reason for this markedly increased effort I will explain later in this lecture.

With regard to Iraq generally, the life of the Church as a whole is going on as freely as can be expected, but I am sorry to say that we have had some rather discouraging experiences. Since you are here to learn the real situation in the Middle East, I had better explain those experiences.

The Metropolitan of India died some seven years ago, and we were in a very difficult position. First, we had to find someone to consecrate who could take his place. During the interval I had to administer the Church in India from as far away as Chicago. As with all Churches, especially with a Church like the Church of the East (or the Assyrian Church), which is so much used to episcopal supervision, there was a good deal of misunderstanding in the community in India. Matters reached the stage when I was getting prepaid telegrams from the two contending parties, and I was trying my best to deal with most complicated problems from such a great distance. To administer that Church from a distance of several thousand miles and to solve their problems was a tremendous task. I found that the best policy was to leave matters as they were until I delegated someone to look into matters on the spot or else consecrated the new Metropolitan. The Metropolitan I finally consecrated last spring in the United States of America and sent him to India.

During this interval, however, I tried to send the Metropolitan from Iraq, but unfortunately the Iraqi Government would not grant him a passport. Then we had the same problem with our Church in Iran, where we have many thousands of members but no bishop. I wanted the Metropolitan from Iraq to go to Iran, and the Iranian Government were extremely reasonable in their attitude and issued him with a visa, but again the Iraqi Government would not grant him a passport. At the third attempt I thought that I would travel all the way from the United States to Cyprus, to meet there the Metropolitan Mar Yosip from Iraq and to consecrate one or more bishops, which we needed very badly for our Church, and also to discuss the problems of the Church which we had not discussed for the last twenty years. His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury tried his best to help in the matter, but unfortunately again the Iraqi Government would not give the Metropolitan a passport. No reason has been given for this extraordinary attitude. They have merely persisted in it, and it is very unfortunate, especially when no reason whatever is given. These few remarks explain in general the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq.

Those who are in the villages, of course, are either settled in their own original homes, as in Barwar, or are settled as serfs on privately owned lands in the Rowanduz, Dohuk, or Amadia districts.

Many of you know the history of Iran during the first World War. As Lord Templewood has mentioned, our small people fought on the side of the Allies, and during that period I am afraid that a lot of blood was shed on both sides, which was both tragic and unfortunate. I remember at the time as a boy when my late uncle, the Patriarch Mar Binyamin, gave himself to the task of stopping the bloodshed between us and the Moslems. It was suggested that a meeting should be arranged with the object of

reaching an understanding between the Kurds and ourselves. Despite warnings that Simko the Kurd was treacherous, my uncle was willing to take the risk, with the result that he lost his own life and that of about one hundred leaders and men who accompanied him, all murdered treacherously. We tried our utmost to prevent these misunderstandings and tragedies, but nevertheless in the madness of the first World War they still took place.

The tragic memories of these occurrences persisted, and I have been told that my own name was among those who were prohibited from entering Iran. About five years ago, however, during the time of the events in Azerbaijan and the situation created in Persia by the Tudeh uprising, the Assyrians there to some extent again fell victims. The Assyrians of the United States, led by myself, naturally protested against this. As a result, the door was opened. The Iranian Embassy, in a very statesman-like manner, approached me. I was naturally quite willing and happy to accept the hand of friendship, which was equally welcomed by Assyrians in the U.S.A. and by my flock all over the world. The State Department was also extremely helpful in opening the door for this understanding.

There were certain things that we asked of the Iranian Ambassador. Certain Assyrians had been put in prison on grounds of suspicion, and I asked that their case should be taken into consideration and that if they were innocent they should be set free. Our second request was for freedom in church life. Both requests were fulfilled. The men were set free, and ever since then we have had a church committee in Iran, with a Visitor-General from Urmiya, who is free to visit the Assyrian communities all the way from Urmiya to Abadan to hold meetings and arrange about Church matters, and we have now established twenty-five village schools which we are supporting from America.

Of course, they are not the kind of well-organized schools that people understand in this country, nor are they any substitute for the Government schools. But the chief object is to preserve the faith and the language, and in those schools the faith is taught in the afternoons, after the children come out of the Government school, and the Aramaic or Syriac language is being taught to the Assyrian children. That in itself is very promising. Since that time the Iranian Embassy have told me—and when I met his Majesty the Shah during his visit to the United States he confirmed the invitation—that I can go to Iran whenever I wish and a visa is ready for me. This has been a very statesmanlike gesture, with the result that they have won the hearts of our people.

Only the other day, in Turloch, California, a big banquet was given in honour of Princess Fatemeh-Pahlavi, sister of the Shah, at which a message was received from the King. When the Iranians made that gesture, the Assyrians were ready to return it. It is unfortunate that others also are not doing the same thing.

The other part of the Church is now in the United States of America, and it is interesting to recall how the Assyrians started to come to America. The first Assyrian went there in about 1850, and somehow or other he went to Chicago. Later, others began to go. All that they knew was the name of America and the name of the Assyrian in Chicago, and so they

went straight to Chicago. The result was that those who followed all found themselves going to Chicago, until they realized that there were other places in the United States; and so, afterwards, they began to extend from Chicago to the east and the west coasts.

After 1920, when the Assyrians lost their home, emigration began on a large scale, and the men who had been stranded brought over their families after the exodus from Urmiya, either from Iran directly or from places like Bakuba and elsewhere. Gradually, therefore, the numbers in America began to increase, and throughout the United States there are now estimated to be some 15,000 to 20,000 Assyrians, the majority from Urmiya. Between them, of course, they embrace various denominations. They do not all belong to the Church of the East (the Assyrian Church); they belong to various Churches in America.

When I went to Chicago in 1940, so far as the Church of the East was concerned, we had no help except the sympathy of the Episcopal Church, who let our people have the use of their churches, but, while the other elements had the support of either the Roman Catholic Church or the Presbyterians, and so on, we had to work on our own. The result was that when I went there we had only two churches, and the rest were merely loosely organized into parishes. Now, I am glad to say, we have about twelve parishes in all. In about nine of these we have churches or houses or property of other kinds. I am very proud to say that all the money for this has come from the Assyrians themselves. Not a penny has come from elsewhere.

I have been to those parishes, and I have got them together and have appealed to them. Every man, woman and child has contributed generously to show their interest in their Church; amongst them we have working men who could not really afford to do so, and on a percentage basis in general they pay more than Christians of other Churches whether in England or elsewhere. In some cases they have paid as much as 1,000 dollars apiece in order to build these churches, and they have given far more than they were really able to afford.

We now have churches and priests, and thirty-eight deacons. In addition, we have begun to translate the liturgy and other literature into English, in preparation for future generations. We have schools and we have an organized Church. Everything is not by any means perfect, however, and we have very difficult years ahead, but during the last thirteen years we have been able to accomplish a great deal.

All of this goes to show how much the Assyrians can do if they enjoy freedom and justice. They are the same Assyrians who were in the Middle East—in Iran, Iraq or anywhere else—and in a short time in America they have done so much. In fact, one of them in Chicago is a millionaire and has built two enormous buildings close to where I live, sixteen and seventeen stories high. In 1920 he came as a young man, aged about 20, who knew nothing apart from how to write his name. As soon as he arrived he started painting with a brush; then he became a contractor, and he has always gone forward. This one example demonstrates the quality of our people.

We also have a periodical newspaper, known as the *Light from the*

East, which I started about five years ago, and which goes to Assyrians all over the world. We have friends in England who get it, and one of our customers is the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company, who not only wrote but on one occasion even telephoned from London to New York, asking us to add their name as subscribers. As a result of all this we have three more periodicals for the Church in India. Through these papers we are able to help the Church and the community to know about each other and what is happening, and this also serves to increase the zeal of the people.

As I said at the outset that I would explain later the reason for this extraordinary revival in the last five years, all these events have taken place since we have had the understanding with the Middle Eastern Governments. In accordance with a request made of me by Wazi El Asil, then representing Iraq in the United Nations, I was pleased to address a message to the Assyrians in Iraq to be as always loyal and law-abiding citizens of that historic land. I have also written to Assyrians everywhere, reminding them of their duty as Christians to be law-abiding citizens as they have always been. As the Patriarch and Chief Shepherd of the flock, I was glad to repeat the command of our Lord and the advice of St. Paul that they should be loyal and law-abiding, and they have all responded with zeal. My advice to them has been that they should consider themselves settled in whatever country they may be, and that they should consider it their home and do their utmost to get along with their neighbours and with their officials and everybody else.

The Church in India, to which Lord Templewood referred, has been part of our Church from the first century. It has a very long and interesting history. Time does not permit of my telling you its history, but it has been in direct contact ever since St. Thomas went there in the first century. The present Metropolitan follows a long line of Metropolitans there. They have been so much attached to the Mother Church that I offered last time to give them an Indian Metropolitan, but they preferred an Assyrian, and he was given a great reception.

You may be interested in an example of the effect of the reputation that the Church there has had. On his arrival in Bombay the Metropolitan was received by the mayor of the city and by the Anglican bishop, who invited him to his house and made him his guest. When he arrived at Malabar the city was gay all night. The Hindus brought out their elephants and gave him the greatest reception ever afforded to a Christian prelate. This, of course, was the result of the impression which his predecessors in India had created, and recently he has been photographed with Pandit Nehru.

I have already said that my advice to the Assyrians is that they should all adapt themselves to the circumstances, wherever they may be. We cannot blame the Assyrians for what has happened. We all know that "hope deferred maketh the heart sick," and people suffered terrible times during the first World War and the succeeding events. Naturally, people who have gone through all that cannot be expected to forget it all at once. Time is the cure, and that time has now elapsed.

Twenty years have passed since the last unfortunate events in those countries, and a new generation has now grown up. We have been brave

enough to face persecutions in the past, first under the Persian Empire, and then through the subsequent troubled periods in the Middle East. And so we have arrived at the present, and I feel that we can again face the future, whatever it holds for us.

This is not the first time that we have had to move from one country to another, and despite this we have been able to maintain our faith and our language through all vicissitudes of history. I often wonder whether the English people, or Europeans generally, had they passed through all that we have been through, would still be Christians today. As I have said, the Assyrians are taking the line which I have advised them to follow throughout the Middle East, and they are delighted and pleased with the changed conditions.

The history of our ancient Church has been the history of the Assyrians as a people since the time of the birth of Christianity. Without the Church they do not exist. It is the Church that has kept them together and that formed the nucleus of the first Christians to go and preach the Gospel. It is this Church, with its Fathers, its martyrs, its bishops, its patriarchs and men of learning, which has maintained the people and their language until now, and it is my earnest prayer that the day will come again when the Assyrians, through their ability, their learning and their brains, may once more recover the position which they held in the Khilafate of Islam during the seventh century and in later years.

I have in mind the debate between Mar Timotheus I, Catholicos Patriarch of the East, and Khalif Mahdi, the third Khalifael, in A.D. 781, which was in the form of a private theological discussion and lasted for two days. That discussion is now in print, both in Aramaic and in English, and is one of the outstanding literary works of Christian history ever to have been done, when the head of a Christian Church has sat down and discussed theology with the head of Islam and the successor of Mohammed.

Then there is the great part which the Church of the East played in giving to Islam the knowledge which it passed to the West during the Dark Ages. The knowledge, and even the philosophy, of the Greeks, which was completely lost to the West, was given back through the Universities of Cordova and Salamanca truly by the conquering Islam; but behind it was the Church of the East, and her great men of learning such as Ecob (Job) of Urhai (Edessa), who was born in the latter part of the seventh century and who died in the early eighth century, a philosopher, a scientist and a theologian of great learning, who was head of our School of Medicine in Baghdad. There is a multitude of others, such as Bar Rabbar, El Tabari, Bar Sahda, the famous family of Bukhtishu, the private physicians of the Caliph of Baghdad, and many others whose names have gone into history. These were the men amongst the multitude who made such a tremendous contribution to the Arab Empire's knowledge of philosophy and science, and who translated the works of Galen and others from Aramaic or Greek into Arabic.

I should like to read this quotation, which refers to the work of one of the philosophers of our Church, namely Job of Edessa: "He was the first to develop in detail, through deduction of method and reasoning

based on natural phenomena, the idea of the elemental origin of the universe and of the different bodies comprising it."

That is sufficient evidence of the progress made and the freedom of science enjoyed within the Church of the East, when we come to think that in the seventeenth century Galileo was excommunicated for declaring the sun as the centre of the solar system.

I think I have said all that can be said, and if there are any questions I shall be glad to answer them, within the limits of time.

Colonel ROUTH: The last time that I met the Patriarch Mar Shimun, I think, was at McMurray's drawing room in the Bank House at Abadan in July, 1918. The Lady Surma had been educated in America?

The PATRIARCH: By Dr. Brown, one of the members of the Archbishop's Mission.

Colonel ROUTH: We were a little frightened of the Assyrians. General Brodie, of Dunsterforce, said "Where is the Assyrian contingent?" The 39th Brigade was on its way up, but was not yet there. The Lady Surma was talking to me over a cup of tea and she said, "We were very lucky. We only lost 2,000." I asked what had happened to them, and she looked at me rather pathetically. I said, "It takes a long time to liquidate 2,000 persons." She looked at me sadly and said, "Not with machine guns." I felt that that was her last word. They were in Hamadan for some time before we were able to get them going.

Mr. HAMILTON: Are the Khabur Assyrians going to stay on where they are, or is any sort of move likely?"

The PATRIARCH: The position as it exists now is for every Assyrian group to remain where it is. The idea of a move was tried before but it was not carried through.

Mr. HAMILTON: How many Assyrians are there now in Iraq?

The PATRIARCH: I would say about 30,000 to 35,000. An estimate by the Governor of Mosul, which I saw in the Press in the United States of America, put the number at 50,000, but I doubt that.

Mr. HAMILTON: Are they increasing in numbers?

The PATRIARCH: Yes, I think they are on the Khabur, and also in Iraq. We are more or less cut off, of course, from those in Russia. In the war, one of the villages wrote to their people and they said that the group who were there had increased more than when they left Kurdistan, but in the last war they had lost a lot.

Mr. HAMILTON: In a place like Habbaniyah, where the people cannot do agriculture, what would be the most suitable form of occupation for them? I was thinking of the Levies at Habbaniyah when the Air base comes to an end.

The PATRIARCH: As long as Habbaniyah remains, I presume they are learning various professions, and they are working in all kinds of trades there. It is difficult to say exactly what will happen when it comes to an end. Those who know of the opportunities that now exist in Iraq are in a better position than I to know what will be the possibilities and the best outlook for the future.

Mr. HAMILTON: As an engineer, I was hoping that the development of irrigation in Iraq would have enabled them to spread to newly developed

lands elsewhere. One hopes that that might happen, but the development goes slowly.

The CHAIRMAN: Their training will be useful to them, anyhow.

The PATRIARCH: Yes, it will.

Mr. MARMORSTEIN: Have any Syriac publications, apart from periodicals, been issued in recent years?

The PATRIARCH: I am afraid that there have been no books. We have a Press in India. What we are trying to do now is to reproduce what we already have, but nothing new at all has been written in Syriac in recent years.

Mr. MARMORSTEIN: Is no newspaper published?

The PATRIARCH: Yes, and that is in English and Syriac.

The meeting closed with votes of thanks.

COMMUNISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

By FAREED S. JAFRI

(Editor, "Civil and Military Gazette," Karachi)

Lecture given on April 1, 1953, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: The reason why I was delighted to hear that Mr. Jafri had consented to lecture was because he has been until just recently the editor of the *Civil and Military Gazette* in Pakistan, and I have read that Gazette regularly for a quarter of a century. As the editor of that very well-known paper, Mr. Jafri has a very deep and thorough knowledge of events in Pakistan. He has studied Communism there; he has travelled through Persia, through the Arab countries and through Turkey. Now he is going to tell us his views on the impact of Communism on the Muslim countries.

YOU all know that today happens to be All Fools' Day. Two or three years ago, if I had talked on this subject, people would have said that it was a foolish talk, and even now, wherever you go, to whomsoever you speak in a Muslim country, you will hear: "Oh, Communism; we have nothing in common; we are all godly people; there is no danger of Communism in our body-politic." But during the last ten years I have travelled much throughout the Muslim world, both officially and unofficially, and I have noted that the general belief that there is no danger from Communism in the Muslim world is wrong, because Communism has gradually crept in and slowly has become the dominating force during the last ten years. Actually during the last two years it has become more evident.

There are, of course, many reasons for this: firstly, I believe Communism is making headway in the Islamic world because the structure of Islam has become rotten. As far as the foundation, our fundamental life, is concerned, I can say with pride that that is as sound today as it was 1,400 years ago, but the superstructure, the body-politic, has over the course of the past ten centuries become rotten and it has to be changed; in other words, rebuilt. I found only one country, Turkey, which has actually rebuilt its structure. Islam in Turkey has been revalued, re-orientated, and there you find the least danger of Communism. Similarly, when I went to Indonesia quite recently I found the same thing. The Indonesians are going ahead towards progress. They believe in the importance of a spiritual democracy and in the value of a spiritual outlook in the body-politic; but they also think it is necessary to bring the society into tune with modern needs and ideas. That is the only way in which we can save ourselves, and if we save ourselves surely we save the world, because we in the Muslim world are 500,000,000 strong and we hold the key position. We are the heart of the world.

That is one reason why Communism has made some impact on the Muslim world, but it has not been able to overpower us, because our foundation is sound. Most of those here with experience of Central Asia know that we believe in a democracy which has a spiritual basis. We do

not have colour prejudices and racial bias, and we believe in the brotherhood of mankind.

Let me take you back to the last lecture the Prophet of Islam gave, in which he emphasized the fact that mankind was one brotherhood and that there was no distinction of caste or race as far as Islamic society was concerned. That is the foundation of our social order. That also proves that Islam is in fact a social order. In this social order God is important because God is our focal point. At the same time the spiritual objectives concern us more intimately, because Creation is the result of the summing up of those very objectives. We hear the charge that our society is a theocratic society; but we refute that charge and say we are as democratic as you are, probably more so, since we have not an ordained priesthood in our society; and to understand the influence of Communism in the Muslim world it is necessary for you to understand this basic point of our social order. Islam is a complete social order, based on religion, but it happens that Communism is also such a social order, and as far as the creative objectives are concerned there is little difference. The difference comes on the question of the Creator, the Supreme Being, the Omnipotent Power, the All-Sovereign; and this is where ours is a superior democracy.

Professor H. Gibb has said that Islamic democracy provided a balance between two exaggerated democracies, that of Western capitalism and Communism. Please do not be offended. That is true. Because, while on the one hand, under both the Capitalist and Communistic concepts of life, there is a sort of regimentation, on the other hand Islam actually refutes dictation and regimentation; it believes in absolute individual freedom; everything has to be judged by reason. On the basis of the laws which the Prophet gave the entire world of Islam, the message was one of peace. If you believe in peace you have everything.

Then other things happened which gave impetus to the Communistic movement. In 1918, when Communist forces attacked Muslim Russia, there was no resistance. 28,000,000 Muslims in the Soviet Union gave up almost overnight, although Central Asia and Muslim Eastern Asia were cradles of Islam. The foundation was sound, and that saved them from total extinction. But their structure, again, had become rotten. I believe that was due to the unfortunate influence of the *Mullahs*, the clergy, who maintained rigidity and did not want any progress. When the body is weak, one cannot resist. That is how 28,000,000 Muslims in the Soviet Union collapsed.

The same happened in China. History shows that over 15,000,000 Muslims have been massacred in China during the last three hundred years; nevertheless, Islam is still alive in China. There are nearly 50,000,000 Muslims in China today and they have been resisting all sorts of attacks; but as soon as the Communist forces came in with a new social order, dynamic and alive, they also gave in. If Great Britain and the United States of America had been really clever in 1946 we would today have had in China a Pakistan, and a Chinese Pakistan of 50,000,000 people would have been a great bulwark for democracy against the menace which is dragging us to another dreadful war. Sinkiang wanted actually to join with Pakistan, but because of the wonderful idol of your de-

mocracy, Chiang Kai-shek, you would not support this; you absolutely gave in. And during that same period the wonderful Chiang Kai-shek's generals destroyed a whole group of villages of Muslims. There was, of course, no publicity in this country or even in the United States, in spite of the "freedom of the press." Hence you have lost the support of 50,000,000 people who were unable to resist any longer because, again, their structure had become rotten. The Muslim clergy and other feudal influences had so much hold on the way of life of the people that they had no spirit of resistance against the new flood, which also had the fundamentals of Islamic democracy—the equality of man and no racial prejudice, no colour prejudice, and at the same time economic socialism, which is the basis of Islam. That is why Islam collapsed in China also.

Now there is much talk of the Tudeh influence in Iran, but before 1941 there was actually no Communist influence in Iran, in spite of the closeness of the two frontiers. All of a sudden the Tudeh party appeared in 1941 as a socialist party and that was the result, again, of the misguided foreign policies of the Western world and our own rotten social structure. Reza Khan had done a tremendous amount of good. He had brought about a sort of renaissance; he had actually changed the outlook of the people. There was no *Mullah* influence left, and for the social and economic uplift of the people he called in experts from Great Britain, France, Switzerland and the United States of America so as to build up his country according to modern needs. Then something happened. There were both the British and the Russian forces inside the country, and there was the natural reaction of the people against them. When the Tudeh party was formed, the Communist seed was sown.

After the death of Shah Reza Khan the old reactionary forces came again to the fore. Mussadeq is in office, but he has not your support and that is why he is weak. He cannot resist those reactionary forces; he cannot put his country on the right road because of threats. Reactionary forces always exploit and try to prevent the settlement of difficulties when such a situation arises. After all, one cannot fight on all fronts. So you see Mussadeq is weak, and because of his weakness the Communists are growing in importance. They go to the people and say: "Look here, Islam is a social economic movement; everybody is supposed to be equal and yet you have feudal lords and thousands and thousands of people starving. Most people have no houses, a few people have palaces; you go a few miles away and you will find a different picture. We in the U.S.S.R. are also Muslims, but we have brought our life into tune with the Islamic concept of life; we are modern and we are happier." People, of course, are impressed by that.

Take the case of Egypt. Egypt holds a very important position today. Until the advent of General Neguib, Egypt was getting into the grip of the same reactionary forces. There were all sorts of feudal tendencies and retrograde religious tendencies which had actually nothing to do with Islam, because Islam is a dynamic religion, it is a forward movement; it is not a backward movement. Those people were taking Islam backward, with the result that Communist influence was growing in Egypt. When General Neguib came into power his first act was to bring about

land reform, because he thought, as I think, that land hunger is the root-cause behind the upsurge of Communism. He removed that cause; he brought about land reform; and immediately he became stronger. As soon as he became stronger he started talking in terms of politics, not in terms of religion, because, after all, the basic principle of our religion is also the foundation of our society. General Neguib did stop Egypt from getting into the grip of Communism. He very soon became so strong that he banned the Communist party because, as a subversive movement, it started to undermine the security and peace of Egypt.

Well, about one hundred miles away is Syria, and that country today has a very strong Communist influence. A few miles further away is Lebanon, which is almost the headquarters of the Communist movement in the Middle East. But we can save those areas from passing entirely into the hands of the Communists, because we have started rebuilding our structure. The rebuilding will be slow because, again, there is outside interference and there are adverse circumstances. Nevertheless, because of the stability of our foundation, we are all right, and if we start rebuilding upwards we shall save ourselves from the sort of collapse which happened in China and in the Soviet Union.

Now let me take the case of India and Pakistan. You may be surprised to hear, if you do not know it already, that as far as India is concerned the Communist movement and Communist leadership has always been in the hands of Muslims. You may be surprised at that. I am not. Because when I came to England in 1935 and returned in 1938 I almost went back as a Communist. During the last two hundred years the British contribution to our rebuilding has been great, but, at the same time, you have created such a situation that we are bound to breed Communism. Take the Rajahs and Maharajahs. You have always been keen to preserve them as exhibits. Through your hurried land reforms in India, particularly in Bengal, your permanent settlement and otherwise, you created a sort of feudal order. A feudal order in the 20th century when new forces were reaching even India, even the backward villages of India, was responsible for the growth of Communism in that continent. Hunger, poverty and lack of education were responsible for that. You created the Babus, the graduates who were getting about £6 a month filling up your offices. They were caught when the Communist movement started. And even Pundit Nehru was caught, in spite of his Regency background, when in 1935 he returned from Moscow, or as he showed recently when he spoke of Stalin as "a man of peace," and so on. That was not merely emotional talk. Again the racial outlook did a great deal of damage.

I feel happier in England in these days. I have been here at intervals during the last ten to twelve years. I would like to settle down here. I find it very peaceful and congenial. But when I came here as a young student with an immature mind I did not like it one bit. Because of a cold, superiority complex that I noticed among men in the street, there was created in my mind an unpleasant feeling. I started to read the *Daily Worker* and to go to Communist meetings, and I got influenced. Now that I can see things better, I find good and bad in all people.

Again, I hate the thought of racial discrimination. I do not think that is democracy. The people of the East read and hear of the things taking place in South Africa or East Africa, and they are horrified. A bad impression is created. They also sometimes become emotional and talk as Pundit Nehru did. When one sees on the one hand Western democracy, capitalistic imperialism, and on the other hand Soviet democracy, what is one to do? The best thing is to keep away. We should create a bridge between them; a balance. Of course our social concept is suited to that, too. But that is all we can do. Then we may save our world and your world, because if we are not saved you will not be saved for long. You have to improve your own democratic tendencies; you have to create true spiritual values in your society. You have to think of the whole of humanity as one brotherhood, irrespective of colour, race and creed. You have to be, in short, Christian. If you become true Christians today, the new tendencies in the world of Islam are such that we in a very short time can become one united force. Whatever happened in the wars of the Crusades, forget that; there were other tendencies which were neither Christian nor Islamic, but today the new forces, the new outlook, are such that we can create one brotherhood. We want that. You want it, too. You have to become true Christians, but it must be modern Christianity with a scientific outlook. We should also revalue our social order, bring it into keeping with the needs of modern times, as Turkey has done. Then we shall be able to march together in a common cause.

In Pakistan this tendency is growing, and rapidly growing, for we must rebuild and reorientate. You may have read of some recent disturbances, very serious too, but we are not afraid of them because, after all, the reactionary forces would not give religious liberty. They have to be fought in order to save Islam, to save the world for democracy, and to create a spiritual democracy, which was the democracy given by the Prophet Mohammed to Islam and to you by Jesus, Moses and Abraham. They were all messengers of God and all brought the same thing—a social order, a world order, peace and tranquillity, and also betterment of the people.

So you see we must forget our superiority complexes and our inferiority complexes. We must start treating one another as belonging to one human brotherhood. The day you open your doors to the so-called coloured people, and prove your democratic outlook by asking us to come and take a cup of tea with you, sitting on the stool in your kitchen—I tell you, the day that happens, from here you will see marching new forces, the forces of democracy, which would bring universal happiness.

The CHAIRMAN: A friend in Pakistan with whom I am in touch tells me that never was the feeling between British and Pakistanis better than it is today. Mr. Jafri, I believe that the same feeling is reciprocated here towards your country. I am quite sure of that. But I would like to say this: you were talking about the Indian student here. I had, during the World War II, to go to Cambridge University to give the undergraduates what we call a "pep talk." I came to the conclusion, in talking to many

Indian students whom I saw there, that they had gone to the university with the fixed idea that people were not going to be kind. And that you have got to get rid of.

I had a letter from the grandson of an old Indian officer of mine, asking if he might see me. Naturally I asked him to my house at once. I think he and I are friends now, because he often writes to me and he addresses me as "Dear Great-Uncle." So I think you will agree with me that we are friends. But I had to talk to that boy for quite a long time before I could get out of his head that there was prejudice against Indian students who come to this country. I assure you, Mr. Jafri, that it does not exist.

To revert to your lecture. I have always believed that to the real Communist, Communism is a faith, a religion, and that if you are going to beat him you have to produce a faith that is stronger than his own. I always have believed that that faith existed in the religion of Islam, and so it was rather a shock to me, Mr. Jafri, to hear one or two of the remarks you made. It may be that I did not quite understand. I would like to ask, Is there any indication in Pakistan that Communism is getting any influence over Islam, or not? Would you say that it was making headway, that Communism was making progress?

Mr. JAFRI: Yes. When I spoke of the Communist influence in Islam, believe me, I too was shocked.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, the same thing has happened there as in other parts of the Muslim and the Eastern world. The foundation is there, but what is there above the foundation? Is there economic equality? Today you find a few feudal lords grabbing thousands and thousands of acres of land, and hundreds of thousands of people living in poverty. In industry there are marked differences between worker and employer, and in other things there are differences which help to create and encourage Communism. We must give up these tendencies. We must come back to the basic Islamic democracy. That is the only way in which we can save the world of Islam from Communism. And I am glad to say that in Pakistan this movement has started. We have started a land reform policy. We have labour laws. We have welfare officers, and in each case of dispute between employer and employee they have so far always sided with the workers. During the last five years not one industrial dispute has gone in favour of the employer. The land is being divided equally. Of course it will all take time because of the need for money, for water, for electricity. But we have started, and we have saved Pakistan from coming under the direct influence of Communism. There are Communists among our so-called intellectuals: newspaper men and writers and a few of the middle class. East Pakistan is more agricultural, and if we carry out land reform there we will be able to save Pakistan from Communism.

Mr. WARIS AMEER ALI: There is one correction I would like to make at first. Mr. Jafri talked of the late British Government having "created a feudal system in India" in the late eighteenth century by instituting the permanent settlement. It is perfectly true to say that the permanent settlement was an imitation of the then English Land Tax, a permanent fixed

tax on land recovered in this country. That was brought in by Lord Cornwallis in the old province of Bengal and in the east of the United Provinces under an error, because he thought that the Zemindars or "landlords," instead of being land-holders, were actually freeholders as in England. They were not. They were people, or their descendants, appointed by the indigenous Governments to collect the land revenue in cash and kind for the State, because in theory all lands in oriental countries are the property of the Ruler or the State. I think it is the same in China; it certainly was in the old oriental empires, and the so-called landlord or land-holder was only an intermediary to collect the revenue for the State and keep a varying share of it for his trouble.

As for the Princes, in the old days they were *primi inter pares*, and the old East India Company received help from many of them in times of war and confirmed them in their territories. Many were chieftains of clans or tribes; others were not feudal proprietors in the old sense but feudal tax collectors for the old Governments. There came a divergency between those sort of people and the masses in the nineteenth century owing, I think it is not unfair to say, to the introduction of a more European outlook on life.

Largely for this reason we had much agrarian trouble in Oudh in 1920-21. An old officer of my service, and also old Indian gentlemen, told me that the trouble was that in the old days the collector of taxes who had been confirmed by the Government as a land-holder used to sit at the gate of his house and talk to his tenants and share their good fortune and their troubles. Now that new luxuries had come, if he wanted to buy an expensive American car or what not, he put an extra cess upon his tenants.

Thirdly, I would like to say, having had the inestimable privilege of sponsoring what was then an experiment, the introduction of people from India, of all kinds and all creeds and all races, to H.M. Forces in Britain during the late war, that there was no colour prejudice whatever. We had Indians serving in the Royal Navy, in command of British troops, and in the Royal Air Force, along with Britons, Scots, Canadians, Australians, and all others. So I think it can be put out of mind that there is any question of that distinction. I think there is apt to be, as Sir John has said, an undue sensitiveness on that score. After all, under our present social conditions, we cannot extend the same hospitality even to our own near kin as we used to do in the not so old days. I do not think that was a quite fair criticism for Mr. Jafri to make.

One last word. I understand Mr. Jafri, rightly or wrongly, to say that the leading inspiration of Communism in India came from young Muslims. I do not think so. If I may contradict him, we know three of the leading Indian Communists had Brahmin names. They went underground, I think it was in 1948, to hide from their own Government, and for all I know they are still underground. Some of them had been carrying on subversive activities for many years. So I do not think it is correct to say that Communism is practised mainly amongst young Muslims.

Mr. JAFRI: The last speaker did not mention the three Brahmin names, but I would nevertheless repeat that in my belief the first Communist impact on India was brought from Russia by people who had migrated

via Kabul to Muslim Russia between 1919 and 1926—I have the entire history—and today you see them in Hyderabad State.

I have been misunderstood. I do not intend to generalize about colour prejudice. If it were general here I would not have returned to this country so often over all these years. After all, there are many friends here. Their faces do not give me that impression of prejudice. They have a wider outlook than many others. Then, too, there are 800 Pakistani students in this country today and they are very happy. But there are those with racial prejudices even here. Slowly the outlook is changing. The quicker it changes, the better.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks to the lecturer.

THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT EVENTS IN TIBET

By P. B. HENZE

I

THERE has been relatively little information from Tibet during the last two years. In fact, this part of the world, which has always been comparatively isolated, seems since its subjugation by the Communists to have become almost as effectively cut off from the West as the innermost regions of the Soviet Union itself.

Apart from occasional statements by the Chinese Communists, the information we do have consists almost entirely of newspaper reports from India. Most of these reports appear to be much exaggerated, especially those that speak of mass troop movements and airfield construction in remote and rugged regions. But there is undoubtedly a core of fact in much of this fantasy. It seems safe to conclude that most of the settled areas of Tibet and all the main communication routes are now under Communist control. This control is in many cases apparently not too complete, and local administration seems to have been left in Tibetan hands. Likewise, in Lhasa itself the government seems to have been permitted to continue to function and the religious foundations of the State have apparently not yet been openly challenged. The Chinese appear to be attempting to consolidate their hold over the country by gradually taking over existing institutions and administrative mechanisms, rather than by introducing radical and disruptive reforms. This is, of course, at the same time a very practical and a very clever policy. It remains to be seen whether their own revolutionary zeal and perhaps Soviet pressure may not force them into speeding up rapidly the process of Communization once they feel that they have the reins of power firmly in their grip.

There are varying reports on the economic situation in the country. In the region around the capital, at least, it seems that the burden of supplying the Chinese troops has caused severe shortages of food and fodder and there has consequently been serious inflation of the currency.

Reports on the number of Chinese soldiers in Tibet range from fantastic accounts of several hundred thousand to more realistic estimates of twenty-five to thirty-five thousand. It seems incredible that the Chinese Communists—at a time when they are heavily committed in Korea and to a certain extent indirectly committed in Indo-China—would be willing to maintain any more troops in Tibet than are actually necessary for preserving their hold on the country (an easy task so long as control of the central government in Lhasa is secure and no radical political or social innovations are attempted) and to control travel over the borders from India, Nepal and Kashmir. Tibet's transportation system is far too primitive to permit the maintenance and supply of large numbers of troops in even the centre of the country, let alone in the remote border regions,

and the land is too poor to permit very many soldiers to live off local resources.

Most of the newspaper speculation about Chinese schemes for an invasion of the Indian Sub-Continent as well as some of the more sophisticated analyses of the strategic significance of Tibet* fail to stand the test of dispassionate examination of the facts. Tibet is not the key to Asia. It is too high, too devoid of exploitable resources, and too backward to play the same rôle in Asia as Bohemia is supposed to play in Europe.

II

What then is the significance of Tibet and recent developments there? Why have the Chinese Communists devoted themselves to conquering this remote and backward country?

The Chinese Communists felt compelled to take over Tibet both because they were *Chinese* and because they were *Communists*. It is difficult to say which element was most important.

As leaders of what they are trying to make a dynamic new China, the Chinese Communists must consolidate *all* of China under their control. The Chinese, under whatever form of government they have had, have always regarded Tibet as an integral part of their dominions. Even though they have seldom been able to exercise much control over it, they have always stubbornly refused to abandon their claim of suzerainty.

Since Communists now usually tend to champion all the national aspirations of the country they rule, it is natural for those in China to have as one of their main aims the domination of all areas traditionally or legally Chinese. With Outer Mongolia already well established as a Soviet satellite and more or less permanently lost to China, and parts of Sinkiang under some measure of direct Soviet control, the Chinese Communists probably felt it especially necessary to gain a firm foothold in Tibet as quickly as possible. In the minds of some of them the idea of thereby warding off direct Soviet intervention in Tibet may not have been entirely absent. Realistically speaking, however, it must be admitted that the Soviets have so far shown little indication of desire to interfere directly in Tibet. They have no easy avenue of contact with the country; perhaps they are also somewhat at a loss as to how to manœuvre in a country so solidly and happily feudal in nature and are willing to let the Chinese handle this task by themselves.

The Chinese Communists also had their peculiarly Communist reasons for advancing without delay into Tibet. A Communist régime must crush all potential challenges to its power within its territory and must subjugate all people whom it considers to be its citizens. The Chinese Communists could not allow Tibet to continue to exist as a refuge for their opponents and as an example of their inability to bring all nominally Chinese territory under their control. Nor could they allow Tibet to remain open to even the slightest non-Communist foreign influence. Western countries or India might, over a period of time, have increased

* E.g., Amaury de Riencourt, *Lost World: Tibet, Key to Asia*, London, 1950.

their contacts with Tibet and provided aid that would have enabled the Tibetans better to resist Communist penetration. Only when a Communist régime controls all possible forms of power within and adjoining its territory and has all possible sources of resistance choked off can it begin to feel safe.

Had open invasion of Tibet been likely to have provoked effective Indian, British, or American countermoves, the Chinese Communists might possibly have employed less drastic and longer-range methods to gain predominance in the country. As things turned out, however, the Communist invasion of Tibet provoked nothing more serious than an academic interest and journalistic alarm in the West or even in India, and nobody proved willing to come to the aid of the beleaguered and rather pathetic Tibetans.

The relatively quick victory of their armies gave the Communist régime an accomplishment to boast about at home, where the fact that Tibet was now at last under effective control must have appealed to the national pride of many non-Communist Chinese, and at the same time made a deep impression on both friendly and unfriendly foreign observers. The whole undertaking cost the régime very little in troops and material.

III

At this stage in history the Soviets, in contriving their plans for world domination, undoubtedly place many times more value on the Indian and other South Asian indigenous Communist parties than they do on the strategic position of Tibet under Chinese Communist control. Not that they are not willing to use the Chinese Communists for military expansion when the gains seem to outweigh the risks (as in Korea), but the masters of the Kremlin are sufficiently competent military strategists to realize that Tibet, as has been pointed out above, is just not well suited as a jumping-off point for the conquest of South Asia.

There is always the possibility that Communist China may engage in some private military sorties of its own without the approval of the Soviets. This sort of development, however, does not seem too likely for the present. Indications are that Communist China has established troops along the Tibetan borders not nearly so much because of grandiose military designs on South Asia as for reasons of national prestige and defence against outside influences. Communist States seem always to be obsessed with the notion that foreign powers are incessantly pouring saboteurs and subversive agents across their borders. Communist China is no exception.

Both the Soviets and the Chinese are nevertheless eager to make whatever tactical use of Tibet they can for exactly the same kind of diversionary activity they always expect other States to be directing against them. They are trying their best to influence the course of events in Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal by infiltrating political agents and agitators into these principalities. Western Tibet offers a useful line of communication with Kashmir, where conditions are still unsettled and where the Communists are following a classically double line of supporting Pakistan's demands in Pakistan and Pakistani-occupied Kashmir while simultaneously championing India's

claims in India and in the Indian-administered portion of the disputed State. No better illustration could be found of Communist willingness to jump on any and all nationalist bandwagons that might carry them closer to their goal of usurpation of power for themselves.

Tibet's borders have never been too clearly defined and there are many old Chinese claims which the new Communist régime is eager to champion—at least unofficially—for various political purposes. The most potentially dangerous attraction for the Communists in this respect is Ladakh, which has always had strong religious and cultural ties with Tibet. Should India and Pakistan again become involved in open conflict over Kashmir, it is not inconceivable that they might soon find a significant portion of that valuable State lost to both of them, if the Chinese Communists should decide to “assist” the Ladakhis to “unite themselves” with their homeland, Tibet.

But notwithstanding all this fascinating intrigue across the borders, the existence of strong Communist movements in India and other South Asian countries is in no way contingent upon Communist control of Tibet, though the latter fact no doubt occasionally facilitates Soviet and Chinese contact with native Communists in South Asia. Soviet-sponsored Communism would be a problem in this part of the world even if the Communists were still not fully entrenched in power in China proper, not to mention Tibet.

There is at least one encouraging aspect of the situation as it stands. Communist control of Tibet and efforts at infiltration into the border areas have had certain fortunate consequences for the West, for the government and leaders of public opinion in India have come to display much more understanding of the real nature of Communism since they have come face to face with it in their own backyard.

IV

The masters of Communism have seldom been known to follow a single line of policy or development to the exclusion of all others, nor are they by any means always logically consistent in what they do. The Marxist dialectic permits them to follow several quite different and often contradictory lines of action in the same area at the same time and justify it to themselves intellectually.

The purpose of what has been said above is not to prove that the Communists intend to make no use of Tibet as a base for subversive activities in neighbouring regions, but only to put some of the speculation that has been going on on this subject into perspective. Geographical facts alone make it highly improbable that the Chinese will embark on any major military ventures over the Himalayas. But they and their Soviet comrades will undoubtedly continue to engage in small-scale political activities along the Tibetan borders. India and Pakistan can therefore not afford to be complacent. In the long run, these subversive manœuvres may well do the Communists more harm than good, for they have tended to keep both Pakistan and India on the alert. Future

developments in this area will be worth watching as examples of Communist methods and techniques, even though they may shed little light on the grand strategy of the Kremlin.

In the meantime, Tibet itself will in all likelihood remain firmly under Communist control, an unhappy condition for any country to endure for long. But Tibet is a rather special case. A unique combination of social, religious and geographical factors should make it far more difficult to apply the Communist pattern than in most of the other countries the Communists have captured. If the Chinese do not attempt to change the old ways of the country too fast, the Tibetans may succeed in preserving and strengthening some of the basic elements of their civilization. There are some signs that do not bode well for the future. Mao-Tse-Tung recently stated that the population of Tibet should be increased first to six and then to ten million. He was probably not thinking entirely in terms of natural increase.

IN MEMORIAM

COLONEL WILLIAM G. ELPHINSTON, M.C.

IT was with the greatest regret that the Society learnt of the death of Colonel William Graham Elphinston, M.C., at his home at 34, Hurlingham Court, Fulham, on November 20, 1952. His loss will be deeply felt by the Royal Central Asian Society, of which he became a member in 1926. In 1947 he was elected to the Council, in which he took an active part until June, 1952, when he resigned as he was suffering from heart trouble.

Colonel Elphinston was born at Winchester on June 5, 1886, the son of John Elphinston of the Bombay Civil Service, and was educated at Repton. He was commissioned on August 5, 1905, and, after a period of attachment to the Royal Irish Fusiliers, joined the Poona Horse, in which he served as Adjutant, Squadron Commander, and later as Commander, when he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. He always retained his great love for his regiment and, up to the time of his death, organized the annual dinner at Hurlingham Club. In the first World War he was awarded the M.C. and between the wars became a graduate of the Staff College. He had staff experience in India at Southern Command H.Q. Poona, at H.Q. Western Command, and after promotion to Colonel, as A.A. and O.M.G. Deccan District.

His wide experience of the Middle East included Intelligence Staff Work at H.Q. of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in 1919 and 1920, and as General Staff Officer to the Iraq Army 1925 to 1928 when he travelled much among the Kurds. In the second World War he served as G.S.O. 1 Middle East Land Forces, as General Staff Officer Palestine and Trans-jordan, Head of Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq, G.S.O. 1 Jerusalem Bureau, and G.S.O. 1 Political Intelligence Centre Middle East Land Forces. These appointments gave him the opportunity of extending his knowledge of the Kurds to those of Syria, and, after the war, those intellectuals among them who had been accustomed to visit the continent of Europe often came on to London only because they knew that they would find Elphinston and therefore a warm and hospitable welcome. He also devoted much time to helping and encouraging Iraqi students in England.

His wide circle of friends all over the Middle East were always delighted to welcome him on his unobtrusive journeys, in which he was invariably accompanied by his painting gear. As an artist his work was acknowledged to be of very considerable merit, being hung on the line at the Royal Academy. He was a member of the Art Club of the Royal Society of Painters in Water Colours in Conduit Street and his pictures were seen regularly in their annual exhibition; they were also exhibited at the Galleries of the Royal Institute of Painters in Water Colours in Piccadilly. It was in the garden of Hurlingham Club that he found many of the floral subjects which he painted with such skill, and his wide circle of friends obtained great pleasure from the Christmas cards which he

designed for them each year. After his retirement he attended the Slade School to learn the technique of industrial design, in which he had considerable success.

Colonel Elphinston became a member of Chatham House in 1937, and on his retirement from the army in 1944 offered his services to assist in work on the Middle East. He became, in a voluntary capacity, Middle East Research Secretary and was largely responsible for the Middle East Discussion Group, which is an important activity of Chatham House.

Elphinston will be sadly missed by the members of the Royal Central Asian Society, where his great interest in obtaining and making known the facts and accurate details of all treaties and matters concerning the Middle East was much respected. His personal knowledge and experience of the Middle East theatres in both Great Wars, and of those areas between the wars, is a loss indeed. The deepest sympathy is extended by all members of the Society to Mrs. Elphinston in her bereavement.

C. G.

IN MEMORIAM: AHMAD SAMIH AL KHALIDI

TO THE EDITOR,

ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL.

DEAR SIR,

In the July-October issue of the *Journal* you published a memorial notice of the late Ahmad Samih al-Khalidi by his colleague Jerome Farrell. May I, as one who worked under both of them, say a little more about these two remarkable men, and what together they achieved?

Ahmad Khalidi was a many-sided man. He was an Arab of the Arabs. His race and family were to him a source of much pride but no prejudice. He was determined to adopt and to use the best wherever he found it, and he had a genius for finding it. He would often laugh with penetrating good humour at the oddities of men and women of his own and other races; it was indeed uncanny how, in a sentence, he could hit off their frailties and foibles; but I never heard Ahmad Khalidi say an uncharitable or bitter word against any of them. As an educator his aim was as ambitious as it was simple. He explained to me one day twenty-five years ago that he was tired of what he called *la jeunesse Jaffioté*, by which he meant the young Levantines who, as he said, might have been born in Marseilles, Smyrna or Alexandria for all the individuality they had. His aim was that the Arab College should produce an unmistakable Arab College product, a boy who would be recognizable as being, like Ahmad, an Arab of the Arabs, but also like him—though I am sure he never thought in such personal terms—receptive of learning and excellence from whatever source it might be obtainable. In this aim he notably succeeded, and by the end of the Mandate the boys who left the Arab College were among the best educated and the best mannered in Asia.

During the latter part of Ahmad's time as Principal of the Arab College, from 1937 to 1947, Jerome Farrell was Director of Education. As is clear from his memorial notice, he had early detected Ahmad's abilities, but more and more the two came to complement and rely on each other. Farrell appreciated Ahmad's exuberant charm, his energy, and his sometimes eerie insight into the minds and motives of his countrymen. Ahmad deeply respected Farrell's immense learning, deep humanity and single-hearted devotion to the cause of Arab

education. Between them they worked out, and put into effect, something which was unique in the Arab world—namely, a curriculum which, through the medium of the Arab vernacular, took boys from the First Primary right up to Matriculation standard. None of the so-called “National” schools attempted anything of the sort: they used English textbooks for their Secondary studies. When the Farrell-Khalidi plan first came into action there were no advanced Arabic textbooks, but neither of them would recognize this as an obstacle: and the principal and instructors of the Arab College might be found night after night burning the midnight oil (for there was no electricity in those days) translating the next day’s lectures from English into Arabic. Farrell and Khalidi were always raising existing standards and planning new developments, until ultimately the Arab College became one of the finest centres of learning in the Levant, in which with a wholly Arab staff the attainment and fluency in English was as high as in many an English-medium school, the standard in Arabic and other subjects certainly no lower.

It is nearly forty years since I first met Jerome Farrell. It would be presumptuous in me, and embarrassing to him, if I praised the man rather than the educator. But I may perhaps say that he has shown his affection for Ahmad Khalidi in the next generation also. He taught Ahmad’s eldest son Latin so well that his pupil has already produced his own English verse translation of the fourth Book of the *Æneid*; and last spring he coached the youngest for the entrance examination for Haileybury, which he passed with credit. Of Ahmad, his wit and wisdom, of his creation of the “Boys’ and Girls’ Villages” of Deir ‘Umar, of his plan for a great Arab hospital on Mount Scopus, perhaps I may some time have an opportunity of telling the Society. Here I can but recall them as typical of Ahmad’s vision and patriotism.

Now that the errors and omissions of the British Mandate are blamed and magnified, and its achievements belittled, let it be placed on record that the work of British education in Palestine was great and good, that it is remembered with gratitude and admiration, and that its influence is abiding. The Education Department was always stinted for money, often obliged to accept less than the best in buildings and equipment, but it was fortunate in those who worked for it. The enthusiasm and wide sympathies of its first director, Humphrey Bowman, the self-effacing efficiency of its Directress of Women’s Schools (and foundress of most of them), Hilda Ridler, the administrative ability of Jibrail Katul, these founded the edifice. But its consolidation and culmination were the work of that great partnership, Farrell-Khalidi. They are daily praised and missed by those whom they taught, and it is fitting that by Arab and Briton alike they should both be held in grateful remembrance.

Yours faithfully,

STEWART PEROWNE.

REVIEWS

Revolution in China. By C. P. Fitzgerald. Cresset Press. Pp. ix + 290.

Highly documented histories of the Chinese Revolution are beginning to appear, and students of this stupendous happening are bound to rely on such works as *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, by Conrad Brandt and others, and Benjamin I. Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, for much of their source material. But, indispensable as these works are, they leave with us the task of assessing the significance of the basic texts. Mr. Fitzgerald has undertaken something much more difficult and daring—namely, an *interpretation* of the whole course of the Chinese Revolution, not only tracing its origins back through the labyrinths of Chinese history, but attempting to estimate the probabilities of its future course. He says that his book is not written from the angle of the Left or Right of Western political opinion, but that “in so far as it expresses a political outlook, it is that of historical experience and philosophic anarchism; that all governments are bad, and some are worse.”

Mr. Fitzgerald's thesis is that the coalition of the peasant and the scholar has been the key to the triumph of Chinese Communism, and considers that its future depends on the success with which the Communist rulers can continue to satisfy both these classes. Though the Communists have utilized the convenient ideology of Marx-Leninism, their leader, Mao Tse-tung, had adapted it to suit the basic needs of China, so that the Revolution has become a fundamental and enduring change and not merely an exotic accident that will be corrected in the course of time. “Since few who have studied the actual working of the new Government can find grounds for the belief that it is losing internal support, hope for its overthrow tends to centre in the expectation of a world war and the victory of the Western powers.” That even a world war and a Western victory would have this result is believed only by the section of American opinion that is influenced by the propaganda of the China lobby.

An enterprise of this pioneering kind, necessarily involving many wide generalizations and provocative speculation, was bound to expose the author to criticism both from those who found his conclusions politically unpalatable and from jealous specialists who stood ready to poison with their minute darts or brain with their meticulous pens anyone who should venture to cross their narrow preserves in space and time. Mr. Fitzgerald has, I think, escaped any mortal wound from guerilla action of this sort, and none of his challengers in the broader sphere have succeeded in destroying the main premises of his argument. His chapter, “Christianity in the Chinese Revolution,” may not be altogether acceptable to Christian missionaries who feel that their life's work has been threatened by the success of Communism, but at least it contains lessons for the future. (“The approach of both Catholic and Protestant failed to meet any real need in the Chinese mind. . . . In the foreseeable future China will on the whole be hostile to Christianity. . . . Christianity has not provided the inspiration for the Revolution, nor the spiritual force which moves masses of mankind.”)

Whether or not Mr. Fitzgerald is right in all of his conclusions, he has attempted on a large scale what all of us who have any concern with international politics have to attempt in some measure on our own—namely, to assess the meaning of the Chinese Revolution and its implications for the world as a whole—and we must be grateful to him for showing us how to begin. His book is deterministic to the extent that he regards the continuance of Communism in some form in China as inevitable, but it is hopeful in that it believes that there will always remain in China men of speculative temperament, of ideas rather than techniques, who will not be satisfied with the hard-and-fast dogmas of Marxism and Maoism. If so, their influence on Chinese Communism may cause it to assume a form more closely approaching that of Western democracy and thus allow China to rejoin the main human stream.

VICTOR PURCELL.

I was a Surgeon for the Chinese Reds : By Ernest M. Lippa, M.D. 240 pp. Harrap. 1953. 12s. 6d.

This book is a story of Red China in 1949—from the inside. Dr. Lippa had almost unbelievable relations with Chinese hospitals, but his tale rings true and makes exceedingly good reading. As an Austrian who knew China, he left Vienna in 1938; he returned to his trade after his internment by the Japs, and went to the Mission hospital at Sinsiang, north of the Yellow River. Thence, 300-odd miles to Luanfu through very rough country. He admits to "cherchez la femme" as his incentive, in the shape of a nurse from New Zealand who submitted to foul treatment by the Reds rather than break her contract.

The skilled surgeon, and Austrian at that, was too great an asset to the Communists to waste, and many attractive offers came his way. He loves China and longs to return, but not unless he can insist on modern methods of hygiene, at least in the operating theatre. His details of septic surgery under Chinese management are really amazing. One realizes that though superficially the Reds appear to follow Western practice, in effect their surgery is quite primitive. The patient, for instance, was given time-expired Procaine because the Superintendent would save on his budget and so help the Party. Who cares? Four students can easily hold the patient down while his ribs are scraped.

Dr. Lippa has a pretty sense of humour. On the plea that he had no knowledge of North China (which he had) he was given an interpreter, and the misinterpretations gave him, and give the reader, real pleasure. Communism in China has much the same trend as in Europe. His province had been seven years "liberated," but the peasant was far from happy. Perhaps organized Communist confiscation was preferable to Nationalist looting. But there was not much in it. The old days were best, but do not seem likely to return.

On page 162 are quoted the remarks of Anna Wong, European-born wife of a top Communist official in Peking, in a train conversation: "We have dispensed with the sloppy humanitarian viewpoint that wastes valuable (medical) material on useless dregs of humanity merely because they happen to be ill. . . . We are not interested in the people of China as they are now. They must die before we can build the new China. To prolong their lives by medical care would not only be a waste but it would retard progress." So much for the expensive medical equipment subscribed by Western charity.

It is possible that this light-hearted travel story does more to illumine the new China than most more serious *ad hoc* studies. Perhaps, if its history can tell us anything, in the future some happier China will evolve. But it is clear that more use must be made of Western "know-how" unless that evolution is to be very long drawn out.

G. M. ROUTH.

Elementary Chinese Flash Cards: By Shau Wing Chan. Stanford University Press, California. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press.

These cards are intended to help the student to memorize the Chinese characters as he learns them without the assistance of the context. The principle is not, of course, new: it was in general use when the present reviewer went to Peking forty years ago and long before that, and, for all he knows, is still in general use. Its claim to originality must rest, therefore, on its special features—viz., (1) the fact that each card is numbered, so that while they start in alphabetical order according to their Romanized sound, they can be shuffled for use and rearranged in alphabetical order; (2) that many of the cards carry a list of "compound words"—i.e., phrases starting with the particular character; and (3) that each carries a reference to the chapter in the textbook in which it first appears (and in which each compound word appears).

Whether these special features are helpful or not cannot perhaps be finally judged without knowing the scope of the book, but it would appear that they might tend to defeat their own object—of training the memory without the aid of associations; as

soon as one sees that the number in the alphabetical list is a low, middle, or high number, he could make a fair guess as to the sound of the character within limits; and the associated "compound words" would certainly give a hint of both sound and meaning.

The other special feature is in a different category. While the Romanization known as the Wade system is (mercifully) retained there is a new system of indicating the tones—viz., by a system of accents, rather than in the traditional way by numbering them. Variations of this system have, of course, been frequently tried, but they presumably have not proved their superiority over the traditional system—except, perhaps, in the very early stages of learning the language; and in parts of the country such as West China where the first and second, and third and fourth, tones are transposed it would probably still further complicate matters.

The author claims that, although these cards are primarily intended for use with his book on elementary Chinese, being "preponderantly basic in nature," they can be used with any other textbook. This may be so, but it raises the question how many (or rather, how few) words as a minimum suffice for a basis. Professor Giles, many years ago, selected the "1,000 best characters" and followed it with the second 1,000, and Sir Walter Hillier and others have generally taken 2,000 as a minimum. This author is content with 880, and, while it might not be fair to judge their adequacy without seeing the exercises, it is legitimate to point out that even the figure of 880 must be further reduced by at least 25 to 30 in view of the fact that the total includes a number of non-basic characters (e.g., the first two on the list are *ah*, a note of exclamation and of interrogation; and several personal names), that where a character has two forms of pronunciation and slightly different meanings (e.g., *chang*, "to grow," and *ch'ang*, "long," both written the same way) they are counted as separate characters; and—even more reprehensibly—two, three or even four cards are allowed to one character to accommodate the number of compound words included under it (e.g., all the days of the week under *li* (*pai*), although they are merely the numerals; or under *yi*, "a" or "one," all the numbers from 100 to 100,000,000 that start with *yi*—i.e., one hundred, one thousand, etc.), and yet it is reckoned that each of these cards serves a new character—which it does not!

A. G. N. O.

Ma-Rai-Ee. By Chin Kee Onn. Harrap. Pp. 256. 12s. 6d.

The author, a Chinese born and brought up in Malaya, gives a graphic picture of the courage and suffering of the Chinese community during the Japanese occupation. Cast in the form of a novel, *Ma-rai-ee* (Malaya, as pronounced by Japanese) is more than a tale of wartime adventure spiced with horror. As those of us know who were ourselves in the hands of the Kempeitai in Malaya, the background is authentic.

At the time of the fall of Singapore the Japanese, expecting the hostility of the Chinese populace, tried to cow them into submission and co-operation by oppression and brutality. Blunder succeeded blunder, until virtually the entire Chinese community came to fear and hate the garrison and especially the Kempei. This book covers the whole period from the chaotic beginning to the chaotic end of the occupation, from the panic that spread as the invaders swept down from the north to the growth of the guerilla and refugee movements in the jungle and the final transformation of many of these into Communist organizations. It is in a sense a memorial to the real heroes of the occupation, most of them Chinese, who died at the hands of the Kempeitai.

It is a story which needed to be written, and Mr. Chin has done it very well. With his vivid style and great descriptive powers he has produced a historical novel which is not only very readable but will be useful to the historian. It is not a book for the squeamish, but let no one dismiss it on the ground that such things could not happen. They did.

R. H. S.

A Forgotten Journey. By Peter Fleming. Pp. 190. Rupert Hart-Davis, London. 1952. 10s. 6d.

There are many things that can be said against travel diaries, particularly rather sketchy and incomplete ones. They provide only bits and pieces of information. They are often filled with fragments of incidents and snap judgments. They are sometimes replete with lengthy descriptions of trivia and details of transportation arrangements which were only of passing importance at the time and of no importance at all now. They frequently omit information which the author and the reader both very much wish had been included. This diary has most of these faults. Nevertheless, it is well worth reading.

A Forgotten Journey consists of notes made by Mr. Fleming during the course of six months spent travelling from Berlin to Peking from August, 1934, to January, 1935. They are reproduced practically as he wrote them at the time, though he has included a number of explanatory footnotes. A few passages still remain more or less unintelligible (apparently to him as well, if one may judge by two or three of his footnotes). On the whole, however, the book gives a series of realistic, if incomplete, pictures of places which even at the time Mr. Fleming visited them were beyond the reach of most ordinary travellers, and which during the past decade have become totally inaccessible to Westerners.

After a short stay in Moscow, Mr. Fleming set out for the Caucasus in the company of Lord and Lady Gage. His descriptions of their hunting expeditions in the mountains and valleys of Georgia are among the best in the book. Parting company with the Gages, he crossed the Caspian Sea to Krasnovodsk and Soviet Central Asia. This section is brief and somewhat disappointing, though there are interesting glimpses of odd bits of Central Asian life, both Russian and native, at the time. The trip up the Turksib and then via the Trans-Siberian to Vladivostok is full of little incidents illustrative of the spirit of the times—life on the station-platforms, difficulties in obtaining food, casual conversations with various Russians, and encounters with Soviet and Japanese customs and police officials. After several frustrating experiences with Soviet bureaucracy in Vladivostok, Mr. Fleming went on to Manchuria, where he teamed up with Ella Maillart for a trip into the Mongolian border country. He eventually reached Peking via Jehol. The descriptions of the Mongol country rank with those of Georgia as the best of the whole diary. The last part of the book contains some interesting reflections of the military and political situation in Manchuria at the time, and Mr. Fleming fortunately provides a lengthy footnote which helps to put some of the incidental details into perspective.

A Forgotten Journey was a prelude to the much more famous trek from Peking to Kashmir made by Mr. Fleming and Miss Maillart during 1935 and well chronicled by both of them in *News from Tartary* and *Forbidden Journey* respectively. The present book is not up to the level of either of these. The author makes no pretence of presenting a finished product. He has published some long-forgotten notes for what they are worth. They are entertaining and they do contain information of value.

PAUL B. HENZE.

The Eternal Question: A Study in Present-Day Trends. By H.R.H. Prince Peter of Greece. Copenhagen: Rosenkilde and Bagger. 1952. Pp. 138.

The death of Stalin and the present position in Russia make this book of particular interest today. The author considers the problem of relations between Russia and the Western world from the point of view of a historian, and suggests that it is nothing new. From the time of the Persian wars with Greece there has been a continuing struggle between the European culture, based upon the sea and with an individualistic outlook, and the Asiatic way of life based on the steppes and a tribal organization.

Russia has always suffered from a split personality; pulled Eastwards by geography and Westwards by its admiration for European ways. Before the Tartar invasions Russia had close relations with Scandinavia, Byzantium and other Western princes, but after that blow had fallen, not all the struggles of Peter the Great

and his successors ever again brought Russia into such close touch with the European way of life and thought. Today the U.S.S.R. frontiers have advanced to the Elbe, but, by imposing controls upon her own populations and the peoples of the satellite States, Russia has so far prevented the modern easier means of communication from developing a closer mental and cultural relationship between the Soviet Union and the West.

The author emphasizes the dangers of Russian imperialism, which are as great today as they ever have been. He links purely territorial ambitions with the desire to spread the creed of Communism far beyond the geographical frontiers of the U.S.S.R. But, while it is true that Russia is today the outstanding example of the authoritarian way of life, she is by no means the only exponent of such a régime, nor is an authoritarian form of government confined to any one part of the world or any one type of country. It seems therefore that "The Eternal Question" poses two problems and not one. The first is clearly whether the world today can find a way of living at peace with Russia irrespective of the type of government that exists in that country. The second is whether the rule of liberty can survive under modern conditions or must everywhere eventually succumb to one shape or another of totalitarian régime.

The solutions of the Eternal Question's first problem examined in this book are assimilation or absorption. If the Western world can persuade the U.S.S.R. that there is nothing to fear, and that no one seeks to molest her, then it is possible that, as Yugoslavia has found a way to live at peace with her non-Communist neighbours, so too may Russia. With peace would come better relations and greater opportunities for the exchange of ideas, so that the process of assimilation could work unhindered. Mutual contacts of ideas and ways of life are usually beneficial, and in this case, with improved communications, might well remove the causes of jealousy and fear which lie at the bottom of the world's present unhappy state. Absorption is obviously ruled out. It can work both ways, and the West cannot adopt methods which have resulted in so much misery since 1945.

For the second problem there seems no obvious solution. With the increasing complication of life, the temptation to control the activities of individuals according to some preconceived plan becomes ever stronger and stronger. Furthermore, Aristotle's theory of the cycle of monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny appears to be as perfect a round today as it was when he propounded it. Modern conditions seem to indicate that the contest between the freedom of the individual and the power of the State is turning in favour of the latter. Security against want may prove more attractive than the intellectual advantages offered by a less regimented existence.

This book certainly provokes much thought. It seems probable that the author's forebodings regarding the unlikelihood of our ever finding complete solutions to these questions are all too true. If we are in fact now moving into the fourth stage of Aristotle's cycle, then life in the future will be less colourful and stirring than in the days when individual brilliance was allowed to flower unhampered by regulation and control. In any case that part of the problem will remain to be solved by future generations. The optimist may hope, however, that if peace is achieved the world may be able to find a compromise and to evolve a happy way of life in which all that the Greeks held dear may be combined with greater material comfort and security than was known in the past.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

The Greeks in Bactria and India. By W. W. Tarn. Cambridge University Press. 2nd Edition. Pp. xxiii + 561. 1 Plate, 1 Table, 3 Maps. 50s.

Sir William Tarn is a scholar of international repute. He has devoted the labours of a long life to the doings of the Greeks in Asia, and this book with its companion volume on Alexander* represents the fruit of those labours. So the least that can be

* Alexander the Great. By W. W. Tarn. Vol. I Narrative, II Sources and Studies. Cambridge University Press. 1950-51. 18s.

said is that what Sir William does not know about the Greeks in Bactria and India is not knowledge. In fairness it should be added that, so far as a plain man can judge, all too much of what he does know is not knowledge either, but, to borrow the incisive phrase with which Mr. Nugent Moncke opened his recent address to the Elizabethan Stage Society—"carefully-worked-out supposition, like the Life of Shakespeare."

This is not to say that the book lacks power. Far from it. Page after page is filled with strenuous argument. The evidence is skilfully, if not always very scrupulously, marshalled and innumerable scraps gleaned from the most recondite sources are pressed into service. This is done with notable success on pp. 105-9 where the question is discussed whence the ancients got their supplies of gold. Still less does it mean that what is after all the main conclusion has not been triumphantly established. Those Greeks, whose portraits appear on the coins so admirably reproduced in the plate, and the men who made those coins, were not little men, nor in any sense degenerate. They can never have been very numerous, yet the harvest of their coins already gathered is enough to show that they made no small mark on their contemporary world, though their traces have since been almost obliterated. It may well be that, as Sir William says, besides imitating the exploits of Alexander they also dreamed his dream of fusing East and West together and by giving effect to this policy made their own task easier. It is also pretty safe to assume that the one gift they lacked was the power to combine. That has often been the failing of Greeks both ancient and modern. But how far the relations of these princes one with another and with men of other races really followed the pattern drawn by Sir William is another matter. Scholars and experts must decide, each for himself, how far in each case he can accept Sir William's conclusions on the evidence adduced. The layman would do well to keep out of that worse than Serbonian bog, or, if he must venture on to its treacherous surface, he should aid his vision by procuring a diminishing-glass (if the science of optics can furnish such an instrument) and should keep it firmly fixed in his eye. Thus equipped, where the text says "must have," he will read "may have," and he will see clearly to gear down all the adverbs, so that "certainly" becomes "probably" and "probably" becomes "possibly." Weaker vehicles of hypothesis will behave as variables. Some will stand and keep their colour, others will fade out *per inane profundum* like the grin of a Cheshire cat.

In his preface to the first edition, which appeared in 1938, Sir William tells us that he had dreamt of this book for forty years before it took shape and saw the light of day. It seems strange that he was never warned in any of his dreams to go and visit at least the more accessible parts of his region and see for himself which of his theories he could still "trust at the end of an Indian June." Had he done so, it is possible that "the cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces" of his vision, erected out of such scanty materials, would have assumed a different shape. Things often look different on the spot.

This irreverent attitude on the part of ignorance in the presence of so much erudition, acumen and diligence, if it is not to be set down as sheer impertinence, must be fortified with instances. I will confine myself to three. The number, I suspect, could easily be multiplied. They are but trifles—mere straws. But straws, though poor building material, have their uses, and Sir William is the last man who should complain if others use them beside himself.

Here they are:—

(a) Towards the end of the book (on p. 408) Sir William has occasion to mention Hunza and Nagar, the two little States which confront each other on opposite banks of the Hunza river on the south side of the Karakoram range. Hunza, owing to the fame of a recent ruler, the late Mir Muhammad Nazim Khan, and the character of its people, has attracted a good deal of attention recently, and the names of the little kingdoms are well known, though few people have been able to visit them. Sir William's remarks are based on a book* by Col. R. C. F. Schomberg, who passed through Hunza several times on his way to or from Chinese Turkestan about a quarter of a century ago, and who visited Nagar in 1933. Sir William Tarn states

* *Between Oxus and Indus*. 1935.

that the two Mirs are brothers, that they claim descent from Alexander, and that the Mir of Nagar, Shah Sikander Khan, likes to be told of the resemblance of his own profile to the heads on some Greek coins. My own visit to Hunza and Nagar, which was of an official nature and lasted for a good many days, was made in 1927. I had ample opportunity to enjoy the company and conversation of both Mirs, both separately and together. So far as I recollect, the Mir of Hunza laid no stress on his own descent from Alexander, but it was already a favourite topic with the Mir of Nagar, though nobody had then as yet thought of the coin approach to the subject. Shah Sikander Khan was content to base his claim quite simply on his name (Alexander-Sikander). He also said that more than one intermediate ancestor had borne the same name, which may well be true. Actually the two Mirs were not brothers, nor does Schomberg, whose account is both full and accurate, ever say that they were. He shows that, at the most, on the paternal side they may have been very distant cousins, since both claimed descent from a common ancestor, less remote indeed than Alexander, but still only a legendary figure of the distant past. And even if Colonel Schomberg had said it, nobody familiar with the ways of Central Asia and of polygamous rulers generally would accept the statement without question. Such a division of power, freely postulated by Sir William for his princelings of the past, if by any freak of fortune it did come into existence, could never be of more than very brief duration, and it is no more likely to have obtained 2,000 years ago than now. If these things have been done in a green tree, what may not have been done in a dry?

(b) On page 163 Sir William discusses the question whether an elephant on a coin bearing a Greek legend means that it was minted at Taxila. On an Indian coin admittedly it does not. As to its significance on Greek coins the matter is left undecided. It is a possibility, a suggestion, no more. On p. 271 the suggestion has become a certainty, and on it is based the confident assertion that Heliocles (or another man of the same name who may have been the son of Heliocles I) conquered Taxila, which "cannot have been later than" a specified date.

(c) On p. 260 Pliny is quoted as saying that "Alexander forbade the Fish-eaters [of Gedrosia] to eat fish." Sir William goes on, "which must mean that someone had sought to make these coasting voyages easier by trying to establish centres of agriculture along the dreary coast of the Mekran." Anybody who has ever visited that coast, and seen conditions at Gwadar, Chahbar, Jask and the other ports where the Fish-eaters still live (on fish in defiance of Alexander!), would readily agree that nothing short of compulsion in its direst form would make any man other than a lunatic start a market-garden there, in the hope of trade with occasional mariners. But surely the statement admits of another and an easier explanation. Alexander, like Napoleon, made a tremendous impression on his contemporaries and those who came after. They never tired, as Europe is still not tired, of telling stories about the great man. When the stock of true stories and good stories ran out, they invented and repeated silly ones. Historians heard these stories and sometimes without stopping to think wrote them down. Even Herodotus, the Father of History, did this now and then, and very few of his descendants but have also had an occasional lapse. Pliny is a notorious offender. Herodotus' own best effort in this line though well known is perhaps worth repeating. As Sir William points out (p. 107), in origin it may be a boggy-story designed to deter explorers. It purports to explain how the Indians residing on the borders of Bactria come to have so much gold. They get it, he says, from the arid wilderness, uninhabited and uninhabitable, near which they live. In this wilderness are to be found gigantic ants, of the same shape as other ants, and like them with nests underground, but they are "as big as dogs and bigger than foxes." These creatures dig down in the sand and the spoil which they throw up is gold-bearing. In that region, unlike the rest of the world, the sun is fiercest in the early morning, and the ants then retire below ground to avoid the intolerable heat. The Indians provide themselves with bags and go to the wilderness, each man taking three camels harnessed together. He rides the middle one, which is a she-camel that has recently foaled. The other two are males and run on each side of the female, like trace-horses. The Indians time their start so as to arrive while the ants are underground. On arrival they hastily fill their bags and clear out for home as quick as they can. The ants, which are incredibly swift and equally fierce, give chase by

scent. Sometimes they run down the male camels, which are cast off when they begin to flag. But the she-camel, naturally swifter than the male and eager to return to her young, does not flag, and having a good start of the pursuing ants carries herself and her burden to safety. Herodotus also mentions and in part rejects a similar tale told about a people called the Arimashi, who also play Tom Tiddler with fabulous creatures called griffins (or gryphons), and rather plaintively remarks that the things which are rarest and most beautiful, such as gold and spices and incense, seem mostly to come from the ends of the earth. We should be grateful to Herodotus both for his customary good sense and his occasional lapses.

The second edition of Sir William Tarn's book is a reprint of the first with such additions to the author's already prodigious stock of knowledge as the intervening years have brought, and the reinterpretation of evidence consequent upon those additions. The book is beautifully printed and very carefully indexed. It is provided with an admirable chain of cross-references. But in spite of all these aids to learning the layman will not find it an easy or an enjoyable book to read. It is too close-packed with argument for that. Instructive he will find it, beyond question, even inspiring, and in some passages—for example, in Chapter V, where Sir William is telling the story of the Seleucid Antiochus IV—the narrative rises to the height of a great theme and sweeps along with power and majesty.

Much more might be said. But enough. The dim confines of those shadowy kingdoms through which the reader is so confidently conducted are no safe place for intruding footsteps to linger. There is a threat of hideous chastisement :

“ As when a gryphon through the wilderness
With wingèd course o'er hill, o'er moory dale,
Pursues the Arimasian who by stealth
Had from his wakeful custody purloined
The guarded gold.”

(Milton, *Paradise Lost*, Bk. II, l. 943-7.)

Herodotus is right. It cannot be all true, and perhaps it is not all gold.

E. B. HOWELL.

Hidden Highway. By Flora Davidson. Stirling Tract Co. Pp. 185. Illustrations.

The North-west Frontier Province of Pakistan (formerly India) is known to all readers of this Journal as an historic and adventurous tract, with Independent Tribal Territory, the Khyber Pass and the Pathan tribesmen on its northern border, and influencing the life of the area.

How many British soldiers and statesmen have served the Empire in this area, and found the Pathan a virile, attractive person and amazingly hospitable! But how few have touched on or come to know the deep tragedies, the pathos, hidden in the hearts and homes of these people, especially of the womenfolk?

Here in this book Miss Davidson has sought to reveal these things through true sketches of personal contacts with many Pathan homes. Her life (during more than thirty years amongst these people) has been one of real adventure, fearless courage and Christian love, which alongside a sense of humour makes the book absorbing if often sad reading.

The writer's power of description makes places and people live, and the photographs are an excellent addition. Though the author has seen some changes come with the years, I cannot agree with her that “ women can now walk unveiled through Peshawar city and never a male head is turned to look!” That day has still to dawn.

To readers unfamiliar with the vernacular language, the number of foreign words used without translation may prove a little trying, but there is a full glossary. As Dr. Zwemer writes in the introduction, “ The chapters of this book challenge faith and sacrifice.”

The challenge remains and Miss Davidson through her experiences brings one face to face with it. These true stories hold attention and must compel thought.

K. A. W.

The Last of the Dragomans. By Sir Andrew Ryan, K.B.E., C.M.G. Geoffrey Bles. 1951. Pp. 351. 25s.

In the days when Constantinople was perhaps the most desirable place in the world for civilized Europeans to live in, the peculiar states of foreign residents imposed on their national representatives the continuous duty of defending their capitulatory rights against the persistent attempts of Turkish administrations to mitigate what the latter regarded, not unnaturally, as something of a nuisance and an offence. The day-to-day execution of this task on behalf of the British Embassy fell to the dragomans, and from 1899, when Andrew Ryan joined the Levant Consular Service, until 1924, when, as Chief—and last—Dragoman, with the additional rank of Counsellor, he left Constantinople, problems requiring highly specialized knowledge of the Turks, their history and customs and their relations with the Great Powers occupied (except for the Great War years) the whole of his official time. "I worked," he wrote, "more than I played"; and though his account of events, great and small, in which he took part is often enlivened by his irresistible sense of the comic, the reader cannot but feel that here was one for whom fulfilment of the daily duty nearest to hand brooked no competition from other aims.

Thus in retrospect the author found himself often in a better position to describe some of the trees in the political wood than the wood itself; writing, as he said, far from libraries and official sources of information, he could not attempt anything like a history of the momentous epoch which embraced the struggle of the Young Turks, the Balkan Wars, Turkey's part in the Great War, the rise of Ataturk and the Treaty of Lausanne, but confined himself generally to things remembered or recorded incidentally at the time. With inveterate modesty he saw himself as "first and foremost a Civil Servant in a subordinate position, toiling along from day to day and from crisis to crisis," and it is from that restricted but authoritative viewpoint that the light he sheds on many important events derives its value. He intended an autobiography, but we are told no more than a little of the family life which plainly meant so much to him.

Some of Sir Andrew's verdicts on highly-placed persons in Constantinople are very forthright and quotable. Of Mehmet Reshad, brother and successor of Abdul Hamid: "His mental calibre was so low that he frequently seemed almost gaga." Of one eminent British diplomat: "He has half the qualities of a great ambassador." And of another: "He saw little farther than the end of his nose, but saw exactly what was at the end of it." The book is always readable, and three-quarters of it deals with the first thirty years of its author's official life—a period of growing distinction during which, as Sir Reader Bullard, his friend and editor, tells us in an apt foreword, he was to be seen at his best. Saudi Arabia, where he became later the first British Minister, was unfamiliar and less congenial to him, nor was his final post, at Durazzo, one in which a man of his experience and attainments might have hoped to complete his career. It is on his work at Constantinople, at Lausanne, and then for six years at Rabat as Consul-General, that his reputation chiefly rests.

Even those who (like the present reviewer) never knew Sir Andrew Ryan, will be attracted by the kindliness, simplicity and charm reflected in these memoirs of a religious man to whom not only work but life itself was a duty to be faithfully performed.

E. L. D.

Hafiz of Shiraz. Thirty Poems. Translated by Peter Avery and John Heath-Stubbs. Wisdom of the East series. John Murray. Pp. vi+66. 4s. 6d.

This small book is an attempt to produce, on novel lines, a translation of a selected number of the poems of Hafiz. The object of the books in the series in which this is published is, as the general editor informs us, to "act as ambassadors of good-will between East and West, the old world of Thought, and the new of Action."

The introduction gives brief biographical details of Hafiz followed by an interesting and adequate account of the times in which he lived, with a description of the intellectual background, and concluding with a discussion of his poems and the sources from which he drew his inspiration.

The translations, however, are disappointing. The translators, in their introduction, have rightly stressed the difficulty of rendering Persian verse into English. Indeed, all who in the past have essayed the task have been confronted with the same difficulty, but they have generally found that the most satisfactory solution is a paraphrase, while preserving some sense of the rhythm of the original.

The translations have been done into modern English verse, and though the meaning has been preserved they are not comfortable to read. Hafiz is certainly colloquial, but his language is at the same time dignified and elegant. The same cannot, however, be said of the translations. Persian is essentially a musical language, and those who can understand Persian or have heard the poems recited by a Persian will find little in the translations to remind them of the originals.

R. W. H.

The Faith and Practice of al Ghazali. Translated by W. Montgomery Watt. Allen & Unwin. 1953. 9s. 6d. 156 pp.

This is a translation of two of the shorter works of the great Muslim mystic: *al Munqidh min ad-Dalal* and *Bidayat al Hidayah*.

The first is in the nature of an explanation and justification of the mystic way of Islam, the second an extremely matter-of-fact set of detailed instructions for the ordering of daily life in "its outward aspect," divided into Acts of Obedience and Avoidance of Sins. The Acts of Obedience include some trivial actions that we should consider it rather the function of an advertisement for tooth-paste to teach, and others that the author intends should become automatic through being habitually done in the same way on all occasions.

On the Avoidance of Sins, al Ghazali's counsel is often acute, and it may be added that this translation is brilliant. For instance (p. 134): "Be careful to avoid backbiting . . . by giving people to understand something without actually stating it, as when you say 'May God make him a better man, seeing that what he has done has harmed and grieved me'; or 'Let us ask God to make both us and him better.' This combines two evil things: firstly backbiting . . . and secondly . . . praise of oneself for freedom from sin. Now if your aim in saying 'May God make him better' was to intercede for him, intercede in secret; if you are grieved for *his* sake then the sign of it is that you do not want to criticize him . . . but in making public your grief at his wickedness, you make a public assertion that he is wicked. . . . Just as you dislike being openly criticized and having your vices mentioned, so he dislikes that. If you veil him, God will veil your faults for you. If, however, on examining your . . . life you do not come upon any vice in it, you may be sure that your ignorance of your vices is the worst kind of folly, and no vice is greater than folly. To regard oneself with approval is the height of stupidity and ignorance."

At times, in the second part of this book, one has the sensation of stepping unexpectedly off a pavement, with a jolt from the noble to an almost puerile scrupulosity. Had al Ghazali found that his pupils in the mystic life needed some anchor, and emphasized legalism since he refused the discipline of neo-Platonist philosophy? Nevertheless, the first part—the *Munqidh min ad-Dalal* Deliverance from Error—is an autobiographical justification of mysticism as a means of reaching truth of the most fundamental and persuasive kind, as relevant to the world of to-day as when it was written, and covering the whole subject in the simplest, briefest and most lucid way.

It certainly meets the intention of the publishers "to place" one of the religious masterpieces of the world "within easy reach of the intelligent reader who is not necessarily an expert," and to this the admirable English of the translation and the notes greatly contribute.

Modern Arabic Poetry. An Anthology with English verse translations. By A. J. Arberry, M.A., Litt.D., F.B.A. London: Taylor's Foreign Press. 1950. Preface, English translations, Arabic texts. Pp. 144. 30s.

This volume of modern Arabic poetry is the outcome of a series of discussions held at the School of Oriental and African Studies by Professor Arberry and a

group of advanced students from many parts of the Arab world. The poems chosen, considered and translated by the group and done into English verse by Professor Arberry, are drawn from the chief Arab countries and also, surprising to most readers, from the United States and South America.

Translations were included in the hope of attracting a wider public, and, at a time when every morning's newspaper records the political and nationalistic reaction of Arabs and Islam to the Western world, it is valuable that the general reader should apprehend, if only at the second hand of translation, the parallel reaction in poetry and thought, and the continuing existence of a subtle, sophisticated and profound culture, differing from his own.

Not every poem here is likely to appeal to modern European taste, which is apt to associate hyperbole with insincerity and in love poetry will prefer the wry flippancy of 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aggad to Bishara al-Khuri's extravagance of roses, amorous butterflies, frankincense and plangent nightingales. Nor is elaborate rhymed structure (which, incidentally, is thought to have come into medieval Europe from Arab Spain by way of the Pyrenean kingdoms and the troubadours) still in our ears the major beauty in poetry which the Arabs consider it. A modern English anthology will contain a large proportion of excellent nature poetry, while here nearly all the images from nature seem half conventional and there is in that genre only one poem which is vivid and evocative—"The World of Sight," by Muhammad al-Asmar:

. . . E'en apes and lions that possess
Their proper sort of shapeliness;
The viper, nestled on a stone
That has a beauty of its own. . . .

Our prejudices and predilections aside, there is here much real poetry that touches and moves across the barrier of different language and tradition, the grim acceptance of Salih Jaudat's consumptive—

. . . Pallid, as if the sickness in their bone
With the grave's dust their faces overspread; . . .

—the insight and passion of 'Abd al-Majid ibn Jallun:

. . . I—I am but an unremembered ghost
Whose world was once conterminous with thine. . . .

I was the chattel of thy poet's love;
I did not think passion could perish whole;

—the restlessness of the wanderer through this life ('Abd al-Qadir al-Qatt):

On a road whose waymarks are the bones of starving men and slain. . . .

The poets cited above are of the Old World. If those of the New World have any one quality in common, it is that of intensity of emotion—of abandon, of disillusion, of homelessness, of tranquillity. With these, if anywhere, the reader may wish that Professor Arberry had not omitted, no doubt deliberately, all biographical notes. Poetry should, and can, make its own direct impact. Yet here, after the poetry, we are left with the question: Are these poets Americans of the second generation, and is their continued Arabic culture a portent in the Transatlantic world?

In calling his translations inadequate Professor Arberry disarms criticism. In fact the variety and skill of his metres is extraordinary, his renderings are frequently felicitous and memorable in their own right.

M. H.

The Israelites' Crossing of the Red Sea. By Professor B. Hellström. Institution of Hydraulics, Stockholm. 2nd Edition. Pp. 29, illustrations. 1950.

Professor Hellström's theory of the Israelites' Crossing of the Red Sea, which he explains in his book of that name, is not a new one, since the first edition was published in 1924, and the revised edition, which is translated from the Swedish, merely

adds some scientific evidence to prove that the original theory was correct. The professor locates the crossing at Serapeum on the Suez Canal between the Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah, and there is nothing very original in this, since a number of students of the Old Testament have put it in much the same spot. There is evidence to prove that some 3,500 years ago the Red Sea extended as far north as Ismailia, and, if this was the case, there would have been shallow water at Serapeum about 3 kilometres wide, which might have been so affected by a gale that a crossing was possible there.

The author of the book has recently made some experiments to prove that a strong current of air will have an effect on the level of water, and he holds the view that, if there had happened to be a strong northerly gale blowing, the bottom of the Red Sea at Serapeum would have been uncovered. Exodus, chapter xiv, verse 21 states quite definitely that it was a strong east wind that was blowing at the time, and an east wind coming in from the high lands of Sinai would have had no effect on water levels at that spot. If therefore Professor Hellström's theory is correct one must conclude that Moses did not know the points of the compass.

The book is well illustrated by a number of pictures of the Crossing, and those which were painted a century or so ago provide a reasonable idea of the occurrence. This is more than one can say for some of the modern and impressionist types, one of which shows the Israelites engaged in what looks like the square dancing that is so popular today, with an angel overhead acting as "caller."

C. S. J.

The Sudan Question. By Mekki Abbas. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd.
Pp. xv + 201. 21s. net.

Egypt has been well documented from the days of the earliest Pharaohs; but until recently very little has been written about her southern neighbour, the Sudan, and Mr. Mekki Abbas is, I believe, the first Sudanese writer to tackle the problems of the history and emancipation of his country. It is not a long story, for the Sudan itself only emerged as a geographical entity some 130 years ago; and even after its conquest by Egypt in 1821 it remained for another fifty years a stagnant and neglected country known mainly as the place where the Nile came from and the happy hunting ground of Arab slave-traders for the Egyptian and Arabian markets. But the discovery of the source of the Nile and the growing intensity of the world anti-slavery campaign put the Sudan on the map, and shortly afterwards the Khedive Ismail's imperial ambitions directed his plans south and Khartoum became an important military and administrative Egyptian base. But by 1875 Ismail's *débaçle*—his bankruptcy in Egypt and his defeats in Abyssinia—had practically obliterated Egyptian control in the country; and then in 1882 the Mahdi appeared, and it was not until Kitchener's Anglo-Egyptian army had reconquered the country in 1898 that the Anglo-Sudanese Condominium Convention brought peace, solvency and an impartial administration to the Sudan through the initiative and devotion of a fine British staff.

Thirty-seven years later the Sudan clauses of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 stipulated that the joint efforts of the co-domini should be the welfare of the Sudanese. This was a further milestone in Sudanese history: for it inaugurated the new and, for the Sudan, vital policy of "Sudanization." Its evolution proved unpopular in Egypt; but the Sudan Government pursued it methodically and from 1943 changes were rapid and profound: firstly the Sudanese Provincial Councils in the north and a Central Advisory Council in Khartoum which shortly blossomed into a Sudanese Legislative Council; then the promulgation of a Sudanese constitution and elections and a Sudanese Legislative Assembly. All these developments were essentially the outcome of the Sudanization policy of 1936; but as they took shape under British guidance they were criticized by successive Egyptian Governments with increasing vehemence; and in 1947 the Egyptian Government of the day went so far as to bring the issue of "the Independence of the Nile Valley" before the Security Council of the United Nations. But, in so far as the Sudan was concerned, the Council was unanimous that the Sudanese had the right to self-determination; and in face of this

unanimity Egypt itself was forced to come into line, though her spokesman qualified his agreement by the objection that this right to self-determination must not be exercised under British rule or with British aid.

This episode registered a further milestone in Sudanese evolution in the eyes of the world, but it did not solve the problem of the future of the country. For in October, 1951, the Wafdist Government in Egypt not only denounced the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Convention and declared ex-King Farouk as King of Egypt *and the Sudan*, but also produced a new Egyptian-made Constitution for the country on lines which differed little from Protectorate status: and all this without any previous consultation with Sudanese opinion. This was a gross Egyptian political mistake, as General Neguib was quick to realize when in 1952 he tackled the problem from a United Nations' standpoint; and after admitting the Sudanese right to self-determination, initiated negotiations first with the Sudanese and then with Britain towards an agreement acceptable to all three parties.

All this Mr. Mekki has related with conciseness, cohesion and power, and his narrative constitutes a permanent asset to all historians for all time. But there is another more immediate interest in his work. For the present Sudan agreement is in a sense only the prelude to the settlement of further problems; and to aid us in our appreciation of this future, Mr. Mekki has given us admirable analyses of the main problems facing these two African neighbours. Most important of them all is the Nile: for it constitutes Egypt's real interest in the Sudan, in that any breakdown in the present delicate hydraulic machinery which controls the supply of Nile waters to Egypt would be calamitous for Egyptian agriculture. And today every Egyptian is acutely aware that two-thirds of the course of the great river lie in Sudanese territory. Mr. Mekki's chapters "The Nile Waters" and "The Control and Allocation of Nile Waters" (pp. 65-88) go deep down into the roots of an issue which Egypt will be watching anxiously during the coming three years during which a new purely Sudanese administration will be preparing the country for its self-determination decision in 1956. Neither country has full confidence in the other, and both countries will be called upon for a high degree of caution and statesmanship in their approach to an issue which is so vital to both.

Mr. Mekki has told a difficult and delicate story methodically, thoroughly and vividly; and his excellent book is above all readable and has been written with a welcome avoidance on the one hand of the chill of an official pen and on the other of the taint of over-exuberant nationalism.

O. T.

Population Growth in Malaya. By T. E. Smith, Malayan Civil Service. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1952. Pp. viii + 126. 15s.

A valuable addition to the small but increasing range of studies of population problems in the tropics, and a subject of increasing interest to the world at large. At first sight it would appear that Malaya would not be a very hopeful field for investigation. The large migrant population, the upheaval resulting from the Japanese occupation, the current civil disturbances, might be expected to diminish the accuracy of any figures available. The author, taking advantage of a stay at Princeton University, has faced up to these difficulties and has used them; the population of Malaya is, in any case, not static, and these disturbances have brought the different trends into higher relief. The analysis of whatever figures are available is skilful and instructive.

The object of the study is to forecast the trend of population in Malaya. That country is still far from being fully developed, but with a population increasing by 2 per cent. per annum plus any *welt* immigration (at the moment nil), development will come. The study will help the authorities to guide that development. Possibilities of an alteration in the rate of increase are examined in some detail for the three races, Malay, Chinese and Indian, for urban and rural, for wage earners and others (agriculturists and fishermen), and, if nothing else, lines of enquiry for the future are delimited.

But the study has another aspect. In large areas of the East there are none or scanty records of population. Yet if the standards of life in these areas are to be raised some figures are essential. The present study, in a small area with a small population, should throw light on other areas occupied by not dissimilar peoples. In particular the examination of the effect on the Chinese of contact with Western influences is most valuable.

B. W.-P.

Pamphlets received include :

Camel Brands and Graffiti from Iraq, etc., by Dr. H. Field. Supplement to the Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1952.

Age, Stature and Weight in Surinam Conscripts, by Prof. A. B. D. Fortuyn. Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen. 1952. (In English.)

Sociaal Dienen in Minder Ontwikkelde Gebieden, by Prof. C. T. Bertling (Community Development). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen. 1952. (In Dutch.)

Biographies of Meng Hao Jan, translated by H. H. Frankel. University of California. 1952. 4s. From Cambridge University.

The Law of Income Tax and Zakat in Saudi Arabia, compiled by S. Shamma. Jedda. 1951.

Lebanon: the Mountain and Its Terraces, by N. N. Lewis. From American Geographical Society. 1953.

The Oldest Dam in the World (at Sadd el-Kafara—Egypt). Supplement (English and French) to La Houille Blanche No. 3, 1952. Grenoble.

Oxford University Exploration Club Bulletin, No. 5. 1952. Including a useful note on Transport for Overland Expeditions.

Nepalese Kangchenzönga, by Professor R. N. Rahul. Delhi. 1950. (Reports on the expedition of the Swiss Foundation for Alpine Exploration in 1949 as published in *The Hindustan Standard* of Calcutta.)

People's Democratic Dictatorship. An English translation of Speeches by Mao Tse Tung. Lawrence and Wishart. 1950. 1s. 6d.

Sanitation for Estate and Mine Labour Forces. Advisory Service of the Ross Institute, Bulletin No. 8. 1952.

A Vowelled Arabic Reader. Passages in Simple Arabic for Reading and Translation. 2nd Edition. M.E.C.A.S., Shemlan. Printed at Beirut. 1953.

ERRATA

In the review of *Afghanistan* on p. 97 of the January number of the Journal, it is much regretted that the title did not make it sufficiently plain that (as stated in the review itself) the authors are Fathers E. Caspani and E. Cagnacci, and that the book is entirely in Italian.

The Map on p. 91 gave four areas in Russian Central Asia the wrong title.

Qazaqstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan are all full S.S.R.

Qaraqalpaqistan is an A.S.S.R. (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) within the S.S.R. of Uzbekistan.

CORRESPONDENCE

HEADQUARTERS,
THE BRIGADE OF GURKHAS,
JOHORE BAHRU, MALAYA.

TO THE EDITOR,
ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL.

SIR,

Dr. Victor Purcell is reported, in your Journal for January, 1953, pp. 74-5, as having said that Pekan Jabi lies "three miles north of Singapore Island," and as making a rather important deduction from the supposed nearness of the village in question to Singapore itself.

In fact, this village, the scene of the incident to which Dr. Purcell refers, lies in the Administrative District of Segamat and 119 miles by road to the north of the Singapore Causeway.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
LANCELOT PEROWNE,
Maj.-General, C.B., C.B.E.

March 17, 1953.

10, LYDEWODE ROAD,
CAMBRIDGE.

DEAR SIR,

With reference to the letter from Major-General L. Perowne dated March 17, may I refer him to the *Straits Times* dated October 29, 1952, which reads as follows:

"*Kuala Lumpur. Tuesday.*—Outnumbered police and Home Guards of Pekan Jabi new village in the Pengarang area of Johore—only a few miles from the Singapore coast—last night beat off a savage attack by forty well-armed terrorists."

There are half a dozen towns and villages of the same name in southern Malaya and there might well have been one of them at the point mentioned in the report.

But wherever the Pekan Jabi intended by the official communiqué may be, it makes no difference to my statement that "the guerillas or Communists are able to penetrate near to big strongholds of the Administration." This statement was based on my own personal experience in August-September, 1952, and I visited one new village only a few miles from "a stronghold of the Administration" and many miles from anything that could fairly be termed "jungle" where there had been two murders of Chinese headmen in quick succession a week or so before my arrival and without interference from the police or military. Pekan Jabi merely appeared from the report to be (at the time of my lecture on November 5 last) the latest example of this kind of thing.

May I add that my remarks in my address to the Royal Central Asian Society were based on personal observation and statements made to me in Cantonese, Mandarin, Hakka and Malay, tested against a background of over thirty years' knowledge of Malaya.

Yours faithfully,
VICTOR PURCELL.



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NOTICES

THE Council acknowledges with gratitude the following accessions to the Library :

Manual of Palestinian Arabic, by H. H. Spoer and E. Nasrallah Haddad.

Eastern Turki Grammar, by G. Raquette.

Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh, by Major J. Biddulph.

A Sketch of the Turki Language (Pt. 2 : Turki-English Vocabulary), by R. B. Shaw.

A Turkestan Diary, 1926-29, by R. C. F. Schomberg.

A Second Turkestan Diary, 1930-31, by R. C. F. Schomberg.

Maps and photographs of the Indian-Tibetan and Indian-Turkestan Frontier.

All presented by Colonel R. C. F. Schomberg.

Annals and Antiquities of Rajast'han, by J. Tod. 2 Vols. Presented by Major R. Sinclair.

The Council wish to acknowledge with gratitude the generosity of the late Major D. Burt-Marshall, D.S.O., O.B.E., in providing for a legacy of £250 to be made to the Society. Major Burt-Marshall had been a Member of the Society for fourteen years.

Members and contributors alone are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

Members will be interested to hear that a sundial in memory of T. E. Lawrence was unveiled in the South Cliff Gardens, Bridlington, on Wednesday, September 23, 1953.

The sundial is of Yorkshire stone with a metal plate bearing the inscription, " This sundial has been erected to the memory of Lawrence of Arabia, who as Aircraftman Shaw served in the Royal Air Force in Bridlington between 1929 and 1935."

BRIDGING AND ITS INFLUENCES IN ASIA TODAY

By A. M. HAMILTON, B.E., M.I.C.E., M.I.Mech.E.

Report of a lecture illustrated by a film delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on April 22, 1953, Group-Captain H. St. Clair Smallwood, O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my pleasant privilege to introduce to you Mr. A. M. Hamilton, who is no stranger to the Royal Central Asian Society, having been a member for twenty-one years, so that you will realize that he is very interested in Eastern countries.

Mr. Hamilton is a New Zealander by birth and one of his many claims to fame is that in 1928 he joined the Iraq Public Works Department, during the period of the British Mandate, and built a road through Kurdistan. The Kurdish mountains in the north of Iraq were then infested with bandits and the Arab and Kurdish population were perpetually fighting each other. It was felt that policing depended on putting a good road through the country.

That road took four years to build from Arbil to the frontier of Persia, and Mr. Hamilton has told me that people used to try to lure him down to Baghdad and Basra, but he preferred, in spite of all the difficulties, his life up in those mountain areas. He has written a book, *Road through Kurdistan*, and those who have not read it should either buy it or borrow a copy from the library of the Royal Central Asian Society. The book was published in 1937 and it describes a great engineering—and social—feat.

Mr. Hamilton, in conjunction with Mr. White-Parsons of Callenders Cable Company, invented a bridge which can be transported in parts, put together with untrained labour and pushed across from opposite sides of a river to meet in the middle. This bridge has been used to a great extent in backward countries, particularly by the British but also by the French, and was used by the British Army in India and Burma during the war. I was in the Burma campaign and I know how vitally important those bridges were, being rather stronger and more permanent than a Bailey bridge. The bridge was also widely used in other parts of Asia. It was first thought of in Kurdistan, and then adopted by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Some years ago I read an obituary of Kipling by a writer in the *Morning Post* in which there was a sentence which has always remained in my mind: the writer said that Kipling described better than anybody else "the touch of duty in the bare spaces"; that, I am sure, describes the work of our lecturer, Mr. Hamilton.

ONCE had an Assyrian overseer whose English was not too perfect and who seemed to regard the words "bridge" and "British" as meaning much the same thing, so that he used a word that lay between the two and which sounded like "britsh" and meant either. Thus when he said "Things are better since the 'britsh' came" one could take it either way, and I have imagined that he thought our name was due to national bridging skill.

If so, he had reason, for wherever we moved in Iraq, on the plains or in the mountains, we built bridges: pile bridges, girder bridges, floating bridges and flying ferries. It was only when the overseer came to the plural "britshes" that I wondered if he meant our trousers entered into it also, as differing from the Eastern and being advantageous.

Certainly, whatever else the British are held to be in Asian history, it will, I think, be conceded that they were great bridge-builders. We may even have overdone it if you look at the wave of nationalism made possible largely by improved communications in some countries, but taking the long view I do not think it is really so.

A first cousin to the bridge, structurally, is the aerohangar, and another near relation is the irrigation dam. In a talk on bridging I can only mention these other great engineering branches of air communications and irrigation, but both were put on a fundamental footing in India, Iraq, Egypt and so on. The most recently completed of the big bridges is the Howrah Bridge, Calcutta, over the Hoogly, which ranks high among the score of great bridges in the world and is made from Indian steel. Both the Irrawaddy or Ava and the Howrah bridges were designed by Rendel, Palmer and Tritton, consulting engineers, and the Howrah was erected by the Cleveland Bridge Company, Darlington.

Remember that bridges are relatively easier to destroy than to build; and it is a great tribute to our often abused administration that such communications have worked so well for so long and have been so much appreciated. In many lands where we found only broken bridges or none at all we have introduced not only bridges but a freedom of movement over them that is prized in the Western world and was so, from very ancient times, in the Eastern.

Let me quote from the Dane, Fugl-Meyer, and his book *Chinese Bridges*,* where he tells of bridges—suspension, cantilever, arch and so on—built from bamboo or hardwood or stone, old even when Marco Polo saw them. He says: "In the Buddhistic list of meritorious deeds, the building of a public bridge is one of the first mentioned, and many bridges are built in combination with temples and monasteries. One of the few methods to reconcile the Ten Judges of Hell is proof that one has contributed to the construction of a 'public bridge.'" Note "public bridge," not military bridge.

So I think that any bridge-builders in this audience—and the "British" are all, by association at least, bridge-builders—can cheer up a little and take a less pessimistic view of the future. On the above criterion we must rank *somewhere* even with the Buddhists, and surely too with the Moslems, for the old tradition of the worthiness of bridge-building reached from China to Iraq. I remember a Turcoman overseer telling me when we were building a frontier post at a place called Kani Rash that it was so named because the great Haroun al Raschid of the *Arabian Nights* built either a mosque or a bridge wherever he went in his dominions. There before us at Kani Rash was a broken bridge, which gave one the idea that there were fair communications, to some extent, all over the East in earlier times. Another similar broken bridge was in the Greater Zab Valley, which the Assyrians, perhaps the oldest Christians of all, claim to be the original Garden of Eden.

It is surprising how much we can learn from the very idea of a bridge, if we have a mind to do so. For example, our technical education on bridges today tells all about what goes *in* them—steel, rivets, concrete and

* Fugl-Meyer, H.: *Chinese Bridges*. Shanghai. 1937.

so on—but few of us in this age of specialization think enough, perhaps, about the flesh and blood that goes *on* them. To continue playing our part in Asia means knowing just that. For instance, we should not back just the apparently rich and powerful against the seemingly poor and weak, for the tables can be turned suddenly in Asia, as we now know. We have seen that happen in Persia.

At this point I will, if I may, recall an earlier address I gave to this Society many years ago entitled “The Construction of the Rowanduz Road,” which described the job I had just been in charge of—the making of a new road through the Zagros Mountains to the Persian Plateau in Azerbaijan, where it met another road constructed by the Persian Government from Tabriz, so that the road formed part of a highway from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea, and I hope some day it will go onward far beyond that.

Since that other lecture I have spoken a few times in discussions, though more often I have sat back and enjoyed the comfort of the Royal Society chairs while always, of course, listening attentively to the lecturer!

Though the mountain section of the Rowanduz Road was somewhat difficult to construct owing to the remarkable gorges and precipitous terrain—long a natural barrier—it proved easier than anticipated because of the help readily and generously given by the Kurdish people, who we had thought would be sure to oppose it. I would like to add a word on the influence of bridges in that part of the world because it seems to me it must be typical of the influence of bridging generally in remote places. We thought the Kurds, whom nobody had tamed—the Turks had not done very well with them and nobody else had subdued them throughout history—would oppose the building of the road. On the contrary, they did nothing of the kind. They welcomed it. Shaikh Mohamed Agha, the tribal chief of the area in which the bridge was built, was quite appreciative of the fact that the bridge was to be built. He and his men did nothing whatever to obstruct our workmen; there was not at any time any suggestion of hostility.

Thus the acceptance of the Rowanduz Road by everybody concerned, including Persia, led me to say to this Society that road-building and bridges and public works are not things needing to be forced upon people but, on the contrary, are welcomed by them. A little later in *Road through Kurdistan*, describing the work in more detail and the tribal reactions and Iraq minorities of the area, who are chiefly Assyrians and Kurds, and whose feuds were completely set aside during the course of this work, I said, perhaps jokingly, but I am now certain with an element of truth: “We felt we could go on making roads across Asia to the China Sea.”

In fact, there was only one hitch: the minor bridging required, often every mile or two—minor as compared with the great bridges I have mentioned. Usually it held us up and it was apparent we needed new methods, because the types sent to us were of fixed length and strength and would not “stretch” to suit wider rivers or contract to fit narrower ones as we came to them. Neither the World War I Army bridges we mostly used, designed originally to cross French and Belgian canals, nor the

“tailor-made” bridges we also sometimes used could alter their designed lengths and strengths.

To facilitate my work I thought it would be a good idea to try to produce a new type of bridge that, though being of light parts, would, figuratively speaking, stretch or contract at will and, having one type of universal bridge instead of several, make river crossings quicker to complete. We could not make the river fit the bridge, not even obliging Asian rivers that dried up for part of the year and then came down in sudden flood and washed our plant away for the other half, so I felt we had to make the bridge fit any river. For delay on a bridge delays the whole road work; machinery in those defiles just cannot move on.

Not only in this practical way is bridging very important. I had already noticed it meant something quite deeply moving to the people's minds, just as Meyer has said. We had joyful banquets every time a bridge was opened. I had to pay for the feasts, but it was well worth it. The opening of a bridge means trusting all those on the other side and encouraging not only distant trade but local co-operation. The bridge is thus an emblem of trust. Perhaps nothing represents man's belief in man better than a bridge. Go forward to unite, I thought, and you go forward without difficulty.

Not that bridges cannot be abused; they easily can be. I was indeed sorry that so soon after the road to Rowanduz was opened it was used for Iraq military operations against Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan. I believe this Shaikh said to his chiefs: “Bring a rope and hang me to the nearest tree, or fight with me against the machine-guns of the Arabs and the aeroplanes of the British who molest us.” Yet neither he nor Shaikh Mohammed Agha was anything but helpful in the work I was doing, both on the road and on bridge construction.

The history of the Barzan tribe since then is rather a sad one. The road penetrated the walls of the Shaikh's mountain fastness, bridged his moat, and the Iraq Army came up and made the Shaikh a prisoner. Much though we have lost, there is, I think, a watchword that can carry us far in Asia again, and it is *sincerity* as to the people's welfare. Given sincerity of purpose we must in the end succeed and reap the great reward of trust.

But to return to the search for the universal or “stretchable” bridge: after my return to London an engineer colleague and myself were able to interest the Royal Engineer Board of the early thirties in two ideas in standard bridging they had not previously employed. In simple terms, they were, firstly, the building of bridges in storied or tiered construction and, secondly, providing what is called “variable section” of the bridge, so that those bridge members requiring to be stronger than others can be made so by adding identical units, and the bridge steel varies along its length.

That construction was first adopted by the Army after thorough testing, later by the Ministry of Transport for civil use, and we entered the war knowing for certain that the variable section “stretchable” bridge worked and that we were ahead of other nations with it. The first tests were carried out at the Experimental Bridging Establishment at Christchurch. I suggested to my colleague we name the bridge the “patent

collapsible," but he thought that was completely inappropriate, so we called it the "unit construction bridge." The Ministry of Transport School at Harmondsworth had this bridge put up to teach contractors how to erect an emergency bridge. A number of the bridges were used for emergencies and replacements in this country, and many more are in use in France and Holland. Incidentally, many of you probably walked over one of the bridges over York Road into the Festival of Britain.

But I want to show how making improvements to meet Asian bridging difficulties can affect Western bridging and how this bridging, after being tested out in the West, still further affects war and development in Asia. Any theory, whether put forward by people in the East or in the West, that either part of the world can be self-sufficient is utter nonsense. We interlock at all stages of technical and non-technical matters, and neither side need have any inferiority complex. I know I learned from the people in the East and I am sure they too learned from us. Thus if today we buy their fuel oil, we do give something back. It is often said we have taken a lot out of India, but add up what I have been saying about communications as only one thing and just think what India must owe us altogether.

The earliest user of unit construction bridging actually in the field was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose stocks interchanged with Army bridging during the war. There are quite a number of bridges in the oil area besides the main one over the Karun River. Some also went to Ceylon. During the war, to save British shipping and British production time my colleague and I, as a "two-man band production ministry," managed to arrange for the bridging to be made in India and South Africa, benefiting the steel industries of both countries as well as enabling bridges to be brought quickly to where they were needed in the S.E.A.C. campaign. We added a few score of large aerohangars, too, for war service both in Europe and in Asia. It was not always easy to get all this done, but we managed it in good time—by 1941-2.

A great problem arises owing to terrific flooding of the rivers, especially of that river coming out of the Himalayas to join the Brahmaputra called the Manas, which has an extent of flooding almost unknown in any other part of the world. The bridges over the Manas tributaries on the Bengal-Assam Railway have been replaced nine times in the history of the railway. When the floods come down they not only wash a bridge off its piers and abutments; they often bury everything completely under 60 ft. of silt.

About the longest-span bridge, or one of the longest, is a bridge in Holland, and again I jump from East to West because the same problem is being faced. In Holland there was destruction by the Germans on a tremendous scale. Dordrecht required the biggest of the replacement bridges of this standard type of which I know. Incidentally, that large bridge of nearly 500 tons weight is an index of the gain in the strength of bridging between World War I and World War II, the strength compared, say, with the Hopkins bridge Shaikh Mohammed Agha inspected being ten-fold.

In India the extensive S.E.A.C. stocks of this bridging have, I am sorry to say, been put to what can best be called strategic internal road-building to take Indian military forces into Kashmir without having to

use the old route through Pakistan, and presumably to control Pakistan water supplies if possible, which is not a very worthy aim. The Indian Army was able to use this S.E.A.C. bridging lying surplus at the end of the war, with considerable financial saving denied to Pakistan, but I should greatly doubt if the British Treasury has been credited with its value and that of other ex-war material Britain paid for and gave away, or sold very cheaply.

Well, there is little to add. Though in the thirties I joked about a possible Haifa-Hong Kong Road, West to East, over Asia, I do not do so now, for I see much of it on the map coming into existence. There are still formidable stretches to be made and bridged in the Hindu-Kush Mountains, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Burma and China itself. If, as I have already said, we can supply not only the technical skill, which is the easy part, but also the era of peace, sincerity of purpose and co-operation between all peoples and races, which is the more difficult part, then I am sure we shall take our place in much greater schemes than we have already engaged in, and that intangible thing felt by all who have worked there, the "Spirit of Asia," will be with us.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Hamilton has said he will be pleased to answer questions from any member of the audience.

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: I went down from Persia along the Rowanduz Road in 1950. Does Mr. Hamilton think that road is being looked after now? When there I did not see anybody looking to the bridges or making any repairs. There was then no sign of disrepair starting, but of course that is bound to appear after a few years.

Mr. HAMILTON: I am interested in that question and I will ask Mr. Skinner, who is with us today, to supply the answer; he was Chief Road Engineer in Iraq just after the war.

Mr. SKINNER: Up to about two years ago money was very scarce and there was a maintenance allowance for the Rowanduz Road of something like £15 per km.—a very small sum. The bridges were kept in a reasonable state of repair and about the only thing which did give trouble was expansion due to the terrific heat, the air temperature being sometimes as high as 170° F. I do not think there is really anything to fear; a certain amount of attention has been given to this road and in 1950 about 25 km. were strengthened. The non-appearance of workmen on these roads is a big problem. Indeed, they would seem to appear only when someone in authority is due to come along. It may be, of course, that Mr. Price came through from Persia after the repair work had been completed.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like you to pursue that particular line of country which Mr. Price has suggested. Can Mr. Hamilton add anything about the roads and bridges from India into Burma and from Burma into China? It will be tragic if the bridges made to join up those countries are allowed to fall into disrepair.

Mr. HAMILTON: I cannot say anything definite upon that point, but I can say that of all the countries in the world, oddly enough, Burma is the most bridge-minded country there is. Burma goes on bridging and bridging. I believe what was done militarily during the war set them an

example and from that they will develop their country enormously when they settle their internal disputes. The road from India to Burma should not be a bad one if maintained. With regard to the road leading to China, which is very mountainous—even more so than the Rowanduz Road—I would think some of the bridging that has been taking place might be along it even if just for defence. I feel pleased that the wartime standard bridge seems to have appealed to a country which obviously needs it so much in peace. I would not know whether it is a good through road into China yet. I do not think it was a very good one during the war, though it was used greatly and may well, in time, come into great use again for trade.

Mr. SKINNER: If I may return to the Rowanduz Road, I think what Mr. Price has just said bears great testimony to the work done by Mr. Hamilton. In the summer of 1950 the rail system in Persia seemed unable to stand up to the strain of traffic and it was found by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that the only way in which they could get deliveries of oil into northern Persia was to ship them to Basra, transport them from there by rail to Arbil and thence by road tanker through Kurdistan. For a period, something like ninety road tankers passed over this road daily, at the end of which the road was not in bad condition. This shows that the work which Mr. Hamilton did on the Rowanduz Road can even today stand up to what must be regarded as a very important operation.

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: My remarks were not intended in any way to throw any doubt on the excellent work, which immensely impressed me, being entirely without any engineering knowledge on my part. It is wonderful to have constructed that road through that country and thereby do so much to pacify it. We all know that in Persia the position is such that money devoted by the Government for purposes of road-building does not always go to the right place, but I have a feeling that Iraq is not like that and that money assigned for a particular purpose goes to the right place. I wanted confirmation of that. I knew Iraq was not too well off financially a few years ago, but now with the agreement between the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Government I think Iraq is in a very favourable financial position and there should be no difficulty in maintaining this wonderful road.

Colonel CROCKER: Have the bridges in Burma been repaired? When I was there in 1945 I went up to Mandalay and saw a number of bridges which had been blown up. There was one big bridge destroyed on the line going to Tharrawaddy; there was also a very big bridge which had been blown up on the line to Mandalay.

Mr. HAMILTON: Were those bridges on the railway?

Colonel CROCKER: Yes, on the branch-line going up towards the Irrawaddy to a place called Tharrawaddy.

Mr. HAMILTON: My information is that they were all repaired by the military units that went up, and I had a report on various bridges that had been repaired. I am sorry that I have no photographs of the repaired bridges. I have been anxious to get some, but owing to the usual military formality I have not yet been able to do so: I believe they are in the hands of the Bridging Section of the War Office. Repair has taken a long time

in Borneo; it was done more quickly, in fact brilliantly, in Burma, where the Army just had to have the line working as soon as possible, and I am glad our Indian-made bridging was available.

As to Mr. Price's suggestion that in Persia money goes to the wrong place and does not in Iraq, I think under the careful Scottish scrutiny of Mr. Skinner no money went to the wrong place in Iraq.

Mr. LANGE: On my way through Kurdistan I drove over a very fine bridge across the Greater Zab River at Altun Keupri, which means the "Golden Bridge." Might I ask Mr. Hamilton whether that was also constructed by his company?

Mr. HAMILTON: No. I did not erect the Altun Keupri bridge. It was a military Inglis bridge and had only limited strength. Another engineer took that bridge down and put up the stronger military-type Hopkins bridge, which can take heavier vehicles. There are a great many of the Hopkins bridges in northern Iraq, including a crossing of the Tigris at Mosul; and the type has been of much value in civil use.

Colonel ROUTH: I understand that many bridges were broken down in China during the Civil War. The Chinese are trying to industrialize, and it seems to me an important factor in the industrialization whether or not communications are open even to the extent that they were in the past. Can Mr. Hamilton say what is being done in China to restore communications?

Mr. HAMILTON: On China I am somewhat ignorant. I do not even know what influence the Russians have had there; I expect they have had some. Though I have heard that some of our bridging went on to the Hong Kong-Kowloon Railway, I have no definite information about bridging in China. I have not been able to find out anything in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN: If that is the end of the questions—and it seems to be—it only remains for me to convey to Mr. Hamilton, on your behalf, our very grateful thanks for a period of most intense interest. I feel that if only due credit were given to bridge-builders, how very much would come to Mr. Hamilton. Our small thanks from this audience do not amount to much, but if the thanks could be collected of all the Eastern countries in which he has added communications and bridges, it would be a very, very large vote of thanks indeed. But as far as we are concerned we do thank you, Mr. Hamilton, for coming here and giving us this intensely interesting paper. Thank you very much indeed.

ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN INDO-CHINA

By COLONEL MELVIN HALL, D.S.O. (U.S. Air Force, retired)

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, April 29, 1953, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Colonel Melvin Hall, who has had a very colourful career, first contacted the British Army when touring round the world as a student in a car in 1914. He joined our Expeditionary Force, complete with his car, and served in Flanders until his own country came into the war, meanwhile earning a D.S.O. He then joined and spent the rest of the war with his own American Army.

In between the wars he served in Persia, in Turkey, where he helped with the building up of their civilian air lines, and he also served his own country with the building up of their civilian air force. During the last war he served in the United States Air Force until he was wounded and invalided.

Quite recently he has been out in Indo-China, where he has been an observer, both in the air and on the ground, and I will now ask him to render his address.

INDO-CHINA has sometimes been described as a "basket of crabs." If that gives you some idea of what the situation is, I can assure you that trying to trace out the movements and manifestations of a basketful of crabs is no more difficult than following the events in Indo-China. It is complex enough to start with, and recent events have made it more so. I will touch on the Laotian situation later, but in the beginning I will tell you, what many of you certainly know, that Indo-China as such is a misnomer, if we think of it as an entity.

There is no such thing as Indo-China other than a geographical outline on a map, as it contains great divergencies in racial origins, in religions and in languages. There are three countries, no one of them particularly liking any of the others. The largest and most populous is the state of Viet Nam, which is made up of three former countries or provinces—Cochin China, Annam and Tonkin, which never cared especially for one another. There are some 65 millions of Vietnamese, including 1,500,000 permanent Chinese residents, 500,000 of them in Cholon, the Chinese town of Saigon.

The situation is extremely complex in that the Viet Minh, now the rebel enemy against whom the Franco-Vietnamese forces are fighting, originally started as probably a true movement for the independence of Viet Nam. Ho Chi Minh was considered the leader of all the parties that desired liberation, some of them violently anti-French, others not so; but they all wished national independence. The name Viet Minh is an abbreviation of a string of monosyllabic and disyllabic words that mean, roughly, the union of all the associations and societies for the independence of Viet Nam.

The Viet Minh started as a resistance movement against the Japanese. In 1946, after the expulsion of the Japanese invaders, Ho Chi Minh signed with the French two separate agreements. That was at the time that

Russia was still, in a manner of speaking, an ally and had not turned against the West. Ho Chi Minh had been educated in Moscow, and as soon as Russian policy turned against the West he received certain instructions—I do not pretend to know precisely what those instructions were—and immediately began the elimination of all the non-extreme-Leftist groups of the Viet Minh, until today they march with the Communist world attack.

The bulk of the fighting has been in Tonkin, on the Red River delta, where the French have had most of their forces tied up in this unorthodox combat in the rice paddies. One of the great difficulties in clearing up the area is that it does not stay cleared up—the Franco-Vietnamese have not enough forces to post behind to police it. I was told by the Governor of Tonkin that whereas certainly the bulk of the population are favourable to the régime of Bao Dai and the Franco-Vietnamese efforts to eliminate the Viet Minh, they are afraid of retaliation. That is true today. He added: “We do not control definitely more than about 10 per cent. of the delta at night. We control more of it in the daytime, because then the people who cause trouble at night are simple workers in the paddy fields.” This is one of the more unpleasant features of the war in the delta. You quite often do not know who your enemy is by day, or where he is at night.

There is a series of isolated blockhouses, mostly to keep the roads open. They do not keep the roads open except spasmodically, and then only between 7 o'clock in the morning and 7 o'clock at night, when they are patrolled—and that is on a very few of the roads. One of the roads I have been over by jeep on several occasions, from Hanoi to Haiphong, is very frequently cut. There are other roads, few and far between, where you can go by motor in convoy. It does not always have to be a very big convoy, but at least big enough so that one car can support another in case of trouble. So most travel is done by air, and some of the airfields are sketchy in the extreme.

I will mention, particularly for the information of my friend C. G. Grey, who knows a great deal about the air and airfields, one field that I have been into several times: rather an event in itself. This field is at Lai Chau, in north-west Tonkin. It is 6,000 ft. below the peaks in a gorge so narrow that the aircraft cannot circle over the strip. The strip is just long enough for a Dakota to land on it, if you land without any flying speed, at the exact edge which falls off into the river. If you have any flying speed, you overrun the strip and hit the houses of the little town at the far end. One can circle, in a manner of speaking, up river, and a good pilot *can* avoid hitting the hills and the trees on both sides while letting down, but you can see the branches of the pines and teaks practically brushing each wing tip as you circle round. That is one of the worst, but there are others that are none too good.

As one of the complexities of the situation: the Thais in north-west Tonkin, who are tribal people, are very friendly with the French. They fight with the French and they are fighting against the Viet Minh, not because they know or care anything about Communism, but primarily because the Viet Minh are largely composed of Vietnamese, whom the Thais detest; yet today they *are* Vietnamese.

We have heard a good deal recently about the airstrip at Na Sam. That is maintained primarily for the support of the Thai country.

There have lately been some criticisms (I noticed some in the French press today) of the handling of the defence by General Salan, commander-in-chief of all the forces in Indo-China—land, sea and air—in that he has allowed these isolated posts to be retained and a number of battalions, in some cases amounting to a division, to remain practically immobilized and serving no useful purpose. But take the case of Na Sam, which is the bastion for the Thai country: if it is given up, the French are letting down their Thai friends, as there is no way of protecting them other than by bringing up munitions and supplies and reinforcements by air lift to Na Sam. Attacks have already been made against the Thais, the principal centre of the Thai country being at Lai Chau, where this curious airstrip is that I mentioned previously. If Na Sam is abandoned, there is no protection for Lai Chau.

The forces available all through the area are insufficient to take on all these isolated operations of the Viet Minh and to guard the country against reinfiltration. The forces on one side and the other are too close in balance, and the Viet Minh are highly mobile. They go through the jungles. They move at night through the rice fields. Criticism has been made that their lines of communication have not been cut. But the cutting of lines of communication through the heart of the jungle is a difficult affair when columns of men inured to jungle warfare are moving through the forests without heavy equipment. The French have been obstructed by bad weather, so that air reconnaissance and air bombing and air machine-gunning of the advancing enemy columns have been impeded. This also makes it difficult to know exactly what is going on.

The attack on Laos, which is so much in the newspapers today, was unexpected. The King of Laos, whom I know and who has the pleasant name of Sisavong Vong, which sounds like the reverberations through the forests of the great bronze drums of Laos, is old as Orientals go. He is 68 or 69, and he has liver trouble, also suffers from gout, and most of the time he is lying in bed. His son, an excellent man—Prince Sivang—is 45-ish, big for a Laotian, and very intelligent. He is highly educated. He was educated in France and speaks excellent French. He has visited America several times, and he is a very substantial and well-esteemed character.

He is definitely a Laotian first. He is not unfriendly to the French, but he wants the complete independence of Laos. He has no desire whatever to play with the Communists. He told me on two occasions, one not very long ago, that the Viet Minh war, as far as Laos was concerned, was finished, that there were no more than 500 Viet Minh Communists or their supporters in Laos, and that they would shortly be eliminated by the Laotian forces. Therefore the Viet Minh war was now a Vietnamese civil war, which was not particularly interesting to Laos. The Vietnamese could fight this out in Viet Nam. The Laotians do not care for the Vietnamese. On the other hand, the Laotians are certainly not friendly to the Viet Minh.

Now this attack has been launched on Laos—open aggression on a country which has not been interested in the Viet Minh movement and has not fought actively against the Viet Minh except in guarding its own frontiers. Laos looks very much as if it is going to be overrun, and that is an extremely unhappy situation for the future. With that as a *fait accompli*, there are two or three things that could happen. One of them is that a peace offensive may probably be launched by Ho Chi Minh on the basis of the fact that he holds Laos and has very important forces in Viet Nam, more particularly in the Delta area in Tonkin.

If that peace offensive is launched, as I think it very likely will be, he has all the cards, and our peace *defensive* has no very sound foundation. Just what is going to happen I am unable to predict. But certainly we have read that the Viet Minh have the intention of trying to get all the Thai people together and of forming an independent Thai State under Communist dictation. That would be a great misfortune, and I do not quite know what the result of it would be, because they want to include part of north-eastern Siam and a part of Yunnan, where there are some Thais, and the Laotian area, in a new State which would be absolutely under the dictation of the Communists. We are in no manner of speaking in a position today to dictate the terms of an arbitrated peace, nor, in my opinion, to accept those that would be offered by the Viet Minh.

There are two capitals in Laos. There is the capital where the King and the Crown Prince are in residence, and there is the administrative capital. The first, Luang Prabang, is a pleasant old town up the Mekong River; a sleepy place with a lot of monasteries around and not much of anything else. The other is Vientiane, on the Mekong River further south, with Siam just across the muddy stream. In the latter are the administrative establishments and the Government. Vientiane will probably fall, and it is not easy to foresee the future of Laos, which is a very mountainous country. It is a difficult country to defend and to fight over, but it is a country which is very independent and not Communistically inclined, and it would be a pity to see it go.

In Cambodia, which is south and west of Laos, you have a situation where there are certain elements of Viet Minh and certain elements which are against the French but which are not really Viet Minh. The little King, who is a little King physically, a very pleasant character, is not strong enough to hold Cambodia if Laos falls.

At the present time the Vietnamese army is being increased considerably, and I think quite wisely. It is being increased by Commandos, like the Viet Minh forces highly mobile, who it is hoped will gradually replace the French. The French forces have been putting up a pretty good show, but it is very difficult because of these infiltrations in and around and behind them; and once they "clean up" an area they do not have enough forces, as already mentioned, to leave behind to keep the area clean.

The French have a negotiable capital outlay in Viet Nam of, perhaps, a billion three hundred million dollars. I speak in terms of dollars because I cannot instantly translate it into pounds at the present rate of exchange. In any event, the figures are satisfactory for comparative purposes. It is costing them a billion 250 million dollars a year. There is not any great

financial future in that, and just what will be the outcome one does not know.

There is no doubt that the French have agreed reluctantly to give more and continuing independence and power to the three States, Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam; but at the present time it is questionable whether any of the States is capable of carrying on alone, and for some time the French will have to hold substantial forces there which will gradually be replaced, they hope, by Vietnamese in Viet Nam.

In Cambodia the total force is about 5,000 men, which is not very important. In Laos there are some 8,000 Laotians under Laotian command, independently; and some 8,000 with a mixed French-Laotian command. All three of these countries are very reluctant to see foreign forces in their midst, except French forces. They want support, and the French agree to this. They want monetary support, they want support in arms and munitions, but they do not want foreign forces in the countries, and that goes for American, British or any other.

General Salan was hopeful, until this recent attack on Laos, of being able more or less to clear up the situation within two years. It looks as if that may be doubtful now.

There is no indication at present of any Chinese combatants in action, but there were at one time some ten Chinese battalions inside the north-west part of the Viet Nam province of Tonkin. I have seen them and have flown over them, as an observer and helping to drop supplies on the defenders. Those battalions were small in size, perhaps 300 to 350 men each. They were only partly trained, but they were regular troops.

They were sent there for three reasons. One was to collect opium, because that is an opium-growing country and opium is a product which is easily negotiable and can be used to defray the cost of the troops. The second reason was to show a certain regiment, the 319th, a Viet Minh regiment that had been badly cut to pieces by the Mayo resistance, that the Viet Minh were supported by the Chinese, that there were Chinese battalions behind them, and so to rebuild morale. The third reason may possibly have been to train these battalions on the frontier to knowledge of the country in which they might eventually operate.

These ten battalions were pretty badly mauled by the Mayos. The Mayos were completely surrounded, but they put up a very stout fight. There were about 6,000 Mayos when I went out there, and we pushed out ammunition, equipment, supplies and rice to them. The brother of the Mayo chieftain was on board the aircraft I was in. The Mayo chieftain spoke nothing but Mayo. His brother was a Mayo liaison officer in Hanoi and spoke French, and he translated for me what he was telling his brother in Mayo, on a very high-frequency wavelength which, I was assured, the enemy could not pick up. He told him all the latest news. He told him by remote control that the *Légion d'Honneur* had just been conferred upon him by the French and he had been made honorary Lieutenant of the French Army. That pleased him a lot.

Then over went the supplies, parachuted down. When doing a tight circle in pretty hot weather at no great altitude, to push 150-lb. sacks of equipment out of the open door of a Dakota is a fairly tough job, because

in the tight circle the 150 lb. gets up to about 300 lb. on account of the centrifugal action. Then we pushed out the rice. The Mayos had a landing strip on which this equipment was parachuted, and when the signal was given that the rice was coming down you could see them scattering away like ants, because the rice comes down free and hard, and the sacks weigh about 100 kilos, or about 220 lb. The rice is in a burlap container which is tied into a much larger one. The inner container bursts on hitting the ground, but the outer container holds the rice. When it hits the ground it hits it with a big thump, and the Mayos get well away from it.

Now as to certain personalities. General Salan, the French Commander-in-Chief, is very well known to me. He is, I think, a very capable officer. He is under fire today, so I notice in the papers, from several sources for his defensive arrangements: for his isolated outposts, which are surrounded and render no very good purpose in the present fight. Yet, as I have mentioned, Na Sam with its landing strip controls the areas leading into the Thai country, and if it were given up it would be a death blow to Franco-Thai co-operation, and would have a very bad effect on the prestige of the French and allied forces.

The objective of the Viet Minh attack on Laos is partly surprise, partly for psychological purposes, to offset their failure to conquer and hold the delta, and partly to establish an independent Thai country under Communist dictation—the Thais of northern Tonkin, Laos, certain Thais, although there are not so many, of Cambodia, and Thais in north-eastern Siam. That would spread to the Shan States of northern Burma and would have a gravely disturbing effect all through south-east Asia.

The primary objective, I suspect, is the peace offensive, putting us on a peace defensive, when Ho Chi Minh comes out and stands on the *status quo* and says, "Here I am. We will have peace. Who controls this country?" It would be a very awkward thing for us to counter.

In many cases the Communist political commissars come along and say to the peasant people, "Well, you like the moneylender? You like the big landlord? No! All right, then you are a Communist at heart, like us, so come and join us and we will get rid of all these fellows." We have not at the present time a ready answer, to give them a definition of what we offer. When I say "we," I mean the French particularly and the allied Powers who are interested in this situation. I personally am convinced that if South-east Asia goes, it will be a major disaster, and it will spread rapidly over Siam—certainly northern Siam—Burma, and probably Malaya, though not so quickly in Malaya. Once the area has gone, it is going to be very difficult to recover what we have lost, in any sense. From there I think it will spread further to the west, go through the Near East and into North Africa—and that would not be good medicine for the Western Powers.

Certainly it is costing the French a great deal. It is costing them the equivalent of the graduates passed out by St. Cyr in officers alone, killed and missing and very gravely wounded, who cannot, at any rate, be returned to action. It is costing them a great deal in money. America is spending a large amount of money, over 35 per cent. of the total, and this

financial participation is increasing, but that does not reduce what the French are actually spending.

There is a good deal of opposition in France itself to continuing this sacrifice. There is elsewhere an opposition to enlarging the scope of the wars in which America and the British are engaged. It would be most unwise for America to suggest sending infantry or other ground forces into Indo-China. This is not desired by the French; it is not desired by the Vietnamese, by the Laotians or the Cambodians. What they want is more equipment, and we are speeding up the equipment very rapidly. The Americans have a mission out there which delivers this equipment and teaches the Vietnamese and the other associated nations how to handle it.

The future is not quite clear and it is not too bright. It has changed materially through the attack on Laos, which, according to a statement by General Salan, was not intended originally by the Viet Minh. Who pushed them into this attack? The Chinese. Who pushed the Chinese? Possibly it was the Russians, or if the Russians did not push the Chinese into it, the Russians at least did not stop the Chinese and tell them: "Do not do this now. We are on a different basis since Stalin died." It leaves one to imagine that perhaps there is no great sincerity in the manifestations of a desire for a rapprochement on the part of the Russians towards the Western Powers. In my personal opinion it is a stalling. I do not think it is a good sign to see what is happening to a country which has no desire to be Communist. There were extremely few Communists in Laos, save for some defectors who had fled the country and had been declared outlaws; yet the country has been chosen for an aggressive attack by large forces of Viet Minh, suddenly, without warning, through the jungle.

I will give you briefly a slight description of the Chiefs of State. In Viet Nam the Chief of State is His Majesty Bao Dai. His Majesty Bao Dai was the legitimate inheritor of the Emperor of Annam. During the Japanese occupation the Japanese tried to make him a collaborator. He has sometimes been called a collaborator, but he was a very reluctant one and not one who was at all active. When Ho Chi Minh started his resistance against the Japanese, Bao Dai joined in, after the defeat and expulsion of the Japanese, with the so-called Liberation Government, until it became evident that the Liberation Government was swinging over to the Communist side; then Bao Dai withdrew to Hong Kong and stayed there for some while. He was brought back by the French and established as Chief of State of Viet Nam.

I know the Emperor quite well. He does not call himself the Emperor now, but the people do in an honorific way. He calls himself "His Majesty." He is not a playboy in the sense that Farouk was, and still is, a playboy. Bao Dai plays heartily, both indoors and out, but he also has some strength of character that expresses itself occasionally, and he could possibly do a good deal more. I have sometimes described his attitude as that of a feudal knight who has put on his spurs but has not yet got on his horse. He desires to be the Commander-in-Chief. He does not want the French to move out until the Vietnamese army has been created on a much larger scale. He is a very expensive luxury, and in addition to drawing about one-sixth of the total revenue of the State he receives a con-

siderable amount of money from the Chinese gambling concession in Cholon, which makes it difficult for him to step out wholeheartedly and try to crush the graft which is current among the high officials of Viet Nam.

The King of Cambodia is a pleasant little man. He is quite a good horseman. He has shown some character recently. He overthrew the Government because the Government was leaning towards getting rid of the King. He has a comparatively small army, and he has certain problems in those who are not Communist but who are independents, whatever that may mean. It means primarily that they are armed brigands, but they support the idea of independence. There are protests on all sides, in all three countries, at the slowness of the French in giving them complete freedom and liberty.

I think the French have been slow, in some ways, but I also think that full liberties should be spread rather thinly until people are capable of using them wisely. If they are given complete and full liberty, they will then go on exploiting themselves, as they always have done, and the exploits will not be benevolent on the part of those who are a little cleverer than the average run of peasant.

I have already mentioned the King of Laos. The general inter-relation of the three countries is one of slight mistrust, and they do not particularly love each other. There is some fear that the two countries on the west of Indo-China—Laos and Cambodia—may be taken into an area in which Siam would be the principal market; and that certainly would have a very serious effect on lower Viet Nam. The port of Saigon is largely dependent on trade, and a good deal of its trade comes down river. If the western Indo-Chinese orient themselves towards the west, it will leave the Vietnamese rather isolated and with a good deal of difficulty in maintaining themselves.

Viet Nam is no more an entity than any other quarrelling group of people who are selfishly inclined and who distrust each other. That makes it somewhat difficult to establish national government in a short time. They always want to go too fast.

One of the ultimate objectives of the Vietnamese—and I think the French are now largely in agreement—is to establish their own army. They are going to need a great deal of help, but they want their own army. A cadre of officers is not created overnight, and while junior officers have been turned out at a fairly rapid rate, it takes longer to form senior officers, obviously, and to formulate units.

The Vietnamese, when well led, fight quite well if they know what they are fighting for, but the fighting is very complicated. There is fighting in the rice fields and the jungles; they are fighting people about whom they are uncertain as to whether they are their enemy or not and who are frequently quite treacherous. That has certainly been the experience of the French.

As to the general constitution of the army, perhaps some 40 per cent. of the 225,000 are French combatants, and the rest include Senegalese, various other North Africans and the Foreign Legion. There are some Vietnamese under their own command, principally of company rank—a

battalion is generally the unit, and it rarely goes up much higher than that; but the Vietnamese do not yet possess the senior officers. The Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese army, General Hinh, was a Lieutenant-Colonel when I first went out there more than a year ago. He was a good aviator. He had been trained by the French, had a French brevet, and quite a number of decorations for war service, including a good American decoration for active service. However, he had never had any experience as Chief of Staff. There was no Staff of which to be chief, nobody to advise him except the French, and he did not want French advice, and so for quite a while he commanded two men. Those were his two orderlies. He is a likeable officer, very pleasant indeed, but to create a Staff overnight that is effective is, obviously, a task which is not simple.

The only numerically substantial native army in that whole area is the Vietnamese. The others are small. They are jungle fighters, but they lack equipment and they lack trained officers. For the Viet Minh to be ejected by the Vietnamese army alone is something that I do not quite foresee for some years to come.

The French felt that within the next two years they could make a very good start at throwing the Viet Minh back on their haunches and driving them into the mountains, but since this new manifestation towards Laos, which was apparently unexpected, even by the French intelligence up to a few days before it was launched, there is some question as to just what the future will bring.

If there are any questions that anyone may care to ask, I shall be pleased to do my best to reply to them.

The CHAIRMAN: Colonel Hall has very kindly said that he will answer any questions, and we should also welcome any comments from anybody in the audience.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: There is one question that I should like to ask. Could not this campaign be carried on by the French at a considerably cheaper rate if they made greater use of air power? I realize that it is a very jungly country and that the present landing grounds are very bad, but one knows what can be done with determination in the way of making airfields, and it seems that the terrific expense with which France is being faced could be very much reduced if she had a larger and stronger air force.

Colonel HALL: Being an aviator myself, I am naturally prejudiced in favour of the use of aircraft. The country is very difficult in view of the fact that it is covered with jungle, and the jungly paths are used for infiltration. People come at night in the rice fields and it is difficult to tell whether you are bombing your friends or your enemies, because those who seem to be working in the rice fields in the daytime as your friends may turn out to be not your friends at night.

The French are, I believe, making as much use of aviation as they can under the circumstances. We are supplying them with a substantial amount of equipment. The circumstances involve two things. One, of course, is the weather; there is a rainy season out there in which it is very difficult to operate. The other is the jungly cover over the mountainous

area, or a large part of it, and the rice fields in the Delta. The bombing of rice fields is not very effective. The roads are kept pretty well free in the daytime, but at night it is difficult. There is, fortunately, no enemy aviation at all, though there is plenty of enemy anti-aircraft. Therefore, high-speed equipment is unnecessary. There is only one airfield which could take modern jet aircraft, and it is no simple matter to construct airfields in that country. It is difficult to maintain them in a country where it rains for several months on end, and it is difficult to operate, particularly in the rainy season, over jungles through which people are seething like mice.

There is also the fact that maintenance out there requires a considerable number of men. The French Air Force is being called upon to build up, in France, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They are continually being urged to build that up and to make it stronger, and they have found a great deal of difficulty in doing both things at the same time. I agree that the use of air power could be increased, but it is not the complete answer to that kind of warfare; and although much of the equipment that they have is obsolescent, it is quite excellent for the purpose in view of the fact that there is no enemy air opposition.

General GRACEY: I hope that this excellent address today has told those who were doubtful about it what a magnificent job of work the French are doing in this almost impossible situation. There is an awful lot of criticism of the French out there which is absolutely unfounded. I went out there after the war and saw the French after they had been through a most uncomfortable time with the Japanese—again, placed in an impossible situation by the fact that they were never helped by the Allies at a time when they needed every possible help; and they could not possibly hold off the Japanese. They did the next best thing, and their resistance movement was excellent.

I was interested in what Colonel Hall said about Ho Chi Minh's resistance movement, because I am quite certain that it was leading up to such a result all the time and that anything he did was for himself and his party alone and not for the good of French Indo-China as a whole.

I was welcomed on arrival by the Viet Minh, who said "Welcome" and all that sort of thing. It was a very unpleasant situation, and I promptly kicked them out. They are obviously Communists, and I think, as does Colonel Hall, that it is a very dangerous situation and that unless we do everything in our power with all the determination we possibly can, the only hope for the independence of Indo-China is under Ho Chi Minh. Otherwise I think that the French and the Vietnamese are at a very great disadvantage.

When I was out there two years ago there was one question that the Vietnamese asked me. I think that that was the reason why the French asked me out there, so that I could give the answer. This is what they said: "The French say that they cannot nationalize or give us an army under fifteen or twenty years—without French assistance. How is it, first of all, that the Pakistan army has been able to be reorganized in three years? And, secondly, how is it that the Viet Minh forces are able to find their officers? After all, they have not been going at it very much longer

than we have." The first part was easy to answer. I merely pointed out that we had been nationalizing the Indian Army, of which the Pakistan army was only an offshoot, for thirty years. That was an easy one to answer, but the question of Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh officers was a very difficult one to answer. The only answer I could give to that was that if the Viet Minh had had decent officers, they would have had possession of French Indo-China long ago.

I was very impressed by the Viet Nam rank and file. The French were training them properly, for Viet Nam and not for France. Before the war it was all for France, but now it was for Viet Nam. There was a good spirit and they were tough chaps, but their officers were deplorable and of the wrong type. They are very young and, like so many of these people, the moment they put anything on their shoulders they are apt to get the wrong impression. If a lieutenant put on a general's uniform, he thought he was a general and had to be told that he was still a lieutenant. They were impossible. I hope that anybody who goes out there and who is ever asked about this by the Vietnamese will stress that, no matter how good the rank and file, if the officers are not up to the mark, the rank and file will be destroyed and a lot of valuable lives will be wasted. The solution, I think, is that if it is to be kept an anti-Communist country, we must give them all the assistance we can and we must keep them going until the Government have a good, strong army. If the army has the right spirit, it has a chance. If it does not have the right spirit, it does not have a hope. (*Applause.*)

Colonel HALL: I came over from Paris a few days ago having talked with the representative of Viet Nam in France. He went into a long dissertation about certain things, one of which was that they must have a Vietnamese army as quickly as possible. I said: "But the French have shown every indication recently that they desire the creation of a Vietnamese army as quickly as possible in order to relieve the French forces, and they are doing their utmost, but you do not train officers overnight." He replied: "Now, for instance, we send cadet-officers to France to be trained and they do it in a leisurely fashion, and it takes three years before they come back as second lieutenants, but we need them in a hurry." I said: "After all, I do not know that the French are yet prepared to set up in France a training course for officers which will operate with your officer material much faster than it operates with their own." There is some question on that score. The officer material, I agree, is poor, and I think there is something that affects the Vietnamese when he becomes an officer. Some of them are good, but they are few and far between. The French are certainly, to my mind, doing all that they can now to train the Vietnamese, and we are helping them with equipment and material.

Neither the French nor the associated Powers want any foreign ground forces, and nor do the Vietnamese want foreign instructors in Viet Nam training their officers. What they want to do is to send them to America, to England or to France or to Korea for accelerated, rapid training. There is some complication in that. I doubt very much whether the United Nations Powers in Korea are going to welcome a large staff of untrained Vietnamese who are about to be made into officers; but that is one way of

doing it. On the other hand, I think that probably the United States would welcome a reasonable number sent over there. My belief is that the French would not object to that in reasonable numbers, but they do not want any American interference in their command, and I am not sure that I blame them. On the question of the Vietnamese army, they have behaved very well sometimes, even up to battalion strength, in actions which were difficult, when well commanded; but in all cases they were commanded by the French at and above battalion strength.

The training of officers is one of the major problems—there is no question about that. I think they are wise in that their fifty-four new battalions which are to be formed are to be of the Commando type, because the warfare is to a very large extent guerilla warfare and is not identical to the Korean war, where there is a definite front and trenches and that sort of thing. In Indo-China it is pretty mobile. To my mind, however, it will be quite a long time before the Vietnamese army will be able to handle that kind of situation by itself.

Colonel CLIVE GARSIA: I should like to ask Colonel Hall two questions. The first is very simple. I wonder whether he would point out on the map what portion of central Viet Nam is occupied by Viet Minh?

Colonel HALL: It is mostly along the coast (*indicating positions on map*). I have come down as an observer on a corvette from Haiphong harbour to a little island off the coast in this neighbourhood. There they had a small school for Commandos under a French officer and some Vietnamese non-commissioned officers, all Catholics, because this area here has a Catholic population. It is occupied by the Viet Minh, but these lads would go ashore and stir up the villages against the Viet Minh on the grounds that the Viet Minh are anti-Catholic, and they had some success in that way. They blow up railways and do quite a lot of damage.

But there is no fixed area. At Natrang there is a naval academy for the Vietnamese and an air academy. They are training some Vietnamese pilots with French instructors. So far, of course, they have not got much beyond Moranes, which are little observation planes—that is about all the progress they have made. Dalat is quite free, and you can get up there in convoy by road from Saigon. Bao Dai has a big villa there and goes there quite frequently, and all this area is free. Vinh is occupied by the Viet Minh, and they control a road that runs over towards the west. Most of the forces are in the area of the Red River delta, and there are some others scattered around; but the principal Viet Minh forces are right along near the coast, but not in all cases on the coast.

Colonel CLIVE GARSIA: My second question concerns rice. I understood Colonel Hall to say that there is a danger of the Viet Minh overrunning northern Thailand and northern Burma, if not the whole of both countries. I have seen it stated elsewhere that the French may be unable to continue to hold the Red River valley. If the worst happened would it not make virtually insoluble the problem of providing India, Malaya and Japan with rice in the quantities vital to their existence?

Colonel HALL: It would make it very much more difficult. On the other hand, the Viet Minh would want to export their rice and would probably make favourable terms if they got some kind of recognition. I

am not very confident of the resistance of some of these countries towards the blandishments of successful Communists. Where they trade is a matter of concern. The Viet Minh are getting out substantial amounts of rice at present from the Red River delta, but they do not control the whole of it by any means. They could perhaps go over into Thailand—the north-eastern area—where there are 45,000 Vietnamese refugees, of whom at least 25 per cent. are Communists and supporters of Ho Chi Minh. So it is all a very complex business.

I would hardly think that the effect on the supplies of rice for India, Ceylon and Japan would be more than temporary, because the Viet Minh would want to export their surplus rice to any paying market.

A GUEST: Colonel Hall has talked about the Thai country, the newspapers have several times referred to the Thai country, and Siam calls itself Thailand. How does one distinguish between the two? As regards the Vietnamese inability to produce officers, perhaps they have not realized that officers have to be bred, like the British. Officers are born, and not made.

Colonel HALL: The Vietnamese intellectuals are essentially pretty self-confident—non-combatant and self-confident. They do not see any reason why they should not become generals. General Hinh, I think, is a good officer, but he certainly is not yet an experienced Chief of Staff. There are others who made a fairly good impression on me, but they are not very many. I have some question in my mind as to whether the average Vietnamese soldier, like the average American negro soldier, will obey and follow his Vietnamese officers to the death. The negro soldier would prefer to follow white officers rather than those of his own colour.

As to the Thai affair: "Thai" is a generic term, a racial term. The Thai country here is in north-west Tonkin and it runs from Lai Chau southwards from the frontier. Lai Chau is the centre and headquarters of the Thai country, and that is in the white Thai country. This sounds rather like an invitation to dinner, for there are white Thais, black Thais and red Thais, but Lai Chau is the centre.

There are some Thais in Southern Yunnan, and there are Thais in the Shan States. There are Thais in Siam, of course, which now is called Thailand. That is based on the fact that the bulk of the population in the north are Thais. They are more particularly in the area contiguous with the Shan States and with north-west Tonkin and southern Yunnan, which would make it possible to form a so-called legendary independent Thai nation, which would be an awkward thing in that particular spot. I think the Thais in southern Thailand are fairly spattered around and mixed up with a lot of others.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, I am afraid our time is up. I should like on your behalf to thank Colonel Hall very much for coming here and giving us this very interesting talk. The chief impression that I carry away from it is so well expressed by General Gracey: it is the very difficult task that the French have, and how much they need all the help that we can give them. I will now ask you to express in the usual fashion your appreciation of Colonel Hall's coming here.

The vote of thanks was carried with acclamation.

CHURCHILL OF LEBANON

By N. N. LEWIS

HIGH on a terraced valley-side in Central Lebanon, some fifteen miles from Beirut, stands the ruin of a handsome house. In the courtyard two magnolia trees flower brightly despite their hundred years. To find the place you need only ask the inhabitants of the village, called Bhouara, for "Churchill's house," and they will be glad to show you the way, asking if you are English, and whether you realize that the builder of the house came from the same family as our present Prime Minister.

If you interest yourself in the matter you will find that the house was built by a certain Colonel Charles Henry Churchill, who lived here from 1841 until his death in 1869. You will find that he certainly claimed to be "of the house of Marlborough," and that the claim was repeated on his tombstone and elsewhere. He called his son, by a Syrian wife, Arthur Richard Winston Wellesley. In Beirut you may meet members of Lebanon's princely family, the Shehabs, and find that some of them are "Churchill-Shehabs," proud of their descent from one of Churchill's daughters. Until his death two years ago you might have met an old gentleman of the family who is said to have gloried in his resemblance to Sir Winston Churchill, and you may hear of one old lady, daughter of Colonel Churchill's son, who is the last to bear the Churchill name in Lebanon.

I live not far away from Churchill's village, Bhouara, and was very interested when, going through some of the nineteenth-century papers in the British Consulate in Beirut, I found a good deal of material about him. A picture of the man began to grow in my mind as I read the letters and reports, and I set out to unravel his story. It was easy to find out about his life in Lebanon, but what I was particularly anxious to know was whether his claim to a Marlborough connection was true, and if so, just what the relationship was. This proved difficult, reference to the Society of Genealogists and other authorities failing to provide the essential information; and the key was at last found by accident in Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff's *Rambling Recollections* (Vol. II, pp. 44-46). I am most grateful to Mr. A. H. Hourani for having brought the passage to my notice. It now became possible to trace Churchill's descent, and a fascinating story emerged.

The story begins with General Charles Churchill (1654-1714), the brother of the first Duke of Marlborough. He had no legitimate issue, but had a natural son, Charles (No. II of the line). This Charles either married or lived with Anne or Nance Oldfield (1683-1730), an actress. Her

father had been a guardsman who put her with a seamstress, but she wasted her working time reading plays. Eventually Vanbrugh took her up, and she reached the stage of Drury Lane. Both beautiful and gifted, she became the most famous actress of her time, and her body was buried beneath the monument to Congreve in Westminster Abbey. An application by Churchill, her lover, to erect a monument to her in the Abbey was, however, turned down by the Dean! She and Churchill had a son, Charles (III), who, in his turn, married an extraordinarily interesting lady—Anne Maria, the illegitimate daughter of Sir Robert Walpole by Manid Skerrett, the Irish beauty who bore him two such daughters before he privately and bigamously married her. For Maria he was successful in obtaining a patent of precedence as an earl's daughter (he being Earl of Orford), which raised a tremendous outcry. The son of Charles and Maria was also called Charles (IV) and was, unlike his father and grandfather, legitimate, and with him the line becomes less glamorous. He maintained the family tradition by joining the army (he was a Captain, his grandfather having been a General and his father a Colonel) and by calling his son Charles (V), but was original in adding Henry as a second name. Charles Henry (1772-1811) was the only one of the line not in the army. He followed a respectable but undistinguished career in the service of the Honourable East India Company in Madras Province. There, in 1806, he married Sophia Purchas, and a year later their son, Charles Henry (VI), the subject of our story, was born.

Charles Henry returned to the family tradition and became a soldier. We find him first in the 60th Rifles, a crack regiment, and in 1827-28 he served in Portugal. After a short period in the 79th Regiment he joined the Anglo-Spanish Legion under General Evans and again saw service in the Peninsula (1835-36) during the Carlist War. His adventurous nature was plain, and his liking for irregular service found another outlet when, in 1840, he was seconded to the British Expeditionary Force to Syria.

Here it is that our story properly begins, and it is probably appropriate to sketch the background of affairs in Syria. For three centuries the country had formed part of the Ottoman Empire, but in 1831 it had been wrested from the control of Constantinople by Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt. Mohammed Ali and Ibrahim hoped to retain Syria and to make it part of an "empire" dependent on Egypt. The Sultan of Turkey was naturally determined to thwart this scheme to partition his empire, and he was supported by Lord Palmerston, who wished to maintain the unity and integrity of the Turkish Empire. Palmerston believed that "it would not do to let Mohammed Ali declare his independence, and separate Egypt and Syria from the Turkish Empire. That would result in a conflict between him and the Sultan, the Turks would be defeated, the Russians would fly to their aid, and a Russian garrison occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles, which once in their possession they would never quit," whilst Mohammed Ali's provinces might fall under the dominance of France. Instead of a neutral Turkish Empire there would be "two separate and independent States, whereof one would be a dependency of France and the other a satellite of Russia."

When, therefore, in 1839-40, matters moved to a crisis, the Turkish and Egyptian armies clashed, and Palmerston's fears seemed to be on the verge of fulfilment, he determined to assist the Sultan in driving back Mohammed Ali's armies to Egypt. The other powers, with the exception of France, were persuaded to co-operate, and a fleet and an expeditionary force were sent to Syria. France was disposed to dispute the issue, but Palmerston, believing rightly that France would not support Mohammed Ali to the extent of risking a European war, forced his policy through, instructing his Ambassador in Paris to "tell M. Thiers that if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up; and that if she begins a war, she will to a certainty lose all her ships, colonies and commerce before she sees the end of it; that her army in Algeria will cease to give her anxiety, and that Mohammed Ali will just be chucked into the Nile."

The task of the Turkish and allied naval and land forces in Syria was to force the evacuation of the country by Ibrahim Pasha. A general rebellion of the Lebanese peasantry against the Egyptians was encouraged, and arms were distributed to the Druze and Maronite mountaineers. One by one the coastal towns were shelled by the fleet and taken. Under cover of a diversionary bombardment of Beirut, Commodore Napier landed just to the north, at Jounie, with British marines and Turkish and a few Austrian troops. Supported by Lebanese irregulars he joined battle with Ibrahim Pasha near the village of Qornet Shahwān (which appears in the accounts of the time as Cornichovahn, Ornagacuan, Kornetsherouan and Ornachajuen!), and such was the dash with which he attacked (he was to be seen at one moment driving on some of his less enthusiastic allies with the flat of his sword), and so hopeless the general situation for Ibrahim, that the latter withdrew to the interior. In succeeding months he pulled in his forces to Damascus, and then, under orders from his father, withdrew through "Transjordan" and Palestine to Gaza, whence his troops returned by land or by sea to Egypt. Peace was made and Syria reverted to the Sultan's government.

Churchill missed the excitement of the earlier fighting, arriving in Beirut on December 12, 1840, but was presumably employed in the Palestinian phase of the operations. Then, in 1841, we find him with the rank of Assistant Adjutant-General in Damascus, but before the year was out he had left the army to serve for a few months as Vice-Consul. His Syrian career had started, and it is probable that he decided to stay in the country when, also in 1841, he married Merché Sarkis, a Damascene girl, perhaps an Armenian, later described by one of his friends as "a dancing girl." If one can perhaps detect a hereditary influence here, it seems to be more in evidence as his few eventful months in Damascus go by.

He quickly became embroiled with Najib Pasha, the Turkish governor of the city, reporting that he was corrupt and his government rotten. The restoration of the Sultan's government, Churchill wrote in a typical despatch (No. 2 of May 31, 1841, to Consul-General Rose, at Beirut), had given rise to universal dissatisfaction. Fiscal oppression was greater than it had ever been under the Egyptians, and bribery, corruption, intimidation and intolerance were rife. The government of the city symbolized

the triumph of Moslem reaction—if, for example, a Christian wanted to appear before the Council or the Pasha he had to wear a black turban, a humiliation which had been abolished by Ibrahim Pasha.

It may have been because Churchill was such a vigorous critic that Najib Pasha stirred up opposition to him in Damascus, accusing him of misbehaviour with a Moslem woman and of secret intrigue with Druze and other notables of the region. Churchill had to face a court of enquiry, but maintained that the charges were trumped up against him, and indeed they were never substantiated and eventually he was cleared. One cannot help feeling, however, that here was a case of “where there’s smoke there’s fire,” and soon afterwards Churchill quit official service and Damascus and went to live as a country gentleman in Lebanon.

His basic income was the interest on £10,000 in Consols left him by an uncle, Colonel Purchas. He was to add to this in numerous ways. He chose an excellent place to live: Bhouara is some fifteen miles from Beirut, and just off the Beirut-Damascus road, and is therefore well situated for the kind of trading ventures in which Churchill indulged. It lies in a fertile, well-watered valley, 2,000 feet above the sea, and enjoys a delightful climate—some of the neighbouring villages are famous summer resorts today. He bought land here, terraced, irrigated and cultivated it. He built his house at the head of a flight of steps in the steep valley side, overlooking the terraced orchards and vegetable plots of the lower slopes. Below them, barely seen from the house, the stream dashes through a gorge and under a bridge which he built. Not far above is the main ridge of Lebanon, white with snow in winter; whilst in the other direction the eye travels down the valley to the sub-tropical lowland of the Mediterranean shore. All about are Druze and Maronite villages.

Presumably this was a profitable holding, but he made money in other ways: speculating in real estate, for example, buying and selling raw silk, and advancing money on silk crops. In 1851 he “purchased twelve mules to merchandise between Beirut and Damascus.” At another time he sent mares for sale in Cairo. He was always quick to invoke consular assistance—in collecting debts, for example, or in securing an order from the government exempting his muleteers and mules from tolls and forced labour.

He was evidently able, from the proceeds of these various activities, to maintain some not inconsiderable pretensions, employing a number of servants, a secretary and an agent. For some time, till 1848, he travelled about preceded by a liveried servant carrying a silver-headed staff, like those carried by cavasses in front of consuls and ecclesiastical dignitaries. Colonel Rose, the British Consul-General, therefore wrote to him: “The Capitulations grant the privileges of kawasses to Ambassadors and Consuls and no one else; they are nothing but guards in fact. In employing therefore kawasses you infringe, my dear Churchill, the Capitulations. . . . As regards the sticks themselves I think them a bore and only use them when I am obliged. I always feel more or less, when under their influence, like a beadle going to a vestry meeting!”

Churchill took offence at this, and evidently refused to give up his little show. Rose wrote again, more sharply and officially, and eventually

Churchill gave way, though evidently with a bad grace, for on August 13, 1848, Rose wrote in his stiffest way :

“ SIR,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter containing an explanation of the matter which has lately formed the subject of correspondence between yourself and Her Majesty's Consular Authorities, and I have the satisfaction to tell you in reply to your letter that its contents enable me to state to you that I consider the matter to which it relates as settled.

I have, etc.”

Churchill, with his pretensions, love of intrigue, ill-controlled temper and imperious manner, was a problem to both British and Turkish authorities. He took offence easily, and the consular archives are full of complaints from him about Turkish officials, or debts, damages or slights to him. He is always righteously indignant, always convinced that he himself is as reasonable as can be. . . . In 1850, for example, he was in trouble for building in Beirut without a licence. He reports some official's remarks, commenting “ what a monstrous absurdity, and what a monstrous lie! . . . I endeavoured . . . to get on, by civility and concession, and pocketed the humbug about not building nearer than twenty yards from the wall, with the best grace imaginable.” At another time he even demanded to see the consular correspondence about him which had recently passed between Beirut and Damascus, “ on the mere supposition that it contains matter disparaging to yourself,” as Rose remarked.

Sometimes he was involved in more serious trouble. In 1857 he suspected that one of his connections by marriage, recently deceased, had been poisoned, and he caused a lot of trouble by agitating for an enquiry and post-mortem. Soon after, in a dispute about property, Churchill led an armed attack on the other party in the quarrel. This time he had gone too far : he was in court for causing a “ fight or riot ” and lost his claim to the land into the bargain.

With all this, he was clearly a strong personality and became a man of consequence in Lebanon. He became friendly with Christian and Druze notables of the mountains, and interested himself deeply in their affairs. He was particularly intimate with members of the Shehab family, the clan which had provided the “ Emirs of the Lebanon ” since 1700, and whose greatest man, Emir Beshir II, had recently died after ruling the country for forty years. In 1856 Churchill married one of his daughters, Joanna, to Emir Abdullah Shehab, and after his death Gulnare, his second daughter, married Emir Selim Shehab (1872). Such mixed marriages were, of course, rare, but more unusual than the marriages of his daughters to Christian Emirs were Churchill's relations with their enemies, the Druze sheikhs, for he is said to have been their “ confidential adviser and military counsellor ”!

In the years between 1840 and 1860 tension developed and increased between the Maronite Christians and the Druzes, and the two groups clashed several times in civil war. In the period immediately preceding

1860 the Maronites were said to be planning the final destruction of Druze political and military power. Like many Englishmen, Churchill was attracted by the colourful, warlike Druzes, and interested in their strange, "secret" religion. He seems to have supported their cause against the Maronites during the early stages of the culminating struggle in 1860.

According to an American missionary of the time, Dr. H. H. Jessup,* it was actually Churchill who planned the successful Druze attack on Zahle, one of the chief Christian strongholds. This may not have been true—one can well imagine such a story growing up about a man of Churchill's type—and it is in any case certain that Churchill soon ceased to support the Druzes. When they turned to unrestrained and barbaric massacre of Christians, he joined other Europeans in efforts to stop the slaughter and in urging the punishment of the guilty.

Churchill immediately settled down to write an account of the events of 1860, and his book appeared two years later. It is excitedly written, but is a gripping and well-informed account. He lays much of the blame for what happened squarely at the door of the Turkish authorities for not only conniving at but assisting in the massacre of the Christians. He is disgusted because the punishment of the Druzes was very light, and because the European powers had been (in his view) so easily outwitted by the Turks when they attempted to intervene. The final passage of the book is typical of his "grand manner."

"Christian emperors and kings! How long will you continue to desecrate the sacred cause you so ostentatiously pretend to espouse, and to bring contumely, reproach and disaster on the Christians of the East, by your spurious protection, your baneful jealousies, your selfish intrigues, and your blundering ambitions? How long will you tarnish your crowns, sully your sceptres, and put the name of Christ to open shame, by submitting to be led captives of the Turks?"†

This book supplemented three massive volumes which appeared in 1853, called *Mount Lebanon*, a description and a history of the country. Whilst a great deal of his material was taken from the *History* of Emir Haidar, one of his Shehab connections—Churchill's Arabic would seem to have been very good—and whilst the quality of the book would not be highly rated by a scientific historian, it forms a fascinating and valuable source of information on the history of Lebanon and its people.

Churchill died in 1867, leaving children by a first marriage in England as well as those by his second wife. He apparently died intestate, and his inheritance was disputed. We owe some of our information about him to the subsequent legal proceedings. In the end, the income from his uncle's legacy was divided between the children of the second marriage. He was buried in Beirut, where a headstone still stands amongst others of his generation, but his own favourite memorial would be the inscription on the bridge he built at Bhouara. This is carved on a marble slab, a four-

* Dr. H. H. Jessup, *Fifty-three Years in Syria*, p. 174, New York, 1910.

† *The Druzes and the Maronites under Turkish Rule*, p. 283, London, 1862.

line poem in Arabic, generally believed to be the work of Yazidji, a well-known Syrian poet of the nineteenth century :

“ Churchill Bēk built this bridge
So that people might cross safely.
When he bought this area it was a wilderness,
And he made of it a paradise.
He was a nobleman of noble line,
Relative of a great English General :
And his name was Marlborough.”

THE PROJECT FOR A BRITISH UNIVERSITY IN PALESTINE

By DR. A. L. TIBAWI

ONE of the most remarkable omissions in the voluminous and bewildering mass of literature on Palestine under the British mandate is the scant attention paid to the subject of education. Interest in the political and economic sides of the problem of the country during the mandatory period seems to have almost completely submerged interest in the cultural side. As a member of the mandatory Department of Education who suddenly found himself, on the termination of the mandate, with some time for review and reflection, I have recently been writing a history of education in Palestine from Allenby's capture of Jerusalem in 1917 to Sir Alan Cunningham's departure in 1948. One of the obscure and little-known aspects of that history is the attempt to set up a British university, and the purpose of this paper is to publish, for the first time so far as I am aware, a summary of the ramifications of that attempt.

It is often forgotten that English schools, which started to function in the late eighteen-forties in Palestine, were thriving during the second half of the nineteenth century under the auspices of the Anglican Bishop, the Church Missionary Society, and the Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews. Other British cultural activities, notably the Palestine Exploration Fund, are more well known, especially in learned circles. When, therefore, Great Britain became the mandatory for Palestine after the first World War, she did not come to an indifferent land. British ecclesiastical, educational, and archæological interests were already well established in the country, to say nothing about other interests.

During the early years of the mandate British enthusiasm for the welfare of the Holy Land was perhaps at its highest. It was natural that the minds of thoughtful residents and administrators should turn to the subject of education and culture. Under British tutelage an Arab educational system was being built up; with less official supervision a Hebrew system was steadily developing; the English schools were reaping the harvest of generations of patient work; other foreign schools were no less prosperous. The scene was clearly set for an institute of higher studies or a university.

Accordingly in 1922 a committee of senior British officials and prominent educationists, Muslims, Christians, and Jews, met under the chairmanship of Sir Ronald Storrs, then Governor of Jerusalem, and considered a proposal to establish a British university in that city which would serve as an educational apex to the various school systems in Palestine and possibly other neighbouring countries. There is no evidence to indicate what was the Palestine Arab reaction to the proposal, but according to Dr. Klausner, who was named as one of the Jewish professors at the proposed university, the Zionist Executive immediately informed the chairman of the committee that the Jews would not participate in the project because in their

opinion it "constituted a threat to Hebrew culture in Palestine" and because "it meant competition for the projected Hebrew University."*

While Palestine was still under Turkish rule, a dispatch dated March 15, 1914, from the British Consulate in Jerusalem contained the information that a site had been purchased in Jerusalem for a Jewish university which was to be under British protection and affiliated to one of the British universities.† This is not the place to discuss the history of the Hebrew University. Suffice it to say that its foundation stone was laid in 1918 and it was formally opened by Lord Balfour in 1925. Although situated in a territory under British administration, it was never under any control, still less protection, of any British authority.

The rebuff administered in 1922 to the idea of a British university in Palestine did not spell its final doom, for the idea continued to be cherished in many quarters down to the last days of the mandate. Having failed to secure general agreement on a university for all sections of the population, some of the promoters of the project re-formed in 1923, also under the chairmanship of Sir Ronald Storrs, and created the Palestine Board of Higher Studies "with a view to promoting education of a university standard."‡ Let us observe this subtle change of function without actually abandoning the original aim. The Board was formed by the joint action of the governors of the English schools, the Government Department of Education, the British, American, and French Schools of Archaeology (the only institutions of higher education in the country at the time), and certain individuals, Muslims, Christians, and Jews.

The Board, which for obvious reasons described itself as an unofficial body, was composed of some thirty members with a chairman and a dean. After the departure of Sir Ronald Storrs, the chairman was invariably the holder of the post of the Government Director of Education. The first dean was Dr. Herbert Danby, later Regius Professor of Hebrew at Oxford.

Having failed to make itself responsible for teaching institutions, the Board sought to establish academic standards by holding public examinations, very much like the early days of the University of London. A committee of the Board was accordingly charged with the duty of drawing up a syllabus and holding "a common secondary-school leaving examination," which was called the Palestine Matriculation Examination. The first Palestine matriculation examination was held in July, 1924, for twenty-five candidates of whom only nine passed it.§ Almost immediately the Board scored its first academic success when the American University of Beirut, the institution patronized by most students seeking higher education from Palestine, recognized the Palestine matriculation. In the meantime the Government had recognized the Board, and as from 1926 assigned to it a grant of £500 p.a. (later raised to £1,000, and finally, during the last year of the mandate, to £1,500).

* *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1925-50*. Jerusalem, 1950, pp. 37-8.

† *The British Consulate in Jerusalem*. Edited by A. Haymson. II, p. 583.

‡ Government of Palestine, Department of Education: *Note on Education in Palestine, 1920-29*, p. 5.

§ Government of Palestine, Department of Education: *Annual Report, 1924*, p. 14.

The English schools were the first to prepare students for examinations higher than matriculation. The first Palestine Intermediate Examination was held in July, 1927. Five candidates sat for the examination through the medium of English, the only medium allowed at the time, and two of them passed. In 1936 the Board decided to allow examinations higher than matriculation to be taken through the medium of Arabic or Hebrew as well as English. A final examination taken two years after the intermediate and leading to a diploma, equivalent to a general B.A. or B.Sc., was instituted by the Board. It was held for the first time for one candidate only, presented by the Scots College of Safad, and he satisfied the examiners in science and mathematics. In 1930, three candidates presented by two English schools sat for this examination, and two of them passed it in arts. Except in the subject of Arabic, papers for this examination were set and marked by experienced examiners at the University of Oxford.

The Board's activities during its twenty-five years of life did not go beyond holding public examinations, and thus promoting indirectly higher education at certain secondary schools for a small number of students. Its primary purpose of promoting education of a university standard was served merely by the opening of post-secondary classes, chiefly at some English schools and at two Government schools, whose controlling authorities were the most influential elements in directing the policy of the Board. In other words, the promotion of higher education was restricted largely to certain schools in the "Arab public system." Why, it might be asked, did not the Board extend its activities to the "Hebrew public system"?

The Board was as representative of all shades of religious, racial, and academic interests as could be achieved in Palestine. Thus during the last years of its life it included not only British, Arab, and Jewish, but also French, Greek, Armenian, and other members. Within this mixed national and racial membership there were two Shaikhs of the Supreme Muslim Council, an Archimandrite of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, a Grand Sacrist of the Armenian Patriarchate, two Anglican priests and one Presbyterian minister, a Franciscan Father, a Frère, and a Mother Superior, together with lay university teachers, school inspectors, heads of schools, and educational and other administrators. The number of members during the 'forties was well over forty. How could such a heterogeneous body act quickly and efficiently? The right answer was happily found as early as 1923 when, immediately on the formation of the Board, a joint committee was appointed which, together with the permanent officers, conducted the business of the Board. Other sub-committees were appointed for specific tasks. As a body the Board rarely met more than once a year.

The Jews were represented on the matriculation committee, but they declined to work on any of the committees for higher education, largely because of the attitude they chose to adopt at the start towards developing a British university. But on the other hand the Hebrew University was anxious to regularize the conditions of entry to its departments and came to a provisional agreement with the Board and the Department of Education for the formation of a joint schools examination committee. Certain sections of Jewish opinion, however, opposed the scheme, and consequently

the more important Jewish schools continued to the end to ignore the Board's matriculation.*

No opposition to the Board's activities came from the Muslims or the Arab side in general. Indeed, the Board received nothing but assistance from them. The Arabs were free from, or shall we say insensitive to, cultural competition of an examining body or a foreign university. Their attitude may be explained by the general observation that Arab-Muslim culture is not exclusive and is cosmopolitan inasmuch as it assimilates important elements of the Hellenistic and Christian heritage. Besides, the Arabic language and Muslim culture were so well entrenched in Palestine and so interwoven in the life of the people that fears comparable with the fears of the Jews—a heterogeneous population trying to cultivate a common language and to imbue the new generations with Hebrew culture—were out of the question.

Thus, even when in the early 'thirties a Muslim congress, convened in Jerusalem, passed a resolution to establish a university in that city, and the president of the Supreme Muslim Council soon afterwards was, in the words of the Swiss member of the Permanent Mandates Commission, "touring the world to raise funds" for the projected university,† still no opposition was offered either to the Board or to the projected British university. Muslim schools, private schools, as well as schools controlled by the Supreme Muslim Council, continued to offer candidates for the Board's examinations. All the more important national schools (Muslim and Christian) did likewise. During the last year for which figures are available, 1946, at least one-third of the candidates for the Board's matriculation came from Muslim or National schools.

It may be concluded that even in the limited field of holding public examinations, the Board could not achieve a complete unity of the diversity of educational systems. The two national systems, the Arab and the Hebrew, remained as separated from one another as ever. The latter had the Hebrew University as its apex, while the former had the Government Arab College, which was steadily developing into a university college. Each institution was emphasizing in its own way a different nationality and a different culture, in the same country.

This brings us back to the point raised at the beginning of this discussion. If Palestine as a whole, both Arab and Jewish, could not be served by the Hebrew University, and if the Arab College could be developed only as an Arabic university, was there no possibility for another university, neither Arabic nor Hebrew? What were the chances of a *via media* in a British university? The English schools in Palestine have always been, during the Turkish as well as during the mandatory periods, a neutral ground for all religious and racial groups, offering a liberal education similar to that provided at the public schools in England—was it possible to develop in some of them or in a new higher institution facilities for higher education?

That the disappointment of 1922 was not allowed to stand in the way of

* Government of Palestine, Department of Education: *Annual Report*, 1945-6, p. 14.

† *Minutes of the Twenty-Fifth Session*, p. 39.

further exploration of the possibilities of a British university is demonstrated by the fact that the authorities of the English schools again acted as champions of the cause. In 1927 the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem invited Dr. Headlam-Morley, historical adviser to the Foreign Office and formerly one of His Majesty's Inspectors of schools, to visit and report on the Anglican schools in Palestine. Dr. Morley, however, visited not only the Anglican schools but all other secondary schools in the country, in addition to a visit to the American University of Beirut. His report provided a basis for discussion between the Bishop and the Department of Education on the subject of developing secondary and higher education.*

Out of the consideration of Dr. Morley's report came a scheme for a "Jerusalem Institute of Higher Studies," which was formally submitted to the Government of Palestine and was approved by Lord Plumer, then High Commissioner, who in turn recommended its approval by the Colonial Office. In 1929 the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies considered the proposal in the presence of Lord Plumer and Dr. Morley, and appointed a sub-committee, of which the famous English educationist Sir Michael Sadler was a member, to go into details. This sub-committee arrived at the conclusion that "a university rather than an institute" was required. They recommended that the proposed university should be an independent body, "free from all racial and religious restrictions," working in harmony with the American University of Beirut and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The initial capital cost was estimated at £250,000, which was to be raised through a public appeal.

In May, 1929, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Amery, approved the scheme and asked the Palestine Government to open negotiations with the two universities, to prepare a detailed scheme, and to launch an appeal for funds. The task of drafting a detailed scheme was entrusted to Dr. Danby, who was Dean of the Board of Higher Studies and, as a canon of the Anglican Church, a member of the Bishop's close advisers.

During the summer of 1929, however, Palestine was plunged into one of the most violent Arab-Jewish riots and the Government's attention, both in Jerusalem and in London, was diverted to a series of controversial political and economic enquiries which occupied the greater part of two years. Such an atmosphere of racial and political strife was scarcely the right one for the prosecution of the project of a university that was to be without "racial and religious" prejudices. Dr. Danby's scheme appears to have been pigeon-holed somewhere in Jerusalem or Whitehall, and the subject ceased, for the time being at least, to receive active consideration.

Revival of interest in the subject during the 'thirties was mainly due to the initiative of the British Council,† acting with the support of the Colonial Office and the tacit approval of the Foreign Office. But henceforth the idea of a parochial "Institute of Higher Studies in Jerusalem" or even a "University of Palestine" was abandoned in favour of the more ambitious scheme of a "British University for the Near East." In other

* Government of Palestine, Department of Education: *Annual Report*, 1926-7, p. 14.

† Much of the information contained in this and the following three paragraphs is based on unpublished documents.

words, the scheme of 1922 was revived with stronger emphasis. Authoritative support for the scheme in its new form was not lacking. In October, 1935, the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies adopted the following resolution: "We regret the absence of an institution in the Eastern Mediterranean offering post-secondary courses of instruction, general or professional, suited to the needs of Palestine and Cyprus and conducted in accordance with English aims and traditions. . . . We think it essential that any English institution established in this part of the world should reach a high level of efficiency so that it may attract and provide for the best type of students and establish respect for English culture and education."

The Committee further recommended that the "political and financial circumstances" of the scheme be carefully considered. Of the territories under British control in the Near and Middle East at the time, Malta was excluded from the scheme since it already possessed its own university. The Cyprus authorities, it was thought, would not welcome an inrush of students from Greece or Turkey. Palestine, though ideally situated for the purpose, had too much political trouble, and the British mandate was bound to come to an end one day. According to Sir Miles Lampson (later Lord Killearn), British Ambassador in Cairo, neither Palestine nor Cyprus was an ideal centre from the Egyptian point of view, while Egypt itself was hardly a possible choice in view of the treaty of 1936. Viewed from this angle Cyprus was more suitable as a centre of "probable permanence of British political influence." But the Colonial Secretary ruled out any public funds from Cyprus, and as a mandated territory Palestine was "precluded from expending Palestine money on a distinctively British university." It was therefore decided that the British Council would appeal for contributions, while the claims of Cyprus and Palestine as the centre of the university remained under consideration.

The comprehensive Report of the Palestine Royal Commission of 1937 included an interesting reference to the subject of a British university in the Near East. "We are aware," the Report states,* "that the project of a British university in the Near East has been mooted in other quarters, and we are not in a position to say how practicable it may be financially or otherwise, but we recommend that in any further discussion of the project the possibility should be carefully considered of locating the university in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem or Haifa."

The opinion of a Royal Commission always carries due weight. Accordingly all future plans for the proposed university were made on the understanding that it was to be located in Palestine. But we must not forget that the Royal Commission assigned a rôle to the proposed university rather different from that assigned to it in all previous plans. The Advisory Committee wanted an institution "conducted in accordance with English aims and traditions" that would "establish respect for English culture and education." Lord Lloyd, speaking as President of the British Council, pointed out during a special meeting held in April, 1937, in the British Embassy in Cairo that "what was wanted was something rather blatant which would show quite obviously in the Near East the excellence

* Cmd. 5479. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, 1937, p. 344.

of British culture." But, apparently influenced by a memorandum submitted by the Anglican Bishop, whose schools always stood for racial and national reconciliation, the Royal Commission recommended a British university "to moderate the estranging tendency" of the existing Arab and Jewish school systems, and "to check the further growth of narrow and discordant nationalisms." While it would be open to all English-speaking students in the Near and Middle East, the proposed university was meant presumably for Palestine in the first instance: Arab students were to be saved "the cost and inconvenience of going abroad" for higher education, and Jewish students before or after taking a degree at the Hebrew University were to be afforded opportunities for study and research.*

The Royal Commission's proposal was, then, an attempt to achieve national and racial harmony through the agency of education in a university. Because of the difference in language (made more serious by the difference in race and religion, and aggravated by a bitter political conflict between the two peoples), it was impracticable to effect a joint elementary school system for the Arabs and the Jews. Having decided under these circumstances on two national systems of elementary education, it was difficult to provide joint secondary education. But secondary education through a foreign medium, neither Arabic nor Hebrew, proved not only possible but also fruitful in some foreign, notably English and French, schools in Palestine. Has the Government tried to bring the two national systems of education together by providing state secondary or higher education through the medium of English?

The proposal of 1922, as we already know, was to create a British university for both Arabs and Jews with departments of Arabic, Hebrew, and other studies. Opposition to the proposed university by the Jews was because it was to teach through a medium other than Hebrew and because it was to spread a culture which was not wholly Jewish. Jewish participation in the Board of Higher Studies was limited for similar considerations. This tendency to exclusiveness in education was systematically followed in practically every field. One more example will suffice here:

Sir Ellis Kadoorie, a British Jew whose family hailed from Baghdad, bequeathed in the early 'twenties some £100,000 to be spent on opening schools in either Iraq or Palestine. The Colonial Office decided in favour of Palestine, and the Director of Education's advice was to open an agricultural school for Arabs and Jews in a single centre. The plan was to teach during the first part of the course through the medium of Arabic to Arab students, and through Hebrew to Jewish students separately, and then to teach them together during the second part of the course through the exclusive medium of English. Throughout the course, Arab and Jewish students were to join in the same practical work on the farm and to share the same dining-room and dormitories. This plan was approved by the High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, and the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Amery, but the Zionist Executive protested against it and informed the Government that they would dissuade Jewish parents from sending their sons to a school "in which Jews were not taught in Hebrew through-

* *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 343-4.

out." Sir Herbert Samuel succumbed to this resistance, and the Colonial Office acquiesced in a change of plan. The result was two separate schools, one for the Arabs at Tul-Karm and the other for the Jews at Mount Tabor.*

But this is not to say that opposition to some joint educational institution came only from the Jewish side. It is not certain that the Arabs would have welcomed any Government—as distinct from a private—institution where their children were taught together with Jewish children through any medium. All that is said here is that there is no evidence of a categorical rejection of the idea by Arab political leadership. In any case, the Arab school system was under direct state control, and the authorities could have recruited enough students from the secondary schools to any such institution. They were in no position to do so in the Hebrew school system. But apart from all these considerations was the proposal of either a joint secondary school, agricultural or other, or of a university, Palestinian or British, really practical in a social environment saturated with political antagonism? Or, to put the question differently, could such an institution of secondary or higher studies, assuming that it was feasible, achieve international understanding between the two rival nations, the Arab and the Jewish?

There are two notable local precedents—and there is no need to go far for more—to guide us in trying to find a fair answer to this question: the mixed foreign schools in Palestine and the still more mixed American University of Beirut. In the foreign schools, students of various races and creeds, including Arabs and Jews, learnt no doubt something of mutual tolerance and understanding, but experience indicates that what was learnt was in fact superficial, and did not go beyond personal relations, if at all. During the frequent outbreaks of violence in the country, Arab and Jewish students in mixed schools were placed under severe strain. Many boys' school authorities found it difficult even to keep their schools open during such emergencies. The true explanation is to be found in the fact that whatever the schools did was for practical purposes more or less undone by the environment, because the latter almost invariably proved stronger, in this respect, than the former.

At the American University of Beirut, where international understanding was deliberately fostered, Arab and Jewish students from Palestine had little or no contact with one another outside the lecture halls. They usually went to different clubs, frequented different societies, and generally viewed one another, if not with open hostility, at least with belligerent neutrality. During troubled times in Palestine "incidents" of a serious character were quite frequent between Arab and Jewish students even on the University campus. Their relations, while not specially cordial in the 'twenties, became strained in the 'thirties to the rupture point, directly in proportion to the mounting tension at home. The moderating influence of the American staff was of no avail in the face of what was already a second nature promoted alike by home, school, and environment.

Experience, therefore, tends to give little support for the Royal Com-

* Bowman, *Middle East Window*. London, 1942. Pp. 263-5. Cf. Sir Ronald Storrs' Introduction, pp. xv-xvi.

mission's recommendation of establishing a British university primarily to promote Arab-Jewish understanding. The university was, however, desirable for its own sake first and for other considerations afterwards. Lord Lloyd's idea to establish such a university in Palestine for the countries of the Near East as an evidence of "the excellence of British culture" seems to have been a more practical approach. That was the same approach to the project as envisaged by the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, and that was indeed the real aim of the principal promoters of the scheme of 1922. The British Council, when it espoused the idea of a university during the 'thirties, was no doubt trying to discharge one of its main functions, but was not directly concerned with the Royal Commission's ideas about Arab-Jewish understanding through English education.

The British Council did not start its activities in Palestine on any appreciable scale till 1940, when it opened institutes in Jaffa, Nablus, Haifa, Tel-Aviv, and Jerusalem. In 1945 it finally opened the Jerusalem Institute of Higher Studies, which prepared students for the external examinations of the University of London, thus providing a nucleus of a university college. So did the Government Arab College in the same city. Profiting from the experience of the Palestine authorities, the British Council tried to foster education of a university standard for the Arabs and the Jews separately. Thus it endowed a chair of English at the Hebrew University, and tried to develop the Institute of Higher Studies, parallel with the Government Arab College, into a university.

It seems that the Council hoped to co-ordinate the two institutions in a venture towards university status, and that their efforts during the last years of the mandate were somehow thwarted. In May, 1946, Dr. Morgan, Educational Adviser to the British Council, visited Palestine and went into the whole problem of higher education on the spot. His unpublished report, which may be taken as the final phase of the story of the attempt to establish a British university, makes rather sad reading. He called attention, *inter alia*, to the fact that Jewish students were not likely to come to a British institution in any appreciable numbers, while the best Arab students not attending the American University of Beirut were at the Government Arab College in Jerusalem. The further development of this institution through co-operation with the Council provided the most hopeful opportunity for promoting university education.

Dr. Morgan, however, appears to have been offered a ready-made scheme: the Department of Education would continue to select as non-fee-paying scholars the best product of the secondary schools for an honours course at the Government Arab College, while the British Council would take the residue as fee-paying students at their Institute of Higher Studies. Faced with the possibility of playing a secondary rôle where it hoped to play a major one, the Council was advised by Dr. Morgan to wind up the Jerusalem Institute since "it is surely not the function of the British Council to make itself responsible for giving a so-called university education which in fact would be second rate." In this he agreed with the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies which was careful as noted above to insist on catering for "the best type of students."

The Jerusalem Institute did not close down immediately, but on the

termination of the British mandate in 1948 and the dispersal of the staff and students as a result of the war it collapsed and has not been reopened since. The Government Arab College met with the same fate. With the closing of these two institutions all hope of developing a university, British or Arab, in mandatory Palestine came to an end.

KUWAIT TOWN DEVELOPMENT

By LIEUT.-COLONEL L. W. AMPS, O.B.E., M.Inst.C.E.

Report of a lecture illustrated by a film delivered at a meeting of the Society on Wednesday, May 13, 1953, Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., Chairman of Council, in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Colonel Amps, who is going to talk to us this afternoon, is an experienced civil engineer with a long and distinguished record who is at present a director of the Gulf Engineering Company, which is a subsidiary company of Richard Costain, Ltd., the contractors who are doing a large amount of the building with which he is concerned.

It is a great personal pleasure for me to take the chair for Colonel Amps, as he was one of the team of very able administrators who went out to Hong Kong after we reoccupied it and were responsible for really getting the Colony going again. His chief task was the reconstruction of all the European buildings which had been looted and gutted.

Previously he was at the War Office with the Pioneer Corps, which he took a great part in organizing, and later went to Burma. He has just come back from one of his visits to Kuwait and he is now going to talk on what he saw there, and during the talk we shall see a short film.

ALTHOUGH it is now about twenty-seven years since I joined this Society I am really a most unsuitable person to talk about the Middle East because most of my experience abroad has been gained in places other than the Middle East. In fact, my only excuse for talking to you, when there are so many other people present who are experts on this region, is my own great interest in Kuwait. I shall try to talk to you simply as a contractor about some of the problems which one meets in a big development scheme, and the way they are being solved.

Any opinions that I express will be my own and not in any way those of my firm or other organizations.

As you know, Kuwait is a little State about the size of Wales at the north-west end of the Persian Gulf. It has been an independent State for over two centuries and it has been ruled by the same family during that time in unbroken succession; the rule not necessarily going from father to son, but keeping within the same family.

The administration is in a way a feudal one, and until a few years ago Kuwait was a State that was comparatively poor. The people existed by fishing and pearl diving and by building dhows, at which they became very accomplished; consequently they also became first-class seamen and had a great part in the trade between India and Africa and the Middle East.

Five or six years ago, as you know, the oil started to be developed and the State jumped from being a comparatively poor one to being one of the richest, if not the richest per head of the population, in the world. At the same time it had to change from a feudal State to a modern welfare State, without any of the intervening steps that most countries pass through in the process.

The State has very few resources and so it has had to depend largely on

importing and exporting, and it has through the whole of its history been an important entrepôt, a free port importing goods from one place and exporting them to another—somewhat similar to Hong Kong in a different area.

There are three social elements in the State. There are the ruling family, the merchants and the people. The merchants are shrewd and able, far-seeing men and I have little doubt that they will take full advantage of this new capital which is pouring in because of the oil. The people, as I see them, are hardy and resourceful and full of initiative. They have had to lead a hard life for generations; they are self-reliant and have a strong national feeling.

The ruler's object is to use this money which is coming to him for the benefit of his people first and foremost. He is a man with foresight and high principles and his objective is to use this money to make the State into a cultural centre for the whole Middle East. That means raising the standard of living for his own people and developing water and power, housing and the port, the roads and airfields and all the things that go with them.

Kuwait is not, of course, a British Colony or a British protectorate. It is a State that is in treaty relationship with Britain, and the ruler has appointed a Development Committee to handle the enormous development which is taking place there. Under their general direction are advisers, British advisers for the most part up to the present, who are controlling the various Departments of Government, each of them under a Kuwaiti director. The people of Kuwait feel that they wish to retain the control of this development while, on the other hand, they require the technical advice that the British can give.

The work is carried out by firms of British contractors mainly who are, nevertheless, not allowed to work entirely on their own. Each one is required to take on a Kuwaiti partner, and this in our experience works very well. It ensures that the British firm is always thinking from the point of view of the Kuwaitis, and, after all, that is what we are all out for. We all want to help the ruler in building up the State to the standard that he is aiming at. Also appointed are consultants, town planning experts, architects, civil engineers and mechanical engineers, and all the rest of the technical experts needed to give effect to this programme.

The local resources are very few, of course, with the exception of oil which has brought about this miracle to the Kuwaitis. That means the importation of practically everything—bricks and cement and all manufactured articles like steel, water pipes, plant, machinery, and so on; even aggregate for concrete has to be brought in from Iraq in part because the resources there are not sufficient.

The town planning has been carried out by a firm of expert town planners and they have divided up the region into eight residential areas of about 6,000 people each. In each area there will be a shopping centre, a primary school, nursery schools and a playground; the secondary schools will be more widely placed, and there are reservations for light industries in each area. Then there is a main industrial area where the port will be situated, and a power station, water distillation plant and other industrial buildings

and installations. There are educational and hospital areas and a new airport is also in the scheme. Ring-roads and main avenues are being made and houses are being demolished to make room for them.

In a project like this it is very difficult to decide what are the things to be given priority. Those who know that part of the world will realize that the first priority is probably fairly obvious; it is for water. All round Kuwait is desert with nothing growing on it. But it is very interesting to see after the showers of rain which do occasionally occur that the desert breaks into flower and wonderful little flowers appear. These flowers are short in height, but the productivity of that desert is amazing when there is enough water to give it a chance to promote growth.

So the first part of the development scheme has been the installation of a distillation plant. This plant distils water from the sea and provides a million gallons a day. That, when you realize the number of inhabitants of Kuwait is only about 200,000, is not a very large amount per head, and so it is proposed to extend the project progressively until it produces a total of about five million gallons. The other water there comes from the wells and most of it is unfit for human consumption. Before the distillation plant came into being, fresh water was brought by ship from the Shatt el Arab and was put into goatskins and carried on the backs of donkeys and camels and sold in the town.

There were experts (one of whom is here today) who were hoping it might be possible to find fresh water coming, I understand, from under the Gulf from the Persian side, and much has been done to try to locate that water, but so far without success; but one never knows, and I hope it will come in the future.

The Kuwait Oil Company have supplied a little water, such as they could spare, to the town which was most valuable up to the time of the opening of the new distillation plant. Obviously, a distillation plant like this is normally very expensive to run—it is expensive in fuel—but in this case the engineers arranged to use the waste gas from the oil wells. It might therefore be said that, excluding the capital cost of the pipeline, the fuel cost is nothing, and that helps a great deal as far as cost is concerned.

The film of the opening ceremony of the distillation plant, entitled *Kuwait Town Development*, was then shown. A tall brick-built building of modern design was seen, surmounted by the Kuwait State flag flown at half-mast in respect for Queen Mary's death. Leading sheikhs and commercial magnates in dignified Arab robes, together with a number of European and American guests, gathered to receive His Highness the Ruler. Introductory speeches were made by Abdulla Mudda Saleh and Mr. W. Kitson, and His Highness cut the tape across the entrance with a pair of gold scissors presented by the architect, Mr. Frankland Dark.

Inside the building His Highness opened a valve causing the "sweet" water to flow into the town mains, and he and his guests were invited to taste the water.

The lecturer then continued :

You can understand what a miracle such a plant is for people who have been for centuries without their own sweet water supply. A good example

of that was given by my Arab chauffeur, who took a couple of bottles of the clean water home to his wife. When she saw it she would not believe it was Kuwaiti water! Then he took the water round to the coffee shops, which are rather like our public houses, with old gentlemen sitting around and talking. They looked at the water and said, "It seems all right now; but wait until tomorrow morning, it will be clouded." Consequently when I went to my car the next morning I was met by my chauffeur waving a bottle. "It is still clear!" he said joyfully.

Nearby this plant is another urgent requirement of a developing State, and that is a power station. It is just being started now. The town of Kuwait is remarkable at night for the amount of light there is in it compared with that of many other Eastern towns I have been in, and that of course requires a lot of electric power. In addition, there is an increasing tendency for people to get coolers to install in their house, and more and more current will be needed for industry, so there will be a great demand for power. It is with the greatest difficulty that the supply of power is kept up with the demand, so the construction of a power station is one of the items with very high priority.

Roads are very important. A year ago there was really only one good road in Kuwait, and that was the road from Kuwait town itself to where the oil company's headquarters are; but now roads are improving at a very fast rate. They have modern machinery for surfacing and you can now drive in comparative comfort through the main avenues and boulevards of the town. A very far-sighted policy is being adopted about roads and, in spite of a certain amount of local objection, buildings are being cleared away to make wide avenues.

No doubt in time a road to Basra will be built. The present track is very poor, and it takes a long time to get there by car. The distance is only about 100 miles, and it should contribute quite a bit to the future of Kuwait when there is a really good motor-road to Basra.

Another important item which has priority in any town which is advancing in the way of Kuwait is housing, because people are continually coming in from outside and the population is increasing by leaps and bounds. The State are putting up a prefabricating plant for building houses at a central depot which can be erected speedily on the sites. The idea is that they should be erected outside the town wall first. Work is already being done there in two of the areas. After that it will be possible to move the people from other places where it is required to drive ring-roads through.

His Highness attaches great importance to education. He knows that if his country is going to play the part he wants it to play he must see that the youth of the country is well educated. Therefore, schools are being built all over the place. As sites become available in the town schools are being put up. There are already two elementary schools and three nursery schools under construction at present. The elementary schools take 600 to 800 boys or 500 girls, and the aim is for classes of not more than thirty pupils. Nursery schools will take about 100 pupils. Outside, in an area south of the town, there are one elementary and two nursery schools being constructed and other areas will follow in due course.

First of all there will be schools for boys and, later, schools for girls, and I must say there is great enthusiasm among the youth of Kuwait. When you go in the morning into the streets you see hundreds of children carrying their little satchels with books, obviously keen to go to school.

One of the wise provisions in this educational programme is a large central kitchen to serve 14,000 meals at midday every day. I believe it is one of the largest kitchens in the world. When it is in operation the meals will be carried round in heated or refrigerated containers to the schools, both existing schools and new schools. During the holidays meals will not be taken to the houses, but the children will be expected to go and get their midday meal at the schools, and it is hoped that they will get into the habit of doing that.

I cannot help feeling that this is a very wise provision, because one of the troubles with the Bedouin is that often they are underfed, and if the youth of the State are brought up with adequate food it should mean they will play their part much better as citizens.

Technical schools will have dormitories for residential pupils. It is proposed to teach artisans and craftsmen first, and later there will be a university so that those who are more promising can study for the professions. There will be workshops and wood-workshops and a foundry, etc., and provision is being made for a technical library. There will be a swimming pool in each of the schools, including elementary schools, and an assembly hall with a full stage and cinema projection equipment.

In addition, plans are being made for an official guest house, a parliament building and a hotel. There is a very good hospital system at present, which is free for the inhabitants; it is staffed by European doctors with a European matron, and trained nurses. Further hospital buildings will form part of the programme eventually and some of the buildings are already under construction.

Another vital item is the port and harbour. At the present time the harbour facilities are very inadequate, which makes it very difficult to carry on with the rest of the work. The last information I had from Kuwait was that there were eighteen ships lying off Kuwait waiting to be off-loaded. Only three or four can be dealt with at a time and so it is vital that a modern port should be constructed. The dredging is just starting and it is due to finish some time in 1955; the port construction is due to start at the end of this year. There is a temporary jetty, giving thirty feet at low water, which is now ready for use.

Another form of communication which is important is air communication. Kuwait is not exactly on the sea route, but it is on the direct air route to the East from Europe and so, in my view, it must achieve increasing importance as the years go on. The present airport is usable and the Argonauts of the B.O.A.C. go down there, but it is not suitable for the more modern machines, the Comets, etc. When there has been rain, no aircraft can go down at all.

All this makes one wonder what is the future of this State. There are no resources, as I have said, except oil, but there is the initiative and enterprise of the people and I believe that that will carry them a long way. The

function of the State may well be to continue on a larger scale as an entrepôt for trade between Europe and the Far East and Middle East countries around. As long as it has a free port, a good harbour and a good airport there are great possibilities for it.

An industrial class will have to be built up in Kuwait. There are already the merchants, and the Kuwaitis will, I think, gradually become more and more commercially minded and will be able to cope with the future commerce of the State. There must be light industries and one wonders what they will be. Possibly they will be furniture making, fish canning and boat making—because boat making will no doubt go on as before—glass making from sand perhaps, and so on. It is also possible that quite an important link will be formed by transport, both by land and by sea.

There is one other particular which is essential to Kuwait and that is irrigation. Whatever is done with distillation plants, there will never be enough water for making even a waterborne sewerage system a practical proposition; but if there is irrigation from the Shatt el Arab it will alter the whole complexion of the State of Kuwait. The distance involved is only about 100 miles or so, and it has already been said officially that His Highness intends approaching Iraq to arrange to bring water from the Shatt el Arab. That would be as epoch-making an event as was the opening of the distillation plant.

I wonder what part the British have to play in all this. I feel that it is the part of a team worker, to win the confidence and trust of the Arabs so that they feel we are willing to give them friendly co-operation in making Kuwait rich, not only in money but in that formation of character and resourcefulness which will fit the people of the State to play their part in bringing about peace and teamwork amongst the Arab States.

The CHAIRMAN: Colonel Amps has very kindly said that he will be very glad to answer any questions or receive comments, and I am going to take advantage of my position by asking him the first question. I am very interested in what he said about the desert blossoming out when there was some rain. If sufficient water was available, is there any reason why that desert should not be reclaimed and have food grown on it?

Colonel AMPS: I am no agriculturalist, but I have seen both in Afghanistan and on the North-West Frontier similar unprepossessing land become wonderfully fertile when given water. When I was in Basra a few weeks ago I was talking to an Iraqi agricultural expert, who was trained in agriculture at Oxford, and he said he had no doubt that the desert could be made extremely fertile if it had adequate water.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: I have listened with intense interest to what Colonel Amps has had to say to us today, because my last visit to Kuwait was something like thirty-seven years ago and then it appeared there were no possibilities of development. One might have thought that not even the Almighty could make anything out of Kuwait, but I think we can now say that oil is taking the place of the Almighty. It is producing tremendous results, and the reference to British help which Colonel Amps made should make us all feel rather proud.

I have one question: With the increased prosperity in Kuwait will there not possibly be an immigration problem? When the wealth per citizen is so great is it not likely, because of the surrounding countries which are poorer, that there will be a problem of immigration to deal with?

Colonel AMPS: I think that problem exists already, but that is one of the political points on which I am afraid I am not very competent to speak. At present Kuwait is welcoming tradesmen, carpenters, bricklayers and such people, from Iraq and Jordan and the refugee Palestinians, etc., up to a certain number, but I do not quite know what the attitude will be if the number of people coming in gets unmanageably large.

Mr. C. LANGE: During the several trips I made to Kuwait just before the Second World War I could not put up in Kuwait because there were no hotels, and accommodation was very kindly given me in the house of one of His Highness's Ministers. May I therefore ask the lecturer whether anyone going to Kuwait from abroad can now be put up in a hotel or are there rest houses or any other accommodation of that kind?

Colonel AMPS: There is a Government guest house and those who are invited to the State by the Government of the State are put up there. Others stay with local residents, as you did yourself. There is a plan to build a really fine hotel, but I suppose that will take a little while to put into operation. I believe there is another hotel, but I do not think it is very comfortable.

Colonel G. ROUTH: With these enormous revenues coming in and all these projects, will there not come a time when it will be rather difficult for the people in Kuwait to know what to do with all their money? I suppose some of it has been invested?

Colonel AMPS: It is, of course, impossible for them to spend the 50 or 60 million which we read in the Press is the income of the State. No one can spend that on development works and so forth in a year, as the British have learnt to their cost in trying to develop other big schemes abroad which have not been an unqualified success. No doubt the money will be invested, because I think it is realized that oil does not last for ever and also there might be some alternative fuel evolved as the years go by. Exactly what is being done in that direction I could not say.

Miss KELLY: Is any of the great wealth being used to help and resettle the refugees of Palestine?

Colonel AMPS: That is a very difficult subject and I am afraid it is one of those political questions which I am not really competent to talk about.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions or comment, I should like to thank Colonel Amps very much on your behalf. We have had a most interesting and very valuable lecture, or talk as I prefer to call it, from him. I was particularly interested when he spoke of the part that our people can play. I am quite sure myself that our own national character, integrity and initiative comprise one of our most valuable exports and we should treasure and cultivate it.

TOWNS AND ARCHITECTURE OF THE HADHRAMAUT

BY MRS. M. DE STURLER-RAEMAEEKERS

Report of a lecture illustrated by a film delivered to the Society on Thursday, May 21, 1953, Mr. W. H. Ingrams, C.M.G., O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: As you can well imagine, it is a great pleasure to me to take the chair this afternoon for Mrs. Sturler-Raemaekers, because I have spent ten years in the country which she is about to describe. Unfortunately, ever since I left it in 1944 time has done nothing but take me somewhere else in the world. I have just returned from a tour of the United States, Mexico, Central America and the West Indies. Most of my time seems to be taken up in Africa and it is difficult to get an opportunity of looking again at the Hadhramaut. Hence it is a great pleasure to be able to see Mrs. Sturler-Raemaekers' slides and to hear her account this afternoon.

I expect that in some respects at least the architecture of the Hadhramaut is familiar to many of you through Freya Stark's books, perhaps particularly the illustrations in her book *Seen in the Hadhramaut*; also Mr. Osbert Lankaster, an architect who many may know better as a cartoonist, wrote an article on the architecture of the Hadhramaut some years ago which appeared, I believe, in the *Architectural Journal*.

There is a very long tradition of architecture in the Hadhramaut. One wonders how long this wonderful working in mud has gone on. In ancient days the ancient Hadhraumauti used to go in for monumental stone masonry on a large scale. I remember seeing huge stones lying on the old Hadhramauti ruins and being told by the local people that the stones had been transported to the early buildings by the Adites, who were formerly giants. Hadhraumaut is a country which has always recognized the Book of Genesis, that there were giants in the land in those days.

Mrs. Sturler-Raemaekers was born in Holland and came to England as a child, first, during the first World War. Here she was educated, so we can at least claim part of her. Then she went to France and later came back to England to study architecture for three years at the Architectural Association. She took her degree in Brussels and practised there. Then she travelled a good deal in Europe. She returned to England again at the outbreak of the recent World War and has been here ever since except for her travelling. In 1948 Mrs. Sturler-Raemaekers thought she would go further afield and, fortunately for us and for Arabia, she chose to go there, but before doing so she took the precaution of studying Arabic for two years at London University.

Mrs. Sturler-Raemaekers spent ten months in the Hadhramaut in 1950-51 and was there again in 1952 for five months. She has told me, very modestly, that that is a very inadequate time in which to study the Hadhramaut, but I think we shall discover that she found out a great deal of much interest while she was there.

MY experience of the Middle East is, as you have heard, somewhat brief, being only three years. I therefore feel a little embarrassed when speaking before a gathering in which there may be many who have probably travelled there for much longer periods. I trust they will show some indulgence towards anything I may say which may not be either new or just as they saw it; I have at least specialized knowledge in one subject which took me there, and that is architecture. I went to study the buildings of Hadhramaut and make measured drawings of them. I do not intend to give a technical discourse on exactly how the buildings are constructed or how the bricks are made, because I do not think that this is

what people want to hear. In this short talk I would like to deal more with the feeling of these buildings as related to the people who live in them and who have created them. If time allows I hope to show a short colour film I made there and which portrays general scenes of life in Hadhramaut.

There is one thing I can say without any hesitation or doubt, and that is to give expression to my great gratitude to those who helped me to go on these journeys. I could not possibly mention by name all those to whom I am indebted, but at least I wish to speak of Sir Bernard Reilly of the Colonial Office, who made it possible for me to go to Hadhramaut and gave me the necessary introductions. I also want to thank Dr. Serjeant of the School of Oriental and African Studies of London University, who taught me for two years and who showed me everything I had to know in order to travel in that strange and isolated country he had himself visited. Finally, I am most grateful to Colonel Hugh Boustead, Resident Adviser of the East Aden Protectorate, who facilitated my journey in every possible way. He was my kind host and gave me travel facilities and permits to go where many people had difficulty in going.

To plunge into my subject, I might say that one does in fact almost plunge into the Hadhramaut from above. It is one of those rare countries which cannot be reached by rail or by road and hardly by sea except on a little native dhow; so that since the British Protectorate authorities started to develop the country it has been habitual to go to Hadhramaut by plane, and one does indeed drop into it from the sky. Such isolation is rare in our times and needs some explanation for those not familiar with the geography of Southern Arabia.

Arabia has always been one of the most difficult countries of access to Europeans, for geographical as well as religious reasons. In the centre of the peninsula is one of the largest deserts in the world, and it is surrounded by forbidding coastal ranges from halfway up the Red Sea coast, down to the "barren rocks of Aden" and eastward along the southern coast, almost three-quarters of its length before there is any break in the mountains.

But for small valleys, these mountains and the interior are absolutely barren. With the exception of the Yemen, to all intents and purposes, little or nothing grows in that vast area. There is no water. There is little earth, and in the relentless mountain ranges and plateaux along the coast there is often not even sand—just rock and flint and granite. Yet these coastal ranges are crossed in all directions by ageless tracks made by camel trains of the bedouin traders who have followed them for two thousand, perhaps three thousand years, bringing the incense from Dhufar beyond Hadhramaut.

The people who now live in the interior highlands are the bedouin, the descendants of the traders of old, who dwell in small stone-built villages or mud castles. This south-western corner is still largely a tribal area where there are different little bedouin sultanates. Some of them are being gradually brought into the confederation and some even accept complete British protection; others live entirely in their own ancient way of life of blood feuds and strife. Some miles out of Aden a sultan recently

killed two of his cousins because of some rivalry between them, and not more than fifteen years ago there were cases of open piracy at Balhaf. Such incidents will illustrate that it is not easy country to travel through or to subjugate, isolated as it is behind roadless mountains and plateaux. There are some 500 miles of this barren, rough country, where the people are fiercely independent and distrustful of outsiders. It was long impossible to travel right across it, and it has been done by only very few people, chiefly by the Dutch explorer Van der Meulen, who has crossed it three times.

Considering the geography it is not surprising that modern civilization, and particularly European civilization, has never penetrated the interior of this peninsula. In such outcrops of continents as this all civilization seems to come and go very slowly, and so does life itself. The Indo-European civilization, which started in the Fertile Crescent before the time of Ur of the Chaldeans, has only very slowly percolated down to this outcrop of Asia, as it did in the peninsulas of India and Malaya; once there, it remained static and almost intact for 4,000 years. When one goes to Hadhramaut now one can almost imagine living in the time of Abraham of Ur and the Chaldeans.

The Hadhramis themselves trace back their ancestry and history to Noah, from whom they descend through Sem and his grandson Ad, who is their legendary father of the giant race, and from whom in turn descends *Hathermaveth*, whose name means "Death is Present" and became "Hadhramaut." This shows that in those far-off days the Arabs of Southern Arabia were hardly less bellicose than they were until the British came to Hadhramaut in 1934, when Mr. Ingrams started negotiating cessation of wars and blood feuds.

Hadhramaut, we know then, lies 400 miles from Aden eastwards along a roadless coast, across merciless basalt mountains, quicksand, dunes and deserted beaches—400 miles of sand and rock and ragged cliffs, with only five unknown bedouin fishing hamlets en route. Going along this coast—be it by plane, dhow or, at last, since 1951 by pioneer desert trucks—one can hardly believe that any form of life is possible inside or behind these torrid treeless wastes. For behind these coastal ranges, to the north, we know it is the great desert that covers all Southern Arabia, the Empty Quarter, which has but four or five oases along the 600- or 700-mile camel route that crosses it. Neither from north nor south is there seemingly any life vein, nor from east nor west. Yet it is here that we shall find the valley of Hadhramaut.

Like the hidden valley of Petra, Hadhramaut has remained secluded throughout the centuries, but with this difference: the valley of Hadhramaut is not dead.

When one has braved the 400 miles of desolation eastward from Aden, one suddenly comes upon a great scintillating white harbour; a crescent moon wedged between an azure bay and blistering pink rocks. This is Mukalla, the beautiful white-and-blue port, the cup of its harbour filled with many little native craft and sailing dhows. Behind the town there seems nothing but endless waste tableland with one or two poor bedouin hamlets—the Jol, rising to 6,000 feet and stretching 150 miles inland. But

a second miracle happens. There is a cleft in the great basalt plateau and a beautiful green valley opens abruptly in the flat tableland—a valley running from east to west, joining the sea some 150 miles further on. This is a fertile valley with gardens and palm groves, millet fields and white palaces. An underground river continually provides water for the wells and the little irrigation channels. There are crops up to three times per year. In this lovely setting very civilized and well-dressed townsmen live in large mud-built towns on the valley cliff sides. Recently they have laid aside their arms and ceased their blood feuds and tribal wars which raged from town to town, from tribe to tribe, from family to family. With the aid of the British adviser they have established law and order and made their foreign trade, which is their livelihood, flourish unhindered.

When we go back into history to find out where this miracle has sprung from, we discover that there were the old Sabean and Hymyaritic civilizations of 1,000 or 2,000 years B.C., of which Mr. Ingrams spoke. Perhaps it started with the Minean Empire, on the eastern border of Yemen, and its capital, Ma'in. Later came the Sabeans with their capital a little south, at Marib; followed by the Katabaneans, whose centre, Timna, was at the south-eastern corner of the great desert. And lastly, perhaps, the Hadhramis, whose early capital may have been the much disputed Shabwa. These people built in stone, and their buildings were several storeys high and of very fine dry masonry. Many are the ruins covering the western territory between Aden and Hadhramaut and to the north in Yemen. But also in Hadhramaut itself, further east, there are vestiges of towns and temples, in the main valley and the side valleys; great plans of garrison cities, and remains of castle and palace walls in beautifully executed stonework, all erected perhaps some 2,000 years ago.

With such a tradition it is not surprising that something is still found in the present day, and although the Hadhramis have not continued the stone masonry and have turned mainly to sun-dried mud bricks, their achievements are of remarkable interest.

Reviewing the various groups of the population, there are the bedouin who still live by camel transport, the sand bedouin of the desert who live in simple black camelhair tents, and the bedouin mountain tribesmen who live on the arid plateaux. The latter are rugged and tough, like the country round them. Their life is hard; it is scorching hot without any shade in the day, bitterly cold at night at 6,000 feet. They still build their low windowless huts with brushwood roofs with the stones of the plateaux in dry walling. They carry on in their primitive way the stone tradition which has been lost elsewhere in the eastern area.

The next class of inhabitants we meet are the remote valley bedouin, who live in rather better circumstances. They do have a little grazing, cultivate a little land where they grow millet called dharrah and a sort of little cucumber-tomato called faguws. They live in the earthen beds of long-dried-up rivers that have a flood from the hills about once a year. They have grown lazy like everyone else, and they build their little castles of mud bricks with a base of rough stones from the river-bed. A passage down the centre leads from the entrance door with almost windowless rooms for storage either side to a stair leading to a sheltered roof terrace.

It is the same type of building that has been carried to perfection in the towns. This brings us to the chief group of interest—the townsfolk.

The ancient cities usually lay on some small eminence in the centre of the main valley or up a side valley. They had defence walls round them and were probably manned by very well-organized garrisons. When the "middle ages" or "dark ages" of Arabia came upon this area with the decline of the land trade routes in the second century, these cities seem to have been abandoned as the empires broke up. The people who remained after this decline seem to have taken to living in eagles' nests and cliff-side towns built on the steep slopes of the valleys. They may be the forefathers of the town dwellers found today in the main valley of Hadhramaut and its tributaries of Wadi Do'an, Wadi bin Ali, and Wadi 'Idm.

People of the side valleys remained much closer to bedouin tradition than in the main valley, as in lovely Do'an, for instance—the narrow, riverless valley, its bed entirely covered with thick palm groves which are irrigated with water collected in pools and tanks from the yearly rains. They live simply, drinking the old bedouin drink of husk coffee with ginger and eating the plain millet cakes with a few dried herbs and vegetables (instead of tea and imported rice as is now done in the large towns). There are no natural resources here. Food, except dates and honey, is scarce. To earn a living the Do'anis go and trade abroad, mainly in East Africa. The women of the valley retain their picturesque costumes with heavy jewellery reminiscent of the bedouin silver. Their dresses are mostly of homespun black cotton (as also the men's coloured loin cloths), but for "best" they wear silver embroidered black velvet with gold and silver braid bodices.

Their cliff towns are a fair size and an amazing heaping-up of one building above the other. They are solid and well built of several storeys, on a long narrow plan parallel to the hillside in order not to dig too far into the mountain. Massive walls have small windows and corbelled cornices not found elsewhere in this area; they have a Gothic decorative-ness that is pure instinct and a lovely rough, crumbling mud surface that fades into the mountainside because they are made of the same material as the mountain itself. Usually the houses are laid out in small apartments, a room with a lobby and a washroom to each; sometimes one, sometimes two to each floor. Both buildings and streets are narrow for lack of space.

But when we come to the great Wadi Hadhramaut the streets are wide and the buildings are much larger and more sophisticated. This Wadi has its underground river and innumerable wells. Luxury abounds. The people from the great valley towns—Shibam, Saiywun, Terim—made their fortunes in Singapore and Java, and here one comes to the most impressive buildings of Hadhramaut.

The great desert town of Shibam with its 500 houses is a town of merchants only. Contrary to all other towns its site is on an eminence in the centre of the valley, and I wonder whether it may not be an old Sabean site. The buildings on the outer rim of the town form a solid wall, five to six storeys high, and these are the houses of the great, where they get a maximum of air, light and view. Six storeys is the agreed maximum, so that no one shall overlook his neighbour. Only the ruler's castle, on

a mound, is seven storeys and rises above the rest, the whole, like all others, built in mud bricks.

In the centre, the space that is left, lie huddled the one-storeyed shops of the suq and the many-storeyed flat houses of the poor. Shibam seemed the only town where houses were occupied in flats. Elsewhere I saw almost exclusively one-family houses even if the family had many groups within it.

All houses in Hadhramaut have a strong inward slant from bottom to top, which gives them a look of strength mingled with grace. There are no basements and barely foundations, but the ground floor is an almost solid base, so thick are the walls that taper towards the top. They may be almost 3 feet thick at the base for a tall castle, and a foot at the top.

In Shibam, the houses forming a solid rampart wall have windows at the two ends only, and a small light-well to light the stairs in the centre of the deep building. The ground floor usually contains granaries and stores. The straight flights of the stairs rise between thick walls with a very heavy central block. On the first floor the Shibam citizen keeps his goats and rabbits in the outside rooms, while the centre is occupied by more stores. About the second floor begin the living quarters—that is, the office and rooms of the men, stores in the centre again, and often with kitchen, washroom, and lavatory. These washrooms and lavatories are systematically built over a central shaft, though water is mostly allowed to run from a gutter into the centre of the street. But there are “back” streets for the sanitation and “front” streets for doors. About the third floor the private quarters begin. They would be men’s living quarters, with the ladies on the floor above, the fourth, with kitchen and washrooms again; right on top, often little private quarters for the owner of the house where he may enjoy most fresh air. Each floor has a double set of windows, a large one down to the floor and a small square one for ventilation above, up against the ceiling, so that there are continual draughts running through the top of the room. Practically all rooms have windows on two sides, and with this and the thick walls and the smooth plaster they remain pleasantly cool.

The lower floors are usually the loftiest; even the ground floor store rooms are up to 12 and 13 feet high. The house often has two entrances—a large door for the men and a little one for the ladies, with separate stairs in the larger houses, even in Shibam where land is scarce. The façades are in rough mud brick, a uniform brown colour with a white plaster smooth base and white ornaments round windows and parapet, getting richer towards the top of the house, which is the best part of it.

Their plasterwork is one of their great arts. It is extraordinarily hard. To obtain this it is presumed to be mixed with date juice. When polished with a piece of flint and rubbed with a cloth for hours it acquires a lustre that makes it shine like marble. This is chiefly done inside the main rooms and in the washrooms and stairs. Outside it is only polished at the base, for water to run off. The ornamentation of the upper storeys is left rough white. But as people’s wealth increased they have abandoned this form of very characteristic decoration, which divided the tall buildings in broad brown bands alternating with narrow white bands at window level.

Now they cover the building in white plaster all over, and the charming ornamentation in darts and trefoils is lost.

The oldest building in Shibam, the castle, which may be anything from 80 to 150 years old, still shows this decoration in horizontal bands of white round the windows. It seems an old bedouin tradition, for I have found it in remote bedouin villages. So all these old, charming and vigorous forms—dart motifs, broad bands, crenellated terraces, carved and nail-studded doors and graceful mucharabias for the ladies to look down into the street from the high terraces—are being abandoned. The present-day Hadhrami thinks them old-fashioned and copies the Indian and pseudo-Classic styles he has seen in Java and Singapore. Niches are filled in; and instead of the flat, low relief white ornaments (all shapes receding because the mud crumbles and the yearly rainfalls wash them away) we now find entablatures, pediments, balusters and pilasters, designed for much more lasting materials, like stone, and which here soon become shabby.

Shibam, the old-fashioned, has only just begun to suffer from this. Going, also, is one of the amenities of the Arab house: the coffee corner. In almost every room and terrace there was a little dais in a cool and shaded corner by a window where the master or mistress sat to make coffee for the guests. In the walls behind the dais there were niches specially shaped to take the pestle and mortar, the charcoal tin, the cups, and a small cupboard to lock away the precious ingredients—coffee, ginger and sugar. On the window-sill there was often a tall jar for the water and a runnel for waste water to flow away. Instead of these we now find the tea ceremony round the samovar in the middle of the floor, the little dais being broken away.

But we now move to the most fashionable of the Hadhramaut towns—to Saiywun and Terim and the many surrounding small towns. Here one finds a different type of people. There are many merchants too, but here we find another leading class, also great landowners in Java and Singapore. These are Sayyids, members of the eighty holy families, descendants of Mohammed, who live in these towns beside the lower classes. They have been the spiritual and temporal lords of the country for centuries. They have authority in matters of justice and civil affairs, and they are believed to have healing gifts. Until recently they were the undisputed rulers of the country. Now their power wanes before more democratic forms.

These people live in shining white palaces in the manner of *grands seigneurs*. They wear long white silk coats or the Indian silk longie and pastel-shaded shirts. The ladies, up till recently, wore heavy satin embroidered and sequin-covered kimono-like gowns, bunched into a low silver belt round the hips. Now these are forbidden as they cannot be washed. They wear their hair in hundreds of fine plaits. Up to the age of eight little girls may show face and hair, then they cover hair and neck with a close-fitting shawl and at twelve they go into purdah completely.

Their houses are built in a solid square block without inner courtyard and with windows on all four sides. Even the old streets are fairly wide in these towns that lie in the foothills. The more modern houses are surrounded by a walled garden. They are completely divided into two, one

half for the men and one for the women, each with their entrance, kitchen, store rooms and granary on the ground floor, reception rooms and wash-rooms on the first floor, and more private apartments with washrooms on the second floor. There may be a third floor with terrace rooms, but usually not more.

Although the span of the ceiling beams is quite small, as everywhere else (about six feet, determined by the maximum size of timber available), many of the rooms in these houses are very large, being divided up by two, four, six or nine pillars. They have rows of three or four windows, some even more, on two sides. The floors are covered with carpets, and cushions against the walls are the only form of furnishing. There will be niches with cups, silver samovars and brass trays; other niches with some books; and a few large flat basket-trays hung on the walls, from which one eats. But that is absolutely all that is needed. There are large wall closets for clothing and for bedding, the normal place to sleep being the floor. But there is no difference between a living-room and a sleeping apartment. Each room serves for either purpose in turn, the men and the women being separate. Nor are there clothes for the night and clothes for the day, though the men wear beautifully laundered clothes, frequently changed.

Washrooms consist of a spacious compartment, with glazed plaster walls with niches and pegs for clothing. Near the window stands a tall jar with water and a scoop for showering oneself. The water runs out under the window through a runnel and gutter. Some washrooms have a shower tank. The washroom may contain a lavatory of the south continental, foot-rest type, or this may be in an entirely separate spacious compartment. Each floor has at least two. Besides this the Saywun and Terim house has a little "roman" bath for complete ablution about 10 feet square, and which is usually near the private prayer-room.

Another pleasant characteristic of the Saywun house is that in the large corridor that runs from one side of the house to the other; in front of the window at the coolest end there is usually a corner for drinking-water skins to hang up in a cooling draught. Niches for cups are at hand, and again there is a runnel for the water dripping from the skin to run outside. The same arrangement is found on most terraces. Upper rooms are used in summer, lower rooms in winter for warmth, for there is no glass in the windows and only ill-fitting wood shutters to keep out the night air.

All these amenities will be found on a small scale in the most modest houses. The house of the dhobbi had three floors. It contained about four living-rooms, two washrooms, a kitchen and a store. So that where space is concerned the Hadhrami house does not compare unfavourably with European standards.

A film showing Hadhramaut buildings was followed by a vote of thanks to the lecturer.

ANNUAL MEETING

THE Annual General Meeting of the Society was held at the Hall of the Royal Society of Arts, 6, John Adam Street, Adelphi, W.C.2, on Thursday, June 25, 1953.

The President, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., was in the chair, and the Anniversary Lecture was given by Mr. W. H. Ingrams, C.M.G., O.B.E., who spoke on "Hong Kong and its Place in the Far East."

The PRESIDENT, on taking the chair, called on Colonel H. W. TOBIN, D.S.O., O.B.E., to read the Honorary Secretaries' Report.

HONORARY SECRETARIES' REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1952-53

Since the last Annual Meeting the Society has suffered the loss of its Chairman, Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., and of its Secretary, Miss Rachel Wingate. General Sir John Shea will express the deep sense of loss that we all feel in his Presidential Address. Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., has taken over the office of Chairman of Council.

One hundred and thirteen new members joined the Society this year, a slight decrease on the previous year's numbers. The number of resignations unfortunately shows a considerable increase, being 106, but, on the other hand, 432 members have increased their rate of subscription voluntarily in response to our appeal, and 188 have signed new Deeds of Covenant. In addition to the resignations the membership of another 48 has lapsed through non-payment of their subscriptions, bringing the total membership down to 1,767.

We regret to report the death of thirty-nine members, among whom was Colonel W. G. Elphinston, who had been a member of the Society for twenty-six years and served as a Member of Council and as a Vice-President from 1947 to 1952.

Twenty-one lectures were held during the year. These included seven on South-East Asia and the Far East; four on the Near East, including two on Israel, one of which was given by H.E. Elisha Elath on Population Problems; two on Arabia; and three on Persia, including Dr. Lockhart's talk on the Causes of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute. H.R.H. Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark gave an account of the work of the Third Danish Expedition to Central Asia and the Tibetan Border, illustrated by some very impressive coloured films. His Beatitude the Patriarch Mar Eshai Shimun lectured on the Assyrians in the Middle East.

We should like to acknowledge the help of the local honorary secretaries and other members of the Society in furthering its work and bringing in new recruits, and we hope that recruitment during the coming year will make up for the fall in total membership during the last year.

The Annual Dinner was held on July 16 last, with the President, General Sir John Shea, presiding, and the guests of the Society were Admiral of the Fleet Sir John and Lady Cunningham, Sir William and

Lady Fraser, Mr. and Mrs. John Rogers, and Mr. and Mrs. Chester Wilmot.

THE HONORARY TREASURER'S REPORT

Major E. AINGER presented the accounts and the Honorary Treasurer's report as follows :

I think I might say that the accounts for the year ending last December have fulfilled the best hopes of the Council.

You will see from the balance sheet there was an excess of income over expenditure last year of over £400 instead of a deficit of over £175 as there was the year before. Besides this our claim for repayment of tax has risen from £280 to £475, which gives some indication of the extent to which members have responded to the Council's appeal for subscriptions under Deed of Covenant.

You will see, too, from the income and expenditure account that our internal expenditure appears to be approaching stabilization; as regards our external expenditure, the cost of the Journal, too, is not much greater than it was last year, a fact which to some extent is accounted for by the fall in paper costs.

I have left perhaps the most important point in our income and expenditure accounts until last—that is, the substantial rise in the figures for donations received. For this, as Treasurer, I would like to render the thanks of the Society to the generous donors—the Boards of many of the great companies trading in the East. We particularly welcome this as an indication that they appreciate the efforts which this Society is making to be of greater help to the junior members of their staffs, thus assisting them to play an increasingly important role in those areas in which the Society has always been interested. We earnestly hope that these efforts will be to the mutual benefit of our country and of those countries in which these young men work.

I would in the normal course also have added my tribute to the way in which Miss Wingate and her staff have worked on the side of the Society's affairs which concern me, and despite the very great loss we have suffered by Miss Wingate's death I still wish to render my usual and very sincere tribute to the help she herself and all her staff gave me during the past year.

I now propose that the accounts for 1952 be adopted.

Mr. O. WHITE formally seconded the motion, and the accounts were adopted without discussion.

ELECTION OF COUNCIL AND OFFICERS FOR 1953-54

The PRESIDENT announced that the Council had elected for the ensuing year: As Chairman of Council, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B.; as Vice-Chairman, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, G.C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.; as Vice-Presidents, Dr. Ethel J. Lindgren, M.A., V. Purcell, Esq., C.M.G., Ph.D.; as Hon. Vice-President, Right Hon. Lord Hailey, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E.

The PRESIDENT announced that the Council had recommended the following to fill vacancies for the ensuing year: As Honorary Secretary,

W. H. Ingrams, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.; as Honorary Treasurer, Major Edward Ainger; as Members of the Council, The Right Hon. Lord Birdwood, M.V.O., C. A. P. Southwell, Esq., C.B.E., M.C., V. L. Walter, Esq., C.B.E.

Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT proposed that these members be elected *en bloc*, adding: Two Vice-Presidents have retired, Brig.-General S. V. Weston and Mr. C. J. Edmonds, who retire automatically. In addition, General Sir Bernard Paget has asked not to be re-elected for the Council. This leaves three vacancies on the Council to be filled.

Lord Birdwood, like his father, is a soldier and he was in the Indian Army until he retired, since when he has done a good deal of public work. Mr. Southwell is Managing Director of the Kuwait Oil Company, and Mr. Walter was for many years Managing Director of the British Bank of the Middle East in Persia.

Mr. C. J. EDMONDS seconded the motion and it was carried unanimously.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

The PRESIDENT, commenting on the death of Admiral Sir Howard Kelly and Miss R. O. Wingate, said: We have suffered such serious losses this year that it is indeed difficult to refer to them without emotion. Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, our Chairman, and Miss Rachel Wingate, our Secretary, in addition to their personal attributes, were as a team a remarkable combination. They worked most successfully in happy co-operation.

Admiral Kelly was a superb Chairman. Not only did he give very wise advice to his Council but was indefatigable in working for the interests of the Society. When he was quite a young naval officer he decided that he would perfect himself in French. He did so, and that had a marked effect on his subsequent career, for we found him in the Naval Intelligence of the Admiralty, a Liaison Officer in Paris, and British Representative for two years on the League of Nations. Lord Cork in his "In Memoriam" in the January, 1953, Journal traced his career, as also did the obituary notice which appeared in *The Times*. If you have read them you will find it hard to decide whether this accomplished sailor, of whose merit in his profession Lord Cork has spoken, was a greater sailor or a greater diplomat, for he was unquestionably most successful in the diplomatic field.

Perhaps I may be permitted to recall two instances. Admiral Sir Howard Kelly was appointed Commander-in-Chief China in 1930 and in 1931. Then began the long struggle between China and Japan, and the situation about the International Treaty Port of Shanghai was very delicate indeed. The Admiral's object was to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in that neighbourhood, and by his determined attitude and his visits in turn to the rival Commanders he was able to gain their confidence and to prevent the outbreak of hostilities at that period. But I always think that a more difficult and delicate situation was after he had retired, when he was recalled to work which specially suited him. Sir Andrew Cunningham in his book said: "My application to have a Senior Naval Officer at Ankara was accepted and Admiral Kelly was appointed as Liaison Officer

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W.1.

BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1952

	LIABILITIES.							ASSETS.					
1951	£		s.		d.		1951	£		s.		d.	
£							£						
	I. Capital Funds:							I. Capital Fund Investments (at cost):					
	Life Subscription Account 267 5 0							Persia Fund					
	Add: Amount received in 1952 60 0 0							£531 6s. 7d. 3 per cent. Saving Bonds					
267					327 5 0		537					537 1 6	
	Entrance Fee Account .. 1,115 18 0							General Funds					
	Add: Fees received in 1952 101 0 0							£280 12s. 0d. 3 per cent. Savings					
1,116					1,216 18 0		284					283 18 7	
600	Legacy Account 600 0 0							£1,405 0s. 0d. 3 per cent. Defence					
	Lawrence of Arabia Medal							Bonds, 4th Issue 1,407 1 2					
96	Fund 96 11 0							Post Office Savings Bank					
578	Persia Fund 578 4 10							No. 2 Account: £ s. d.					
	Sykes Medal Fund .. 150 0 0							Sykes Medal Fund .. 161 9 11					
	Add: Accumulated							Persia Fund .. 45 8 0					
	Interest 11 9 11							General Funds .. 166 17 9					
158					161 9 11		2,593					373 15 8	
70	Investment Reserve Fund 69 17 11							Note:					
2,885					3,050 6 8		The Market Value of the above Investments at 31st December 1952 was approximately £2,463.						
	II. Income and Expenditure Account:							II. Fixed Assets:					
	Deficit, 1st January 1952 176 13 3							Society Premises Account:					
	Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year to date 419 0 3							Balance as at 1st January 1948 .. 110 19 3					
177					242 7 0			Additional Expenditure since that date 31 6 0					
	III. Liabilities:						142					142 5 3	
200	Loans from Members free of Interest .. - - -							III. Current Assets:					
422	Sundry Creditors 496 5 2							Income Tax Repayment Claim .. 480 4 0					
					496 5 2		284					10 16 0	
£3,330					£3,788 18 10			Cash: Post Office Savings £ s. d.					
								Bank No. 1 Account .. 410 5 4					
								Cash at Bank and in hand 143 11 4					
												553 16 8	
					£3,788 18 10							1,044 16 8	
					£3,330							£3,788 18 10	

AUDITORS' REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

We have examined the above Balance Sheet and have obtained all the information and explanations that we have required. In our opinion such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the Society's affairs, according to the best of our information and explanations given us and as shown by the books of the Society.

DASHWOOD HOUSE,
OLD BROAD STREET, LONDON, E.C.2.

WILLIAMS, DYSON, JONES & CO.
(Chartered Accountants).

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W.1.
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1952.

1951	EXPENDITURE.	£	s.	d.
£	Office Expenses:			
1,108	Salaries and National Insurance	1,348	12	2
127	Rent, Light and Heat	126	6	5
17	Telephone	18	10	1
281	Stationery and Printing	116	11	7
59	Postages	169	11	3
212	Cleaning and Upkeep of Premises	225	10	11
10	Audit Fee	10	10	0
6	Insurances	6	5	7
14	Bank Charges and Cheque Books	12	3	3
23	Sundry Expenses	34	17	10
		<hr/>		
1,857		2,068	19	1
	<i>Less:</i>			
200	Contribution from Palestine Exploration Fund ..	200	0	0
		<hr/>		
1,657		1,868	19	1
	Journal:	£	s.	d.
935	Printing	969	19	4
63	Postages	50	1	11
53	Reporting	81	17	6
		<hr/>		
		1,101	18	9
194	Lectures and Study Group	175	0	9
5	Library	4	17	8
42	Legal and Professional Expenses	47	5	0
6	Persia Fund Lecture and Subscription to "Iraq" ..	6	16	0
		<hr/>		
2,955		3,204	17	3
	Excess of Income over Expenditure carried to Balance Sheet	419	0	3
197		<hr/>		
<u>£2,758</u>		<u>£3,623</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>6</u>

1951	INCOME.	£	s.	d.
£				
1,917	Subscriptions	2,155	17	2
249	Journal Subscriptions and Sales	356	9	8
	Interest Received:	£	s.	d.
51	Government Securities (net)	54	18	10
20	Post Office Savings Bank	22	9	2
		<hr/>		
		77	8	0
284	Income Tax Repayment Claim	475	1	11
110	Donations Received	557	3	2
27	Sundry Receipts	1	17	7
100	Contribution received from Members of the Dinner Club ..	-	-	-
		<hr/>		
<u>£2,758</u>		<u>£3,623</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>6</u>

with the Turks. There never was a better choice, for in the years to come he was a tower of strength. His imposing presence and his perfect knowledge of the French language soon made him *persona grata* with the Turks." And Lord Cork has told us that the Admiral was successful in gaining the friendship and the confidence of what Lord Cork calls "the political recluse, Field-Marshal Fedzi Chakmak." Thus you will realize that the Admiral occupied a unique position in the estimation of the Turks, and it must have been very difficult for him vis-à-vis the British Ambassador. That Admiral Sir Howard Kelly managed his difficult task so successfully and without friction is indeed a great tribute to him. You will remember that Sir Andrew Cunningham referred to Sir Howard's "imposing presence." I can imagine him so well in command of a ship or of a fleet, when nothing but the highest standard of duty or the strictest discipline would satisfy him. But underneath it all, and in spite sometimes of a certain cynical turn of phrase, there beat a very generous heart, and only his intimate friends knew how much attention he paid to the feelings and opinions of others. Though he would have endeavoured to conceal it, I think he would have been gratified and touched by the large concourse of his old comrades, and indeed of many others, who came to pay their last tribute of respect at his memorial service.

Miss Wingate's death came as a real shock to us all. She was to have come up to occupy a seat to view the Coronation procession, and two days before that event her sister sent a message to say that Miss Wingate had a very heavy cold and that the doctor had refused to allow her to come. Then they sent her to hospital so that she might be really carefully nursed and looked after, and I am assured that the expectation of her recovery was great, when suddenly, alas, her heart gave out and she died quite unexpectedly. We all do most bitterly feel her loss, because not only did Miss Wingate serve the Society very well but she was our friend.

She came to the Society as permanent Secretary in 1945, and in 1947, when the Society moved to its present office, 2, Hinde Street, she became also Assistant Secretary of the Palestine Exploration Fund. Miss Wingate was indeed well equipped for those offices because she had a knowledge of oriental countries and languages. She had spent five years with the Swedish Mission in Kashgar and Yarkand. She had taught in a school at Ramallah in Palestine. She had maintained her contacts with Central Asian countries, and when she returned to London she was an assistant secretary at the School of Oriental Languages; and in collaboration with the then Director, Sir E. Denison Ross, she produced the only Turki-English Dictionary.

But beyond all this was her remarkable character. Her courage and her determination were shown by the fact that when she went to work with the Swedish Mission in Kashgar and Yarkand she took six weeks to get there, riding on horseback often above the snow line. When in 1932 the rebellion in Kashgar turned out the Mission she returned to India by the very difficult Gilgit route, and was the only European in the party. Miss Wingate was, indeed, a woman of a very lovable nature. She had a wide human understanding and sympathy, and all these sterling qualities which she possessed were based on a profound and sure religious faith.

HONG KONG AND ITS PLACE IN THE FAR EAST

By HAROLD INGRAMS, C.M.G., O.B.E.

Anniversary Lecture delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on June 25, 1953, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

IN a world in which more and more people who live in colonies are becoming nationalist minded and showing a dislike of colonial status, it is refreshing to contemplate an important colony which not only seems to like it (if its apparent lack of any marked enthusiasm for constitutional advance is any criterion) but in circumstances of peculiar difficulty makes a tremendous success of itself, and is indeed very much of a show place.

The circumstances of Hong Kong are, however, so different from those of any other colony that I do not think it is possible for those who regret the natural aspirations of the inhabitants of other colonies to run their own affairs to find any clue in Hong Kong which could suggest that, if the methods of Hong Kong were employed elsewhere, things might be otherwise.

The reason is to be found principally in the make-up of the population and its outlook. This has, for the past few years, been enormous: about $2\frac{1}{4}$ million packed into 391 square miles and mostly into the city and island of Hong Kong, 32 square miles, and the city of Kowloon. The population in these two cities is, of course, overwhelmingly Chinese in number, but they can claim to be very cosmopolitan as well, for even if the actual proportion of other races is small, the non-Chinese play a tremendously important part in Hong Kong affairs. There are some 10,000 citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies and of Commonwealth citizens. Of these about 2,500 are Indians whose former homes are now either in India or Pakistan. The figure does not include members of the armed forces and their families. There are 3,000 British subjects of Portuguese origin and about 2,000 aliens, chiefly continental Europeans, Americans, and Portuguese born in the Far East. Of course, there are a number of other colonies with populations as mixed, but in most cases a substantial proportion of each element regards itself as being citizens of the colony with a stake in it, even if they are not yet fully prepared to look on members of other elements as full fellow citizens with equal rights.

In Hong Kong only the British Portuguese, the Eurasians, and an undetermined number of Hong Kong born Chinese are prepared to say, "This is my home, my native land." The total number is perhaps as little as 10,000 and, though some people would put the figure as high as 100,000, whatever it is it is only a small proportion of the total population. These people certainly want to remain British, and if there were more of them they might no doubt develop a nationalist movement. As things are, they prefer a crown colony régime under which their way of life is not

threatened by any other larger group. The Indians, too, are probably mostly British in sympathy, having a loyalty, I fancy, rather to the abstract Britain represented to them by the spirit of the old régime in India rather than to Hong Kong. The British, of course, are mostly expatriates who look forward to retirement at home and would probably wish to see Hong Kong remain under the crown colony system.

But the really determining factor in Hong Kong's political future is the enormous Chinese population and in the Chinese character itself. This latter is the really important thing. If the ordinary Cantonese could have his way, he does not want to be bothered with politics at all. He is primarily a cheerful, industrious individualist and realist. He wants nothing better than to be allowed to work and make money for himself and his family with as little interference as possible. He regards everything, his Government, even his gods and his religious system, from the standpoint of how they benefit him. If they do that he appreciates them: if they do not, he discards them or does his best to keep out of their way. He takes the negative Confucian attitude over his neighbours: "Don't do to others what you would not have them do to you." He believes in minding his own business and does not think his neighbour's is any concern of his. One of the proverbs most frequently quoted to me by Chinese was "Sweep the snow from your own doorstep, but don't bother about the ice on your neighbour's roof."

The Chinese pride of race is, I think, a secondary characteristic because Hong Kong seems to show that if it is not offended, the Chinese is ready to let his realism decide whether it is better to live under one flag or another. He would certainly prefer it to be a Chinese flag if life under it was at least no worse for the satisfaction of his primary desires than under another. But it is extremely important to remember Chinese racial pride: and when one considers Chinese civilization and culture and the length of time it has endured, it is more than obvious they have something to be proud about.

These days, of course, it is no more possible for the Chinese to keep free of politics than it is for us. Even the Bedouin in his desert and the African in his forest has little more success. The present pressure of politics gives at least some Chinese the choice of a life under a Communist régime or being in Hong Kong under the British flag. By far the greatest number of Chinese in Hong Kong are temporary migrants who have come there because it offers a better chance of survival than outside. They can make a better living there and they do not experience more interference from Government than is essential. They can also look to Government for security and to the law to see that their rights are protected. If you are interested in business—and what Chinese is not?—a place where a contract is respected is a good place. But this preference for Hong Kong does not make them into Hong Kong citizens with a Hong Kong-British loyalty. Their pride of race forbids this and, since they are realists, they are never quite sure which way the cat will finally jump, so they sit on the fence.

As regards the Hong Kong-born Chinese, a few, as I have said, are largely British in sympathy, but for the most part their race gives China pride of place in their hearts, even if their intellects are with us. They

regard Hong Kong as part of China, but for many reasons would not wish to see it under any but British rule. Some of these belong to the reform movement which does look for constitutional advance on the lines of that granted to so many colonies; but theirs is not a very strong movement. Although the way has been open for Hong Kong to have a new constitution since the war was over, no marked enthusiasm for it has been shown. Last October the Secretary of State announced in Parliament that he had authorized the increase of Elected Members on the Urban Council from two to four, but that, after consultation with the Governor, he thought the time was inopportune for major constitutional changes.

So you see that for different reasons most sections of Hong Kong opinion much prefer that Hong Kong should remain as it is. There is little likelihood of a strong Hong Kong nationalism developing in any foreseeable period.

Hong Kong's development as a highly successful colony under a crown colony system of government stems, of course, from its rôle as a trading port. I shall have something to say about its trade later, for that has a great bearing on its place in the Far East; but at the moment I should like to say something about its career as a colony.

Hong Kong owed its origin to the fact that the British and Chinese differed as to the methods under which trade could be successfully carried on. British merchants, all of them free traders, did not like Chinese restrictions on the way they were to trade, and as British they found the regulations which governed their life in Canton degrading. Hong Kong was occupied not, as the first official despatch from the Colonial Office said, with a view to colonization, but for diplomatic, commercial, and military purposes. The main purposes were, of course, commercial: it was in the early days useful for diplomatic purposes for much the same reasons as for commercial. The military purposes were to defend it as a trading port. The British went into the barren island which Hong Kong then was and said it was open to anyone to come there and trade in the British way. It was a typically British compromise.

The Chinese accepted the invitation and came each year in increasing numbers. Hong Kong prospered because British and Chinese found that their ideas of the conditions in which trade could prosper were essentially the same. It adopted, and has clung to ever since as far as it could, a free trade policy, and this fits in exactly with the Chinese character as much as it does with that of the British merchant. British and Chinese together have made Hong Kong what it is and neither partner could have done without the other. British initiative, Chinese industriousness, and their common instinct for trade have been equally indispensable in their mutual co-operation.

So for a hundred years in the spirit of this co-operation Hong Kong grew and prospered. There were serious setbacks in the early days, but they were overcome and the general tendency was always upwards and onwards. Hong Kong's path was never entirely smooth because it depended for its prosperity on external circumstances entirely beyond its control. It was at the mercy of every wind that blew: it could never dictate to outside influences, it could only attract. Its prosperity always

depended in great degree on trade with China, and since it was always useful to China it always survived. It grew to $1\frac{1}{2}$ million by 1941.

On Christmas Day of that year Hong Kong was occupied. It was as though an extinguisher had been suddenly put on a brightly burning light. Three years and eight months later the extinguisher was taken off and the light again lit. It burnt, of course, dimly at first, but in the few years which have elapsed since August, 1945, it has burnt more brightly than ever before. When the British Pacific fleet sailed into the harbour on August 30 with Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt to assume the military administration of the colony, they found that the ex-internees of the Government Service who had been released a few days before had already at least applied the match to the wick.

It was a challenging situation which met the new administration. The population was down to 600,000, and 80 per cent. of them showed signs of malnutrition. There was ruin everywhere. But there was the one supreme asset. "At no time," it was reported, "did the public mind waver from its initial confidence in a golden future for the colony and its people." They set to and cleared things up, and then they started not only rebuilding but extensive new building. They built not only in the literal sense but in every field of a community's activities.

The building in the literal sense has been quite spectacular. We went over one new primary school which any Educational Authority in this country would have been glad to have. It accommodated one school of 500 children each morning and another each afternoon. It had been built by the colony's Public Works Department in thirteen weeks. They also built the new Queen's College—a secondary school for 900 boys—in twenty-one weeks. We saw one large seven-storey Victorian office block demolished in a week or two, and I see in the 1952 annual report a picture of the modern thirteen-storey block which has been completed on the site. The extent of the building since the war has quite transformed the look of the colony.

Achievements in other fields are no less remarkable. Early in 1950 Hong Kong felt that it was pretty well equipped to deal with about a million inhabitants; but for about four years now it has had to deal with double that number. The estimated population has remained fairly steadily at $2\frac{1}{2}$ million over the last two years. Accommodation and overcrowding therefore still remain major problems.

Three years ago when I studied Hong Kong, the extra million plus tucked itself away into old and insanitary tenements and new but equally insanitary squatter colonies. In the former people lived at approximately one family to 64 square feet of floor area and eight or more families shared a kitchen and latrine. In some I saw the kitchen and latrine were even combined. The squatter colonies could spring up almost overnight on any available hillside. They had no legal existence, but they were otherwise very much there. Some of them held as many inhabitants as a reasonably sized town, and they included squatter factories, cinemas, shops, and even fire brigades. There had even been squatter colonies on roof tops, but these had been suppressed earlier.

At first, of course, Hong Kong hoped that the problem of population

would be solved in a natural way by the settling down of things in China and the consequent return of its surplus population. Since, however, this has not happened, Hong Kong seems to have got down to the task of fitting itself to deal with a permanent population much larger than anything it had previously anticipated.

As its population increases Hong Kong embarks on fresh water schemes. Its existing reservoirs hold 5,970 million gallons. It has started building another to supply an extra seven million gallons a day. About 40 per cent. of Hong Kong Island's water has to come from the mainland, and it crosses the harbour in submarine pipes. Big housing schemes have now been embarked upon, and in each of the last two years an increasing number of families with a limited income who would otherwise be housed in slums in tenement houses or squatter colonies are getting the chance to moving into small flats of modern design. In January, 1952, Government announced a resettlement policy for squatter colonies, and considerable progress has been made in it. The scheme includes the resettlement of squatter industrial workshops, scope for the development of cottage and home industries, schools, and welfare centres. By the end of the year twenty-six factories were operating or under construction, and 2,900 huts, housing about 3,900 families, had been removed. Fire, of course, was a major danger in these squatter areas: there were seven major fires in squatter areas during the year, in which 15,000 people were involved. All these were given the opportunity of resettlement.

Fire is, of course, one of the gravest dangers to these squatter colonies: but perhaps the possible health dangers to the colony are even greater. Cleansing Augean stables would be child's play to the Hong Kong health department and Urban Council, but it would take me too long to quote statistics and explain their significance. However, although the general overcrowding led to an increase of such diseases as enteric fever, diphtheria, and tuberculosis, there was a reduced incidence of these notifiable diseases, and the case fatality in a number of such diseases has shown dramatic falls from 1946 to 1952—*e.g.*, enteric fever from 50 per cent. to 12·8 per cent. Dysentery from 38·5 per cent. to 15·9 per cent. Tuberculosis from 65·9 per cent. to 24·1 per cent. There was only one case of small-pox last year, and there has not been a case of plague for years and years.

The medical and health achievement in Hong Kong is indeed very great. Infantile mortality, which was 617 a thousand in 1935, in 1940, 327 a thousand, in 1946, 89·1, in 1950, 99·6, was in 1952, 77·1. Hospital beds have been increased to 4,337.

The way Hong Kong has coped with increasing demands for education since the war is illustrated by some more remarkable figures. At the end of 1950 there were 162,000 children in primary and secondary schools, and the number of children estimated not to be in school was 50,000. In 1951 there were over 187,000 children in school, and in 1952 another 20,000 were taken in. Government expenditure on education rose from nine million dollars in 1947/48 to an estimated twenty-five million dollars for 1952/53.

And it is interesting to note that Government has recently done much to improve education for citizenship in schools. Indeed, a great deal has been done in the last few years to make the people of Hong Kong more

conscious of civic duties. One of the most interesting developments in recent years is in the field of community development. There is a Cantonese word "Kai Fong" which means "neighbours," "responsible citizens" or "elders," and for centuries there was a significant amount of communal service undertaken by Kai Fongs in urban society in South China. On this traditional basis Hong Kong has developed Kai Fong welfare associations to deal with free schools and clinics, recruitment for St. John Ambulance Brigade, provide children's playgrounds and so on. By December, 1949, there were four associations. At the end of the following year there were fourteen associations with 53,800 members, and at the end of last year, twenty associations with 209,400 members.

This, I think, shows how wrong it would be dogmatically to insist that the Chinese *cannot* learn to live and work in the spirit of a positive democracy. As evidence that they probably can, I myself place even more stress on all that has been done in recent years by Chinese themselves and in co-operation with Europeans in the field of social welfare. I found the youth and child welfare work being undertaken in Hong Kong moving and inspiring. Much that has been done—and it would take me far too long to record it satisfactorily—has stemmed from people like those whom Military Government in the early days of the liberation described as dedicating themselves to public service. They were mostly lowly paid Government servants who called themselves the Endeavourers. They gave their spare time, and more than their spare cash, to run welfare work, and Military Government described them as a "shining example."

I should not be at all surprised to find that Hong Kong was approaching democracy in our sense with a Chinese realism by practising it first and thus discovering its value. In due course perhaps they will find that there is a greater relevance to the spirit of its practice in such of its forms as universal suffrage, parliamentary and local Government, than they have suspected.

All these developments in social services are very much a feature of post-war Hong Kong, and credit is due not only to the Hong Kong Government, but to many private organizations and to individuals as well: as much to people with only moderate means but a great sense of personal service as to wealthy philanthropists with a great sense of charity. There is no doubt that Hong Kong is doing a lot to show a considerable number of Chinese that there is a better way of life than Communism—and a better way too than the graft-ridden régime of Chiang Kai Shek.

The organization of post-war Hong Kong has become much more like that of a normal colony. Pre-war it had not even an Agricultural Department. The Department was formed in 1946, and its growth and development have been very rapid. It is interesting to note that the first acting head of the Department was a Jesuit priest, Father Ryan, who is the superior of the Order in Hong Kong and well known to everybody who knows the colony. If I started to bring personalities into this talk, there would be very many names I ought to mention; but there seems to me something so striking and out of the ordinary about the way in which a team of Jesuit priests helps the colony that an exception is perhaps justified.

One of them, Father McCarthy, is a chemist, and he has done much in

experimentation for the Agricultural Department to make night soil a safe fertilizer. Another priest, Father O'Dwyer, is unofficial Adviser on Co-operatives. He was sent round the world to study them at Vatican expense, and when I was in Hong Kong he spent his time advising the Vegetable Marketing Organization. In 1947, the first full year of its life, this Organization handled 19,427 tons of local vegetables and 7,658 tons of imported. In 1952 the figures were 46,043 tons of local vegetables and 12,071 tons of imported. Others of this remarkable team include a professor of economics at the University, and an expert on drama who has done much to popularize Chinese opera in translation and also produces a first-class magazine for the colony. Another, Father Morahan, makes a very fine unofficial District Commissioner, and has done much to increase a civic spirit amongst the fishermen of Aberdeen and Aplichau Island.

The Agricultural Department does much by demonstration, and the quality and quantity of rice produced has been increased; vegetable growing has been developed as the figures I have just indicated show, and much has been done to improve poultry and pigs. This helps to increase the amount of food locally produced, though of course Hong Kong could never hope to produce all its own food requirements. It grows about 20,000 tons of rice, and its pig population, when I was there in 1950, was something over 30,000. It consumed in 1952 about 250,000 tons of rice, and no fewer than 695,658 pigs.

Talking of Co-operatives reminds me that, although it is not easy to induce the individualist Chinese to be a good co-operator, very considerable progress has been made in that field; and the Vegetable Marketing Organization and the Fish Marketing Organization will in due course become Co-operative concerns. This latter Organization is entirely self-supporting, and it has been planned so that it may eventually be taken over by fishermen and run by them.

In this way also the Chinese in Hong Kong are learning how democratic institutions can work and benefit them. The Fish Marketing Organization, which started after the war, has handled an ever-increasing quantity of fresh fish. In 1946 the figure was 1,904 tons, and in 1952 it was 26,380 tons, thanks to improved methods of handling and to restrictions placed by the Kwangtung authorities on the import of salt or dried fish from Hong Kong. The quantity of salt and dried fish produced has been reduced considerably, and it is now all for local consumption. In 1946 the figure was 12,592 tons, and in 1952 it was 8,067 tons.

An important section of Hong Kong's population, of course, lives its whole life on the water. The number of the boat people is probably about 200,000. There are over 17,000 junks and sampans registered in Hong Kong. Not only do the boat people contribute notably to Hong Kong's food supplies by meeting practically all its requirements in fish, but of course they carry a good deal of Hong Kong's foreign trade. The junks are built there, and junk building is one of Hong Kong's oldest industries.

Although Hong Kong has always had industries, they were never really of major importance until comparatively recent years. The 1914-18 war encouraged the establishment of light industries to produce goods which could not then be obtained from Europe, and imperial preference

in the 1930s gave industry a stimulus and induced local manufacturers to compete in world markets. But the expansion of industry since 1946 has been really spectacular. Local industry now produces about 25 per cent. of all Hong Kong's exports, and there are some 1,500 registered factories manufacturing a wide variety of articles, from rubber shoes to rattan ware and fire-crackers.

Heavy industry is, of course, mainly represented by shipbuilding, for Hong Kong can build vessels up to 10,000 tons. During the first two years of the Second World War it made a substantial contribution in the form of locally built ships. I suppose the oldest of the light industries of Hong Kong are such picturesque things as preserved ginger (whose popularity owed much to Queen Victoria's fondness for it), the making of joss-sticks and fire-crackers and such like things. I saw a pleasant old water-wheel which ground the scented herbs used for making the joss-sticks. Sugar refining and rope manufacturing are old-established industries, and the Green Island Cement Company started work in 1889.

The manufacture of textiles is now one of Hong Kong's most important industries, and it has machinery some of which is better than any in England. The industry employs 30,000 people and covers all processes, including cotton, silk and wool spinning, weaving, knitting, dyeing, finishing and printing. It also includes the manufacture of made-up garments such as shirts, pyjamas, and underclothing.

Eight thousand workers in sixty factories produce a good many of the rubber shoes and boots we use in this country, and we also take a good many of the electric torches which Hong Kong makes. In 1952 it turned out two million dozen; and it makes torch batteries and torch bulbs, too. Enamel ware, vacuum flasks and jugs, paint, aluminium ware, and hurricane lanterns are all made in Hong Kong, and there has been a considerable expansion of the plastic industry—not only the ordinary domestic things we all know are made, but also the traditional Chinese things, such as chopsticks and mahjong sets. But, of course, it is still in the field of commerce that Hong Kong has its greatest pre-eminence.

As I said earlier, the very reason for Hong Kong's existence was as a trading post, and a trading post it has always been. It has always been a well-managed one, a first-class departmental store for the Far East. This has had its educational value, for it has taught the Far East a great deal about Western methods of commerce and the principles on which honest business must be run. But it put business first for a very long time; *laissez-faire* and enlightened self-interest were its guiding principles, and Adam Smith and Bentham its major prophets. To some extent no doubt they still are; Chinese politicians quote Adam Smith in the Legislative Council, and Hong Kong has still a good deal to do before it can claim that social conditions are anything like all they should be. But what has been achieved in a few years and is still being achieved, is, I think, one of the most remarkable things in the history of colonial development.

All this apart, however, Hong Kong's trading rôle is an indispensable one—to us, to Hong Kong itself (for it could not live without it), and to China. Naturally, owing to its geographical position, China was traditionally its major customer. It was the clearing house for goods on their way

to and from South China. The war brought Hong Kong's great commercial machine to a standstill, and the aftermath found a very different Far East.

During 1946 it looked as though economic instability in China might give Hong Kong a temporary advantage in her entrepôt trade, but in 1947 China was forced into foreign exchange difficulties and monetary inflation and imposed severe restrictions on imports. She was ready to take essentials, but you could no longer sell cargoes of such things as toothpaste. Then, too, the rising cost of China products and the military situation in the north made it more and more difficult to deal with Chinese exports. In 1948 conditions in China led to an influx of capital from China to Hong Kong, where conditions were stable, and Shanghai Chinese moved in and a good deal of important industrial development started. But imports intended for China could not be sold owing to the restriction until, owing to shipping strikes in America, merchants were able to liquidate their stock. But trade with China, which, before the war, was about 40 per cent. of Hong Kong's total trade, fell away to less than 20 per cent.

But Hong Kong's merchants always show considerable versatility and resilience. Immediately after the war missions went to all nearby countries for supplies and soon each year showed record booms. On account of the disturbed political conditions in China the merchants developed trade with Malaya, Indonesia, Siam, Korea, and Japan. Goods came from the United States, Canada, and Australia as well as Britain. Trade with Africa, the West Indies, and the Middle East increased. Gradually trade with China showed some improvement, and in 1949 the steady decrease in trade was arrested. Imports from China increased by 30 per cent. over those for the previous year, and exports to China nearly doubled. In addition, the steady flow of capital from China continued, and so, therefore, did industrial development. The general boom continued during 1950, when the total value of Hong Kong's trade reached £469 million. There was, for the first time since the war, a favourable balance of trade with China, due in the main to the large-scale buying activities of the Peking Government's trading agencies which resulted in raising the percentage of trade with China to about 30 per cent. of the colony's total trade. So the trade pattern reverted more closely to the pre-war pattern. In fact, total trade with China increased by 97 per cent. over the figure for the previous year.

As I said earlier, Hong Kong's trade is at the mercy of every wind that blows, and since 1949 it has suffered remarkable fluctuations on account of international events. At the beginning of 1951 the great trade boom (measuring trade in terms of value) reached its peak. This was due to the rise in world prices for many commodities on the outbreak of war in Korea.

Since June, 1951, the embargo on trade in strategic materials with China has resulted in a large decline which was carried further by restrictions from the Chinese forming part of the anti-corruption campaign.

The total value of the colony's trade fell from £581 million, the highest ever recorded, in 1951 to £417 million in 1952—a fall of 28 per cent. In 1952 exports of merchandise to China fell from H.K. \$1,604 million to \$520 million.

I met with a good deal of uneasy comment and some strong feeling in

my recent tour in the United States on the subject of Hong Kong's trade with China. One can understand it because America naturally has strong feelings about anything which it believes enables the Chinese to prolong the war in Korea in which so many Americans are risking and losing their lives. But the criticism is extraordinarily ill-informed, and one is inclined to believe that there is an inclination to believe the worst simply because so many Americans have an emotional reaction against colonialism—a subject on which there is a very widespread ignorance in the States.

But whatever Senator McCarthy may say and persuade other people to believe, the solid fact is that there is no trade whatever in strategic materials of any kind between Hong Kong and China. The banned list is comprehensive and rigidly adhered to. Of course, on the other hand, it has to be allowed that Hong Kong *wants* to trade with China. Its instincts are that way, and history has shown it to be right. Trade in its instincts, whatever nationality people are who carry it on, does not bother much about ideologies, and in this case Hong Kong knows perfectly well that much of its survival value is tied up in the use it is to China, whether China is Communist or not. Its survival in the past has certainly been largely because it was of use to China, and in the long run that will continue to be the case. Be that as it may, Hong Kong *does not trade in strategic materials* with China at all.

As I think you will have gathered, the $2\frac{1}{4}$ million people of Hong Kong rely almost entirely on the mainland of China for their food, and, therefore, there is a good deal of local trade in non-strategic materials which the Chinese civil population needs and in return for which the people of Hong Kong are enabled to live.

It would, of course, be asking for Communism in Hong Kong if one were to starve them. As the *New York Times* said in 1951, the subject was being treated with more emotion than reason, and, in fact, relations with the United States are very amicable.

The fact is that Hong Kong is the greatest asset which the free world has in the Far East to defeat Communism. I do not say this from a military point of view, for no doubt Hong Kong is, in terms of modern warfare, not an easy place to defend. Nevertheless, successive British Governments have declared their intention to stand by obligations, to defend and further the interests of the colony, and have endowed it with the largest garrison it has had in its history. There is obviously no sense in making it more difficult to hold Hong Kong than circumstances make it.

In the international field Hong Kong has obviously today a very difficult hand to play and it plays it very well. Two or three years ago the Governor said in a speech, "We cannot permit Hong Kong to be the battleground for contending political parties or ideologies. We are just simple traders who want to get on with our daily round and common task. This may not be very noble, but at any rate it does not disturb others. We do not feel that we have a mandate to reform the rest of the world." This describes Hong Kong's traditional line of non-interference in China's affairs which China has always well understood and appreciated. The results may perhaps be seen in the fact that relations with China have quietened down, since the days when the Red Army was actively engaged

in "liberating" China. Incidents on the border and in the waters around the colony have taken place sporadically, but they have not shown signs of developing to dangerous proportions.

To my mind, however, the great value to the free world of Hong Kong rests on the fact that it is the only place in the Far East in which the great freedoms can still be understood and practised, the only bridgehead over which they could be carried into China. In making itself into a model colony, in practising the spirit of democracy as we know it, in showing that the life and well-being of the humblest individuals count (as I have shown Hong Kong is trying to do), in convincing increasing numbers of Chinese that the welfare of their neighbours is their concern, Hong Kong is doing a very fine job, though it would be the first to admit it has still a lot more to do. In the realm of thought, Hong Kong University is the only surviving institute of its kind in the Far East. It is the only crucible in which the best of Western thought can be fused with the best of Chinese thought. It is good to see that during the last two or three years large-scale development has begun in the University. It has had a grant of £250,000 from the Treasury and a further similar sum from Colonial Development and Welfare funds, and it has had a further grant of £1 million by H.M.G. from Japanese assets in the colony. It now has faculties of Medicine, Arts, Civil Engineering, Architecture, and Science.

I think this illustrates what Hong Kong's place in the Far East is. It will continue to be a great emporium, and it will be more and more a beacon of the free world.

Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT: You will all agree, ladies and gentlemen, that we have listened to a remarkable discourse on a very remarkable place. I would like to call Hong Kong a beacon in this Elizabethan age. It is kind of Mr. Ingrams to have taken all the trouble he has to prepare the lecture, and we all appreciate the admirable manner in which he has delivered it.

The vote of thanks having been heartily accorded, the meeting terminated.

A DRAMATIST OF TURKISH HISTORY AND HIS SOURCE

GOFFE IN THE LIGHT OF KNOLLES

BY THE LATE PROFESSOR ORHAN BURIAN*

RICHARD KNOLLES' *Generall Historie of the Turkes* (1603) was one of the earliest histories to be written in the English language, and by several discerning judges like Johnson and Coleridge it has been praised as a monument of Elizabethan prose. From the time of its first edition—which was dedicated to James I—it was very popular, and for over a century it was the principal English source for Turkish history.

This, however, should not imply that Knolles was completely original. In his preface he cites as his sources a number of Latin and French authors, while later scholarship has concluded that he was mainly relying on Boissard. At any rate the synthesis was his and he had the flair to make this synthesis both dramatic and colourful. He does not show the impartiality which we expect from a modern historian. He writes with hatred for the enemies of his faith. Yet, true Elizabethan that he was, he seems fascinated by the possibilities of his subject. His theme was the rise of a small nation in three hundred years to an empire without a rival in power and glory. He embellished this theme with all the stories he came across about the ruthlessness of the people and the exotic splendour of their lives.

Thomas Goffe, an obscure university dramatist of the late Jacobean era, found the necessary inspiration and all the material for his two historical plays *The Raging Turke* and *The Couragious Turke* in this *Histoire* of Knolles. Judging by the plays, he was most attracted to those aspects of the book which coincided with the fierce and ambitious nature of the Elizabethans and their unscrupulous pursuit of power. He did not, however, succeed in selecting stories that would have special potentialities for a dramatic handling. A detailed comparison of the plays with the relative chapters in Knolles reveals not only that his source was no other than Knolles, but that his fondness for the spectacular and for extremes in passion had always the upper hand in his work as a dramatist.

Goffe's two tragedies are of special interest to us for being the only plays published between the accession of Elizabeth and the death of her successor to be based entirely on Turkish history. *The Raging Turke* was first printed in a small quarto edition in 1631, *The Couragious Turke* in the following year.

In *The Raging Turke* Goffe's technique seems more elementary, and he slavishly follows his original. But only parallel synopses in detail of the reign of Bayezid II as it is given in the *Historie of the Turkes* and in *The Raging Turke* would bring out the degree of Goffe's indebtedness to

* An obituary notice appears on p. 301.

Knolles. The relation of *The Couragious Turke* to its source is less obvious on the surface. In this tragedy Goffe appears to have tried greater ingenuity. The result is that it consists of three disconnected episodes. First, there is the story of Amurath and the fair Greek slave, which occupies the first two acts of the play. Then follows the struggle of Amurath (Murad I, A.D. 1359-89) with his son-in-law, the ambitious Prince of Carmania, and his war with the King of Servia who breaks the peace, and with his allies. These two episodes are worked out simultaneously though without being properly fused, and they fill the last three acts of the play.

The first episode is clearly a re-handling of the theme of "Mahomet and Irene the Fair Greek," which was popular among English dramatists down to the Restoration. Of the plays that have not reached us, one at least, "The Turkish Mahomet and Hyrin the Fair Greek," was on the same subject. Goffe's treatment of it is the earliest among extant plays. Knolles gives the story in "The Life of Mahomet II."

The incidents that make up the other two episodes of the play are to be found in the chapter of Knolles' *Historie* entitled "Life of Amurath, the First of that name." But Goffe takes considerable liberties in rearranging the time sequence, transferring to Amurath (Murad I) a story about his great-great-grandson Muhammad II, and adding such embellishments as wedding masques and heavenly portents preceding the final battle which are not to be found in his source. Otherwise, both in the development of events and in characterization, he keeps fairly close to Knolles. Beside Amurath and Yacup (who appears as Iacyl in the list of actors), Goffe includes among his characters certain of Amurath's generals and councillors who are frequently referred to in Knolles. Such are Lala Shahin, Carradin Bassa, Burenoses and Chase Illi-begge. There are also the champions of the Christian cause: Lazarus, Sasmenos and Coebelitz—who in Knolles appears under his full name of Milos Coebelitz. Amurath's son-in-law is Aladin both in the *Historie* and in the play.

The events of the reign of Murad I (A.D. 1359-89), as they are given in Knolles, may be summarized as follows:

Amurath succeeded his father Orchanes (Orkhan) as the third Ottoman Sultan in 1359. He was at once confronted with danger from the combined forces of the Moslem principalities in Asia Minor. But he succeeded in defeating them all. Then he crossed to Europe, appointing his old tutor, Lala Shahin, commander-in-chief of his army. Following the capture of several towns, Adrianople was besieged, and yielded to the Turks, who in 1366 made it their capital, the Sultans residing there until the conquest of Constantinople in 1453.

A few years later, while Amurath was in his Asiatic provinces, Servia attempted to drive the Turks out of Europe, but Amurath's generals, under Lala Shahin, defeated the enemy at Zirf Zindugi.

In 1376, one of the Asiatic princes, Germean Oglu (*i.e.*, the Prince of Kermiyan), "for the more safetie of his state" gave his daughter Hatun in marriage to Amurath's eldest son Bajazet (Bayezid), presenting as a bridal gift important parts of his principality. The marriage ceremonies being over, Amurath once more crossed to Europe, and over-running Servia, besieged and took the important city of Nissa (Nisa), whereupon Lazarus,

“Despot of Servia,” sought peace and agreed to pay a yearly tribute of 50,000 pounds of silver and to send a force of 1,000 horsemen to the Sultan’s wars.

Meanwhile Aladin, Amurath’s son-in-law, considering the time opportune while the Sultan was in Europe, invaded his territory in Anatolia. This was a double blow to Amurath because Aladin was related to him and also because, although professing the same faith, he had not hesitated by such treachery to impede “the increase of the Mahometane sincere religion . . . in Europe.” Accordingly he returned to Anatolia and gathered a great army. Aladin had secured the support of “all the other lesse Mahometane Princes of Asia which were not under Amurath his obeisance, to whom the Ottoman kings were now grown terrible.” The two armies finally met on the great plains of Caramania (Kermiyan). At the start there was a serious wavering of Amurath’s vanguard which received a swift and timely relief from Bajazet. The day ended in victory for the Ottoman army (A.D. 1387).

After the battle, Aladin’s seat Iconium was besieged. A royal proclamation ordered the lives and goods of the populace to be left unharmed: they were all Moslems and the war had not been one of conquest. But when the city was taken, some of the Servian soldiers sent by Lazarus disobeyed this injunction, and paid with their lives for it—an incident which was one of the incentives for the next and final clash between Lazarus and Amurath. The capture of Iconium did not end Aladin’s rule as King of Caramania. His wife, Amurath’s daughter, interceded for him and got her husband pardoned and restored to his principality.

The Servians too returned home, but there began fomenting animosity against the Turks. Lazarus appealed secretly for support to the Christian princes of Europe, who agreed to give it. This new Crusade had some initial success, for the Turks were taken unawares. But after the first shock they made a counter-move into Bulgaria (A.D. 1388), so that before long Sasmenos had to crave mercy from Amurath with a winding sheet tied round his neck. He was granted pardon. But when the Turkish forces came to occupy Silistria, which he had promised to deliver as a token of his good faith, he fortified it against them. Amurath therefore ordered a second invasion of Bulgaria and Sasmenos was besieged in Nicopolis. To save his life he appeared before the general of the besieging forces in the same attire of submission as before. The Turkes “having already taken from him the greatest part of his dominion and now out of fear of further resistance” pardoned him a second time.

Amurath now turned on Servia. The two armies met on the plains of Kossova, “The Field of Crows,” in Servia (A.D. 1389). “It is thought, greater armies than those two had seldome before met in Europe. Lazarus, as the Turkish histories report, but how truly I know not, having in his armie five hundred thousand men; and Amurath scarce halfe so many.” In the battle Lazarus was slain and the victory went to the Turks.

As Amurath was walking round the battlefield at the close of the day a wounded Christian, “pressing neere unto him, as if he would for honour sake have kissed his feet, suddenly stabbed him in the bottom of his bellie

with a short dagger which he had under his soldier's coat: of which wound that great king and conqueror presently died. The name of this man, for his courage worthy of eternall memorie, was Miles Cobelitz."

Bayezid succeeded his father as the fourth Sultan of the Turks on the same battlefield. To avoid any future contention for sovereignty, he then and there had his younger brother Iacup strangled—thus initiating a tradition of bloodshed in the succession ceremony of the Ottoman House.

When this material is compared with *The Couragious Turke* it becomes evident that Goffe needed no other source than Knolles and that the play can everywhere be traced back to *The Historie of the Turkes*. Nevertheless, there are certain divergencies from the historical facts as known to Knolles. These are not important nor of a nature to suggest the use of any other historical source. They are interesting solely as Goffe's effort to give a dramatic turn to his material.

For instance, there is no historical ground for Amurath's exclamation at the start of the play:

"I conquered Greece, one Grecian conquered me."

Greece was not to be conquered for another fifty years; and in the first line of his Argument Goffe qualifies the conquest as

"A *supposèd* Victory by Amurath
Obtain'd in Greece, where many captives tane,
One among the rest, Irene, conquers him. . . ."

Again, Amurath's reign was a long one. Goffe makes a plausible attempt to condense its major events from Lala Shahin's siege of Orestias (or Adrianople) in 1361 to the battle of Kossova in 1389. The condensation gives rise to certain deviations from fact: some changes are made for dramatic purposes and on a few occasions Goffe misreads his source.

Here is an example of Goffe's condensation. In Knolles, Amurath captured the city Adrianople, and three years later, Shahin and the other generals at the battle of Maritza or Zirp Zindigi gained a victory over the Christians by themselves and sent news of it to Amurath, then in Anatolia. Whereas in Goffe, Shahin is presented as taking Adrianople which he coalesces with the battle of Maritza.

In the next scene, both Lazarus, "the Despot of Servia," and Sesmenos, "the Governour of Bulgaria," are in flight. There is no foundation for Bulgaria's appearance as the ally of Servia, for it was invaded in the year before the attack on Servia. In the play Cobelitz appears before these abject princes in flight as the ideal of Christian heroism, to upbraid and spur them on to resistance.

In Act III the Christians have been defeated and many of them taken prisoner, and Lala Shahin suggests to Cairadin Bassa a plan "which he has long thought upon":

"They'l fit to be a neare attendant Guard
On all occasions to the Emperour;
Therefore they shall be called Janizaries,
By me first instituted for our Prince's safeties' sake."

This is going a few pages back in Knolles, who tells of the earlier establishment of the Janissaries—except that there the idea is attributed solely to Cairadin Bassa. Although there was little occasion for it, Goffe perhaps thought a reference to this military institution which was so much dreaded in the Europe of his day had some dramatic appeal.

In Act IV, a scene sandwiched between battles, perhaps to provide some relief, represents the marriage ceremony of Bayezid and Hatun, and is Goffe's own addition; except for the wedding gift of Eurenoses, which is authenticated by Knolles, of captive Christian boys and maidens "everie one of them carrying a cup of gold in the one hand and a cup of silver in the other; the cups of gold having in them divers precious stones, the cups of silver being filled with gold." Goffe reduces the number of "an hundred" of each sex to the manageable one of "sixe Christian maidens," with some other changes.

The scene of the death of Sasmenos owes its conception entirely to Goffe. In the play it is almost a sermon dramatized, Lazarus of Servia and Cobelitz meditating on death and decay and on the necessity of suffering.

The first scene of the last act is an elaboration of Aladin's repentance and pardon. The rhetorical speeches abound in Elizabethan conceits—especially the dialogue between Amurath and his daughter. The closing lines of the scene announce the "immediate warres" and Amurath's purpose

" to meet
The Christians in Cassanoe's Plaines with speed."

Actually the site of that battle, which took place two years later, was not chosen by the Turks but by Servia and her allies, who reached the field before Amurath.

In Act V Scene 3, the use of such dramatic expedients as comets to foretell the approach of disaster was a stock device of the contemporary stage. There is, however, no justification for Goffe to put irreligious bragging into the mouth of Amurath. On the contrary, Knolles says that "this Amurath was in his superstition more zealous than any other of the Turkish kings," and that he was really "daunted" on the eve of the battle when he had viewed the opposing army which was twice the size of his own. He passed a wakeful night before engaging the enemy in battle "as soon as it was day," or, in Goffe's words, "ere Phosphorus appeared."

During the battle Goffe has Lazarus killed by Shahin, whereas Knolles simply gives two alternative versions of his death—either that he was taken prisoner but killed with his son after the stabbing of Amurath, or that he perished in prison by a natural death. As to Cobelitz, Goffe allows him full time to pour invectives on Amurath after he has stabbed him. Whereas Knolles remarks that the Serb either died of his wounds or was killed immediately after Amurath fell. Goffe is preposterous enough to make Baiazet attempt to kill Cobelitz, but his hand is stayed by a nobleman.

After the catastrophe, Bayezid has just been proclaimed Sultan on the battlefield and Goffe, not being well informed on Turkish history, puts

into Baiazet's mouth words that ill agree with that ambitious monarch's temperament :

“ We have a brother
Who, as in the same bloud he took a share,
So let him beare his part in government.”

But the generals, aware of the impossibility of such joint tenure, dissuade him, adding :

“ You know the Turkish lawes, Prince, be not nice
To purchase kingdomes, whatso'er the price,
He must be lopt.”

The suggestion of Iacup's death may conceivably have come from the generals who would be anxious to forestall any future feud, as well as to please the new monarch. But Goffe goes completely wrong in talking about “the Turkish Lawes.” Fratricide in Ottoman history *begins* with Bayezid and is not legally formulated until some fifty years later. Historically unfounded again is Iacup's lending a hand in his own murder by twisting his kerchief round his neck, giving the one end of it to Baiazet and himself pulling the other!

This examination of *The Courageous Turke* in relation to its source brings out one point at least—that throughout Goffe was dependent on Knolles. There is no evidence to show that Leonclavius, Chalcondyles and other historians of Turkey furnished him with any material at all. Where he departs from Knolles is in scenes that admit of a dramatically imaginative treatment of certain situations. For the historical sequence of events he drew entirely on Knolles' *Historie of the Turkes*.

ANNUAL DINNER

The Annual Dinner of the Society was held at Claridges, London, W.1, on Wednesday, July 15, 1953. The President, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., presided and 157 members and guests were present. The guests of the Society were Admiral Sir Geoffrey and Lady Oliver, Sir Arthur and Lady Morse, His Excellency The High Commissioner for India, His Excellency The Lebanese Ambassador, The Earl and Countess of Selkirk, Colonel and Mrs. John Hunt and Mr. and Mrs. Lionel Fraser.

The toast to Her Majesty The Queen was loyally honoured.

THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

GENERAL SIR JOHN SHEA, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.: The events within our Society during the past year have been entirely overshadowed by the tragic happenings by which we lost, last September, our Chairman and, last month, our Secretary: Admiral Sir Howard Kelly and Miss Rachel Wingate. They were a quite remarkable combination of brain, industry, and devotion to the interests of the Society. An In Memoriam notice appeared in our Journal of last January on Sir Howard Kelly, and one on Miss Wingate* will appear in the next issue; but there are so many of us here this evening who remember their presence at our Dinner last year, that I venture to think that some slight reference to them might not be out of place.

Admiral Sir Howard Kelly was not only a very distinguished sailor whose repute was assured, but he was also a very successful diplomat. He had high intellectual attainments, and early in his career he had perfected himself in the French language. His knowledge of French and his charming manner decided certain phases of his career, because he not only liked foreigners but he was definitely liked by them. He had the attainment of the great leader in that while he insisted on the strictest standard of discipline and service, he was absolutely loyal to those who served under him. He had a slightly cynical attitude towards life which was definitely tempered by a divine sense of humour, and underneath it all there was a most generous and sympathetic heart.

Miss Rachel Wingate had a very distinguished career at Cambridge. She did so very well in her studies there that one would have imagined indeed that she would have followed a scholastic career. But she shared the characteristics of courage and determination and love of adventure with her brother, General Orde Wingate, and consequently we find her spending five years in Kashgar and Tashkent with the Swedish Mission, and two years teaching in the school at Ramalla in Palestine. How can I apprise her services as Secretary to this Society? Not only was her great brain at its disposal, but she cheerfully undertook the drudgery which is connected with Secretaryship. She was very good, if I may use that word, with the members in getting to know them and also in securing lectures for our fortnightly meetings of the Society. Undoubtedly she was erudite, but when you got to know her the admiration that you felt for her very rapidly

* See p. 300.

turned to affection, because her way of life was inspired by a profound religious faith, and she had a deep feeling of human sympathy for everyone she met.

If I may turn for a moment to the affairs in which this Society has been interested during the past year, it would be impossible, even however briefly, to touch on them all; and so I select the Middle East, in which both the Admiral and Miss Wingate were so interested, and Central Asia, where Miss Wingate was. And any reference to what has happened must include South-East Asia.

In the Middle East there are two Kings who have just come to their thrones, acclaimed by the Arab peoples over whom they rule. They have been educated in this country in the principles of British constitutional practice, which is what the policy of their various countries demands. They are Arab Kings placed there by their own people. We hope that they will have happy and prosperous reigns. Indeed, in Iraq, where there is the young King, the prospect is bright on account of the accumulated wealth which that country is acquiring. Jordan, where the other young King has his throne, is not so happy, because there has been a great influx of refugees into that country, which is without the natural resources of the other. We hope, too, that the advent of these young Kings will mean that there will be a rapprochement between Iraq and Jordan and Sa'udi Arabia, and that the differences which have occurred in the past may be settled.

Into these Arab States there is thrust the State of Israel, which must always and ever be reckoned with when discussing the Middle East. Unfortunately, there is constant bickering between the Arabs and the State of Israel over their perfectly ridiculous frontier, which makes no sense at all; and which, if there is to be peace in the Middle East, should be rectified. In Iraq and in Sa'udi Arabia the old order is changing owing to increasing wealth; and the fierce virtues of the nomad have felt its impact.

If I pass on to Central Asia, we have there a different scene. We find countries of different races and different culture being drawn together by what is happening to the Buddhist religion in that part of the world. India has long been recognized as the home of Buddhist religion, because Buddha passed his earthly pilgrimage there; but whereas the Indian Government is so wise in that it treats the Buddhist religion purely from a religious point of view, China, on the other hand, has used the Buddhist religion as an instrument of policy in Tibet and Outer Mongolia. For this reason, the pious Buddhists in Ladakh, the west of Tibet, who abhor this use of religion and who for many years have been used to making their pilgrimages to Lhasa, are turning more and more to India; and may they continue to do so.

General Templer, in Malaya, has been continuous in his success, and, using the modern helicopter, he has disclosed the secrets of the jungle; not only that, but contact has been made with the aboriginal inhabitants who live there. But his real task now, as he is getting the better of the Communists in Malaya, is fighting for the heart and minds of the people by showing them a better way. He still has his long-term policy of a united people, consisting of Malays, Chinamen, Eurasians, and Asians, who will regard Malaya as their own country. That policy will mature and will

succeed if, for many years to come, the country is allowed to remain under British guardianship.

Now, I turn to the danger spot, South-East Asia. Forgive me if I remind you of the geography of the area, because it is so important to see what a very vulnerable land is French Indo-China. If you will imagine a rough figure of eight with a fat waist, there you have Indo-China. It is surrounded on the east, south, and a bit of the west by sea; then it has Siam on its west and a bit of Burma on the north-west corner, stretching up to China, which goes all along the top, in the north—a very vulnerable land. Inside this figure of eight you have along the top Tong-king, with the Red River delta, which is known as the rice bowl, and Hanoi, an area fortified by the French; then one comes down the east side of Viet Nam to Saigon, which is also held by the French. On the west, going up to the fat waist, is Cambodia; and on the top, Laos.

But the interesting part of the situation in Indo-China today is that hitherto the fighting has been confined to what is called Viet Nam and Tong-king. Two months ago the Communists were fighting the French and the Viet Nam in French Indo-China, then they suddenly invaded Laos and sent troops into Cambodia to establish Communist cells on the Siamese and Burmese borders.

You remember the story of the French: how when the Japanese invaded French Indo-China the French collaborated with them, and then when the Allies were having success in the West, the Japanese got frightened and incarcerated the French and set up a puppet Viet Nam Government. After the Japanese left, this Viet Nam Government was opposed by forces under Ho Chi Minh, which is now called Viet Minh, whom we may for easiness term the Nationalists. Then, in 1945, the French Expeditionary Force landed in the south of French Indo-China, and they have been fighting the Nationalists there ever since.

What is the situation today? If you wish to be optimistic, you will say that it is fifty-fifty, because the French have really had no successes, except two years ago when, under that remarkable General de Lattre de Tassigny, they had considerable success against the Nationalists. Today the French are rather up against it. They have had a very bad time. They quite definitely have not got enough troops there. They have lost the flower of their young officers and, what is perhaps worst of all, owing to the very frequent change of Government in France, they have lacked that essential backing and wholehearted trust which is so essential for the morale of an army that is fighting in a distant country.

Added to that, whereas the Chinese up to date have only supplied the Nationalists with material, latest reports tell us that the Chinese themselves, the so-called volunteers, have taken a hand to help the Nationalists against the French and the Viet Nam. That is, as we understand it, the situation today, which awaits solution by the United Nations.

I fear that I have detained you too long, but perhaps you will forgive me if I turn to a happier subject and say that we are lucky and indeed fortunate in our sailors. We have Lord Cork, who is the chairman of our Dinner Club. There is on the walls of the United Services Club a very spirited, inspiring, and vivid picture of the Battle of Trafalgar. I always

think of Lord Cork when I see that picture. In the old Naval College at Osborne there is a motto on the wall: "There is nothing a sailor cannot do." I should like to put that placard on the opposite wall to Lord Cork's picture and place it there for Admiral Harcourt, our new Chairman.

If you consider what Admiral Harcourt has done lately, he must at least have read that motto, and I think he must have remembered it. He dealt very faithfully indeed with the King's enemies in the Mediterranean, and then he was equally successful in an entirely different sphere as Commander-in-Chief of Hong Kong. He was, I think I am right in saying, Second Sea Lord, and then went to the Nore, the place that has been the home of so many famous sailors, past and, definitely, present.

And so in handing over to Admiral Harcourt and in asking him to propose the health of the Guests, I will say how delighted we are to have him as our Chairman, how safe we know that the affairs of the Society will be in his hands, and how, best of all, we are glad to have him for the Admiral himself.

"THE GUESTS"

In proposing the toast of "The Guests," Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT, G.B.E., K.C.B. (Chairman of the Council), said:

First of all may I thank you, Sir, for the much too kind remarks you have made about me. That motto which you have quoted, I quoted once in Hong Kong when I was called upon to make the annual address as the Chancellor of the University. I said I would try to live up to this motto—"There is nothing the Navy cannot do"—but I had never expected to have to make the annual address of a Chancellor of a University, and I found it rather difficult.

But tonight I have the pleasant task of proposing the toast of "The Guests." We have a large number of distinguished guests from all over the world, and I thought that tonight I would deal with them geographically. Let me explain. This Royal Central Asian Society was founded at a time when Russia appeared to be threatening India, and it was founded to draw attention to that part of the world and what went on there, and to bring it to the knowledge of our countrymen and others abroad.

Since then, by force of circumstances, by the political events and, I think, even more by modern inventions—the wireless and air travel—our activities have been extended to cover the whole of Asia, from Palestine to the Pacific. I thought that tonight I would start on the west, on the shores of the Mediterranean, and work eastwards.

First, I should like to say how very pleased we are to have here tonight the Lebanese Ambassador, the representative of that ancient and distinguished people who live in that comparatively modern State. We are very glad to see His Excellency here tonight. Also from the shores of the Mediterranean, we have the representative of Israel, the Israeli Ambassador, Mr. Elath. Strictly speaking, he is not a guest, because he is a member of our Society, and a distinguished member, who takes a great interest in the work of the Society; but every representative of a foreign power in our country we always look upon as an honoured guest, and we are very glad to have His Excellency here tonight.

Going a little further east, we come to Sa'udi Arabia. Again, the Sa'udi Arabian Ambassador is in the same category, an honoured member of our Society who also has been a great friend to our Society. Then, going further east, we come to India, and we are delighted to have here tonight the High Commissioner, Mr. Kher. Mr. Kher only took up his appointment at the time of our Annual Dinner last year. This is his first appearance here, and we are very glad to welcome His Excellency.

Now I am going to leave the shore, and am going to sea for a moment. We are very glad to welcome here the late Commander-in-Chief the East Indies, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Oliver, the present Commander-in-Chief of the Nore. It is a great personal pleasure to me to bid him welcome. Amongst other things, we share many fine memories of historic occasions that we had the privilege to take part in together during the war. His late domain, of course, stretches from the Red Sea to the Malacca Straits and right across the Indian Ocean to the east coast of Africa—and a very large domain it was.

Going further east, we are very glad to welcome here the Indonesian Ambassador. We wish him and his country a happy solution to the many problems which beset his country, like many other countries in that part of the world.

Now I am going north a bit. I am taking you now up to Hong Kong. Here we are very glad to welcome Sir Arthur Morse, who, ever since Hong Kong fell, has had that difficult task of being the head of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and to whom a great deal of the credit for the remarkable recovery of Hong Kong is due. At our Annual Meeting last month we had an extremely good lecture on the development of Hong Kong since the war. To my mind it was most remarkable. It showed what can be done with what I would call private enterprise with Government encouragement. What they have produced there is astonishing, and I would add further that the good conditions which obtain amongst all the working classes there is the highest defence against Communism of anything in Asia.

I also look upon Sir Arthur as a representative of the great British commercial interests in Asia. I speak of this because up till a short time ago a large proportion of our membership and of the higher officers of this Society sprang from the great administrative British services in Asia, and our members included ex-Viceroy, Governors of great provinces, and so forth, and the young men who were going to be the future Governors of provinces. That source has now ceased. There are still many distinguished ex-Governors and Indian civil servants, but in the future there will be no more coming into our Society. Forty per cent., more or less, of our Society live and work in Asia, and the greater part of them now are the representatives of our big commercial undertakings. We welcome Sir Arthur Morse for that, and for the same reason we welcome here tonight Mr. Lionel Fraser, who is also a banker and has many other interests, including engineering interests, in Asia.

Many of you will remember Mr. Lionel Fraser's name because a few months ago, on return from a trip to America, he wrote a very wise and very interesting letter to *The Times* pointing out how important it was to

get better relations between every man in the street in the United States and every man in the street here in this country. This letter attracted a great deal of attention, and I hope something was done about it, because recent events, especially in Korea, have shown the necessity for the better understanding between these two English-speaking countries. We are very glad to welcome Mr. Fraser here tonight.

Another guest whom we have here is Lord Selkirk, who, like all his family, has taken a large part in our public affairs; and he, like his brother, who was the first person to fly over Everest, has also performed valuable and distinguished service to the Royal Air Force. I am also glad to see here tonight Sir Harold Parker, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, whose activities, of course, range all over the world.

I have taken you over a largish area, but all on a horizontal plane of two dimensions. I am now going to take you to a third dimension, vertical, up to nearly 30,000 feet. This time it is not going to be in a modern aircraft, but by the ancient qualities of skill, of courage, of great endurance; of the most wonderful team work and loyal and selfless devotion to a high ideal. (*Applause.*) I speak, of course, of the journey to the summit of Everest, and we are very glad to welcome Colonel Hunt here. I am going to ask him if he would mind just standing up for a moment, so that we can give him the necessary welcome. (*Applause.*)

I shall not presume to try to translate into words the welcome that you have given him. I would only like to say that the announcement of the achievement at Everest on June 2 was, I consider, the really crowning homage of that great Coronation Day. We do thank Colonel and Mrs. Hunt for coming here tonight.

I think I have talked enough, although I could go on for a very long time with the number of distinguished guests we have got here. To those whom I have not named personally I would like to say how much we welcome them. We particularly welcome the younger members and their younger guests whom I have seen here tonight. I say this because in a Society like ours we may have elder statesmen, but to keep alive we must have the constant stream of young people coming into the Society, and I was glad to welcome so many here tonight when I wrung their hands at the door.

Now I would ask the members of the Royal Central Asian Society to stand, and I give you the toast of "Our Guests."

Admiral Sir GEOFFREY OLIVER, K.C.B., D.S.O., in reply to the toast, said:

I need hardly say how deeply sensible I am of the privilege of having the duty laid upon me to reply on behalf of the guests tonight to our generous and distinguished hosts of the Royal Central Asian Society, more particularly since I have never myself set foot in what could be defined as Central Asia. Moreover, I belong to a Service that is traditionally silent. I have at least discovered, thanks to the Chairman's kind arrangement of drinking our health just now, who are our hosts and who are the guests in this distinguished gathering, and so I feel fortified by that.

As Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt has told you, my only connections with Asia are strictly marginal and in two, and not three, dimensions. Such

bits of Asia that have come my way have been the bits on or near the coast, or accessible from the coast. It is quite true, as the Chairman has told you, that my last job afloat was for two and a half years to be Commander-in-Chief on the East Indies station.

The words "East Indies" do not mean the East Indian islands, which are quite definitely excluded from that station. The name, I suppose, dates back to the days of the old East India Company, which was principally concerned with the sub-Continent of India. At any rate, it is a very ancient British station. We have had a squadron there more or less continuously for over 200 years, and when I got out there I found myself the ninety-seventh successive Commander-in-Chief.

I also found—having been there, naturally, once or twice before, in a much more humble capacity—that the place had changed, and there is now in that part of the world what is called by the newspapers, I think, a "new look." We now have there—and I am very glad to see one of their representatives here tonight—what are sometimes referred to as the "new Dominions."

When I first set forth to take up this job I was in some doubt as to what the framework would be. I had not been there very long before I discovered that I liked the "new look" very much indeed, and I may say that the traditional welcome that H.M. ships generally receive in that part of the world was better than anything I had ever experienced before. The cordiality with which, on our goings and our comings, we were entertained and looked after and generally made to feel part of the place could not have been surpassed.

The duties there are the usual mixture. The Navy has to train always for war, and in addition, in peace-time our duties are twofold: ambassadorial, and, if required, we put the ambassador's hat away and put on a policeman's helmet. I am glad to say—I think the majority of you present tonight are British taxpayers, and I think I can say it now as I am no longer on the station—that in my experience that little squadron out there—it is only seven ships and sometimes fewer—is a very good investment as a peace-time, shall we say, floating supplement to our other activities in the sphere of relations inside and outside the Commonwealth.

I can give you one example, perhaps, of what I mean. At the time that I went out there there was, as there still regrettably is, a certain political coolness on the subject of Kashmir. The Royal Navy is not a political thing—it is entirely concerned with defence; but one of my duties as Commander-in-Chief of our own British forces out there was to give every assistance I could to our neighbouring navies, notably the Indian Navy and the Royal Pakistan Navy and the small but growing Royal Ceylonese Navy, in training their ships also against the possibility of their being required in war.

At that time it had been difficult to proceed with this for what I would call political reasons. What was happening inside the great Continent of Central Asia naturally was not my business, but it was my business to ask if I could proceed with my duties in trying to help these forces to train. Invitations were issued and in due course, I am glad to report, we had a four-navy exercise period, at which were present ships of the Royal Pakis-

tan Navy, ships of the Indian Navy, and ships of the Royal Ceylon Navy, in addition to the Queen's ships. From the naval point of view it was of the utmost value, in that we can do a great deal more in learning our trade with numbers of ships; and it has since become an annual event.

All the officers present had been trained under British officers originally or in Great Britain, and their ships had been built in England. We had the most magnificent fortnight when we were exercising at sea, and when the ships came back into harbour there were entertainments and an Olympiad, at which every single country represented was a victor in some event or another. I have never seen such a remarkable game in my life as the game of hockey in which the finalists, of course, were the Indian Navy and the Pakistan Navy. The Pakistan Navy won by one goal after the most terrific struggle. That that could happen while further north, owing to reasons beyond their control, the land forces of both these Dominions were temporarily estranged shows, I think, that there are some things that can be done with ships that cannot be done on shore.

I will not keep you any longer, but before I sit down, on behalf of the very distinguished gathering of guests that I see here, and amongst whom I am very pleased to see several old friends, I should like to thank our generous hosts here tonight—the President, Chairman, and members of the Royal Central Asian Society. I hope you will join me in showing your appreciation in the usual way. (*Applause.*)

“THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY”

The toast of “The Royal Central Asian Society” was proposed by Sir ARTHUR MORSE, C.B.E., LL.D., who said:

I really feel that I have an extremely severe task before me in rising to speak after you have listened to so many and so distinguished speakers before my turn arrived. However, I am quite sure that for that reason I have your sympathy. It was due to a battle between a fishing smack and a warship that I am called upon to speak tonight. I protested loudly, but when I came in conflict with a gallant Admiral my chances were so small that I finally abdicated.

Tonight we have had a most extraordinary and interesting address from our President. He touched on the very vital points concerning the present position in the Far East. I was especially glad to hear him emphasize how important Indo-China is to the whole situation. I fear that in this country it is little realized what a Communist-dominated Indo-China could mean. Our troubles would only begin if the French were to abandon the very difficult task which they have undertaken in trying to retain Indo-China within the orb of the Western Powers and of what we now call democracy.

I should like to thank the Chairman for his very flattering remarks with regard to myself. They were flattery, but I feel not a little proud of what he said of any small service I have been able to render to that outpost, which is becoming more and more an outpost, of the prestige and, in fact, the honour of what I still will call the British Empire. (“Hear, hear.”) However, the basis and the foundation of the success of Hong

Kong's great recovery can be traced right back to our first Governor and Commander-in-Chief.

I arrived in Hong Kong some months late. I just did not want to get there too quickly. I did not think things might be so comfortable, and so for one reason and another I took my time getting back, and I only arrived there in April, 1946. Even then one could feel a hum of anxiety to get on with the job. One could feel that something was going to happen. Well, something has happened, and I consider what has been done in Hong Kong is one of the wonders of things that have happened since the last World War.

Why and how did it happen? Cecil Harcourt has been gracious enough to pay tribute to the commercial people and to private enterprise. When I got back there and found a rather frightening task ahead, I started to look around. I said, "Well, we have got to get everything going." There we had Sir Cecil sitting in his high and mighty seat. We were all ready and willing to bow down to his great wisdom, but when problems came up, when there were commercial problems or problems with which an Admiral would not in the ordinary course of his career come face to face, and they were referred to Sir Cecil, the answer was "Get on with the damned job, and I will back you up." That is the Navy, as I think we all know. That attitude of Cecil is what, in my opinion, was the foundation of the relationship that has existed since then between the Government and the commercial community. They worked as one.

Mark you, the Government and the commercial community did not always realize that their interests were one and the same. The foundation of that and the beginning of it was due to the attitude of Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt when he had supreme charge in Hong Kong. His name is enshrined in the memories and the hearts of the population. I will not expand on the hearts, because there were many broken hearts when he left there, and there are many hearts today that flutter when his name comes up, as it often does. That is our little island of Hong Kong. It is only a little place, but it is still an important little place in the British Empire.

We exist there on the border of that very great Continent of China, and in my experience in the Far East I have seen vast changes. I have seen changes that, I think, have staggered the closest students of China. We have been not only astonished, but astounded, that a Communist Government should govern China. It is difficult to get exact information, but my view—whether I like it or whether I do not is quite beside the point—is that the present Government of China have probably more control over China than any Government in living memory. That is the hard fact which must be driven home. Naturally, most of us do not like it. It is no use beating about the bush—we do not like it; but what we like and what we dislike is not going to alter that great fact.

Before the last World War Japan was the dominating factor in the Far East. Japan undoubtedly will become a very important factor in the Far East in the future. She will become a very important factor as far as this country's commercial interests are concerned, and the sooner we realize that situation the better for us all.

We are told that everything has changed in Japan; we are told that it is

now a true democracy. I am old enough not to believe everything I hear. Candidly, I find it difficult to believe that in the course of a very few years the spots of the leopard have been completely obliterated—and I do not care who has put the whitewash on. Japan, in some ways like ourselves, revered and honoured the equivalent of our King, and I am quite sure, in spite of all that has happened, that the ordinary Japanese is groping around today to get a figurehead to look up to, and wants to feel that he has someone to look up to. I do not believe that we have changed Japan as much as some people would like us to believe.

They are going to trade; they are going to work, and they are going to be very severe competitors of this country. That is not to say that they will ever occupy what one might call the military position in the Far East as the dominating force they were before the war. I think it will be extremely difficult for them to do so in view of what has happened in China. As a driving force—a dynamic force—we will, in my opinion, find that it is China who will probably lead Asia in the future. One has got to realize that they already have a tremendous economic grip throughout the whole of the Far East, and especially throughout South-East Asia. Turn where you will, go to whatever country you like to visit in the Far East, you will find that the economic situation in that country depends on the energy and hard work of the Chinese.

We have got the Korean war going on. It is to an ordinary individual like myself an extremely difficult thing to see what the end may be. We may get a truce—we probably will; but where do we go from there? Remember—and I would say it as a very serious thing to remember—that it was the intervention of the Chinese that prevented the United Nations from completely cleaning up Korea in a few months. It has gone on for a few years. I would ask you to ponder and think on what the Chinese throughout the world will think of that. I just give you the suggestion, because you can put many thoughts to it.

South-East Asia depends for its prosperity on the work, and the ability to work, of the Chinese. We are today trying to develop North Borneo. For a very good reason Chinese labour is not freely admitted, and therein lies the tale of why North Borneo is slow and ponderous at getting going.

You may wonder what the position of Hong Kong is in all this. After all, it is our concern more than anything else. The whole situation has changed. The only places now where we can go and feel that we can exert real influence are the remaining Colonies which we hold. Unfortunately, they are getting fewer and fewer. But I should like to see our Royal Central Asian Society, and in fact the many other societies who are interested in the Far East, try to refute the practice, that now seems to be the popular thing, not only abroad but in this country, of condemning everything that has been done by the British in the past in the Far East and everywhere else.

We have not done harm. What we have done is that we have brought these countries up to a point where they are beginning to feel that they want their independence, that they want something else. Had we not been there, they would never have reached that point. Undoubtedly many things that ought to have been done may have been left undone; we might

have done this, or we might have done that, but if we could all see into the future there would not be any troubles in the world.

I myself feel, remembering every place I have been where the Union Jack flies, that I am proud to feel that I am a Britisher. It is a necessity and the duty of all these societies, apart from the magnificent work they are doing, just to add one more thing: to contradict and condemn this everlasting disparaging of the effort of the British who have gone abroad and who have worked and who have kept this country in affluence. It is time it was said, and I think it is time it was put over.

I am sure that you in the Royal Central Asian Society, who are represented by so many distinguished people, could use your efforts in that direction. Let us not allow ourselves to be condemned unheard. Those of us who know the Far East did not all go abroad as missionaries—of course we did not. We went abroad to earn our living; but we also went abroad to provide a living for a great many people in this country, and I think people ought to be told so. It is on that note that I should like to finish.

I have just one more thing to say. Is it possible for these great societies to get down to the people who today have the power and who can put the Government in or put the Government out? I think a great effort should be made to get down to that stratum which knows little or nothing about the Far East. I listened tonight about Arabia and the Middle East. I heard things I had no idea of. How much more so do those who have never left these shores require to be taught, or at least to have explained to them, some of the problems that the British are up against, and which are so necessary for our survival as a great nation.

I give you the toast, "The Royal Central Asian Society."

The PRESIDENT: We have got to the end of the toasts that were to be proposed, but this is such a unique opportunity that I think we must trespass on Colonel Hunt's goodness and ask him if he would not say one word about Everest.

Colonel JOHN HUNT, C.B.E., D.S.O.: I was assured by the Chairman this evening that I should not be called upon to say anything, and naturally I therefore have no notes and nothing up my sleeve. It is very good of you, Sir, to ask me to get up, and I appreciate from my heart those very generous words which were spoken by Sir Cecil Harcourt about our expedition and our success in getting to the summit of Everest. If I may, I will pass on my impressions of this wonderful evening to the other members of the team when we next meet. I only wish they were here to listen to what has been said this evening. Thank you very much.

Having said that, I should like in lighter vein to assure you that not all that we get is praise. I was accosted in the street only yesterday by a very angry man, who had evidently recognized me from the Press pictures and who blamed the Everest Expedition, and the leader in particular, for the particularly bad weather of late—he said that we were responsible for it as a result of getting to the top of the mountain—which had ruined the Test Match. I think you will agree that that was rather offside.

It would, I think, be appropriate to this occasion and to this gathering to tell you what a magnificent job, as part of our team, was done by our companions on the mountain, those splendid and gallant little men the

Sherpa porters. As you know, one of them—the greatest Sherpa of all time, Tenzing—stood with Hillary on the top of the world on May 29. I was tremendously pleased that that should have been so, because it was symbolic of the work done by the Sherpas in the many previous efforts to get to the top of that mountain over the past thirty-two years. He was chosen not in any way because he was a Sherpa, but because of his own merits as a mountaineer and on his own skill and his own fitness; but it was right and proper that a Sherpa should share in the glory of getting to the top of the mountain.

I will not take up any more of your time, and I can think of nothing more to say except once again to thank you most warmly for this wonderful occasion and to thank you, Sir, for the kind words which you have said.

INITIAL PROBLEMS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIA

By WALTER McKENZIE PINTNER

INTRODUCTION

IN recent years the problem of the induced economic development of under-developed areas has received increasing attention throughout the Western world. Economic development itself is nothing new; all the advanced nations of the world were, at one time or another, economically backward with respect to their present level of development. However, the phenomenon of induced economic change is less common, and it is not easy to discover clear cases of substantial development produced quickly and under governmental auspices. Such instances should be of exceptional interest and value in studying the problems confronting the Point-Four Programme, the Colombo Plan, the Indian Five-Year Plan, and other attempts to stimulate economic development.

The development of Central Asia by the Soviet régime is an excellent example of just this type of economic change. Isolated from the rest of Russia by desert and semi-desert steppe, inhabited by non-Russian peoples, in large part governed by their own laws and semi-independent rulers, the region's primitive economy was preserved until the revolution of 1917, and for a considerable period thereafter. There is no doubt that Central Asia had almost, if not all, the characteristics generally attributed to under-developed areas: low productivity, antiquated technology, widespread poverty, little or no modern, intensive, or mechanized agriculture, widespread illiteracy, and so forth.

During the Soviet period substantial economic development has taken place. Of this there is little doubt. The most significant progress has been made in cotton production, and there has also been a substantial industrial development in the fields of textiles, shoes, metal working, and hydro-electricity.

The development of agriculture and industry, although inconsistent with some of the typical characteristics of backward areas such as illiteracy and a low level of technology, does not automatically cause a rise in the standard of living. Even if an increase in *per capita* real income is assumed to have resulted from the economic development, any such increase may be diverted to other areas or completely reinvested, leaving nothing for increased consumption.

The problem of the extent and nature of the economic development of Central Asia and the allocation of resources involved has been covered by Henze* and Wilhelm,† probably as thoroughly as the available statistical data will permit. It is not the purpose of this discussion to go over this

* Henze, P. B., "The Economic Development of Soviet Central Asia to the Eve of World War Two," R.C.A.S. JOURNAL, 1949, Vols. XXXVI, XXXVII.

† Wilhelm, Warren, "Soviet Central Asia: Development of a Backward Area," *Foreign Policy Reports*, February, 1950.

ground again, but rather to describe some of the initial, practical problems met by the Soviets in undertaking their development programme and, in so far as possible, to ascertain the methods used in overcoming these problems.

Unfortunately, material clearly indicating the methods used by the Soviets in overcoming the difficulties of development is less easy to obtain from the sources available than information regarding the problems themselves. In the Soviet literature, on which this paper is based, it is frequently the case that blame for some particular failure is attributed in such a way that the observer has no way of telling whether or not the criticism reflects the actual situation or merely is the result of the requirements of Communist ideology. There are almost no critical Western accounts of Central Asia for the period studied, and literature in English is almost exclusively limited to highly popular and sympathetic descriptions, usually of much less value than the Soviet material written for serious internal use.

Although this study is based on Soviet source material it is not primarily concerned with the Communist theory of economic development nor with the general Soviet political policy toward Central Asia. In general, ideology will be considered only in so far as it is directly connected with the practical questions under discussion. It is not meant to deny the immense importance of the ideological framework in which a development programme is carried out. The ideological aspect has, however, received more study than the specific development problems and the theoretical basis is readily available in the writings of Lenin and Stalin.*

For the purposes of the following discussion, Central Asia shall be defined, as is usual in the Soviet literature, to include the four republics of Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Tadzhikstan, and Turkmenistan. Within Central Asia no attempt will be made to treat the four republics individually since they were not designed as economic but as ethnic units. The economic heart of Central Asia is divided between Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, and Tadzhikstan on purely national lines. The chronological period covered is roughly from 1925 to 1935.

EDUCATION AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

A fundamental problem which must be met in the economic development of a backward area is the typically low educational level of the population. Not only is there usually a lack of technicians, but even of persons able to read any language at all. It is regrettable that specific and detailed information regarding the Soviet educational programme in Central Asia is so scanty. There is little doubt that the effort in the field of education was great and that the effects were widespread. The question receives considerable attention in the Soviet literature, but usually in only the most general terms.

Until and even after the end of the first five-year plan, the main educational effort was apparently concentrated on the elementary level, and understandably so, since the native population was almost totally illiterate. As late as 1933 in the republic of Tadzhikstan the claimed literacy rate was

* Holdsworth, M., "Soviet Central Asia 1917-40," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 2, 1951-52.

only 30 per cent., and 90 per cent. of the school teachers had only the lowest level of education. In relatively more advanced Uzbekistan the corresponding figure, for teachers, a year earlier, was 72 per cent.

The most difficult problem involved in the educational programme was to persuade the women and girls of this strongly Moslem society to participate. The following figures, cited by Narysov, despite the progress they show, suggest the extent of the difficulties that must have been encountered. In 1927-28, of the 4,930 students in Tadzhikistan schools, only forty-four were women. By 1931-32, of 135,976 students, only 22,317 were women. It is not surprising, however, for during the turbulent years of the Basmachestvo revolt in the mid-twenties the village teachers and the "emancipated" women were not infrequently assassinated.

The more complex problem of higher education for the native population gradually came to receive increasing attention. In 1927 only 2.4 per cent. of the students at the Central Asian State University in Tashkent were members of the local national groups. By 1933 the general figures for all technical schools and colleges reached 75 per cent. and 62 per cent. respectively in Uzbekistan. As part of the expansion programme the polytechnical schools of Tadzhikistan were separated from the kolkhozes and state industrial enterprises, which were reluctant to use their funds for educational purposes, and the schools were placed in line for direct governmental aid. A sympathetic Western observer, commenting on the Central Asian University, observed that the native students tended to memorize the writings of Marx and Lenin as they would have memorized the Koran a few years previously in the Moslem religious schools. The influence of local traditions in the agricultural schools was severely condemned in a Soviet publication. The professors were accused of being apologists for century-old equipment and techniques. Whether they actually were so or merely were attempting to adapt to the physical limitations of the situation confronting them is impossible to tell.

It is possible that the intensification of the drive for "higher" education was accompanied by a lessening or complete abandonment of the campaign to educate the older peasants. Soviet material gives no indication of this, but the conclusion was reached by an apparently sensitive and objective English traveller who visited Central Asia in 1933.* It would not seem surprising if the Party chose to expend its limited resources of equipment and trained personnel on the more pliable younger generation.

Closely connected, and indeed essential, to its educational programme was the Soviet Nationality policy. In the period under discussion the question of "nativization" (*Koren'izatsiia*) of the school system and other cultural institutions received the most attention in the Soviet literature on education in Central Asia. The increase in the native enrolment in the institutions of higher learning has already been noted. On the elementary level the impossibility of immediate and total "nativization" of the teaching staff was recognized, but this was clearly the goal. The general tenor of the article making this observation suggests that native teachers who were unqualified either politically or academically may have received positions in an over-enthusiastic drive to complete the programme. This type

* Goldman, Bosworth, *Red Road through Asia*, p. 168, London, 1934.

of problem is one which can be attributed to the Soviet emphasis on quantitative goals and their strict fulfilment.

The most important aspect of the nationality policy was the general introduction and use of the local languages among the native peoples, and the substitution of the Latin alphabet for the traditional Arabic letters which were ill-suited to the languages of Central Asia and which made reading difficult to learn. Some of these languages had almost no existing literature on which to base a new written language. Most of what did exist was of a highly archaic nature with little relation to the present-day spoken tongue. The large intermixture of Arabic words also was a problem to the Soviet linguists, for these words were an integral part of the orthodox Moslem religious tradition and, therefore, had to be eliminated. The needs of modern technology, however, required the introduction of a great many new words and concepts. Narysov lays down two principles to be followed in the construction of a new Tadzhik literary language: first, maximum use is to be made of the conversational language of the masses; and second, the assimilation of terms and Russian words used in all the national languages of the U.S.S.R. provided they are compatible with Tadzhik phonetics.

The construction of suitable dictionaries for the new written languages caused considerable difficulty. A new Tadzhik-Russian dictionary was condemned for failing to contain common everyday words and for being filled, instead, with Arabic and archaic words. This dictionary was compiled before any newspaper or other material had been printed in modern Tadzhik and the only source available was the classic literature, so the reasons for its failings are not difficult to understand. Another critic levelled even more serious charges against the same work. According to him, the dictionary failed to include the words "Bolshevik" and "Bolshevism," and for this reason alone it should have been destroyed. In addition, he finds fault with the definitions of several words. For example, "grumbler" (*nynik*) should not merely be simply defined as such, but the consequences of this attitude should be explained. A "grumbler," it should be explained, is someone who is opposed to socialist construction and the progress of Socialism.

The technician in such a situation is faced thus not only with the inherent difficulties of his task but also with the added burden of maintaining and positively affirming adherence to the orthodox ideology. Of course, from the Communist point of view, the acceptance of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy is essential to sound economic development. No effort was, therefore, spared in the propagation of it by every available means and through all channels.

A written language and the ability to read it is not enough. Something for the newly educated peasant to read must be supplied. The extant literature in the various languages was either completely lacking or antique, and steeped in feudal tradition. To meet the need for proper reading matter numerous newspapers were established, translations made from Russian, traditional ballads written down, and indigenous writers encouraged. All this was done not only to develop the new written language but to present the Soviet point of view. The annual circulation of newspapers *per capita*

in Uzbekistan increased from 4.1 in 1928 to 21.0 in 1932. By 1932, 392 books had appeared in Tadzhik with a circulation of 2,191,500. The text of these new publications was not always understood by the average reader because of the large number of new words introduced; nor was the content free from criticism. The economic journal of Central Asia, *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo Srednei Azii*, was accused of being run by bourgeois professors and of failing to orient its readers toward class-conscious thought. Its name was changed to *Kommunisticheskiĭ Vostok*, but it was again brought to task for giving insufficient attention to the problems of regional planning in the individual republics. The Turkmen economic journal was criticized for failing to assist the local planning agencies. Supervision of content was evidently strict and centralized, for these criticisms appeared in the important Soviet journal *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*.

The stimulation of the native theatre and native music would apparently seem to have little connection with economic development. In the Central Asian context, however, this aspect of the Soviet policy must not only be regarded as a part of the general Communist nationality policy (no attempt is made in this paper to consider the more recent developments and controversial aspects of the Soviet nationality policy), but as a conscious attempt to overcome the strong anti-Russian sentiment which arose in the pre-Revolutionary years when large numbers of Russians were settled on native-held lands. The initial use of the Latin rather than the Russian alphabet to replace the Arabic was doubtless part of this same effort. Song and theatre were, of course, fully exploited for purposes of political indoctrination.*

The major aim of the Soviet educational and cultural programme was, as we have seen, to make possible the introduction of a more advanced technology and a new political doctrine while simultaneously counteracting the local anti-Russian feelings. The problems met were principally those of insufficient material and trained personnel. The methods used to overcome these difficulties appear to have been the stimulation of local initiative while maintaining a strict centralized control, a control that sometimes seems to have been a handicap to those working the field.

EARLY COMPROMISES AND ADJUSTMENTS

The most important factor in the Central Asian economy is cotton production. Not only is it important for Central Asia, but also for the whole of the U.S.S.R. During the period under study, the most pressing problem confronting the Soviet planners in Central Asia was how to increase cotton production and make the Union independent of foreign supplies. By 1928 production had recovered from the tremendous drop of the troubled early twenties, and had reached the pre-revolutionary level of about one million bales. By 1932 production reached 1.5 million, and in 1937, 2.9 million were produced and the U.S.S.R. became substantially independent of imported cotton.

The land reform programme, and later the collectivization programme, were all designed, in part at least, to help achieve this goal of increased

* *Op. cit.*, Goldman, p. 188.

cotton production. The first steps taken in the direction of land reform (1921) were directed against Russians with large holdings. Though of little economic significance, this too was part of the campaign designed to gain the loyalty of the native peasants. The Soviet writer Gurevich maintains that it also convinced the Bolshevik party of the value of the land question as a tool for agitation. As Central Asia came more firmly under the control of the Soviets, more radical steps were taken. In December, 1922, the land and water were nationalized, and large and absentee holdings confiscated. The proportion of peasants leasing their land was reduced from 45.2 per cent. to 5.6 per cent. Work animals and equipment also were confiscated from the more prosperous. Gurevich says that the most important consequence of the land reform was to increase the proportion of land devoted to cotton from 35 per cent. in 1924 to 62 per cent. in 1926. Soviet and Western sources are agreed in this respect that the kulak preferred to maintain his self-sufficiency by growing grain, but that the smaller landholder was so dependent on the government for seeds and other aid that he had to grow cotton and hope that sufficient grain and manufactured goods would be imported to meet his needs. The land reform, however, was not regarded as anything more than a temporary expedient and was never effective in the more remote regions. The Party did not approve of it in the long run because it was an aid to the middle peasant but did little for the poorest class.

It is impossible to ascertain from the Soviet literature the degree to which physical coercion was used in forming the Central Asian collectives. It is clear, however, that the resistance to collectivization was strong and the programme was accompanied by a tremendous slaughter of livestock. It is believed that the herds did not regain pre-collectivization levels until 1943.

In addition to the coercion used to stimulate their growth, the collectives had many advantages over the private peasant. They were given preferred treatment in the allotment of credit, work animals, and other equipment. Since large numbers of those entering the collectives had no equipment or animals, this was probably a substantial incentive to the poor peasant who had formerly had to lease his tools and animal power. The traditional extended family system in some areas hindered the further development of the collective system by making the entrance of new members difficult. In one instance 100 of the members of a collective were from one family and the remaining fifty-five from another. In such cases the selection of the kolkhoz manager was especially difficult, each group being offended unless one of its members was chosen. The infiltration of "reactionary elements" into the kolkhoz management, the local Soviets, and even into the party, was evidently a recurring problem in the 'twenties and early 'thirties. Though from many points of view the position taken and the attitudes held by these so-called "reactionary groups" may have great merit, it must be recognized that these elements were an obstacle to economic development as it was being carried out by the Soviet authorities, and, therefore, they cannot be ignored when the problems facing the Soviet authorities are discussed.

The Party was, however, quite willing to make use of what it would

normally have considered "reactionary elements" when it was convenient. Retail trade was extensively developed in Central Asia on the basis of a very large number of small traders, and the Soviet authorities were willing to make use of the existing system. The attempt to develop co-operative stores proceeded slowly, and what is even more interesting, frequently faced the competition of state-owned trusts and syndicates. Stefanov, writing in *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, goes so far as to state that the problem is not to eliminate private trade, but to utilize it to the greatest possible extent. He says, "With our paucity of means it is not permissible to have in one village both a government store and a workers' co-operative."*

The development of the Soviet legal system follows a pattern similar to that of the land policy, though it developed more rapidly. It was realized in the early 'twenties that at least temporarily some accommodation would have to be made to the traditional legal system of the traditional *Shariat* courts, which were based on Moslem law. Political matters were immediately transferred to the local Soviet courts "under the general controls of the working masses," but the "Soviet authorities recognized the possibility, as a temporary measure, of giving permission for the organization of people's courts for the trial of the affairs of the native population according to the regulations of the *Shariat*. . . † The Soviet authorities soon found that the influence of these traditional courts and their application of Moslem law was incompatible with their economic development programme, especially with respect to the assertion of women's rights and subsequent introduction of women into the industrial labour force. The *Shariat* courts were, therefore, gradually abolished. In 1922 *Shariat* jurisdiction was limited to crimes listed in the Soviet legal code and which did not involve any Soviet documents, thereby eliminating many actions from prosecution which were illegal under Moslem law, as well as removing matters connected with Soviet activities from the jurisdiction of the *Shariat* courts. In 1923 financial support was withdrawn and all expenses were henceforth borne by the litigants. After 1924 they had no criminal jurisdiction, and by 1926 they had disappeared entirely. Although officially abolished, the Moslem tradition certainly did not disappear immediately. In 1927, according to a sympathetic Western observer, in many of what were supposed to be Soviet workers' courts the judges were illiterate and continued to enforce the old Moslem law, the only one they knew, and culprits were punished for offences no longer illegal.

THE COLLECTIVES IN OPERATION

The collectivization of agriculture was the most significant single change in the organization of the Central Asian economy brought about by the Soviet development programme.

The general organization of a planned agricultural system involved numerous difficulties. In 1934, 318,000 hectares, which had been prepared for irrigation, were not sown to cotton or any other crop. The figure is a rough but conservative estimate according to an article in *Planovoe Khozi-*

* Stefanov, N., *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1927, No. 6, p. 247.

† Suleimanova, Kh., *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, 1949, No. 3, pp. 62, 64.

aistvo, approximate because there were no proper records kept and the exactness of the figures regarding the total amount of land sown was admittedly questionable. The reasons given for this serious blunder are: (1) Improper planning, no provision having been made as to who was going to cultivate the newly prepared land; (2) improper construction, the smaller water distribution channels being either completely omitted or incorrectly placed; (3) no provision for proper water conservation measures, those located near the source taking more than necessary and leaving none for collectives farther along the canal; (4) the low level of education of the operational personnel. It is evident that the Soviets had as yet been unable to build up a new system of laws and regulations with regard to water rights, so necessary in a desert country to replace the old, abolished by the land and water reform laws. The water was nationalized, but there was still not enough at the right time at the right place to satisfy all needs.

The first five-year plan saw a large increase in the acreage devoted to cotton. Yields, however, remained below the pre-revolutionary average despite the introduction of some machinery, improved seeds, and mineral fertilizers. Gradually, more attention was focused on the problem of increasing yields. It was realized that the cost of new irrigated acreage was high and that "projects for large and grandiose irrigation works unfortunately divert attention from improved cultivation."* Much of the increase in cotton acreage had been accomplished at the expense of lucerne, a leguminous cover crop which was part of the usual rotation with cotton in Central Asia. Naturally, this led to a fall in yields and a shortage of fodder. Truck crops and vineyards were also neglected. Although the importance of lucerne was recognized by Bushchuev in 1930, it was during the same year that an article appeared in the same journal which declared that "the struggle against cotton specialization, against monoculture, is the struggle for precapitalist conditions."† The author was, doubtless, concerned primarily with the competition of grain with cotton, but such a fervent pronouncement in an article loaded with Marxist invective and entitled *The Struggle for Cotton on the Ideological Front in Central Asia* would certainly tend to discourage the planting of almost anything except cotton. By 1934, however, the situation was clearly understood, the trend toward monoculture declared to be reversed, and the extension of lucerne cultivation listed as the foremost agricultural problem in Central Asia.

A lack of trained personnel on the collectives was a universal complaint. The basic cause is obvious and need not be discussed. However, certain aspects of the problem are interesting. Not only were trained technicians scarce, but it was difficult to induce them to leave the cities where they were also in demand and to undergo the hardships of life in a Central Asian village where they were frequently unwelcome and distrusted by the local population. According to Bushchuev, the technician would often "want to abandon the business and put the city-made plans and the directives of governmental agencies away in a cabinet." Not only poor living conditions but frequent transfers and the conflicting orders of the local officialdom made constructive work difficult.

* Bushchuev, M., *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1930, Nos. 7, 8, pp. 232-3.

† Boranoe, A., *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1930, No. 12, p. 308.

Despite the lack of technicians, Central Asia was better supplied with agricultural experiment stations than the rest of the U.S.S.R. The work of the stations was criticized for being too academic and far removed from the practical aspects of cotton production. It was probably easier and more pleasant to work at an experiment station than in a village with a group of conservative and illiterate peasants.

Centralized organization and planning, whatever its advantages, can, as has been shown, present problems as well. Before considering the individual collective farm, perhaps a few more general organizational and administrative difficulties mentioned in the Soviet literature should be noted. It was found that the setting of a "deadline" for the completion of sowing resulted in improper or incomplete work in the rush to finish the planting on time. The relatively unsuccessful kolkhozes tended to be forgotten and to receive less attention and equipment than they were entitled to, thus tending to put them even farther behind the others. The cotton growers' and the cotton users' organizations were not properly co-ordinated. Seed farms were kept waiting the decision of the Textile Kombinat to decide what sort of fibre it desired.

Information regarding the specific problems of the Central Asian collective farm and the methods used in meeting them is much less plentiful than on the general problem of the organization of agricultural production.

Attempts were made on the farm level to solve the problem of trained workers and technicians by establishing schools on the larger units with special attention being given to the participation of natives and women. It was frequently urged that this educational programme be extended. The introduction of women as equal members of the kolkhoz was an important step and it was pressed wherever possible, for it made their labour available for cotton picking, which had not generally been the case in the past.

The operations of a kolkhoz or sovkhoz involve a large amount of book-keeping, which must be done with accuracy and skill if the farm income or piece-work wages are to be distributed fairly among the members or workers in accordance with their work contribution. The lack of qualified book-keepers and the insufficient incentives offered to them frequently resulted in the improper use of materials or allotments of pay which was not only wasteful but tended to increase the already high labour turnover. The book-keepers were urged to get out into the fields and to see what work was actually being done. Quite comprehensibly, they preferred their comfortable offices to a hot cotton field.

The collectives were constantly faced with the problem of dealing with the traditions of the society which they were designed to change. For example, the Uzbeks were reluctant to plant the newly introduced American medium-staple cotton, because its seeds produced poorer oil and its husks were not as satisfactory for cattle food. Nor did collectivization eliminate the traditional differences in the level of productivity of the different nationalities. The Uzbeks, with their long experience in irrigated agriculture, still consistently produce the highest yields of cotton in the U.S.S.R., higher than those produced in the Kirgiz part of the Fergana Valley under similar conditions.

The Party organization on each farm unit naturally took the lead in

efforts to accomplish the assigned tasks. On one of the larger sovkhoses, a Party member or Komsomol was assigned to each working brigade in the spring sowing campaign with specific instructions from his cell. Each cell, in turn, was responsible to, and severely judged by, the Party Committee of the sovkhos. In theory each worker in every group was assigned a specific task, such as a row to cultivate, and careful watch was kept on the quality of the work performed. It was also claimed that the introduction of the Stakhanovite piece-work movement into the machine-tractor stations and sovkhoses greatly increased productivity.

It is not within the scope of this discussion to consider the question of whether the collective form of organization is the most desirable from the point of view of economic efficiency, or to weigh the relative merits of tractor and animal power under Central Asian conditions. The essential merits of the tractor and of the collective system were unquestioned axioms not open to debate in the Soviet literature studied. Anything which interfered with the use of tractors was automatically considered a problem to be eliminated. Irrigated plots found too small for tractor cultivation were, therefore, to be enlarged. A writer who suggested that mechanization did not necessarily increase per acre yields was severely criticized for ideological deviation. Despite these convictions, the use of tractors, especially in sowing, was by no means universal even in 1938. The percentages of work done with tractors varied from 15 per cent. in Tadzhikistan to 48 per cent. in Turkmenistan.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, URBANIZATION, AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

Although in comparison with the rest of the U.S.S.R. the industrial development of Central Asia is relatively small, it is substantial relative to the size of the area and its previous level of development. The most extensive development, especially in the earlier years, was in the field of textiles, as would be expected from the general Soviet policy of establishing processing industries near the sources of their raw materials in order to meet local needs for finished goods and develop the urban working class. By 1941, Central Asia produced 6 per cent. of the Union's textile products. The major centre of Soviet textile production remains, however, in the old central industrial area.

The determination of the scale of the enterprise is one of the first decisions which must be made when planning new industrial development. The Soviet decision to erect large central cotton ginning plants was based not only on a conventional cost analysis, balancing the increased efficiency against the increased transportation costs, but on considerations of a political nature. Since the peasant was responsible for providing transport for the crop, the extra costs would not fall on one of the "progressive sectors" of the economy. Thus the gins constructed were not of optimum size from the purely economic viewpoint.

Long-term planning of large developments such as the Kara Bugaz chemical scheme on the Caspian Sea was difficult in the rapidly changing economy of the Soviet Union. The Soviet writer Mitrokhin,* in discussing

* Mitrokhin, T., *Problemy Turkmennii*, 1934, Vol. I, p. 155.

the Kara Bugaz project, emphasized that development of similar resources in other areas must be continued because of insufficient knowledge of the potentialities of the Kara Bugaz development. A lack of proper surveys, in at least one instance, is believed to have resulted in the construction of smelter capacity (at Chimkent in Kazakstan) in excess of that justified by the ore supplies.*

The specific problems of the Kara Bugaz development are perhaps indicative of the difficulties faced in long-range industrial development in Central Asia. The Kara Bugaz Gulf is a natural evaporating basin in the Caspian Sea, and quantities of various salts have accumulated or can be extracted from the briny water. The area had no settled population until 1929, is excessively hot, lacks a source of fresh water, and is barren of vegetation and, therefore, subject to sandstorms. The discussions of the project written in the early 'thirties contemplated a very extensive development during the second and third five-year plans. A large chemical plant was to be constructed, vegetation planted to prevent sandstorms, and vegetables were to be grown to provide fresh food for the workers. It is interesting to note that these problems were evidently more difficult to solve than was expected in the original planning stages, for the chemical plant was still unbuilt in the early post-war years. The Kara Bugaz has been developed to a limited extent as a source of raw chemicals, which are shipped by water to Dagestan and other points on the Caspian Sea.

The establishment of a large textile mill in Tashkent in the middle 'thirties involved a number of interesting problems. The requirements of standardized production on a large scale required a change in tastes on the part of the local consuming public. Tastes were, therefore, to be "Europeanized" so that fewer types of cloth would be demanded.

It is generally found that in the establishment of a large industrial enterprise in an under-developed area not only must a substantial investment be made in plant equipment and construction, but in addition large sums must be spent for housing and other facilities which would not be required in a more highly developed area. The breakdown of the capital investment in the Tashkent Textile Kombinat clearly shows the extent of these external diseconomies. Of the total investment of 173.3 million roubles, 25 per cent. was for the construction of the factory and 33 per cent. for equipment, while 27 per cent. was devoted to "the construction of socialistic living quarters and cultural facilities" (*Zhilsotskultbytstroitel'stvo*), 6 per cent. to the training of workers, and 9 per cent. for communal eating-places and other facilities. In all, 42 per cent. of the total investment was devoted to secondary items.

Although the training of workers involved a relatively small portion of the initial capital investment, it was without doubt one of the most difficult problems. It involved an attempt to do what normally took ten years to do in the older industrial areas in a period from six months to a year by means of intensive training courses in Tashkent. A small group of forty workers was sent to Leningrad for special instruction. The initial results of the training programme were unsatisfactory because of a lack of sufficient

* Connolly, Violet. "Development of Industry in Central Asia," R.C.A.S. JOURNAL, 1941, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 1, 9.

practical training with the machine which the particular worker was to use, most of the training having been done on group basis.

Special efforts were made to include large numbers of natives and women in the training classes, and they were evidently successful, 70 per cent. of those participating being natives and 67 per cent. women. These figures correspond closely with the proportions projected for the total working force of twelve thousand. In the then (1935) already existing light industry of Uzbekistan, 58 per cent. of the workers were natives and 56 per cent. women.

The construction of housing for the workers in projects like the Textile Kombinat involves the general problem of urban planning and development. The Soviet writers on the subject constantly stress the integral relationship between housing and production. Feudal and capitalistic housing is held to be incompatible with the socialist way of life. Space must be provided for nurseries, laundries, and dining-halls in order to free women from household duties so that they may take part in production. The importance of maternal and child health programmes is stressed for similar reasons.

The Soviet preference for large housing units to make communal facilities economically justified was difficult to put into effect in Central Asia because of the nature of the available construction materials. The standard building material in Central Asia is a soft clay brick which is unsuited for structures in excess of two stories in height. Low buildings, however, require more roads, water mains, and so forth, thus raising the *per capita* cost of community services. The construction problem was apparently unsolved in the early 'thirties, and writers contented themselves with declaring that it was necessary to create an architectural form fitted to socialist life, but using the local materials.

According to one of the few contemporary reports of a Western observer, the new socialist living quarters were not popular with the natives and "the new town was a much worse muddle than the old, since the houses were built closer together, and there was consequently less space in which to dissipate the dirt.* An English M.P. who visited Central Asia during the Second World War remarked on the fact that newly built houses had separate quarters for the women, true to the ancient Moslem tradition.† The development of "socialist architecture" had evidently bogged down.

The allotment of housing space in the cities was used as a means of stimulating the preferred industries. The housing goals for the second five-year plan in the cities of Uzbekistan were, for workers in heavy industry, 12 square metres, for workers in other industries and transport 5 square metres, and for the remaining population 4.72 square metres, the average being 6.5 square metres. At the end of the first five-year plan the average amount available was 3.81 square metres per person.

The problem of water supply is difficult in a desert country like Central Asia. The dust problem on the cobbled streets is also mentioned. It

* *Op. cit.*, Goldman, p. 171.

† Parker, John, "Impressions of Soviet Middle East," R.C.A.S. JOURNAL, 1946, Vol. XXXIII, p. 349.

seems most likely that every problem of rapidly growing cities was met in Central Asia and in a rather acute form in most instances.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The foregoing discussion, incomplete though it is, does suggest certain general observations about the nature of the process of economic development in Central Asia. As would be expected, many problems—those arising from the nature of the area and the character of its population—were similar to those met in other under-developed areas. The lack of trained personnel, the conflict with a traditional culture, these are not aspects peculiar to Soviet development, but there is a second group of problems which stemmed not from the situation confronting the developers, but from the methods and attitudes connected with the development programme. In Central Asia the difficulties that arose from centralized planning and ideological orthodoxy are examples of this type. Such “derived” problems are, in effect, the price paid for the use of the methods chosen. When considering alternative approaches to a developmental problem it is then clearly essential to examine not only the effectiveness of the method with respect to the problem at hand, but also the secondary problems likely to arise from the approach itself.

It is impossible to tell from the sources consulted to what extent physical coercion was used to facilitate economic development after the open revolts of the early 'twenties were suppressed. As has been shown in the above survey of development problems, economic coercion was used unabashedly to eliminate the opposition and to channel labour into preferred industries. In democratic States the extent to which such measures may be used is limited by the population's willingness to accept them, but they are by no means absent. High taxation, differentially assessed, is one form of economic pressure common in Western nations.

The degree of effectiveness of the Soviet educational and propaganda campaigns is not as firmly established as that of economic coercion, but they must have had some effect or extensive economic development would hardly have been possible. An intriguing aspect of this problem is to what extent was the old culture replaced by the new, and to what degree the new was merely superimposed upon the old without altering the basic structure of the traditional society. Adequate information on this question is probably unavailable for Soviet Central Asia.

The West could make more widespread use of education and propaganda than it has until now. The Soviets do, however, have an apparent advantage in their monopoly control of education and communication facilities. The techniques of education and propaganda are ones which conflict far less with democratic ideals than do either physical or economic coercion when they are not the exclusive prerogative of the State. The Soviet developer has the substantial additional advantage that he is able to carry out any given programme with a lower level of social consensus on his side than the developer in a democratic State, or, for that matter, in one with an insecure authoritarian government.

In examining the Central Asian experience it must not be forgotten that

Central Asia had a number of advantages which most under-developed areas do not have. It is politically united and controlled by the State which undertook its development and which, in turn, is the principal market for Central Asian goods. The local population could, therefore, be more easily compelled by external power to abandon certain aspects of their traditional culture for the sake of economic development. The special importance of cotton in the Soviet's foreign exchange position during the 'twenties and 'thirties lent added zeal to their efforts to develop Central Asian production, and the Central Asian producers, in turn, were not faced with a fluctuating world market price for cotton.

Substantial though these advantages may have been, it would be foolish to disregard the Soviet achievement as evidence that economic development can be induced in an area by an outside agency with only the most limited type of co-operation from the local population. As indicated above, however, it would seem that the Soviet methods are adapted only in a very limited degree to Western needs and values.

A CRITICISM OF "COMMUNISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD"

IT is fair to ask, when reviewing a statement of facts such as the one given by Mr. Jafri in his "Communism in the Muslim World,"* what it is the author has tried to tell us. In this case apparently the answer must be that Communism has been gaining ground in the Muslim world because the structure of Islam has for long been rotting. The proposed remedy is that as the basic truths are sound they must be reverted to and it is upon them that the new social order of Islam must be firmly founded.

To illustrate these points he describes the rebuilt structures of Turkey and Indonesia, inferring that because Islam has been revalued and re-orientated "there you find the least danger of Communism." Leaving aside problems such as the true extent to which social reformation has been carried out in these countries, it may still be worth asking just how much a factor such as Nationalism (anti-Russian in the first case and anti-Chinese in the second) affected this condition of least Communist danger.

Islam collapsed in Soviet Central Asia, according to Mr. Jafri, almost overnight. Yet history proclaims that such was the fury of Muslim resistance, the Soviet Russians, as ever ready to accede right to might, granted total amnesty to the so-called Basmadjis when years of strife failed to pacify the region. Even though this prolonged defence was led primarily and naturally by Mullahs and landowners, and therefore by reactionaries in the terminology of such as Mr. Jafri, it was nevertheless very real.

The story of Islam in China is not very well known, and on that account the author is to be excused certain errors. It must suffice to say that there are no good authorities for his quoted figures, nor would it have been practicable even if desirable to establish a Chinese Pakistan. The Muslims of that great land are divided into two main sections: the larger being composed of Chinese and the smaller of Turkic-speaking peoples. Between these two sections there is considerable mutual antipathy. Moreover, they are spread into every corner of the land. In the time of Yakub Beg an attempt by Western powers to create a Muslim State out of Chinese territory failed as soon as the central government was able to reassert itself over Sinkiang. And had such a Chinese Pakistan been attempted in 1946, whose, then, would have been the bitterest denunciation of such Anglo-American imperialism, may it be asked?

One is given the impression that Islam with its several hundred million adherents is akin to Communism. In this respect the author says that "as far as the creative objects are concerned there is little difference. The difference comes on the question of the creator . . .," etc.—that is, on theological grounds. It may be pertinent to add that this would apply more to Christianity than to Communism, and it is certain that Mr. Jafri could not

* Jafri, Fareed, "Communism in the Muslim World," R.C.A.S. JOURNAL, 1953, Vol. XL, pp. 161-8.

have meant to associate relevant methods of proselytization in his comparison of the three systems.

Main causes for the decay of Islamic structure are stated to be the rigidity of Mullah influence and feudalism. If causal factors could be so easily discerned his may well be correct, but cannot surely be meant to be exhaustive. He probably realizes that it is very dangerous to initiate religious reforms and to eradicate feudalism if it is not borne well in mind that those aims are not ends in themselves. It would be useless, to draw an analogy from one of his examples, to destroy the palaces of the rich without first housing the poor. Once Islamic principles are questioned—and questioned they probably will be if some reforms are to be made—the whole authority of the Kuran may be doubted. Once the existing feudal economy is upset, if the change comes too quickly, there is danger of total disorganization. It is reasonable to suggest that some such similar reaction occurred in China when the absoluteness of Confucianism was felt to be no longer in keeping with the events of the day.

Another cause given is that of racial discrimination, and Mr. Jafri vividly illustrates his point with reminiscences of his own experiences, perhaps overdrawn, whilst studying in England. Where he admits only a taint of pink it is probably and shockingly true to say that a great proportion of today's African students return to their homelands more than a little injected with the virus of Communism. To their minds, so often immaturely swayed by youthful hearts, reasons for this reaction are manifold. One of the gravest is asserted racial discrimination, to which Mr. Jafri gives so much prominence.

It is true, of course, that "two wrongs do not make a right," and any form of racial discrimination is definitely wrong, but before undue horror is evinced at happenings in other people's countries let us concern ourselves only with what can be done constructively and immediately in our own. We in Britain are trying to broaden our outlook on such matters, and Mr. Jafri admits we are improved. With all due respect, then, may it be suggested that the great Indian subcontinent, Islamic and Hindu, first order its own house before becoming emotional about others'.

The creed of the Muslims is, according to the author: ". . . we believe in a democracy which has a spiritual basis. We do not have colour prejudices and racial bias, and we believe in the brotherhood of mankind." This is a truly beautiful belief and should be practised throughout the world. As the Christian is urged to be Christian, so let the Muslim be Muslim, and between us let there be universal happiness.

IN MEMORIAM

MISS RACHEL WINGATE

RACHEL ORDE WINGATE, M.A., who was born at Murree, Punjab, on October 9, 1900, was the eldest daughter of Colonel George Wingate, C.I.E., Indian Army. Her mother was the daughter of Captain Charles Orde Browne, R.A. Thus she came of soldier stock, and at an early age became interested in the frontier and its tribesmen, subjects of the lifelong study of her father. She was educated at Priors Field, Godalming, and at Newnham College, Cambridge, where a brilliant career was crowned by the Historical Tripos and the Oriental Tripos (Arabic and Persian). She had studied Persian and Arabic under the late Edward Browne, Professor of Persian at the University. His understanding and love of Islamic culture had a profound influence on his pupil. On leaving Cambridge she became Assistant Librarian at the School of Oriental Studies, London University.

In 1924 she joined the Swedish Mission in Chinese Turkestan. In a narrative written for her family, which she called *A Well-spent Journey*, she described the forty-two marches from India to Yarkand, over seven mountain passes, the highest of which was the Karakoram (18,500 ft.): and how she rode her faithful pony Jonathan from Leh to Yarkand, the only pony which was not sorebacked on arrival there. She closed her narrative in words so characteristic of her :

"It is so difficult for me to realize as I write that, for you, the very names of the places do not call up the sight of camp fires in the dark, or a long line of pack ponies coming over the hillside in the snow, of the quaint garments and cheerful faces of our Caravan men, or of the moon rising over the mountains and lighting up a string of camels coming slowly in, in the dark, to share our camping ground by the river.

"One journey at least we understand far more about after this, 'And by the light of that guiding star three wise men came from country far.'"

As the result of the four and a half years during which she worked as an honorary member for the Swedish Mission, she wrote *The Steep Ascent: The Story of the Christian Church in Turkestan*. She had also found time to teach the boys at the school to play football. On her return journey to India in 1929 she crossed the Himalayas by an alternative route via Gilgit, and was the only European in the Caravan.

On arrival in England she collaborated with the Director of the School of Oriental Studies, the late Sir Denison Ross, in producing the only Turki-English dictionary. She also came in touch with Miss Noel Kennedy, the famous Secretary of the Royal Central Asian Society.

Her next venture abroad was two years' teaching in the Jerusalem Girls' College; followed by another two years at the College of the British Syrian Mission in Beirut. During this period she acquired a great love of Palestine and a sympathy for Zionism.

She finally returned to England in 1935 and became part-time Assistant

to Miss Kennedy. When war broke out she was asked to join the Ministry of Information on account of her knowledge of Swedish and of Central Asia.

On the termination of hostilities she succeeded Miss Kennedy as Secretary; and when in 1947 the office was transferred to Hinde Street, she added the duties of Assistant Secretary of the Palestine Exploration Fund.

Miss Wingate's success at Cambridge might have induced her to adopt a scholastic career; but the courage and determination which she inherited from her soldier stock impelled her to seek adventure in foreign lands. The profound religious faith which was the inspiration of her way of life answered the call of Mission work. When later she turned from this, and from teaching, to become Secretary of the Royal Central Asian Society her high ideals inspired all she did. Her fine intellect and wide knowledge did not shrink from the drudgery which is inseparable from part of this work. Her devotion to the interests of the Society found expression in her capacity for finding lecturers and in the care with which she produced the Journal, and most of all in the happy relationship which she established with the members.

It was an education and a privilege to know her. Admiration for her ability was soon coupled with affection for a warm-hearted and lovable personality. Her death came unexpectedly. A very heavy cold prevented her from coming to London for the Coronation. She was taken to hospital, where there was every hope of a rapid recovery. Then quite suddenly on June 11 her heart failed. Her untimely death has deprived the Society of a remarkable personality and of a Secretary of unusual merit. But it is as the friend, to whom we owe so much, that Rachel Wingate will live in our memory.

J. S. S.

PROFESSOR ORHAN BURIAN

PROFESSOR ORHAN BURIAN died recently in Ankara at the age of 39. He was a leading specialist in English studies in Turkey, and, on the academic plane, he is a grievous loss in the interchange of ideas and knowledge between England and Turkey. Orhan Bey was, furthermore, a most delightful personality, and his early death is a real tragedy for his friends.

Professor Burian belonged to the younger generation of Turkish historians who have begun to make valuable contributions to the understanding of Turkish, and indeed European, history through their independent study of sources in the great west European libraries. With his contemporaries, Akdes Nimet Kurat, Halit Inalcik, and others, Orhan Burian spent several periods in England for research among documents in the Public Records Office, the British Museum, and the older universities. These studies are only just beginning to bear fruit, but they promise to expand greatly our knowledge of Ottoman and east European cultural and political history and to impel a revision of many preconceived ideas

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derived from the rather biased interpretations of historians of the nineteenth century.*

As a result of their sojourns in England, Professor Burian and his colleagues took back to Turkey fresh and original impressions of English life which they introduced to the (relatively new) University of Ankara, where, until the early forties, German and other central European methods and concepts had been most in evidence.†

Professor Burian's earliest thesis was *An Introduction to Hardy's Novels*, published in 1947,‡ but mostly written, as the author tells us, ten years earlier. In this paper Burian paid attention to Hardy's concern with social conditions (a theme which the writer held had been overlooked in other studies). He sought to show also "that Hardy was, from *Desperate Remedies* to *The Dynasts*, in search of some new form by which picturesque, dramatic, and speculative elements would be merged and presented more effectively than in the traditional and accepted form of the novel." This essay is remarkably mature for a man then in his middle twenties who could demonstrate that he had already acquired a notable knowledge of some aspects of English literature and a fair competence in the instrument of the English language.

After some excursions in Byron, Goethe, Emerson, and Wordsworth, Burian settled down to specialize in Elizabethan literature and, in the historical field, on Anglo-Turkish relations in the Elizabethan age. His first important papers on this latter theme appeared quite recently, pre-
saging perhaps a full-length study.§

Orhan Bey was a man of slight build, of modest, diffident manners. But his physical fragility was illumined by a really radiant charm. He had a talent for friendship which seemed easy in him. He possessed a delightful sense of humour, a gift not uncommon in Turks but often suppressed, with foreigners, by shyness and difficulties over language. He was an entertaining and, sometimes, brilliant conversationalist; a conscientious and amusing correspondent. The memory of him, and his discrete understanding laugh, will remain a link between many of his English and Turkish friends.

W. E. D. A.

* Notably Kurat's detailed studies of the period of Peter the Great and Charles XII, and Inalcik's researches into Turco-Russian relations during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Reference may also be made to Enver Ziya Karal's revision of the period of Selim III.

† For the initiation of the exchange of British and Turkish personalities and ideas at an academic level, the much-abused British Council deserves great credit; and not least Professor Michael Grant, the virtual founder of the British Council in Turkey, and Professor Gatenby—who recently received a well-merited "mention" in the Coronation Honours List.

‡ In *Annales de l'Université d'Ankara*, III (1948-9), pp. 441-522.

§ (a) "Four English Travellers' Accounts of Turkey" in *Türk Tarih Kurumu Belleten*, Cilt XV, Sayı 58 (Nisan 1951).

(b) "The First Years of Turco-English Relations" in *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi*, IX, 1-2 (1951).

(c) "The Story of a Gift from Queen Elizabeth to Sultan Murat III," *ibid.* (1951).

(d) "The Report of Lello, Third English Ambassador to the Sublime Porte," a separate fascicule published as *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Yayınları*, No. 83; *İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Enstitüsü*, 3. (English/Turkish introduction and English text of Lello with Turkish translation and footnotes, pp. ix + 80.)

REVIEWS

History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas. By A. L. Basham. Ph.D. Luzac and Co. 1951. Pp. xxxii + 304. £2 2s.

The material of this book was collected originally for the author's Ph.D. thesis and evidently involved much research. There is a twelve-page bibliography of works mentioned in the text, including Pali texts and inscriptions.

The Ajivikas were one of the heretical Indian sects which broke the bonds of Brahminism in the seventh century. Buddhism and Jainism have survived, but, with others even more obscure, the Ajivika doctrine has vanished.

Makkhali Gosala, practical founder of the Ajivika doctrine, was associated with the founder of Jainism, Mahavira, for some time, and there is a resemblance in the doctrine of the two sects. Like the Jains, the Ajivikas divide mankind into six classes according to their psychic colour, but the rigid determinism of the Ajivikas is entirely different from the Jain Karma, and indeed from any other Eastern belief.

"If he come down the south bank of the Ganges, slaying, maiming and torturing, and causing others to be slain, maimed or tortured, he commits no sin, neither does sin approach him. Likewise if a man go down the north bank of the Ganges giving alms and sacrificing, and causing alms to be given and sacrifices to be performed, he acquires no merit, neither does merit approach him. From liberality, self-control, abstinence and honesty is derived neither merit nor the approach of merit."

The Ajivika doctrine of Niyati is a rigid determinism which must have had a non-aryan ancestry, foreign as it is to most Indian religious thought. With the accompanying atomic and molecular theories it provides a cosmic perspective that brings this extinct creed remarkably up to date.

Makkhali Gosala, the leader of the Ajivikas, was one of the six heretics who attacked Buddhism in its early stages. In the time of Asoka the Ajivikas are mentioned before the Jains, as either more influential or more favoured, and though the term Ajivika is in some cases considered as merely a general one for a naked wandering ascetic, and later with not the best of reputations, this creed, which originated when the spiritual life of India was in a ferment, which had its own system of logic and a literature and a philosophy to which this author only supplies reference, appears of more modern interest than extinction.

The actual Ajivika doctrine is not too clearly set out by the author, but he has put a large amount of reference into this research whatever the motive of this publication may be, and by ferreting about the book, a cosmic philosophy of extreme interest can be visualized. The ultimate origin of these ideas is not seriously considered by Mr. Basham, though he mentions the Magadhan as one of the earliest Ajivika scripts. Yet this origin of a cosmic creed is of most extreme and topical interest. Were the gifted originators of the Indus, if not survivors of Atlantis, inheritors of some vast culture of whose forgotten wisdom the Ajivika cosmology might be a whisper? The latest archæological trend into megalithic periods, which may point to some interglacial period that is actual prehistory, may make common sense out of the entire ineffectuality of human effort in a 1,406,600 cycle of birth and rebirth.

E. SWIFT.

Safety Last. By Lieut.-Colonel W. F. Stirling, D.S.O., M.C. With a Foreword by Siegfried Sassoon and an Epilogue by Lord Kinross. London: Hollis and Carter. 1953. Pp. vi + 251. Illus. Index. 18s.

As the title suggests, the author is a gallant individualist, now a septuagenarian looking back across the period of declining British imperial supremacy to regret the passing of the Edwardian "Golden Age"—though he certainly makes it appear brassy with his recommendation that "a play, a partner and a champagne supper at the Savoy cost less than a fiver. King Edward's interest in horses had given a great boost to racing . . ." (p. 24).

For him the "right to adventure in every quarter of the globe" was "our Elizabethan birthright"; and he has certainly adventured in many quarters—from British Columbia to the Sudan and Syria, via Marks and Spencer! In such a varied career he has assembled a mass of personal reminiscence which will no doubt appeal to his near-contemporaries; but the book rarely attains the level of significant comment, such as would serve the future historian, on the events in which its author played a not unimportant part. Many would agree that de Gaulle's character was "ruthless," but was it "scientific" (p. 228)? To say that the British Government's acquiescence in the Italian seizure of Albania at Easter, 1939, "helped to pave the way for the rise of Hitler" (p. 157) is surely to reverse cause and effect; but for Colonel Stirling the Baldwin-Chamberlain era is summed up in the obnoxious slogan "Safety First," and he does not appear to realize that it was designed originally as an antidote to the "direct action" of the General Strike.

Towards the end of his active career Colonel Stirling was British liaison officer with the President of the Syrian Republic during the 1945 crisis with the French, of which his is the first published account by a participant; but here again he adds comparatively little to what can be pieced together from sources already available.

GEORGE KIRK.

Big Tiger and Christian. By Fritz Mühlenweg. Pantheon Books, Inc. \$4.95.

This volume has the unusual charm of being written for youth and yet being full of interest to the adult reader. The reason for this is that the author has intimate understanding of places and people little known to Westerners, and it is out of this knowledge that he has fashioned his tale. Fritz Mühlenweg took part in various scientific expeditions which necessitated residence among the Mongols. No one could live among these primitive people and not be captivated by their simplicity, hardness, hospitality and unsophisticated outlook on life.

The story opens in Peking in the days when the warlord Wu Pei-fu was a threat to the poorly equipped armies of North China. Two delightful boys—one Chinese, Big Tiger, and the other a Britisher named Christian—plan a kite-flying expedition which brings them into contact with a band of good-natured but irresponsible soldiers who persuade them to come into the rear carriage of a troop train and fly the kite from there. The train starts and here are our two youngsters launched on an adventurous journey which involves becoming secret couriers to General Wu Pei-fu and bearers of a letter which they must deliver in person to Governor Yang Tseng-hsin in Urumchi on the other side of Mongolia. The boys willingly accept the commission and start on the unknown trek under the charge of a trusted soldier named Good Fortune.

From that time on life is full of incident as the boys come into contact with herdsmen, lamas, bandits and tribal chieftains, in fact with every kind of folk such as are to be met on the desert trade routes of the Gobi. If such a tale were attempted by anyone unfamiliar with desert travel it would necessarily be full of anachronisms, but Fritz Mühlenweg knows his Mongolia and any one of these adventures might happen there. As they journey on the boys learn the necessary etiquette of nomad life, but they are highly adaptable and meet every emergency in true Chinese fashion with the philosophical sentence "Muh-yu fah-dz" ("It can't be helped"), to which the well-mannered Big Tiger adds flowery compliments in the choicest Peking accent: "This is too great an honour. We are unworthy boys," or "We have to go but we shall count the hours until we can rejoice in your presence." The reader will follow the course of the exciting journey which covers 593 pages of constant adventure, and at the close will find himself greatly familiarized with the customs and speech of a strange ethnic section of the great human family.

In the end Big Tiger and Christian return from their long trek to the shelter of their respective families, whose natural anxieties have long since been allayed by a message from Marshal Wu Pei-fu himself telling them that the boys are engaged on an important mission but are being well looked after.

The book is admirably translated from the German and is delightfully illustrated by Raffaello Busoni, who has caught the true spirit of the Gobi and its nomad tribes.

FRANCESCA FRENCH.

Elizabethan Venture. By Cecil Tragen. H. F. and G. Witherby, Ltd. 1953. Pp. viii + 158. 10s. 6d.

This is the story, in some 46,000 words, of two sixteenth-century trading ventures to the East, John Newbery and Ralph Fitch being the Elizabethan heroes.

It is what is known in reviewers' classifications as "eminently readable," for the author tells a straight tale in simple language. Most of the chapters are interesting enough to grip many readers, though some may conclude that Mr. Tragen has primarily written for the intelligent members of the Upper Vth. Explanatory phrases are dotted everywhere:—"Cathay (as China was then called)"; "the dread disease, scurvy," is carefully explained as being caused by "a salt meat diet and the lack of fresh foodstuffs." When Fitch's own words "You are then to pay eight in the hundred for your goods" are followed by the author's comment "(i.e., 8 per cent.)," one wonders if after all the Lower IVth were not meant to be the chief readers, though there is nothing on the jacket or in the foreword to say so.

The fact remains, however, that the book is well worth reading, for one is repaid by a fascinating picture of Elizabethan daring and almost naïve courage in the face of great geographical difficulties and the mighty organized enmity of Portugal, then so far in advance of England as a power to be reckoned with in the East. There are also some striking informative details. For instance, who actually was the first Englishman to set foot on Indian soil, and when? And the almost modern-minded idealism with which Queen Elizabeth I ended her letter of introduction for the traders to take on their voyage: "seeing that we are born to have need of one another and that we are bound to aid one another."

Just as one is getting impatient with the author's tendency to copy the preacher who told his hearers what he was going to say, then said it, and finally told them what he had said, one comes across some amusing description and forgives him. Such is the pathetic picture of the two Englishmen waiting vainly in the Baghdad market-place for the inhabitants to buy their good thick English woollens, the temperature then being over 100° F. in the shade. Which of us has not experienced, as they did, the hectic hours in a foreign town when time, already limited, has to be spent in searching for some special object requested by a friend at home? In Newbery's case it was not a fancy handbag for Aunt Emily, but a geographical book by Abulfeda for Richard Hakluyt.

When Ralph Fitch was contemplating his return to England the author talks of three routes open to him—overland across India and Persia to the Mediterranean, round the Cape of Good Hope, or by boat up the western coast of India and the Persian Gulf, then across Mesopotamia. Was the route up the Red Sea to Qoseir, across the desert to Qena and down the Nile to the north coast of Egypt quite forsaken in those days? These and other interesting trains of thought which arise in reading this book make one wish again that it had been written in a rather more mature style. And yet if it is read by a twelve-year-old and inspires him with the sense of adventure and enterprise here recounted, the author will have been fully justified. But for any age in any era surely the English language can provide two more imaginative verbs for the performance of insects than those used on page 117—"swarms of insects swarmed and buzzed around him." Or if the supply of verbs had dried up, an alternative first noun would have saved the situation.

However, when all is said and done, the reader is grateful to Mr. Tragen for introducing him to two such colourful figures as Messrs. Newbery and Fitch, and it would be unfair not to say so. The book is provided with two adequate maps and a nearly, but not quite, adequate index.

M. ROWLATT.

A History of the Crusades. By Steven Runciman. Volume II: *The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East, 1100-1187*. Cambridge University Press. 1952. Pp. xii + 473. 42s.

Mr. Steven Runciman in the Preface to Volume II of his *History of the Crusades* states that the main theme is Warfare. This was bound to be the case when dealing with the Crusading States in the East from Baldwin I's Coronation in 1100 to the

annihilation, by Saladin, of the greatest army that the kingdom had ever assembled, on the Horns of Hattin in July, 1187. The surrender of the Holy City, three months later, was the inevitable consequence.

Mr. Runciman in this volume has more than ever proved that he must be regarded as the leading authority of the Crusading period. His work is written for scholars. He has marshalled his facts, obviously after extensive examination of contemporary evidence, and has given his independent judgment, tipping the balance, on the whole, on the side of the Byzantine rulers in their relations with the Western powers. This is especially evident when he is dealing with the Second Crusade.

The general reader, however, will probably find that he is somewhat overwhelmed at following the various campaigns of the Kings of Jerusalem or of the other rulers of the Latin States. Despite the welcome Genealogical Trees given in Appendix III, it is by no means easy to keep in mind the different dynastic alliances. It would have been an advantage to have had some of the chapters arranged in sections so as to emphasize the shift of scene from one area to another. The book needs to be read through a second time and then characters emerge which can excite us or rouse our sympathy, as is the case with the noble leper boy king, Baldwin IV. The background can be admirably filled in by the study of the chapter called "Life in Outremer." It may cause surprise to note that "to the contemporary pilgrim Outremer was shocking because of its luxury and licence." Yet the East had to offer some compensation for the perils undertaken by whole families who had gone to a land "where intrigue and murder flourished." The Holy Land, in some respects, was like it was before the coming of the Zionists. There were religious colonies of every Christian denomination, and some of Mr. Runciman's most interesting passages concern the attitude adopted towards the native Christians both by individuals and bodies. The laity, on the whole, showed wise toleration in contrast to the clergy. From early days, for example, Baldwin I insisted that all wrongs inflicted by the Patriarch on the native Christians in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and in monasteries in Jerusalem were to be righted. Yet any good that could be done in Jerusalem was outweighed by the disastrous policy of the Papacy under Pascal II, whose official view it was that the holy war should be preached against Byzantium. This was the turning-point in the history of the Crusades.

Mr. Runciman divides Volume II into five books. The first deals with *The Establishment of the Kingdom* under Baldwin I, in which the centre of interest is the King. He "ensured that the Kingdom of Jerusalem would not easily be destroyed." Then follows *The Zenith*. With the foundation of the Military Orders of the Knights Hospitaller and Knights Templar in 1118-20 the next King, Baldwin II, saw a solution to the problem of having a regular supply of devoted fighting men, although they were to owe allegiance only to the Pope. With his death and that of Joscelin I of Edessa in 1131 ended the old generation of pioneer Crusaders. The new generation needed to conserve what had been gained. King Fulk saw to the building of some of the great castles, especially those to guard the southern frontier. His Queen, Melisende, daughter of Baldwin II, saw to the building of convents, as for instance in Bethany. But it was in the enemy's camp that the greatest protagonist of the period was found. Zengi, ruler of Mosul, regarded himself as the champion against the Franks. In 1144 he took Edessa, the great Christian city in the north, and gave proof of his policy by massacring the Franks but sparing the native Christians. To the Moslems the fall of Edessa brought new hope. "To the Christians it brought dependency and alarm, and to the Christians of Western Europe it came as a terrible shock."

The result of the disaster led to *The Second Crusade*, which is dealt with in Book III. The scenes of enthusiasm when St. Bernard of Clairvaux preached to the crowds at Vézelay in 1146 are vividly related by Mr. Runciman. Hope surged in the hearts of many of the French nobles, led by Louis VII, and Germans, by Conrad III, when their armies started for the East. Yet the Crusade ended ignominiously as the result of a decision of "utter folly," taken at Acre in June, 1148, to attack Damascus. Five days after reaching the city the Crusaders packed up their camp and returned home. "The crusade was brought to nothing by its leaders, with their truculence, their ignorance and their ineffectual folly."

Book IV, called *The Turn of the Tide*, sees the rise of the second great Moslem

leader, Nur-ed-Din, son of Zengi, who was to be the great thorn in the flesh of the Crusaders in the north, especially after his capture of Damascus in 1154. In the south the third great Moslem leader, Saladin, was gaining control of Egypt. As long as the two leaders were on bad terms with one another the Franks could breathe, but in 1174 came Nur-ed-Din's death, followed soon after by that of King Amalric. The death of these two men opened the gateway to Saladin's future victories. These are dealt with in the final book, called *The Triumph of Islam*. One after another the great cities of the north fell into Saladin's hands. On the Horns of Hattin in the Galilean hills the final battle took place in July, 1187, when Saladin became lord of the Moslem world. After he had taken Jerusalem in October he acted, as is well known, in a most humane way to the Christians. He refused also to allow the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Thus in Mr. Runciman's concluding words: "At the Horns of Hattin and the gates of Jerusalem he had avenged the humiliation of the First Crusade, and he had shown how a man of honour celebrates his victory."

J. D. T.

An Anthology of Moorish Poetry. Translated by A. J. Arberry. Cambridge University Press. 1953. Pp. xx + 199. 18s.

As Professor Arberry says in his introduction, this book is a translation of an anthology compiled by Ibn Sa'id al Andalusi in 1243. Professor Gomez, of Madrid, to whom Professor Arberry pays gracious tribute, edited and translated the text of this anthology in 1942, but the present volume gives the ordinary English reader his first chance of enjoying this remarkable selection of poems.

Professor Arberry's introduction of some ten pages is a great help to the newly initiated, for herein he explains some of the traditional mannerisms of Arab poetry and traces literary origins to pre-Islamic sources.

Ibn Sa'id had arranged his poems in a system original to Western eyes, and Professor Arberry has held to this arrangement. The main divisions are the areas from which the poets hailed—Seville, Jerez, Cordova, Tangiers, Sicily, etc. These are subdivided into categories according to the calling of the writers—*i.e.*, Kings, Ministers, Lawyers, Grammarians and so on, placed in order of social grade. It is entertaining to note in this respect that Grammarians rank above *Littérateurs* (a reflection on the high status of the Arab language), that Civil Servants come before Lawyers, but that Poets as such are quite low in the scale. A modern anthology on those lines might prove an interesting volume.

Professor Arberry has put all these poems into rhyme, a herculean task which must have needed not only great scholarship but at times an almost crossword-puzzle mentality, owing to the intricacy of Arabic symbol and expression. The poems in English vary greatly in charm and wit, but, as the translator points out, so do the originals, a fact which bars criticism of the translation. It is remarkable, however, that among the whole collection of 313 poems there is only one couplet that really jars in its rhyme.

The wide range of subjects is surprising. Love poems are there in abundance and drinking songs too (several commemorate parties which appear to have taken place alfresco at dawn), but as well as these there are poems dealing with such objects as a thimble, a radish, a stolen penknife, and their treatment is fascinatingly polished and modern. Then there are some simple descriptions of nature which, if lifted bodily and placed in next week's *Country Life* over an English name, would ring so familiarly as hardly to cause comment, whereas others express such intricate emotion in complicated phraseology that their appeal would be more to the specialist.

Besides pleasure in the poems themselves, this book can be additionally interesting if the reader follows his own side lines of thought and comparison as he goes. For instance, some of these works, sophisticated and expert, were written in the tenth century when the early stirring of our own language had hardly taken literary shape. Such ideas as the raven being a bird of ill omen, beautifully pictured in a short thirteenth-century poem, are also interesting to note. Some 1,400 years earlier Plautinus mentioned this belief, and the English poet John Gay was expressing it 300 years after the Moorish writer.

It would be ill fitting for one who roams the foothills of Arabic to query much he who has attained the summit, but there are a few details of transliteration in this book which seem to border on the curious and inconsistent. The names "Abus Salt" and "Abur Rabi" are arrestingly odd spelt thus, but, having seen the point and accepted it, why then do we read "Al-Rusafi" and "Al-Sumaisir," written with no attempt at assimilation? Avenzoar, the quaintly Europeanized version of Ibn Zuhr, is admittedly well known, but would it not have been preferable in a book of this sort to have had his proper Arabic name at least alongside his other?

Professor Arberry has added short explanatory notes to a few of the poems. These are invariably helpful and one could wish for a few more, including perhaps a fact or two about the author. The poet from Manish is named 'Asa the Blind, which tells us something important about him, but was not Al-Tutili also blind? The carefree poems of the Sultan Al-Mu'tamid, for instance, would be more poignant to the reader did he know that this ruler ended his days in misery and exile. And would it not have been interesting to read, in connection with Ibn Quzman's humorous poem "The Radish," that he had been the first to take the wandering minstrel type of poem called "zajal" and make of it a literary excellence?

The dust cover shows a spirited scene in plainly Persian style, which sets an unanswered question. Why Persian? Does it represent the young Umayyad, Abdul Rahman's conquest of Spain in the eighth century? The turban-like objects on the banners makes one guess this. But it would be nice to know. A single line of print would have sufficed.

It is rather disappointing that more women's poems do not feature in this anthology, for Moorish Spain produced a quantity of female literary talent. The great Al-Waladah is not represented, though Ibn Zaidun, her lover, has three poems in the book. That, however, is a bone to pick with the departed Ibn Sa'id rather than with Professor Arberry, to whom many will feel most grateful for his opening up of yet another field previously closed to all but the most learned.

Some of the difficulty of his task can be gathered from a verse in this collection. Alluding to a king who died young, the poet says:

"Your life was of the order true
Of Arab eloquence.
The tale was brief, the words were few,
The meaning was immense."

M. E. ROWLATT.

Plant Hunter in Manipur. By F. Kingdon Ward. Jonathan Cape. 1952.
Pp. 254. Illustrated. 15s.

In his latest book the indefatigable Captain Kingdon Ward tells of a ten-month sojourn in the Naga Hills in Assam and what used to be the Native State of Manipur. During this period he and his wife made numerous short expeditions from their base in a *basha* at Ukhrul into the surrounding hills that were but little known in the botanical sense.

Although these journeys were often made under most unpleasant climatic conditions (rain, leeches and a host of devouring insects), the whole expedition as recounted in this charming book was "tame" when compared with those that have been described in his many previous books. However, it would seem that it was deliberately planned to "break in" Mrs. Kingdon Ward to more arduous and ambitious expeditions in the future!

As the title indicates, the book is mainly concerned with botanical discoveries, and, although the pages are amply larded with botanical names, it should appeal to general reader and botanist alike. As one has come to expect, the author's descriptions of incident, people and scenery are delightful, while the fact that much of the country described was the scene of fierce fighting and many gallant deeds when the Japanese attempt to invade India was defeated cannot but appeal to a wide section of the public. The mere mention of such names as Kohima, Imphal and Ukhrul stirs the heart with pride and in gratitude to those who "gave their tomorrow for our today," and lends an added romance to the whole tale.

Throughout the book there is ever-increasing evidence of the enthusiasm with which Mrs. Kingdon Ward entered into the pursuits and interests of her famous husband, and it is delightful to see how often and how generously she is given the credit for the successes achieved. Truly, as the dedication says, she appears to have "enjoyed every day of it."

To the botanist and gardener the descriptions of the many trees and flowers, with which our gardens have once again been enriched, are truly delightful. One may perhaps be permitted to doubt the justification for the enthusiasm with which the author compares his new lily, *Lilium Maclinea*, with such giants of the garden as *Lilium auratum* and *Lilium regale*!

If I have a criticism to offer, it is the perennial one of maps. At several points I found it difficult to follow the author's journey on the map provided.

The book is well illustrated with twelve of the author's own photographs, though personally I should have welcomed more pictures of the flowers described.

The last sentence of the story (p. 231) gives a most welcome indication that we may look forward to further stories of the achievements of this intrepid explorer.

D. L.

The Legacy of Persia. Edited by A. J. Arberry. Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. xvii + 421. 21s.

This is the tenth of the Legacy Series. It follows Greece, Rome, Egypt, Israel, Islam, India and the Middle Ages. As in its predecessors, we have a series of chapters, about thirty pages each, on every aspect of the conception, by real experts. While tuned on a high level with adequate material for scholars, most of these chapters are very readable for anyone interested in Persia. The evidence for the defence seems quite overwhelming, and it is hard to believe that this is the Persia of Haji Baba (1812) and Mussadeq of 1953. One would like to study what Morier would have said for the prosecution in 1812, or Sir Arnold Wilson, a lover of Persia but a realist, in 1930, when he compiled his Bibliography of Persia.

In this well-produced edition there are fifty-three excellent plates which do much to illuminate the letterpress. The thirteen chapters cover the Ancient World, Byzantine and Arab contacts, Persia and India after Mahmood, Persian Islamic Art, Religion, Language, Literature, Carpets, Gardens, Science as seen from the West, and old Persian tales—in all a judicious blending of the professional orientalist and the practical gardener or carpet lover.

Perhaps more than most publications one finds here the modern trend to view history as a useful study of humanities rather than the mere catalogues of dates, kings, battles and murders presented to us in earlier years. Ever-increasing research, archæological findings and keys to ancient scripts have released floods of information denied to our forefathers. These data enable us to take far more accurate and objective views of ancient life and times than they could ever achieve. Much remains to be done. History *does* repeat itself, as Napoleon proved from his narrow military angle, and the "Legacies" may increase in definite practical value as discovery proceeds.

Here the reviewer joins issue with the notice in *The Times Literary Supplement*, which concentrates on the angle of the general reader and deprecates Miss Sackville West being represented as spelling Hafiz with dots under the H and z. In a book referred to by students it is irksome to have to check correct spelling by consulting other authorities, when the offending dot detracts so little from the ordinary reader's enjoyment. Nor will every reader agree that Mr. Arberry has covered too wide a field in his chapters on Literature. Persian influence *did* cover a wide field, and still covers it in an ever-widening circle. It was the yeast leavening more material outlooks from Europe and Byzantium to India and even China. Arab thought in particular, though virile and expressive, gained much from Persian imagination and polish. In this connection the present writer, while studying for "honors" tests, discovered a curious and fundamental difference in the Persian and Semitic outlooks. On being presented with the English idea of the loved one's eyes shining like the sun on the limpid stream, the Persian, while satisfied with the metre and wording,

boggled at the idea. "No, Sahib, Sa'di never said that, Hafiz never said that. No, Sahib, you can't say it." Trying the same idea on the Arab years later, his eyes lighted up. "W'allah, W'allah, even Mutannabi never said that." Persian convention could only be defied by the Master. The Arab honoured those who used *new* words or phrases, which means, incidentally, a distressingly voluminous Arabic vocabulary.

A proper study of Persian literature is assisted by the *Legacy of Islam* volume in this series. The golden age of the Caliphs Harun and Mamun produced many writers of the calibre of the salacious Abu Nuwas, who instilled Persian life into the somewhat vapid Arab outlook, then largely based on nomadic life.

This collection of essays is a very satisfying vindication of our debt to Persia. Even if at times, such as the religious studies, one finds oneself in the stratosphere, even if there are omissions on Fire Worship, the overall picture is remarkably detailed and complete, a real feast for the lovers of Persia—and there are still many of them. They are a very lovable race, with all their faults. And, more than any other single factor, they helped to bridge the gulf between the culture of the Greeks and Romans and the European Renaissance, a culture which might well have been otherwise engulfed during the tragic years after Western civilization had been overrun by barbarians.

G. M. ROUTH.

Daybreak in China. By Basil Davidson. Jonathan Cape. 1953. Pp. 191. 10s. 6d.

When Messer Marco Polo in the thirteenth century wrote of his travels in Cathay he could, if he had wished, have got away with the most fantastic stories because there were few in those days who knew anything about that part of the world; but while it may perhaps now be almost as difficult for most people to enter China as it was for Polo, it does not follow that we are prepared to swallow any travellers' (or should it be fellow-travellers'?) tales, for the reason that there are now many thousands of people who have spent all their lives in one or other of the Far Eastern countries, and many more who may not have been there but know at least something of the truth.

One does not expect an impartial survey from one who went to China in the circumstances described, but an author should realize that he does not make his story more convincing by rewriting history and leaving out the most important facts to suit his theme. If, for instance, a journalist describing conditions in Korea were to put all the trouble down to "the corruption and incompetence of Syngman Rhee" and leave out all mention of the war that has raged up and down the country for the last three years, we would not put much faith in the rest of his writing. What, then, should we think of a book that purports to give a factual account of the situation in China and in the historical survey that precedes it omits all mention of the Japanese invasion and occupation of three-quarters of the country, including those parts containing most of its mineral and agricultural resources, and the cutting off of all means of communication with the outside world for upwards of a decade? Or seeks to ascribe all China's troubles to the fact that Chiang Kai Shek, "then [*i.e.*, in the nineteen-twenties] an important general in the service of the Kuomintang," turned his arms against the Communists instead of the War Lords, and makes no mention of the fact that before, during and after the fifteen years of the Sino-Japanese War the Communists never ceased to intrigue against the National Government (even when in the treaty of 1945 Russia had formally recognized it as the legitimate government of the country)?

It would be a mere waste of time to go into any detailed review of this book. Most of it is common form in Communist propaganda: the usual bugbears of Communism—landlords, priests, illiteracy and, of course, capitalists—are trotted out and forced into the picture, whether they belong or not; and we are told that all these problems and many others, such as industrialization or conservancy schemes—none of which were apparently dealt with before the advent of the Communists!—are being settled by the magic of a formula.

A more appropriate title for the book would be *False Dawn!*

A. G. N. O.

I Left My Roots in China. By Bernard Llewellyn. George Allen and Unwin. 1953. Pp. 175. 16s.

To come to this book after reading that reviewed above is like coming out of a tunnel full of sulphurous fumes into fresh air and sunlight. It is written by one who has obviously really seen and appreciated what is happening in China, or rather what was happening during the latter part of the war and the immediately post-war period, perhaps the least attractive time during the last half-century; it is not always a pretty picture that he draws—it is a portrait, “warts and all”—but he manages to convey the essential humanity of the Chinese and something of the reason why many others besides the writer feel that they have left their roots in China and would like to return there, but not until the present phase is over and China returns (as she surely will) to her true self.

A. G. N. O.

My Hill so Strong. By Jean Kingdon Ward. Jonathan Cape. 1952. Pp. 240. Illustrated. 15s.

Captain Kingdon Ward's recent book (*Plant Hunter in Manipur*) ends on a pleasantly anticipatory note: “Where next?” Now, in this book, Jean Kingdon Ward gives us the answer.

I must say at the outset that I was prejudiced in favour of the book from the moment that I read the dedication, at once so generous and so appropriate!

I was enthralled from beginning to end of this delightfully “readable” book. Mrs. Kingdon Ward tells the tale of a journey that was essentially a failure, and of the disaster which so nearly overtook her husband and herself. After the vivid description of a most uncomfortable journey, through the jungle-clad hills of far eastern Assam, to Rima just across the Tibetan border where they were yet only on the threshold of the country they had hoped to explore, the appalling earthquake comes almost as a fitting climax.

One who has never experienced the horrors of such a calamity cannot possibly appreciate to the full the feelings of those who have nearly been overwhelmed. However, the author is so happily endowed with the gift of vivid description that the reader is enabled to share, to a small degree, in the terrors of her remarkable experiences, and in the feeling of awful helplessness and uncertainty with which she and her husband must have faced the morning of August 16, 1950.

One can appreciate the disappointment when they realized that their hopes of ever reaching the alpine meadows (their real objective) in search of plants could never be realized. It is therefore all the more pleasant to read how they continued to pursue Captain Kingdon Ward's objective even when faced with disaster.

Throughout the book most generous tribute is paid to the help received from the Assam Rifles, and to the consideration and fortitude displayed by individual N.C.O.s and men of that justly famous corps of military police. It is no over-statement that to these qualities they probably owe the fact of their survival.

It is fortunate that the author had received some “training” under the conditions to be met with by an explorer, for on this occasion she was called upon to overcome both illness and semi-starvation in addition to more normal hazards. Despite this, she and her husband are now planning a further adventurous journey in the more or less unknown, and I look forward to reading her account of a truly successful expedition.

The book is well illustrated with photographs, and I would congratulate Mrs. Kingdon Ward on the excellent map, which helps one so much to follow the story of a remarkable journey.

D. L.

Blind White Fish in Persia. By Anthony Smith. George Allen and Unwin. Pp. 231, illustrated. 1953. 16s.

In 1951 four Oxford undergraduates visited Persia in pursuit of adventure under the guise of scientific study. The party, consisting of a zoologist, a chemist, a

geographer and a botanist, go to study their own subject in the villages of Kerman, lured by the legend they had heard that there were blind white fish in the qanats. The zoologist here gives us an account of their travels and experiences.

They were much surprised to find that they were automatically assumed to be spies, and considering that every foreigner in Persia is suspected of spying on behalf of one great power or another, this is hardly surprising.

Perhaps the most interesting parts of the book are the Foreword and the final chapter, in which the author sums up their impressions of the country, its extremes of wealth and poverty, its diseases, and its vast distances. They were struck by the contrast between the town-dweller and the country-man, both limited in their outlook by their own conditions of living, but the one displaying a veneer of education which showed itself in the recital of political slogans and clichés, and the other friendly, though probably disbelieving what he was told about England and the world outside.

The author and his friends seem to have set off with very little idea of what they were going to see and to have discarded as unduly prejudiced and conservative the advice and comments of those who knew the country and its people. Their neglect of the elementary principles of hygiene seems to have been all part of this attitude, and though Mr. Smith explains it away by saying that they would all have caught the germs they did, even if they had taken the normal precautions, this is hardly a valid excuse, since it is always worth while trying to reduce the risks of illness to a minimum. A further point of interest which added to their difficulties was their apparent inability to get on together with the smoothness that was such a feature of the Kon-Tiki expedition. They were, however, saved from the full effects of this by the fact that their different subjects entailed visits to different types of villages, and these separations gave them time to forget their disagreements.

The author being a zoologist, the main subject of the book is the qanats. He studied such life as he could find in them and sought to discover their origin by tracing the channels to their sources in the mountains. This resulted in his learning a great deal about the construction of the qanats and the men who built and maintained them. His account is full of interest, as he has probably travelled further along them than any other Englishman. Most of us who have seen these lines of craters stretching across the deserts of Persia or Baluchistan have contented ourselves with peering down the holes or watching the mugannis from the surface. Mr. Smith, however, made detailed plans and describes exactly how the system works and how the water is distributed. It is this that gives the book its value and justifies the expedition, whatever other results may have been achieved.

In addition, the author elaborates on their relations with the villagers and their efforts to be accepted as friends, problems of administration, carpet-making, and the opium trade, giving the reader an insight into life in Persia which is particularly illuminating.

The travellers' complete indifference to comfort enabled them to get to know and to live on equal terms with the villagers. They obviously enjoyed their relationship with the countryfolk and speak of them with humour and understanding. Altogether their story is one of how to live and travel hard, and, although it is possible that much they endured was due to inexperience and faulty planning, it is clear that they enjoyed themselves immensely and derived much value from their experiences.

The journey to and from Persia has been described many times, but Mr. Smith succeeds in impressing upon his account of it his own personality, and the light-hearted way in which he touches on the complications arising, as he says, from misplaced confidence makes it all amusing reading. Whether or not they achieved what they set out to do seems to matter little, since they clearly learnt much about Persia and its people and returned to England with the knowledge that they had at least spent their time in a most original way.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

Invitation to an Eastern Feast. By Austin Coates. Hutchinson. Pp. 270, illustrated. 1953. 21s.

The key to this book is found in the introduction, where the author describes his arrival in India and his first impressions of the country. He refers to his sensation of being a complete stranger amongst a strange people with an "unforgettable sense of loneliness and exclusion." This, he says, has driven generations of Europeans in Asia to seek companionship exclusively amongst themselves. These may have been his own feelings, but I cannot believe that they are those of the average Englishman arriving in India. Arriving in any country, especially one as vast and complex as India, is likely to engender a sense of loneliness, since everything is so very new and strange, and friends seem far away, but it is not peculiar only to the East, nor does it persist for long. It certainly is not the cause of the exclusiveness of Europeans, which is due to different reasons in different countries. In India it was encouraged by the development of the Victorian code of morals, which frowned upon the way of life existing in the early nineteenth century, and also by the tendency of the government to become more and more bureaucratic and to substitute paper for personal relationships. The result was the establishment of a caste outside the Hindu caste system.

Mr. Coates rightly deplores the racial exclusiveness, which we must remember existed on both sides and which gave rise to so much misunderstanding, and he set out to discover for himself how "ordinarily educated people in the East think and behave." That this was a difficult task his story shows, but he succeeded in his object and was accepted in Bengali households as one of the family. His outlook, however, was, ironically enough, thereby limited to Bengal and a certain class of Bengali. In other words he is an authority on one facet of the subject and leaves many others undescribed. There is, in addition, a suspicion of condescension towards the Englishman who made his life in India and the class of Indian with whom he largely had to deal, namely the peasants and the masses. One feels that the latter are of little importance, and admittedly Mr. Coates was seeking the "educated classes," but to many of us, whose happiest hours were spent in the villages of India, our sympathies and friendship are with the common man and country-dweller rather than with the sophisticated classes. Perhaps, however, the author is wise in his discrimination in view of present trends.

Accepting this, the reader will find much of interest, since after establishing himself and serving his apprenticeship in Bengal Mr. Coates travels to countries farther east, which he views through Bengali spectacles.

He explores the old city of Delhi with his Urdu teacher, sampling food and drink without discomfort, which he, like all of us, had been warned would follow such indiscretions, therefore being at one with India and again proving that in achieving knowledge and friendship of a nation food plays an important part. His graphic descriptions of Old Delhi and the Jama Masjid evoke many happy memories.

From Delhi he moves to Bengal, settling down to an intensive study of food, customs, habits, Indian cookery and the best way to enjoy it, and adopting the style of dress of his hosts, so as more easily to take part in their social life and to become one of them.

His chapter on religion, describing the social advantages of the caste system, namely the unity it gives to the members of the different castes who are otherwise separated by language and race, is especially interesting. He talks of Mr. Gandhi's efforts to bring about the abolition of untouchability, but rather appears to ignore the part played by the equalizing factors of modern civilization, which have resulted in the gradual breakdown of the caste system. Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Gandhi's campaigns were much more in the nature of attempts to accelerate a natural process already going on than the preaching of a new gospel. Without the conditions which exist today their efforts would almost certainly have resulted in failure. Mr. Coates deals with the Hindu pantheon and Kali in particular. It is, however, too vast a subject to cover in a few pages, and the reader is left with the impression that he is repeating what he has been told rather than putting into words the results of his own study.

The account of life in a Bengali household is delightful and the picture of village life nostalgic. Mr. Coates has probably as wide an experience as any Englishman

of how a middle-class Bengali family lives. His account of how a marriage is arranged is both illuminating and amusing. Here as always his touch is light and his approach both sympathetic and understanding.

It is significant that the first section of the chapter on Burma is headed "Burma through Indian Eyes," and Mr. Coates explains that whether he liked it or not he found that he was judging things in Burma by Indian standards.

He is deeply interested in the Hindu kingdoms of the East and the traces which they have left upon present-day life. His account of Burmese family life is illuminating, especially when he meets members of the Mon minority and discusses the problems which they have to face. He visits temples and villages and discusses problems as varied as the increase of crime amongst the religious communities and the disastrous effects of the Burman's passion for gambling.

Through Java he passes from the Indian sphere of influence to China and an entirely different world, again a stranger, and never succeeds in penetrating the barrier created by language and age-old prejudices and traditions. His account, however, is not the less interesting, and he contrasts the Chinese idea of how to entertain a European with the real thing. His description of meals and customs would be a useful guide to anyone visiting China for the first time and wishing to avoid the many pitfalls which beset a newcomer. His visits to monasteries and the comparison between the religious atmosphere in China and India make most interesting reading, as also does his description of Macao.

This is a book which any lover of the East will enjoy, even while disagreeing with some opinions and finding much that is elementary. Because of his enthusiasm his story will appeal to those who have no personal acquaintance with India and other Eastern countries and who wish to learn about the ways of life, with special emphasis on food, in that part of the world.

The book is well written, light and pleasant, and contains many good photographs. Despite the disadvantage referred to earlier of an outlook and experience limited in the main to Bengal, the author has succeeded in producing a work that will arouse and stimulate interest in India and its peoples.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

Afghanistan. A Study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia. By Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler. Oxford University Press. Pp. xiv + 348. Second edition, 1953. 25s.

This is an important book, as evidenced by the need for the new edition. Eighteen extra pages include notes on development from 1947 to 1952 and a short appendix on boundaries—"Where Three Empires Meet."

The first edition was very understandingly reviewed by R. R. M. in the R.C.A.S. JOURNAL of January, 1951, which conforms to the rule that reviews should be critical, readable and descriptive.

It could be emphasized that the outstanding value of this work is in the light thrown on the events of the last hundred years by one who was for many years a responsible observer on the spot and was thus able to sift effectively local evidence which had eluded previous historians. Lyautey's "grain of love" needed for a balanced view of a nation, as referred to by R. R. M. on the first edition, has illumined the whole "Border" problem as those who lived through it had hardly expected. These chapters, and the analysis of Past and Future in Part III, may prove of greater value to historians than any previous evidence.

The new chapter, 1947-1952, is concerned mainly with the present unhappy relations between Pakistan and her two neighbours. The author attributes the Kabul Government's claim for the formation of Pathanistan solely to the spontaneous resurrection of Afghan nationalist aspirations. But there is more to it than this. Sir G. Squire, with whom, in view of his more recent experience in Afghanistan, the reviewer has been in touch, considers that the project may well have been fostered in India. When, in 1947, a referendum was held in the North-West Frontier province on the question whether the province should be incorporated in the new India or in Pakistan, the Frontier Congress Party with great astuteness included the Afghan idea of an independent Pathanistan as a plank in its political

programme. The proposition found little support in the Frontier province, but it is not surprising that the Afghan Government should have been encouraged, first to press the proposal more vigorously in Karachi, and subsequently, after its rejection by the Pakistan Government, to make common cause with Indian irreconcilables and other elements seeking the disruption of Pakistan, even though such an objective had no place in the official programme of the Indian Government. The author recognizes the danger of the situation, a danger which is increased by the change of Prime Ministers in Kabul, recently announced.

One or two points of interest may be noted on "Lessons of History" (pp. 275 *et seq.*). The anopheles mosquito, for instance, may have had more effect on the history of Central and Southern Asia than any other single factor. Had Alexander had D.D.T. the Greeks might still be in India.

Denudation is another such factor: tree cutting, goats, wasteful use of land, but perhaps most of all deliberate destruction of personnel (Sir Percy Sykes, vol. I, p. 225)—*e.g.*, one and a half million in Herat by Chengiz in A.D. 1227, together with all supplies, irrigation and agriculture, "to remove any menace to Mongol communications."

The author has left earlier historical studies of the area to others. Sir Percy Sykes gives a comprehensive picture of these days, surveying our present limited data. There is room for a cameo on early Afghanistan as research uncovers more evidence on the spot. Meanwhile we are deeply grateful for the specialized knowledge here presented.

G. M. ROUTH.

Cities and Men. By Sir Harry Luke. Geoffrey Bles. Pp. 245, illustrated. 1953. 25s.

Sir Harry Luke started travelling early, and in this first volume of his autobiography, covering the years 1884-1914, he seems to have seen more than many of us succeed in doing in a lifetime. From his birth in Kensington to his visit to the Chelebi of Konia in 1914 he appears to have had the good fortune to meet people of interest and importance, and he is able to support his account of them with many amusing and illuminating anecdotes. His knowledge is wide and he has, wherever he has gone, taken a real interest in the history of the people of the country he was visiting, but his heart was early lost to Cyprus and the Near East, so that the fullest and most interesting sections of the book are those that deal with that part of the world.

Of necessity Sir Harry is telling us of a world that has long since vanished, and in this connection his description of Vienna in his childhood is of particular interest. It is clearly his Austrian forebears who have bequeathed to him his cosmopolitan outlook and his interest in the peoples of other countries. Perhaps, however, autobiography is not an exact description of this book, since, apart from an account of journeys and places visited by him, the author tells us very little about his own thoughts and reactions. What he really gives us is an anthology of stories and anecdotes about the places he has seen and the people he has met. There is, indeed, almost an atmosphere of the fireside and the traditional introduction to stories told around it, namely "that reminds me."

The author touches on many subjects from Leopard Men in Sierra Leone to the monasteries on Mount Athos and from life at Eton and Oxford to the history of the Dancing Dervishes, and with it all succeeds in making a book which will be enjoyed by many. The expert may find little new, but the general reader can hardly fail to be interested, since the author gives it all a personal tinge. The style is light and the anecdotes are well told, so that the book becomes a pleasant after-dinner companion. The author's subsequent career in the Colonial Civil Service and the hors-d'œuvre which he has provided in this first volume of his memoirs make one look forward to the issue of subsequent instalments. It is, indeed, perhaps significant that Sir Harry ends his book with some tales of Khoja Nasr ed-din, since, although one would not suggest that he possesses all the characteristics of that historic character, he can truly tell an interesting and amusing story.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

Tibet and the Tibetans. By Tsung-Lien Shen and Shen-Chi Liu. Stanford University Press, California. Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. x+199. 67 illustrations and 2 maps. \$5.00.

This is a book which nobody who is interested in Tibet and the Tibetan people can afford to miss.

Having placed the book in the hands of several intelligent general readers who had little or no previous knowledge of Tibet, my advice to other readers of the same kind would be to leave the first two parts of the book, which are rather stiff and somewhat over-full of unfamiliar words, until the last, and to plunge straight into the accounts of Tibetan Lamaism, the Government of the country, the daily life of the Tibetan people and the principal events of the yearly round in Lhasa. These are described with intimate knowledge and understanding, in excellently clear and easy language, and with an entire absence of the condescension and facetiousness which are apt to mar accounts of a people whose ways are in many respects not our ways. Having thus established touch with the people and their ideas, the general reader will be glad to turn back to Parts 1 and 2 which deal with the geography of the country and with its history as viewed from the Chinese angle, and to go on to read again the later parts of the book. The many illustrations are interesting and fit in well with the text, but it is a pity that the reproduction of the photographs is inferior, and not in keeping with the excellent print of the text.

For the reader who is already interested in Tibet much of the particular appeal of this book will be due to its authorship. This is all the more so in my case, because I had the privilege of getting to know the authors both as most welcome guests at the Residency in Sikkim when they were on their way to Lhasa, and afterwards in Lhasa where Dr. Shen was in charge of Chinese interests, with Mr. Shen-Chi Liu as his secretary. Educated at Harvard University and at the Sorbonne, and with long experience of teaching history to university students in Peking and Shanghai, Dr. Shen, as the representative in Tibet of the Chinese Nationalist Government in the days of the Chiang Kai Shek régime, was well equipped to approach the Tibetan question with a broad mind and with sympathy. Take it for all in all, the general trend of British policy for two hundred years in India and in countries which lie beyond the borders of India, and not least in regard to Tibet, was to help peoples to learn to govern themselves on their own lines and in consonance with their ancient traditions, while helping them to equip themselves to meet the impact of the modern world, thus repaying some of the debt which the West through many centuries has owed to the East. On the evidence of this book it can hardly be doubted, that, if the Chinese National Government had prevailed, and if Dr. Shen's ideas in regard to Tibet had prevailed with that Government, Tibet would have been allowed in large measure to continue to work out its own salvation on its own lines.

An appendix to the book contains a translation of the text of the agreement signed in Peking on May 23, 1951, between the Chinese Central People's (Communist) Government and the "Local Government" of Tibet "on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet." How much peace and liberty are in store for Tibet remains to be seen. Tibetans are taught by their religion to think of the future not in terms of today and tomorrow but of æons of time. Tibet, which as the authors show is the most religious country in the world, may yet have an important contribution to make in the development of Asia. Meanwhile, although the Tibetans are few in number, they have provoked the writing of yet another fine book in addition to the many which have already been written about Tibet and the Tibetans.

B. J. G.

Pamphlets received include :

- Missionaries and Imperialism*, being an account of mission work in the Arab world as a medium of cultural expansion and a preparation for political intervention. By Dr. Mustafa Khalidy and Dr. Omar A. Farrukh. *In Arabic*. Luzac. 1953. 12s. 6d.
- Welcome to Bahrain*. A complete illustrated guide for tourists and travellers. By James H. D. Belgrave. Luzac. 1953. 6s.
- The Colombo Plan*. Report for 1952 by the Council for Technical Co-operation. H.M.S.O. 1953. 6d.
- Japanese Communism*. An annotated bibliography of works in the Japanese language, with a Chronology, 1921-52. By Paul F. Langer and A. Roger Swearingen. Institute of Pacific Relations. 1953. \$2.50.
- Bibliography on South-western Asia*. By Henry Field. University of Miami Press. 1953.
- A Catalogue of Dictionaries, etc., in the Oriental Languages and the Native Languages of Africa, the Americas, Oceania and the Antipodes*. Bailey Bros. and Swinfen. 1953.
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CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR,
ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL.

SIR,

In the January number of the Journal you publish two lectures by Professor Bentwich and H.E. Eliahu Elath which refer specifically to existing conditions in Israel.

Professor Bentwich, in the course of his lecture "Israel in 1952: Trial and Faith," stated: "The supreme need is for peace between Israel and the Arab States."

While Mr. Elath, in his lecture "Population Problems in Israel," also stated: "We are longing for peace in our own part of the world—such peace as will transform the present animosities and rivalries into co-operation and good neighbourly relations."

Sir, to those who are unaware of Zionist irrigation plans for the development of Israel these two statements sound eminently reasonable. But surely the two lecturers are well aware of the project known as the Hays scheme or "T.V.A. on the Jordan," now past the planning stage. This scheme envisages the diversion of two-thirds of the annual flow of the upper Jordan from its proper course to irrigate the Negeb. Professor Bentwich actually mentions this project in his lecture. They should be equally well aware that when this project is put into execution Lake Tiberias will in the course of time become a stagnant salt lake much reduced in area and the lower Jordan will be deprived of its rightful share of water to the detriment of the economy of Jordan and incidentally to the ruination of the many Arab cultivators now pumping from the river.

But it is an axiom accepted in irrigation circles throughout the world that all the water of a catchment should be at the disposal of users within the catchment, and that only water surplus to the catchment's needs may be diverted elsewhere. By any standard of water duty the annual discharge of the Jordan and its tributaries would not permit the diversion of water outside the basin.

Furthermore, a scheme is under consideration by the National Planning Board of the All-Israel Scheme to bring water from the Mediterranean to a power station north-west of Tiberias and then by canal skirting the lake to a point where it joins the lower Jordan. This water is then passed through other power stations along the course of the lower Jordan, the last being planned on the shore of the Dead Sea. Most of these power stations are sited in what is now Jordan territory.

Is it to be wondered, therefore, that these plans cause distrust in the minds of Israel's neighbours, and is it not also natural that they regard

these pious hopes for peace and good neighbourliness with scepticism when it is known that such calculated acts of aggression against the economy of Jordan are being executed and planned in Israel?

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

G. F. WALPOLE, C.B.E., F.R.I.C.S., B.A.I.

(Director of Irrigation and Water Power, Amman).